American opinion of the soviet/vatican struggle 1917-1933

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AMERICAN OPINION
OF THE SOVIET/VATICAN STRUGGLE 1917-1933

BY

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B.A., Mercer University, 1982

THESIS

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PREFACE

The first sixteen years of the history of Soviet/Vatican relations represented one of the most profound ideological and political struggles of the twentieth century. Two powers were, perhaps, never more antithetical to one another than the Roman Catholic Church and the Soviet Union. The ramifications of the conflict affected not only the Russian Roman Catholic communities, but also the attitudes of various Roman Catholic communities throughout the world. It seemed that, wherever the specter of Communism loomed, the Church underwent a time of trial.

In America, the press' analysis of this awkward relationship greatly shaped opinion in virtually every church. It is fair to say that the ecumenical movement in the United States grew because of the Soviet policy of religious persecution. Many American clergymen equated the spread of Communism with the anti-Christ. A host of American newspapers and periodicals kept before the public the vision of a dangerous, atheistic government bent on the destruction of the civilized West.
When examining the American press' assessment of the Soviet/Vatican struggle, it is important to look at both the religious and secular press. The questions this study will raise include three points. First, how did the American Catholic press' coverage and analysis of events compare to that of the American secular press? Secondly, how accurate were both institutions in their facts and judgments? Finally, what changes occurred in American society because of the overall coverage?

Representing the American Catholic press, this study will use as its core three distinguished periodicals: *America*, *Catholic World*, and *Commonweal*. These publications were significant because they reported international events and issues. They also provided the Vatican's views on Church/State relations.

Representing the American secular press, reports from periodical digests, such as *Literary Digest* and *Review of Reviews*, will be used. Each published articles concerning the struggle, and each offered a critical appraisal of events from various American and European newspapers. They also had a national circulation.

Commentary from the American secular press will also include assessments from *Nation* and *The New Republic*. Source material from American newspapers will be limited
to three: the Chicago Tribune, the New York Times, and the San Francisco Chronicle. These publications each have important aspects for this study, but their commentary will be limited mostly to the Petrograd Catholic clergy trial of March 1923.

Because of the length of time from 1917 to 1933, this study will concentrate on the seven events that characterized the Soviet/Vatican conflict in the American press. These events include: the two Russian revolutions of 1917, the Genoa conference of 1922, the Petrograd Catholic clergy trial in 1923, the Papal famine relief mission to Russia from 1921-1924, the Vatican’s prayer crusade in 1930, and the recognition of the Soviet Union by the United States in 1933.

Scholarly sources, in English or in translation, will be used to clarify events that were left unreported or poorly defined. As an overall guide to Soviet/Vatican relations for this period, a copy of Hansjakob Stehle’s Eastern Politics of the Vatican 1917-1981 (1981) is recommended.
CHAPTER I
THE MARCH REVOLUTION OF 1917

Far from being a central issue in the American press' coverage of the first Russian revolution of 1917, the condition of religion was little reported. This neglect was not a result of apathy. Rather, it resulted from the Russian Provisional Government's proclamation of liberty of conscience and religion. Most articles in the American press concentrated on basically two questions when reviewing the religious consequences of the revolution. First, how would the separation of Church and State affect the Russian Orthodox Church, and secondly, what status would minority religions have in post-tsarist Russia?

From March to November 1917, four articles appeared in the American secular press which assessed the condition of religion in Russia. The first article, published 12 May 1917 in the Literary Digest, characterized the separation of Church and State in Russia as a positive development. Commentary provided by Dr. William T. Ellis (1873-1950), a long-time resident of Petrograd and a reporter on religion for the Boston Transcript, held that the rejuvenation of
both scholarly and socially conscious programs within the Orthodox Church seemed assured. To underscore his assessment, Ellis called the Holy Synod's decision to convoke a General Council and elect a patriarch an "event of promising historical significance."¹

Further optimistic assessment on the revival of the Russian Orthodox Church came from an article in the Independent. On 1 September 1917, it printed an article titled, "Russian Reformation."² It duly reported the meeting of the General Council and the bishops' choice of Metropolitan Tikhon of Moscow (1865-1925) as Patriarch. The article approved the Council's choice and the status as a primus inter pares for Tikhon which made his condition similar to the Anglican and Lutheran Churches' bishops.

Another article, appearing in Current Opinion, offered some positive commentary, but it also noted how the previous August General Council of the Russian Orthodox Church failed to provide a consensus. In early November 1917, the article titled, "Russia Looking For Spiritual Guidance," reported the overflowing crowds in churches throughout Moscow.³ Because of the strains of the Eastern Front war effort, noted the article, many sought consolation in the churches. The final analysis, however, suggested a lack of spiritual leadership.
The last article appearing in the American secular press also noted the Orthodox Church's leadership void. In the *Review of Reviews*, an article appeared in November 1917 titled, "The Holy See And The Russian Revolution." Offering analysis from a French article in the *Revue de Paris* by Charles Loiseau, the *Review of Reviews*' suggestion concluded that the March revolution of 1917 in Russia created a favorable climate for reunion between the Roman Catholic Church and the various Slavic Greek Orthodox churches in Eastern Europe. The final analysis surmised that:

The Russians, Rumanians, and Serbs of the Greek Church find their destinies linked with the great Roman Catholic countries; and it may be presaged that the bonds now formed in the various walks of life will survive the war.

Overall, the assessments given by the American secular press detailed accurately events and issues on the condition of religion in Russia. The commentaries reporting the status of minority religions in Russia after the March revolution were uniform. Jews, Moslems, Protestants, and Roman Catholics were reportedly free from the restrictive Russian civil authority. Thus, the American secular press portrayed the era of the Provisional Government as a time when the policies of religious discrimination and persecution had ended.
Unlike the enthusiastic reviews in the American secular press, the American Protestant periodical, Missionary Review of the World, offered a more cautious assessment on the condition of religion in Russia. From May to August 1917, it published three articles with critical commentary. Overall, it provided the best understanding of an American periodical or journal on the significance of the March revolution regarding religious liberty.

In its first article titled, "Russia on the Threshold of - What?," the commentary provided suggested that the fluctuating military conditions on the Eastern Front and the precarious existence of the Provisional Government offered a poor environment for the growth of Christianity in Russia. Historically, noted the writer, the Christian religion prospered in its infancy in a large part due to the stable conditions of the Pax Romana of the Roman Empire. The volatile situation in Russia, furthermore, favored not the traditions of Christianity but rather revolutionary elements which were mostly anti-clerical and atheistic. Only political stability and peace, concluded the writer, would aid the strengthening of Christianity in Russia.\(^6\)
The second article also came in the May 1917 issue. It offered ten pages of events in Russia from March to May 1917. Basically, it approved the separation of Church and State. It also praised the movement to call a General Council in the Orthodox Church for the month of August that year, and it favored the restoration of the office of the patriarch. Nevertheless, the writer believed that there were serious obstacles to religious growth.

The Russian peasants, he concluded, were illiterate, and their religious practices bordered on superstition. Furthermore, the Orthodox clergy was inadequately trained, and the higher ecclesiastics were often little more than civil bureaucrats. There was also no social agenda envisioned by the Orthodox Church when the revolution occurred, and many clergymen favored the return of the Tsar. Overall, noted the writer, a religious revival in Russia would be difficult to enact if the Orthodox clergy were relied on to lead it.7

The one hope for a religious revival came from fellow Protestant churches which could send missionaries to Russia, the writer commented. Indeed, Baptists, Methodists and Quakers already had members in the American Red Cross Mission in Russia. With the declaration of religious freedom granted by the Provisional
Government, the writer concluded that these churches could expand their members to include proselytizing.\(^8\)

The third and final article came in August 1917. Titled, "New Opportunities in Russia," it offered a more positive forecast on the revival of Christianity after examining the General Council's convocation. The writer believed that the replacement of many Russian Orthodox bishops demonstrated a course toward independence from the civil government's tutelage. No longer acquiescent to rigid state control, the religious press also flourished. The official organ of the Holy Synod, *The Ecclesiastical News*, became transformed into a daily paper called *The Ecclesiastical and Social Messenger of All Russia*. In its renamed form, the restrictive and narrow Orthodox tenets under Tsarism gave way to religious debate. The Orthodox Church, concluded the writer, seemed prepared to lead itself by consensus and not rely on the force of civil authority.\(^9\)

In summary, the articles in the American secular press and in the *Missionary Review of the World* stated that the separation of Church and State was beneficial. The March revolution became a symbol in the American press whereby the Orthodox Church was freed from civil authority, and the toleration of other creeds began. Jews, Moslems and Roman Catholics enjoyed freedom from
state sponsored persecution. Undoubtedly, concluded some commentators, American missionary activity would increase in Russia, notably among the Protestant churches.

The Vatican's view of the March revolution was likewise optimistic but publicly more cautious. The *New York Times* printed the Holy See's official reaction without commentary. Articles in the American Catholic press provided substantial assessment on the Vatican's attitude. The two positive developments noted from the revolution, offered in the American Catholic press' analysis, were political and religious freedom. First, the fall of the Tsar and the separation of Church and State meant that the regulation of the Roman Catholic Church by the Imperial Ministry of Heterodox Religions was over. Secondly, the Pope could name his own bishops, restructure the dioceses and establish religious education programs.

The first article concerning the March revolution appeared in the Jesuit periodical, *America*. An editorial published on 14 April 1917 titled, "Russia and the Imprisoned Archbishop," demanded the release of Archbishop Andrew Sheptyckii (1865-1944). He was the leader of the Uniat Church in the Austro-Hungarian Empire with jurisdiction over the Ukraine. The articles' commentary stated further that:
If the new Government in Russia is to command the respect of the world, it must grant to its people not merely civil independence but the right to embrace and propagate the true religion (Roman Catholicism). 11

The first demand the Provisional Government granted, and Archbishop Sheptyckii traveled immediately after his release to Petrograd to organize an Eastern rite church in Russia loyal to Rome. The second demand was also answered quickly. Negotiations between the Provisional Government and the Roman Catholic Church actually began in March 1917. Bishop Edward von der Ropp (1851-1939) of Vilno and Auxiliary Bishop John Cieplak (1857-1926) of Mogilev represented the Catholic Church's interests. Along with several other members of the Commission for the Liquidation of the Affairs of the Polish Kingdom, they concluded an agreement with the Provisional Government which permitted, among other things, the right to proselytize in Russia. Not until 1960, however, did the substance of these negotiations become published.12

Another article in America praised the Archbishop's release. The commentary also noted how the Catholic Church could utilize the Pan-Slav movement with Sheptyckii as the negotiator. It appeared in the article's assessment that the Archbishop's release meant he could begin contacts with the various Eastern Orthodox
churches since these churches followed the same ancient Greek ceremonies that Sheptyckii's Uniat Church used.13

The most knowledgeable Catholic spokesman on the Eastern churches was the Italian Agustinian priest, the Reverend Aurelio Palmieri (1870-1926). He wrote an article for the Catholic World, in August 1917, assessing the impact of the March revolution on the expansion of Catholicism. Palmieri concluded that the greatest religious challenge from the revolution was that the Russian intelligentsia was free from the rigid doctrines of the Orthodox Church.

It was in this group, the intelligentsia, that Palmieri noted a bitter anti-Christian attitude. Because many of the political parties in Russia in 1917 were led by this atheistic intelligentsia, Palmieri stated that the Roman Catholic Church needed to act with circumspection in the anti-religious atmosphere. He understood that the revolutionary character of the various Russian political parties meant that unencumbered religious freedom would not benignly follow the March revolution.14

In September 1917, Palmieri wrote another article for the Catholic World. He seemed more optimistic and noted that the convocation of the General Council of the Orthodox Church would help to further a dialogue
between the Vatican and the Russian Orthodox hierarchy. Reorganizing the Orthodox Church, Palmieri asserted, encouraged reunion. He praised the Orthodox clergy for convening their General Council that August for the first time in almost two hundred years. In a purely religious atmosphere, Palmieri concluded, the Vatican had an opportunity to stress the common bonds of Christian beliefs and practices between Russian Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism.15

Speculation on reunion also came from an article in America on 1 September 1917. Titled, "New Russian Nationalities," the writer surveyed the various ethnic groups in Russia likely to embrace Papal authority. The analysis held that Lithuanians, Poles and Ukrainians would be receptive to the Vatican's direction.16 Moreover, held the assessment, the Ruthenians of the Uniat Church in the Ukraine would benefit by Sheptyckii's release. Throughout World War I, the persecution of the Ruthenians received wide coverage in the American Catholic press.17 In September 1917, their suffering was over, and they were valued assets for the Vatican's plan to convert the Russian Orthodox.

In conclusion, the American Catholic press examined the consequences for religion in Russia from the March revolution and rendered an optimistic verdict.
Appraisals on the condition of the Orthodox Church were sound and insightful. Likewise assessments on the prospects for expanding Catholicism were also realistic. As an erudite scholar on Eastern Orthodoxy, Rev. Palmieri provided excellent and informed commentary for the American Catholic press.

In November 1917, when the Bolsheviks seized power, an article in America called the act a usurpation of authority. The appraisal depicted the Bolsheviks as radical revolutionaries who would not last in power. Their action, however, placed religious liberty in a precarious state, noted the commentary. Conclusively, though, the article noted that collapse of the Bolshevik government seemed certain.18

As far as the second revolution in 1917, most observers in the American press, both secular and Catholic, withheld their commentary until a more stable picture of civil order emerged in Russia. Since virtually no one predicted the possibility of a Bolshevik revolution in 1917, there was little to report on the probable consequences for religious freedom in Russia. Not until February 1918, when Lenin proclaimed his constitution, did the American press report the substance of the Bolsheviks' policy on religion.
CHAPTER II

THE NOVEMBER REVOLUTION OF 1917

The American press' coverage of religious conditions under the Bolsheviks from November 1917 to November 1921 was sporadic. News from Russia was difficult to obtain, and an influential source, the growing Russian émigré community in Riga and Warsaw, maintained little objectivity about the Bolsheviks. The émigrés' stories of persecution were usually discarded by American editors as too graphic. Further complications on gathering information came from the lack of American journalists in Petrograd. This absence existed because many foreign correspondents left Petrograd after the Bolsheviks signed a peace treaty with the Germans at Brest-Litovsk in March 1918. Most American journalists departed simply because their assignments were as war correspondents, and Russia was no longer among the Allies after March 1918. Not until the American/Soviet negotiations for a famine relief program in 1921 did Lenin's government permit a dozen American journalists to enter the Soviet Union.19

The lack of experienced reporters left the ensuing difficulties between the Bolsheviks and religious institutions largely unassessed in the American secular
press. Even Frazier Hunt, writing for the Chicago Tribune, who remained in Petrograd until 23 March 1919, failed to report the Bolsheviks' policy on religion. Most of the commentary in the American press did note, however, that the official decrees and the February 1918 Constitution affected primarily the Russian Orthodox Church. What the Bolshevik decrees meant for Catholics, Jews and Moslems rarely surfaced in the American secular press.

On 2 March 1918, the Literary Digest published an article which bemoaned the absence of reliable news on the growing confrontation between the Bolsheviks and the Orthodox clergy. Its commentary noted that the Russian Patriarch Tikhon, former head of the Russian Church in America, opposed Lenin's decrees on religion. The article also reported from the Rochester Post-Express newspaper that the Orthodox Church refused the sacraments to Bolshevik government officials. Furthermore, the Literary Digest article recounted the parallel of anticlericalism between the French revolution of 1789 and the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 which was noted in the San Antonio Light newspaper. Finally, the article carried an assessment offered by the Philadelphia Inquirer newspaper that the Bolsheviks were "oppressive and unjust" and that Lenin's government was "fatally
impolitic" against the Orthodox Church. Additional appraisal on the obscure transformation of religion in Russia came from Dr. William T. Ellis reporting from Petrograd in April 1918. He wrote articles for the Boston Transcript newspaper. The Literary Digest reprinted many of his articles in its own national edition. Ellis characterized the Bolsheviks as secularized Russian Jews who were unable to abate anti-Semitism caused by the speculation on food in Petrograd. He likewise portrayed the Orthodox clergy in an unflattering manner when he depicted the hierarchy as "ecclesiastics rather than Prophets." Ellis reproached them for remaining silent on the social struggle. Conclusively, he saw a polarization of Church and State power. His summation was that:

There exists a fundamental antagonism between Bolshevism and ecclesiasticism. Eminent leaders of the (Russian Orthodox) Church are utterly opposed to the new political leaders, and the sentiment is heartily reciprocated. There is no cooperation for a common social or national goal.

This antagonism became a state sponsored terror against the Orthodox Church. The American secular press offered few details on the nature of the persecution. In a letter dated 10 April 1919, Robert Crozier Long writing for the New York Evening Post cited the failure of the Orthodox Church to aid the peasants to get land. The hierarchy including many leading bishops, he claimed,
gave no direction, and many of its members were charged as counterrevolutionaries by the Bolsheviks.22

Further commentary in the American secular press noted the West's failure to raise moral objections to the Bolsheviks persecution acts that were known. On 13 December 1919, the Literary Digest carried a report from the London Times newspaper written by Paul Dukes (1889-1967) a long-time resident of Petrograd. His article titled, "Going to Church in Russia," told that the Bolshevik press ridiculed religious worship as a superstitious practice. Despite the flagrant anti-religious campaign in the Bolshevik press, Dukes noted that the Petrograd churches on Easter Sunday in 1919 overflowed with worshipers. The populace, though deprived of a vital Orthodox leadership, clung to their faith, ascertained Dukes.23

By 1920, the American secular press noted that the Bolshevik terror against the Orthodox clergy had its effects. An article titled "Bolshevism Out to Abolish 'God," from the Literary Digest on 17 January 1920, reported that Bolshevik demands for the end of the veneration of relics was partially successful. Many saints' remains were examined and exposed as merely animal bones. Religious icons, after scientific examination disproved their authenticity, were destroyed. The Bolsheviks further converted large Orthodox churches into museums.
with anti-religious exhibits, thus hoping to sway the masses away from the clergy's influence. 24

Overall, the American secular press characterized the Orthodox Church as an institution in turmoil. The clergy were the victims of the state sponsored persecution. Charges of counterrevolutionary activity were brought against the hierarchy. Its members were seriously divided over the social struggle from the Bolshevik revolution. Conclusively, however, the American secular press claimed that despite the terror and subjugation of the Orthodox Church, the peasant masses retained their faith. 25

The American Protestant periodical, the Missionary Review of the World, had little difficulty in accusing the Bolsheviks of persecution. The commentary offered noted that the social struggle was too vehement to allow for a Church/State dialogue. Conclusively, this periodical held that the Russian civil war would have to end before the Bolsheviks and the Orthodox clergy could create a modus vivendi. 26

Furthermore, the Missionary Review of the World noted that few who opposed the Bolsheviks could escape the charge of being a counterrevolutionary. The hierarchy clearly opposed the confiscation of Church property and the abolishment of the clergy's stipends. Although
some clergy reportedly offered compromise, most complained of the systematic destruction of churches and the suppression of the religious press.\textsuperscript{27}

The American Catholic press characterized the Bolshevik revolution in terms of both alarm and satisfaction. These divergent assessments occurred as Catholic commentators were repelled at the violence done to the Orthodox Church, yet saw in this persecution an opportunity to expand Catholicism in Russia. The destruction of the former state church left a void, a void that the Vatican wished to fill by promoting the cause of reunion with the Orthodox. The first article in the American Catholic press on Lenin's constitution and its significance for religion in the Bolshevik controlled areas appeared in \textit{America} on 16 February 1918. The divergent assessments, alarm and satisfaction were evident in the commentary.

The article noted that, although Lenin proclaimed separation of Church and State, this act affected the Orthodox Church. Furthermore, even though ecclesiastical property was nationalized, religious societies, reported the article, continued to use church property for services with the government's permission. Charitable orders continued their work under the Commissioners of Public Charities. Salaries from the government, however,
would end for all clergy on 1 March 1918. The article depicted these acts as a blow to the Orthodox, but acts mainly of economic necessity.28

By June 1918, another article published in America reported on the calls for Allied intervention in the Russian civil war. The periodical's position was that of the Vatican's, strict neutrality by the Catholic Church. The only interest for Catholics was the revolt of the Czech troops along the Siberian railway. The periodical supported the safe passage from Russia for these Catholic Czech troops.29

Greater alarm appeared in September 1918 in an article in America which concluded that the Bolsheviks were merely German agents. The basis for this claim arose when the Committee of Public Information received from its representative in Russia, Edgar Sisson, copies of secret documents outlining Germany's support for the Bolshevik cause. The commentary assessed that Lenin and Trotsky were German agents, that the Bolshevik revolution was financed by Germany, and that the Brest-Litovsk treaty betrayed the Russian people. Conclusively, the article contended that the Bolsheviks were not a Russian government but a German surrogate.30
Further bleak predictions from the American Catholic press came in another America article on 7 September 1918. James Keeley, another representative of the Committee on Public Information reported the disastrous economic conditions in Russia. He predicted that the winter of 1918/1919 would make Russia "the world's most awful graveyard." Moreover, as disaster loomed, the masses turned toward religion to assuage their grief. In this instance, the article noted Robert Crozier Long's appraisal from the New York Evening Post that the religious revival the Bolsheviks equated with nationalism. The Catholic Church favored strengthening this national sentiment among the Lithuanians, Poles and Ukrainians. These groups became receptive to Rome's authority which the Bolsheviks distrusted.

The very next month, October 1918, America published an article depicting the successful expansion of Catholicism in Russia despite the turmoils there. The commentary noted that:

The Holy Father has appointed bishops for the six dioceses which the Czar suppressed. The Titular (bishop) of the new see of Minsk was recently consecrated at Warsaw and another bishopric will be founded in Siberia. The Ruthenians are reported to be returning in throngs to the Church, and numberless Russians of all classes are becoming converts. So, not withstanding the destitution brought upon them by the suppression of endowments, the Catholic clergy are full of confidence and enthusiasm. The Soviets' attitude toward religious authorities is
said to be "consistently and irreproachably correct," a slightly preferential treatment indeed being shown the Catholic Church perhaps because the Orthodox clergy are suspected of holding reactionary opinions. Corpus Christi, it is reported, was publicly celebrated this year in Petrograd with great splendor.32

This article's assessment occurred along with reports of the Vatican's intercession on behalf of the Romanov family. In August 1918, Pope Benedict XV telegraphed his Nuncio in Warsaw, Achille Ratti (1857-1939) who later became Pope Pius XI (reign 1922-1939), in order to request information on the whereabouts of the former Tsarina Alexandra and her four daughters, Olga, Tatiana, Marie and Anastasia.

The Pope believed that they made various appeals for their release after the execution of the former Tsar, Nicholas II. Historians are uncertain as to whether the entire family perished by firing squad, or whether Nicholas II and his son were tried and executed separately. Benedict XV believed at the time that the former Tsarina and her daughters were alive and held hostage for a possible exchange for German Communists imprisoned by the Kaiser in early 1918.

An article appeared in August 1918 in the New York Times titled "Pope Will Aid Romanoffs."33 The plea expressed was simple; the Pope asked the Soviet government to release the ex-Tsarina and her family, and allow them to leave Russia. The Soviets answered the Pope's initial
request hurriedly but politely. Lenin himself had the Soviet Foreign Ministry telegraph the Vatican that he was unable to release the former Tsar's family because he lacked adequate communication with the forces holding them. The last article on the matter appeared in October. A report titled, "Reds Evasive To Pope," stated that news of a mob setting fire to the house where the royal family resided could not be confirmed or denied. In fact Lenin's government claimed no knowledge of even the whereabouts of their prisoners.

The outcome of this entire exchange was portrayed as a public relations disaster for the Soviets in the American secular press. The American Catholic press failed to comment on the Pope's effort. In their last communication to Benedict XV, the Soviets were rude and uncooperative, hardly the image revealed in America's judgement on the Soviets. The Pope appeared as a magnanimous ruler nonetheless in the American secular press as he offered asylum to his former political and religious antagonists. No doubt this good will gesture pleased the growing numbers of Russian émigrés in Europe too. Berlin, Paris and Warsaw contained many exiles who vociferously called for the West to overthrow Lenin's government.
This encounter demonstrated the Vatican's initial desire to contact the Soviets. Further political developments from the November 1917 revolution required greater Soviet/Vatican contact and communication. On 20 April 1919, Edward von der Ropp was imprisoned by the Soviets. As the Arcbishop of Mogilev since November 1917, he was the ecclesiastical head for the Roman Catholic Church in Russia. Lenin's government charged him with collaboration with the Polish government. His arrest coincided with General Joseph Pilsudski's invasion of the Soviet Union in order to wrest control of disputed Belorussian and Ukrainian territory. After mass demonstrations in Petrograd, the Soviets released Ropp who went into exile at Warsaw.

That the American press carried none of this information while it occurred is disquieting. The Vatican's unofficial newspaper, Osservatore Romano, carried Ropp's case, but the American journalists in Rome failed to cable their home offices. Even the veteran Vatican reporter, Thomas Morgan (1900-1954) remained silent.

Overall, the Vatican's silence on the religious difficulties in Russia was Benedict XV's policy. He hesitated to speak forcefully against the persecutions of the Orthodox Church, because of the fluid situation of Russian politics, and because of his concerns that
there might be reprisals against Roman Catholics in Soviet held areas. The only article in the American secular press to print the Pope's concern came in the New York Times. It published an article titled, "Assert Pope Warned of Bolshevist Danger," which reportedly came in a private consistory of cardinals. 36 This mild rebuke took aim mostly at the rise of socialism in Italy with the Communist movement in Europe mentioned as just one of the dangerous political challenges to the Church's existence.

By 1920 and 1921, the American Catholic press offered only positive assessments for Catholic prospects in the Soviet Union. An article in America on 20 August 1921, reflected the optimistic view. The commentary noted a religious void in Russia since the Soviet destruction of much of the Orthodox hierarchy. In this void, speculated the article, the masses might turn to the leadership of the Catholic Church. The two strong ecclesiastics, Archbishop Sheptyckii and Archbishop Ropp were quoted as believing that reunion had a chance in 1921. The only minor complication noted was the question of which rite to use to attract Russian converts, the Latin rite or the Eastern rite. 37

In conclusion, the American Catholic press portrayed the Vatican as willing to contact and negotiate on a limited basis with the Soviets. The excesses of
religious persecution against the Orthodox were viewed as tragic, but it was an area where the Catholic Church could do little to intercede other than by lower diplomatic contacts. Thus, from 1917 to 1921, the American Catholic press depicted Catholics in Russia as unscathed by the fury unleashed against the Orthodox Church.

It was significant that the American Catholic press also noted that large numbers of Poles left Russia during these years, thus removing millions of Catholics from Soviet dominated territory. The Baltic states also received their independence, thus further diminishing the numbers of the faithful under Petrograd's control. It was never mentioned directly in the American press, but the remaining Catholics in the Volga region, Siberia and the ancient Armenian Catholic Church in the Caucasus were too widely scattered or unorganized to offer much difficulty to Soviet authority. They were portrayed rather as groups of great potential for spreading the faith.

The Vatican seemed prepared, by all accounts in the American Catholic press in late 1921, to recognize the Soviets. They were the victors in the Russian civil war, and had signed a treaty with Poland. Thus, when the European Allied powers called for an economic conference at Genoa in the spring of 1922, the American Catholic
press gave increasing commentary that a modus vivendi between the Vatican and the Soviet Union was a distinct possibility. These predictions were sound, judging from the knowledge that the Soviet/Vatican negotiations over a Catholic famine relief mission were progressing. The American Catholic press, however, failed to assess the Soviet desire to erase all religion from the state.
CHAPTER III
THE GENOA CONFERENCE, 1922

The Genoa Conference occurred primarily for economic reasons. Europe remained seriously disabled from World War I. The Allied powers, especially England and France, were eager to remedy the chaotic market conditions and reestablish a stable currency exchange system. There were two important events which took place during the formal discussions. First, the Soviet Union made its debut as a member of the European community when Lenin's government, the victor in Russia's civil war, accepted an invitation to send a delegation. Secondly, the Weimar government in Germany and the Soviets concluded diplomatic relations at Rapallo thus uniting the two outcast nations of Europe.

From the viewpoint of the English and the French governments, the alliance proved unsettling. They came to Genoa to press the Soviets for payment of the Tsarist World War I debts and for some form of restitution on the nationalized property confiscated by Lenin's government. The pact proved further disquieting to the
Allies because the Germans and the Soviets put aside their claims against each other. This agreement was not the precedent the English and the French desired. In the American secular press, the business community supported the plans of the English and the French. Many industrial and financial concerns desired to establish plans for Allied payment of war debts and restitution for nationalized property. There was, however, no campaign to sponsor an American delegation to represent the United States' claims. President Warren G. Harding (1865-1923) remained aloof from British entreaties to send a delegation. Thus, the American secular press had little to report concerning the United States' involvement since no representation was forthcoming.

One of the most noticeable consequences of the Genoa Conference in the American secular press was the improved image of Lenin's government. Editorial opinion approved of the appearance and style of the Soviet Foreign Minister, George Chicherin (1872-1936). His attention to etiquette made the Bolsheviks seem part of the civilized West. The ruthlessness and brutality of the revolutionary days and the civil war became a part of the Soviet Union's past. The impression
Chicherin made with his cordial tone suggested that the excesses of the Bolsheviks, especially their agitation for world revolution, were over. As a result of this improved image, many American newspapers accepted the name Soviets over Bolsheviks and the Soviet Union over Russia. The acknowledgment of Lenin's victory became an accepted political fact, and the question of American recognition of the Soviets was raised in the secular press.

Like the Soviets' image, the American secular press surveyed the Vatican's stance at Genoa. Pope Pius XI (1857-1939) sent a delegation with instructions to negotiate the legal status of the Roman Catholic Church in the Soviet Union. Unlike the Soviets' decision to send a delegation, the Pope's action received wide and unflattering comment in the American secular press.

Accusations arose condemning the Vatican's goals in the Soviet Union. On 24 April 1922, an article published in The New York Times outlined the Holy See's policy toward the Soviets. The article's conclusion held that Pope Pius XI desired to conclude a concordat whereby the Vatican would recognize Lenin's government in exchange for unhindered religious freedom
for Roman Catholics in the Soviet Union. Because the Soviet/Vatican diplomatic contacts were conducted secretly, The New York Times offered a speculative analysis concerning the Vatican's motives for a concordat.38

The reconciliation between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Roman Catholic Church was the primary goal of the Holy See, noted The New York Times' assessment. The Soviets in return, for allowing Catholic and Orthodox free association and possible union, would gain prestige by having an ambassador from the Vatican in Moscow. Furthermore, a concordat between Moscow and the Holy See would alter the attitude of the entire Catholic body politic in Europe. France, Germany, Italy and Spain had large Marxist parties which vied with Catholic Centrist parties for control of the government. A treaty between the Soviets and the Church, held The New York Times, would neutralize the influence of these Catholic parties.

Although sound in its political judgements, the article was inaccurate concerning the Vatican's religious policy toward the Soviets. For example, the newspaper claimed that, when Pius XI was 'Archbishop of Poland', he suppressed the 'Greek Orthodox Church' in the Belorussian
and Ukrainian territories won by the Polish General, Joseph Pilsudski (1867-1935), in 1921. The article further declared that the reconciliation movement, between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Roman Catholic Church, had momentum prior to 1917 among the masses but that talk of reunion was quiescent in 1921.

As for the first assertion, there was never any hierarchical position as the 'Archbishop of Poland.' Achille Ratti's title was Papal Nuncio to Poland. He held the rank of an Archbishop, but the article misrepresented his jurisdiction. As Nuncio, he restructured Poland's dioceses along territorial boundaries which fluctuated rapidly after the conclusion of the Versailles Treaty in 1919. The suppression of the Russian, not 'Greek,' Orthodox Church in Poland's Belorussian and Ukrainian territories came from secular Polish authorities. Religious coercion was not part of Ratti's design. The article also failed to note that Ratti was no longer in Poland in 1921 when General Pilsudski consolidated his claim on the Belorussian and Ukrainian areas.

The timing of the second assertion in The New York Times' article was also faulty. The year 1917 was the same year when many Orthodox converts freely joined the Roman Catholic Church in Russia especially in Petrograd.
Prior to 1917, Tsarist decrees made conversion a criminal act. Only briefly in 1905, did the Russian Imperial government permit conversion. Approximately 200,000 people in the Ukraine changed their registration from the state Russian Orthodox Church to the Uniat Church loyal to Rome. This seemingly liberal policy was a result of the 1905 revolution in Russia. When Tsar Nicholas II sufficiently regained control, he issued subsequent decrees which rescinded the free conversion policy.

The most penetrating analysis of the Vatican's political motives offered in the American secular press came from the *New Republic*, a progressive periodical. The author of the article, M. Beilinson, criticized the Holy See as an opportunistic power. He assessed that the collapse of Tsarist Russia radically changed the political situation in Eastern Europe. The end of the Russian monarchy proved beneficial to the expansion of Catholicism which Beilinson characterized derogatorily as "Catholic Imperialism." Indeed, he saw that the weakened Russian Orthodox Church, the creation of a Polish state, the post World War I freedom of activity in the Russian border states, especially in the three Baltic countries, and the steady decline of the Greek
Orthodox Church in Western Asia all represented opportunities for the Vatican.40

Diplomatically, Beilinson recounted the benefits that the Vatican reaped from World War I suggesting that the Catholic Church gained from the conflict unwarranted concessions. France signed an agreement with the Holy See, and the Italians negotiated a concordat. The British had a representative at the Vatican, and the London government supported the Pope's interests at the Genoa Conference. As these negotiations between the Holy See and the various secular European governments progressed, the Vatican clarified and strengthened the Roman Catholic Church's legal status.

Despite Beilinson's criticisms, he grudgingly admired the Vatican's diplomatic timing. He described Pope Benedict XV (reign 1914-1922) as a master of diplomacy who chose wisely not to compromise the Catholic Church during the Russian civil war by making contact with the various White Guard factions. The one enticing opportunity to expand Catholicism arose, noted Beilinson, when the Petliura government in the Ukraine, which existed briefly in 1919, sent an embassy to the Pope. Benedict XV responded by sending to the Ukraine a Catholic mission, but before it reached the country, the Bolshevik army re-occupied the territory. The Vatican mission halted in
Poland and eventually returned to Rome.

Concerning the Vatican's intentions at Genoa, Beilinson believed that the rumors of negotiations for a concordat between the Holy See and the Kremlin were true. He declared that Pope Pius XI's attitude revealed a great deal in this matter. Beilinson noted that on 7 April 1922, Pius XI sent an open letter to Archbishop Signori of Genoa wishing the conference success. Russia received mention in the letter. On 29 April 1922, Pope Pius XI sent a second letter this time to Cardinal Gasparri (1852-1934) the Vatican Secretary of State from 13 October 1914 to 7 February 1930. Gasparri was the architect behind many of the Vatican's concordats, thus Beilinson noted that important terms must have arisen.

In this second letter, however, the Pope lamented that no immediate results came from Genoa. Mgr. Giuseppe Pizzardo (1877-1970) went to Genoa on the Vatican's behalf with the Church's property claims against the Soviets, but the Allies informed him that they had already negotiated the return of foreign property without results.

Beilinson's assessment was sound because the Vatican and the Soviets had concluded an agreement at Genoa. Cardinal Gasparri and the Soviet representative to Italy, Vaclav Vorovski (1871-1923), who was murdered
10 May 1923 in Lausanne, Switzerland by a counterrevolutionary, concluded a pact limited to approving the Papal Famine Relief Mission to Russia. The Osservatore Romano, the Vatican's unofficial newspaper, confirmed this agreement, but the document was not published until Hansjakob Stehle (1927- ), a West German scholar and journalist, printed the text in one of his appendices in his first German edition in 1977 in a study detailing the Eastern diplomacy of the Vatican.

Although the agreement concerned only humanitarian aid by the Vatican, Beilinson maintained that the agreement represented an entente cordiale between the Holy See and the Soviets. His overall appraisal on the negotiations was harsh on both the Soviets and the Vatican. He viewed both powers as exploiters who wished to gain at the expense of the weakened Russian Orthodox Church. The very fact that Beilinson referred to the Holy See as the 'Black International' and to the Soviets as the 'Red International' in the article's title revealed his distaste for both powers.

The questions, who was M. Beilinson and what were his or her qualifications when commenting on the Soviet/Vatican struggle, have yet to be answered. Although biographical material, especially education and journalism
experience are unknown, the reporting of events was accurate in the article. Furthermore, the tone of the article represented a mild form of anti-Catholic sentiment which prevailed in the American secular press during the 1920's. Beilinson's conclusions on the Soviets' and the Holy See's motives were skeptical because the author did not subscribe to either's claim that they represented some form of ultimate religious or scientific truth. Thus, Beilinson presented in the article a fairly common theme in the American secular press, namely, that both powers sought a worldwide following based on exclusiveness.

A defense for the Vatican's negotiating with the Soviets at Genoa appeared in the American Catholic press. The Reverend Aurelio Palmieri defined the Holy See's policy in an article for the Catholic World. The reasons for Benedict XV's and Pius XI's contacts with the Soviets, stated Palmieri, were numerous. He admitted to Catholic plans for expansion in the Soviet Union, but he characterized it as "fruitful apostleship" rather than as imperialism. Moreover, he maintained that, when Pius XI took office in February 1922, the Pope wished to extend to the Russian Orthodox the idea of ecclesiastical unity. The schism between Eastern Orthodox and Roman Catholic need last no longer with Tsarism gone.41
Furthermore, Palmieri portrayed the Vatican's activities on behalf of the Orthodox Russians since the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 as sincere efforts. Indeed, Benedict XV acknowledged the persecution of the Russian Orthodox clergy, and he interceded with the Soviets on their behalf. He also collected funds for Russian émigrés. Pope Pius XI continued his predecessor's work and expanded it.

Pius XI continued Benedict XV's plan to send a relief mission to the Soviet Union as part of the international effort to end the famine. He also meant to expand the scope of the mission to include the Volga region. Despite these charitable works, the émigré press in Europe disavowed the Vatican's rapprochement with the Soviets. Some Russian émigrés claimed, like Beilinson, that Pius XI aimed to take advantage of the Soviets' persecution of the Orthodox Church. Specifically, the émigrés press accused the Vatican of seeking to extend its authority by sending Jesuits into Russia with food while proselytizing among the Orthodox.

The various charges raised by the émigré press Palmieri refuted on a case by case basis. The noted Russian novelist and literary critic Demetrius Merezhovski (1865-1941) printed one of the first articles in the
European émigrés press attacking the Vatican's negotiations with the Soviets. In the Russian émigrés paper in Paris, Poslednie Novosti, Merezhovski noted:

the reunion of churches has long since been the yearning of the prophetic spirits of Russia ... The universal pastor, the one flock - this is our hope, our faith, our love ... but this reunion could not take place if the Vatican made a concordat with the international gang who call themselves the Soviets of Russia.42

In Berlin, the reaction of the Russian émigré press was similar to the reaction in Paris. An article in Rul on 14 May 1922 stated:

the Vatican hopes by condescension to pave the way to the reunion of churches. The Vatican hopes to quench the thirst for faith of Russian souls, but that thirst cannot be quenched by any agreement with the persecutors.43

The Serbian Orthodox Church in Yugoslavia likewise represented the Vatican's policy of reconciliation with the Soviets. On 1 June 1922, an article appeared in Samouprava, the official organ of the Serbian Church. It concluded:

that by means of a treaty stipulated between the Holy See and the Soviets, the Pope and the Jesuits have conquered an unlimited right to spread Catholicism within Bolshevist Russia, and to increase the influence of the Roman Church.44

The article continued with the news that the Serbian Patriarch and his hierarchy protested what they saw as a Catholic invasion of Russia. They issued an
appeal to the Patriarch of Constantinople (Istanbul). Their final statement claimed that the 'corrupted' West had no right in the East. The last article appearing in the European émigré press was in another Serbian paper, the Balkan. It charged that the "alleged concordat between the Holy See and Bolshevism is the greatest shame of the twentieth century".45

Because of this religious indignation in Europe, which the American secular press failed to comment upon, Palmieri offered an analysis of the Vatican's policies in order to mitigate the criticisms of the Russian émigrés press and the Eastern Orthodox Churches. His analysis was essential for the American Catholic press since the Holy See looked to the Catholic Church in the United States to provide funding for the Papal Famine Relief Mission to the Soviet Union. Unclarified intentions might leave Pius XI's designs at the mercy of his critics.

Palmieri began by noting that all Popes of the modern age followed a conservative and patient policy toward civil authorities. The Vatican was not unaffected by political changes, but the turmoils of nations would never change Church dogma. The hierarchical Church lived in close contact with secular authority, but it did not follow its vicissitudes. In no way, Palmieri reminded
his American audience, would the Roman Catholic Church depend on the political conditions of society to maintain its existence.

Moreover, Palmieri noted that while the Church remained independent of any political regime, exigencies of the hour made for necessary, and at times, sporadic relations. Conclusively, he held that the Church cannot make war upon political regimes which assumed power by violence. The Church may condemn them, but it retained the right to ask of them the necessary guarantees for the faithful. Thus, for the Vatican to negotiate with the Soviets, in order to mitigate some of the persecution of the faithful, was within the realm of its traditional jurisdiction. Palmieri concluded that reports of a formal concordat were premature. Too many political observers, he wrote, wanted to find a second Rapallo this time at the Vatican's expense.

Comparing Palmieri's analysis to Beilinson's and The New York Times', it is clear that the American secular press failed to note that, at Genoa, Pius XI continued Benedict XV's policy in regards to the Soviet Union. Although Pius XI appeared to chart a new policy, by dismissing the defunct Provisional Government's chargé d'affaires to the Vatican, Nicholas Boch (died 1962),
Benedict XV had already decided this action. Pius XI's desire to use food to win converts was also a continuation of the former Pope's policy which the American secular press failed to report.

Furthermore, the American secular press speculated that the Vatican and the Soviets, while at Genoa, were concluding a rapprochement because of the gains each saw in the famine. Reports appeared declaring that formal Vatican recognition of the Soviet government was imminent. Palmieri's lone voice in the American Catholic press warned that such judgments were incorrect, and that the Soviets' religious policy required significant Vatican concessions, concessions never historically granted to any secular government.

Owing to the impressions on Genoa offered in the American secular press, many Americans were unprepared to grasp the Soviet perspective, or the Vatican's, when the show trial of the Roman Catholic clergy from Petrograd convened in Moscow in March 1923. As far as the American secular press was concerned, the aftermath of Genoa meant acceptance if not recognition of the Soviet Union by the Holy See. The clash of wills in the 1923 show trial came as a complete reversal of the American secular press' assessment on the significance of the Soviet/Vatican agreement at the Genoa Conference.
CHAPTER IV

THE CATHOLIC CLERGY TRIAL, 1923

A comparison between the American secular press' coverage of the March 1923 Petrograd Catholic clergy trial and the American Catholic press' coverage reveals both similarities and differences. The consensus supported overwhelmingly by both institutions suggested that the Soviets aimed to persecute first the small Russian Roman Catholic Church, and then attack the larger Orthodox Church. A few voices, however, in the American secular press, dissented. They examined the Soviets' policy to make the Catholic clergy conform to civil decrees, and they saw no undue persecution. Their conclusions favored the sovereignty of Lenin's government against the prerogatives of the Roman Church.

Whatever side one supported, Soviet or the Catholic Church, the accuracy of trial reports and subsequent coverage on worldwide reaction was sound in the American press. Both the secular and Catholic press printed eyewitness accounts of the five day trial conducted from 21 March to 26. Both also followed international reaction and reported it accurately. From the tone and length of the coverage, it became clear that important ramifications loomed.
Of the seven events characterizing the Soviet/Vatican struggle in the American press, this trial held the most significance. When the Soviets issued the death sentence against some of the clergy, and when they executed Monsignor Constantine Budkiewicz (1867-1923) a canon at Saint Catherine's in Petrograd, the focus in the American press assessed the Soviets' religious policy more closely than when the Soviets were persecuting the Orthodox Church. Underlying tensions were reviewed, revealing a besieged Russian Roman Catholic Church. No longer, as in 1921, did any writer suggest in the American press that the Catholic Church was relatively safe from the Soviets' drive against organized religion.

One of the unique consequences in American reaction was the strengthening of ecumenism. Protestant and Jewish leaders joined in common cause with the Roman Catholic Church because they too shared the legacy of Soviet persecution. Indeed, the unity against the Communist movement crystalized in virtually every American church. Also, due in part to this professed antagonism, the American religious community helped delay the United States' recognition of the Soviet Union by ten years. While Catholic European countries recognized the Soviets, American politicians adhered to the views of
the religious community and withheld recognition. Thus, the trial had a negative impact on American/Soviet relations owing in large part to the reaction of the churches.

In the American secular press, the trial proceedings appeared in several eyewitness accounts. Francis McCullagh (1874-1956), a journalist for the New York Herald, published his account on 6 April 1923 which many American newspapers carried. As an Irish-Roman Catholic, who served in Russia during the Allied intervention as a British officer, and who was a prisoner of Bolshevik forces in Siberia in 1920, McCullagh excoriated the Soviets for conducting the trial. He considered the proceedings sacrilegious and a case of religious persecution. He correctly blamed Gregory Zinoviev (1883-1936) as the man behind the trial.

Zinoviev was the Party chairman in Petrograd, and he wanted the reluctant Catholic Church to conform with the Soviet decrees on religion. McCullagh berated his forcefulness as well as the behavior of the three Soviet judges and the public prosecutor, Nicholas Krylenko (1885-1938). Despite his apparent outrage, McCullagh reported the trial accurately and cited articles in Izvestia and Pravda and compared them with trial testimony. He lost his status as a journalist after the trial.
however, because of the Soviet threat to deport all American reporters if his credentials were not revoked.

Another eyewitness account in the American secular press came from the news service of the National Catholic Welfare Council on 21 May 1923. Reverend Edmund Walsh (1885-1956), the American Jesuit priest selected by Pope Pius XI to head the Papal famine relief mission to the Soviet Union, wrote the report. Along with McCullagh, Walsh, as the Papal representative, sat in the court room from the trial's first day to its close. His account appeared in the *New York Times* on 27 May 1923. Like McCullagh's account, Walsh also ridiculed Krylenko's style, claiming he was 'blood-thirsty' and 'inhuman.' These two accounts supported a survey of American newspaper editorials which revealed that the show trial failed to win sympathy for the Soviets. The trial was portrayed as an attack on religious freedom and not as a demonstration of the Soviets' sovereign right to regulate religious bodies in accordance with civil law.

Two newspapers with a substantial circulation, the *New York Times* and the *Chicago Tribune*, had foreign correspondents in Moscow during the trial. Walter Duranty (1884-1957), a noted English journalist and World War I correspondent, served as the *New York Times'*
reporter in the Soviet Union. His initial reports underestimated the impact the trial would create. Duranty, an admirer of the Communist movement, believed at the beginning of the trial that the Soviets would be lenient and would not issue any death sentences. He reported that only 150 people attended the court's first session; thus, the proceeding was likely to prove routine. The execution of Mgr. Budkiewicz and the mounting world reaction, however, changed Duranty's sporadic coverage. Overall, the New York Times published five editorials on the trial, each favoring the Petrograd clergy.

George Seldes (1890- ), an American citizen with Russian parents, was a foreign correspondent for the Chicago Tribune. Unlike Duranty, Seldes felt that the political ramifications from the trial would be significant. He cabled articles from 22 March to 4 April 1923 on the trial. Seldes succeeded in conducting the only published interview with Edmund Walsh. The American priest reminded Seldes that the generous famine relief collections from Catholic Americans, totaling more than four million dollars, would likely end if the Soviets executed any of the Petrograd clergy.
Both these journalists took a personal interest in the trial and conferred with Soviet officials and foreign ambassadors. Seldes offered a solution to free the clergy by exchanging them for Communists held in Italian jails. Likewise, Duranty had made a proposal to the German ambassador in Moscow to free the clergy, once the death sentences were issued against Archbishop Cieplak and Mgr. Budkiewicz, but similar to Seldes' plan it too failed.

The San Francisco Chronicle published articles on the trial from 23 March to 7 April 1923. Reports in this newspaper stated that Archbishop Cieplak's testimony revealed that Pope Pius XI would allow the Petrograd clergy to sign an agreement with the Soviet government regarding the utilization of church buildings and other properties. The paper reported that Krylenko dismissed the Vatican's compromise because what the Soviets considered important was not last minute compromise but obedience to Soviet law. The theme stressed was that the American sense of justice was opposite the Soviet sense of justice.

Krylenko's statement on why the Soviets acted in this fashion appeared only in the Soviet press. The San Francisco Chronicle concentrated rather on Krylenko's temper and verbal abuse of the clergy which was all part
of a show trial. Many American newspapers also failed to comprehend the Soviet theatrics, and the three editorials published by the San Francisco Chronicle on the trial depicted the Soviets in the lowest terms. The outcry in this newspaper was not that unusual since the city of San Francisco supported various Russian refugee groups all united in their stand against the Soviet government.

Despite the overwhelming support for the Petrograd clergy in most secular American newspapers, editorials favoring the Soviets appeared. The St. Louis Post-Dispatch published five editorials on the trial, three of which were highly favorable of the Soviets. These three editorials also criticized the Petrograd clergy which was atypical, but significantly the criticism came before the announcement of Mgr. Budkiewicz's execution on 4 April 1923.

One of the editorials favoring the Soviets discounted the belief that the priests were tried because of their status as clergymen. The writer suggested that rather they were guilty of treason since they admitted to having communications with Polish authorities during the Polish/Soviet war of 1919-1921. Furthermore, since the clergy all held Soviet citizenship, the writer noted that they must obey the civil laws.52
Another editorial appeared in the Post-Dispatch which condemned the habits and privileges of Russian clergymen. The writer identified himself as a former Russian citizen. The editorial content, however, was flawed and misleading. The writer claimed that the Petrograd clergy deserved their sentences because of their past injustices against the Russian people. These clergymen, the writer held, were guilty of supporting race riots against the Hebrews. While it was true that the Jews suffered in the pogroms, the actual persecutors were the Tsars and the Orthodox Church. The writer failed to note that the Roman Catholic clergy never held a leading role in Russian society.53

The writer further claimed that the Petrograd clergy owned too many valuable tracts of land. Concerning the Catholic estates, however, the writer failed to note that the Tsars confiscated most of these properties during the nineteenth century. Finally, the writer accused the priests of trying to overthrow the Soviet government by inciting the masses. The writer of this editorial confused the highly visible Orthodox clergy with the small and insignificant Roman Catholic clergy in Russia. No distinction appeared between the two in the writer's analysis. The editorial opinion did not correspond to the condition or the role of the Catholic Church in Russia since the November 1917 revolution.
A more concise defense for the Soviets appeared in the Post-Dispatch on 4 April 1923 on page eighteen. The writer of this editorial urged that the policy of self-determination be given a chance in the Soviet Union. He noted that President Wilson's fourteen points provided for self-determination, and the writer saw no reason, not even the trial, to change American policy. As far as the trial went, the writer believed that the Soviets were justified in trying the priests especially since both leading clergymen, Archbishop Cieplak and Mgr. Budkiewicz, were Soviet citizens. The writer surmised that they knowingly and willingly disregarded Soviet decrees because they were inconsistent with the Church's canon law. Hence, their trial and sentences were based on their defiance of the civil law. The writer summarized his view of the Soviets by concluding:

Unless you are ready to say that Russia has not the right to govern herself, and that she should allow the rest of the world to pass on her laws, then I can't see any justification for official interference in the clerical cases. We know that the Russians disapprove of our government, but we certainly don't intend to change it on that account, do we? Then why should we expect Russia to change hers on our account?54
Most commentary in the American secular press favored the clergymen, and many writers noted the unusual unity of faiths against the Soviets' show trial system. After the March trial of the Petrograd clergy, Zinoviev ordered the former Patriarch, Tikhon of the Orthodox Church, to stand trial that April. The existence of religious institutions in the Soviet Union appeared doomed unless clergymen conformed to the government's secular decrees. The 1918 Soviet constitution granting separation of Church and State and the freedom of religious worship appeared meaningless in the American press. What the American press overwhelmingly described during these show trials was a direct attack on religious organizations. 55

What characterized this assault, noted many commentators, was the Soviet desire to end the influence of religion. The government banned Soviet officials from attending church functions. Those workers who identified themselves as believers became second class citizens. They were discriminated against in employment, housing and schooling. Food rationing in Soviet cities, moreover, went according to who was an atheist and who was not. 56
There was some resistance within Russia to the Soviets' persecutions and trials, but there was little unity of the faiths as there was in America. The Orthodox Church was divided; some clergymen wanted their former leader Tikhon to acquiesce to Soviet demands, some wanted him defrocked, and some called for further resistance. Similarly, the Russian Catholics lacked leadership. Archbishop Ropp was in exile in Poland, Archbishop Cieplak was in a Moscow jail, and all the Catholic episcopal sees in Russia by the end of 1923 lacked a bishop due to their exile or imprisonment. Russian Protestant churches, however, such as the Methodists and Quakers had already signed agreements with the Soviets. Russian Jews likewise wanted little publicity and tried to accommodate themselves with the Soviet decrees.57

The most thorough analysis of the Soviet designs against religion came from Louis Fischer (1896-1970) an American journalist sympathetic to the Communist movement. He found the unity of faiths in America hypocritical. Anti-Semitism was part of the Roman Catholic Church's unofficial credo, noted Fischer. The Eastern Orthodox émigrés clergy likewise were against Jews because they believed that many Soviets were ethnic Jews intent on destroying the Orthodox Church.
What Fischer tried to demonstrate in his assessment was that the Soviet show trial system, although flawed by Western standards, was a means of social struggle. The Soviets wanted to end the dominance of the hierarchy of all churches in their state. They selected the Catholics first for a trial because they were a small group, and because they were most adamant in their opposition to the Soviet system. The Soviets failed to assess, noted Fischer, that the Catholic clergy had a worldwide following that would support its struggle. The more significant objective Fischer noted in the Soviet persecution of religion was the destruction of the Orthodox Church. In this case, the Soviets wanted to lead the masses away from the church, thus furthering the class struggle and eventually equalizing all citizens. Fischer summarized that the Soviets failed to ascertain worldwide reaction to their designs in the show trials of 1923.58

Unlike Fischer's apologia, the American Catholic press excoriated the Soviets' show trial of the Petrograd clergy. Citing the Soviet constitution of 1918 granting religious freedom, an article in the Catholic World in April 1923 lambasted the Soviet claims of religious tolerance.59 Furthermore, after the execution of Mgr. Budkiewicz, the Catholic press recounted what it saw as
the martyrdom of the Catholic clergy since the November 1917 revolution. After misleading articles expressing only the best of hopes for the expansion of Catholicism in the Soviet Union, the terrible truth was published. Russia lacked a Catholic hierarchy. The Soviets had deliberately exiled, imprisoned or murdered Catholic clergymen for their refusal to surrender church property. Catholic churches were closed by government decree. Divine worship was all but impossible; large groups at mass were prohibited. Perhaps the final insult was that the Vatican's relief efforts during the famine failed to mitigate the persecution against Catholics. The Roman Catholic Church in Russia was disintegrating.60

It was the execution of Mgr. Budkiewicz that created a dramatic increase in denouncing the Soviets in the Catholic press. The execution was depicted as an act of religious persecution in an article in America on 14 April 1923. The periodical published Article VII of the Treaty of Riga from 1921 which supposedly granted the Roman Catholic Church its legal status in the Soviet Union. The commentary suggested that the execution violated this treaty. Moreover, the commentary speculated that possible responses might include some Polish military action since the treaty was also the peace accord between Poland and the Soviet Union.61
The Catholic press was also eager to report how the Protestant churches supported the Petrograd clergy. Quoting from the Methodist periodical, Christian Advocate, from its 12 April 1923 issue, an article in America approved the commentary:

It is not for any Protestant to lessen the glory of these martyrs by saying that they were obedient to "Rome" rather than to God. They have been bred in the belief that the voice that speaks to them through the Church is the voice of God. And in their defiance of that Soviet law which offends the dictates of conscience they have displayed a heroism that links them with all who through the ages have said: "We know that we ought to obey God rather than man." 62

Despite this approval of Christian unity, grave inaccuracies existed in the Catholic press' analysis of the Soviet system. Charges of a Jewish conspiracy were printed in America. It assessed that:

The Jewish element is trying to gain complete ascendancy in the councils of State. It is asserted that in the event of Lenin's death, Russia will be ruled by a group of five men. Form this group the candidates are Trotzky, Kameneff and Stalin, all Jews and mentioned as certain to have a place, and Zinoviev, a Jew, Rykoff, Dzerzhinsky and Krassin. 63

These latent anti-Semitic accusations were typical of the Catholic Church's unofficial view on the political structure of the Soviet Union. The American Catholic press also tried to mitigate some of the accusations by denouncing anti-Semitic riots in Poland resulting from the trial. The Vatican understood that many of these ethnic revolutionary Jews were secularized, yet the Church failed
to convince many of its members in Eastern Europe that equating Communism with the Jewish religion was a distortion. The American Catholic press, then, was less susceptible to making charges of an anti-Semitic character, yet the European Catholic press was often less tactful.

Overall, there were two consequences in the American Catholic community resulting from the trial. First, its eighteen million members in 1923 would not support politicians who suggested that the United States recognize the Soviet government. Second, the American Catholic Church emerged from its isolation. Dialogues between American bishops in both Catholic and Protestant churches trace their beginnings on unity talks to this period. Furthermore, social and charitable Catholic organizations fraternized with Protestant counterparts. Although anti-Catholicism was strong throughout the 1920's, the trial created a common cause and a common enemy for Catholics and Protestants. Thus, at least at the hierarchical levels, ecumenism gained momentum due to the Soviet persecution of religion.
CHAPTER V

THE FAMINE RELIEF MISSION OF 1921-1924

The American press reported accurately on the Papal relief mission in the Soviet Union between 1921 and 1924 for several reasons. First, the mission was connected to the larger American Relief Administration directed by the Secretary of Commerce, Herbert Hoover (1874-1964). This relief organization had its own public relations and publicity staff which encouraged American donations. Moreover, Lenin's government allowed freedom of communication and transport for American journalists reporting on famine conditions. Finally, the head of the Papal mission was from Georgetown University, the Reverend Edmund Walsh. He kept in close touch with American correspondents and often made appeals to the press when the Soviets hindered his program.

Coverage of the famine reached its peak from 1921 to 1923 in the American secular press. The Nation published six articles during this time. Likewise, the New Republic printed five articles. Overall, their assessments reported the success of the entire relief effort. Millions were reportedly saved. The only uncertainty was how would the Soviet agricultural policy
rebuild the nation. The famine was analyzed in the American secular press as a product of civil war and drought. Lenin had shelved the proposed collectivization of agriculture for his more pragmatic New Economic Policy (NEP). What the Soviets would do after foreign aid had stabilized the situation remained a point of speculation in the press.

In comparison, the American Catholic press expressed hope that the Vatican's relief mission might not only feed the starving Russians, but that it might help convert the Orthodox masses to Catholicism. Only three articles in America, however, appeared because the hoped for conversions never materialized. Worse still in the Catholic press' view, when the Soviets tried the Petrograd clergy in March 1923, government officials expressed no gratitude for Catholic donations. When the Papal mission left the Soviet Union in 1924, Pope Pius XI, clearly disappointed, lambasted the Soviet government.64

There were two striking consequences of the Papal mission revealed in the American press. First, the Vatican publicly condemned the Soviet Union as an outcast nation. This act was significant because, even after the execution of Mgr. Budkiewicz in 1923, the Pope issued no denunciation of the Soviet regime. Thus, the
entire Roman Catholic Church was pitted against the Communist movement. Compromise was remote. Secondly, Edmund Walsh became a leading Catholic spokesman in America against the Soviet system. Serving as both head of the Papal mission and as Papal representative, he worked closely with Soviet officials whom he came to regard with utter contempt. His dual role was difficult, and there were conflicting goals for Walsh to somehow build an acceptable modus vivendi. Walsh was not bombastic in his criticism. He studied and collected virtually ever Soviet publication available in the West. Indeed, his collection at Georgetown is considered one of the best.

The idea of a Papal mission to the Soviet Union began with Benedict XV. In 1921, he authorized funds to go to an international relief organization in Geneva, Switzerland.65 As reports further dramatized the disaster, Benedict XV desired a more direct approach. Giving food to the starving Russians could only help the Vatican's plans to convert the Orthodox, plans well known in the American Catholic press since 1916.66

The Soviets, leary of the Vatican's designs, allowed the Pope to attach his mission to the larger American relief effort under Hoover. Benedict XV died before the Soviets issued their final approval, but the next Pope,
Pius XI, continued to support the mission. He agreed with the Soviet stipulation to appoint an American as the head of the Papal mission. Walsh accepted the appointment, and reluctantly agreed to assume responsibility as Papal representative once Archbishop Cieplak was imprisoned in March 1923. The Soviets had wanted a full Papal Nuncio to help lend prestige to their regime, but they accepted Walsh and the Vatican's relief supplies.

Altogether there were five nations attached to the American Relief Administration. The composition of the Vatican's mission included originally thirteen members. By nationality there were two Americans, Walsh and Louis J. Gallagher (1885-1972), Walsh's biographer and fellow Jesuit, three Italians, two Czechs, three Germans, two Spaniards and one Greek. It was truly international in character with the members aware of how to conduct Eastern rite services another Vatican strategy besides food to attract the Orthodox.

Before Walsh left America, he was director of the Catholic Apostolic delegation which collected funds worldwide for the Papal mission. The amount collected totaled $750,000, mostly donated by American Catholics. The entire American hierarchy had conferred in Washington, D. C. to organize famine collections. Such leading
American Catholics as the Archbishop of New York, Patrick J. Hayes (1867-1938) organized further fund drives. He issued an appeal to his pastors for famine relief on 20 October 1922.68

The Vatican's mission began operations in September 1922 in the Crimea. Walsh organized ninety-two kitchens in ninety-two villages in one day. He expanded the mission to Moscow and Petrograd with the Soviets' consent. The maximum development of the mission occurred between March to September 1923. By this time, however, the initial predictions for success no longer appeared in the American Catholic press.69 The Petrograd Catholic clergy trial precluded all the Vatican's plans to expand the mission.

By late 1923, the Papal mission began experiencing increasingly Soviet interference. The Pope threatened to recall the mission when the Soviets placed a secret police agent in its Moscow office.70 With Catholic contributions falling sharply after the trial, Pius XI knew that the mission's effectiveness was imperiled. Added to the loss of revenue, Walsh had difficulties in negotiating with the Soviets. He held them in contempt, and he lacked an adequate staff to handle the many requests sent by the Holy See.
The Vatican recalled Walsh in December 1923 after his reports on the imprisoned Archbishop Cieplak, given to the Western press, raised Soviet demands for his dismissal. The Soviets did not like Walsh's appeals to public opinion for the Archbishop's release. They disliked pressure from publicity. Moreover, the Soviets objected to the elaborate residence in Moscow which supported the Papal mission. (See Appendix II) For such a residence, the Soviets desired to see an embassy, not a charitable mission headquarters. In Walsh's absence, the Reverend Edward Gehrmann (1888-1960), an original member of the mission, became the director until the Soviets expelled the entire staff in 1924 after Lenin's death.

To summarize the Papal mission's significance, it is important to note that its members worked exclusively among the Orthodox. The various Roman Catholic communities in the Soviet Union were not served by the relief effort. Hence, the Soviets were suspicious of the Vatican's designs. They noted that other religious organizations attached to the American Relief Administration had helped their own denominations. Baptists, Methodists and Quakers located their fellow brethren in the Soviet Union and offered assistance when it was needed. The Soviets likened the mission's undertakings
to the Jesuits' proselytizing in Russia during the early nineteenth century. The Catholics were seen as opportunists.

The Soviets were likewise disappointed that an ambassador did not come with the mission. Pius XI himself encouraged this idea by increasing Walsh's powers but not allowing any form of recognition. Thus, the Soviets concluded that the Vatican only wanted to gain converts during the famine and ignore the recognition question. The Soviets' struggles were seemingly unimportant to the Vatican, and after Lenin's death, the leadership agreed collectively to expel the Papal mission as a dangerous counterrevolutionary element.

The American secular press concentrated its coverage mostly on Hoover's efforts and not Soviet complaints. Reports on the Papal mission usually arose only when Walsh was having difficulties with Soviet authorities. Thus, the Papal mission appeared persecuted by Soviet interference in the secular press. Moreover, no articles suggested that the Vatican's representation was opportunistic. Baptists, Methodists and Quakers all had members sponsored in the American effort, and they too supported evangelizing. Therefore, the secular press did not see the Soviets' suspicions as important.
The Famine appeared as a natural disaster in the secular press. No appraisals suggested that the Soviet agricultural policy was at fault. Rather, the combination of drought and civil war seemed responsible. The assessments also supported American relief efforts. A huge grain surplus and a charitable missionary tradition among American churches made famine relief an acceptable foreign involvement.

Support for American sacrifices continued from 1921 to 1923. During 1922, the prospects for a more severe famine saw swift American response. Meatless and wheatless days were begun by many American families. Seemingly the plight of the Russians was becoming a national, worthy cause. What changed the secular press' analysis was the Petrograd clergy trial in 1923.

Significantly, famine coverage after March 1923 in the secular press offered little encouragement for further American aid. Many editors praised past efforts, but they noted that the Soviets appeared ungrateful for the vast supplies and money. The Friends of Russia issued its Society Relief Work Report in the San Francisco Examiner on 23 August 1923 on page twenty-six. It represented a typical survey of opinion in the secular press that past famine relief efforts were laudatory, but that future aid was no longer a likelihood.
By 1924, reports of another Soviet famine drew few calls in the American public for further action. Overall, the secular press reported that the American relief efforts and the Vatican's attached mission did save lives in the Soviet Union. The Soviet government, however, gained no sympathy as it demonstrated little gratitude for the international assistance. Moreover, after the famine, the secular press began examining more thoroughly the Soviet/Vatican struggle. The end of famine relief coincided with reports analyzing the validity of the Catholic's opposition to the Soviet regime. Thus, the conclusion of the Papal mission revealed the intense conflict that actually existed between the Soviets and the Vatican.
CHAPTER VI
THE PRAYER CRUSADE OF 1930

Pope Pius XI's prayer crusade on 19 March 1930 for those Roman Catholics persecuted in the Soviet Union received broad coverage in the American press. The accuracy of reporting world reaction and the nature of the conflict were sound in both the secular and Catholic press. Each institution had years of statistics on the Soviet/Vatican conflict. Knowledgeable commentary came notably from three men: Walter Duranty, Louis Fischer and Edmund Walsh. Each man had studied and assessed in detail the Soviet and Vatican positions.

A comparison of the Catholic and secular press in America revealed a striking contrast. Both Duranty and Fischer acknowledged Soviet persecution, but they suggested that the uproar in the Western press was politically encouraged, and that not all of the Vatican's religious allies were forthright in their facts. For example, they portrayed the Anglican Church's accusations as past incidents, ones that occurred during the Russian civil war. Walsh, however, cited Soviet decrees and statistics from 1929 which revealed the incarceration
of Catholic priests and the closing of Catholic churches.

All three agreed, however, that the catalyst which caused the Vatican outrage was the Soviet decree of 8 April 1929 on religion. The document included over 6,000 words, and it was by far the most comprehensive series of laws restricting religion. Basically, there were eight points outlined by the American secular press which Western churches opposed.

First, religious organizations lost any legal status in the Soviet Union. Second, all churches had to register with the government or close. Third, no national church could exist. Fourth, no citizens could join a church until age eighteen, and the congregation had to number at least twenty persons. Sixth, material assistance from a church to a member was prohibited. Seventh, the Soviets banned all religious or special meetings. Finally, religious associations, cults and chapels lost any protection under religious laws.76

These restrictions culminated in the Soviet control over religion. Joseph Stalin (1879-1953) promoted the laws, yet he stressed to the Western press that since the promulgation of Lenin's constitution in February 1918, the Soviets had always intended to end religion's sway, especially the clergy's power,
over the masses. Both Duranty and Fischer agreed with Stalin's explanation, and they agreed that had Lenin lived, he would have restricted religion. The Soviet decrees, then, appeared as part of the social class struggle in the Communist movement. Furthermore, Lenin's political philosophy was quoted more directly in the American secular press than in any of the other seven events in the Soviet/Vatican conflict. The following Lenin passage appeared often:

Religion is one of the forms of spiritual oppression, lying everywhere on the masses of the people who are oppressed by eternal work for others ... the helplessness of the exploited classes in their struggle with the exploiters just as inevitably generates faith in a better life beyond the grave as the helplessness of the savage in his struggle with nature produces faith in gods ... Religion is the opium of the people.77

The significance of quotations like the previous one revealed that the Soviets defended themselves on equal terms with the Western churches in the American secular press. The Vatican's crusade did not have a complete hold over a sympathetic public. Rather, the Soviet and the Vatican positions were debated, and cries of persecution no longer generated the overwhelming support of the secular press.

The American secular press questioned critically the Vatican's charges. Commentary in the Nation on 5 March 1930 concluded that the "outrage against the Soviets ... is purely fake."78 Fischer stated further
that the Holy See's policy toward the Russian Orthodox Church in Poland was just as harsh as the Soviets' treatment of Catholics in the Soviet Union. He claimed that in 1929 the Polish government, with the Vatican's consent, converted by force over 500 Russian Orthodox churches to serve as Catholic churches. Conclusively, Fischer stated that the Soviet/Vatican negotiations, conducted sporadically between 1918 and 1927, included plans for the Catholic Church to supplant the Orthodox Church.

Continued in the same article, Duranty reported that the religious furor had support from the European business community. The growing exports from the Soviet Union became a menace to the balance of trade, noted Duranty. Moreover, he depicted the outcry in England as part of the Tory political smear against Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald who favored Soviet recognition and trade.

The *New Republic*'s commentary concurred with the *Nation*'s. It noted that many priests were executed not because of their religious beliefs but rather for their involvement in counterrevolutionary activity. Also, the *New Republic* claimed that the Catholic Church distorted the figures on church closings. Of the total 50,000 churches in the Soviet Union, only six percent were closed reported an article on 5 March 1930. Moreover, millions of Russians appeared free to worship privately
with many displaying icons in their homes.79

Further commentary in the secular press questioned the Western business community's support for the religious crusade. It was noted that, although Pius XI, the Archbishops of Canterbury and York, Bishop William T. Manning of New York's Anglican Church, the Lutheran Council and the American Jewish Congress had legitimate protests, others, indifferent to organized religion, feared instead the Soviet Five Year Plan.

Many Western economic observers noted how the Soviets viewed religion and the kulak peasants as a small-scale capitalist unit. This system, the Soviets proclaimed, had to be uprooted because the unit opposed the collectivization of agriculture and the industrialization of the country. By subsidizing their industries and controlling labor costs, the Soviets exported massive quantities of raw materials at lower than Western market prices. In summary, then, the Western business community supported the religious campaign because economic sanctions against the Soviets might ensue with the moral support of religious leaders.80

Fischer and Duranty championed the Soviet position because they desired to expose the economic motives of the West. Both men had limited access to the Soviet Union, and they admired the progressive, scientific
methods of the Communist movement. They likewise decried political opportunists using the religious protests to further the economic isolation of the Soviets. Their final analysis concluded that it was the fear of the Soviets' Five Year Plan and not the Pope's prayer crusade which motivated many in the West.

The secular press assessed the crusade with the broadest coverage and commentary of the seven events which characterized the Soviet/Vatican conflict from 1917 to 1933. The New York Times carried Pius XI's letter denouncing the Soviet anti-religious policy. American Catholics looked for support from Europe, and they were not disappointed. Unlike the overwhelming European support for the Petrograd Catholic clergy in 1923, however, the prayer crusade created a number of positions. For example, the reaction of the British press displayed a variety of opinion. The Tory Morning Post supported the Vatican, The Daily Worker was pro-Soviet, and the Daily Mail urged moderation.

French reaction included meetings between Jews and Protestants in support of the Pope's crusade. A statement appeared from the French Protestant Federation, the Russian émigré clergy and the Grand Rabbi of France, Israel Levi. This unity was similar to American unity.
Reaction from Germany included remarks by Cardinal Michael von Faulhaber (1869-1952) of Munich. His sermon of 11 February 1930 was quoted at length by both the New York Times and the Commonweal. Another prominent Cardinal, Joseph MacRory (1861-1945) of Armagh, Ireland, also had a sermon published in the New York Times on 2 March 1930 on page five. Taken together, the entire European Catholic community had more of its commentary printed in support of the Vatican than in any of the other seven events.

Other American newspapers concentrated more on the reaction in the United States. The Chicago Tribune did not report the Soviet position and did not carry their statements to the Western press. Rather, it favored the Vatican's views. Thus, it did not objectively analyze the situation. Typical coverage concerned sacrilegious acts such as the destruction of church bells and the closing of churches reported on 18 March 1930 on page one. The newspaper voiced its support for local protests against the Soviets, and it encouraged observation of the 19 March day of prayer.

Reaction from the San Francisco Chronicle blamed Stalin as the instigator of the anti-religious campaign. The newspaper outlined his policy on 17 March 1930 on page four. Locally, the editor supported such actions
as the Friends of Russian Freedom Society reorganizing in favor of Pius XI's crusade. Leo Nicholas Yakovlev became president of the group which had dissolved itself during the Provisional Government in 1917. Its primary task during the crusade was to contact agents in the Soviet Union and collect evidence on the religious persecutions.

Further reaction in San Francisco included mass meetings at the Catholic Mission Dolores where Jesuit Father Victor White spoke against the Soviets. He cited American Catholic periodical literature which described how the Pope's call for prayers created a spiritual unity. White concluded that Soviet persecution represented a moral danger to the West.86

Protests against Pius XI's crusade also received broad coverage in the secular press. Mass meetings at the Bronx Coliseum were reported in detail. The letter supporting the Soviets after the protest appeared in the New York Times. The American author, Theodor Dreiser, was the leading writer.87 The American Communist Party wanted sympathetic people but non-Communists to make such public statements as this one, thus trying to demonstrate a broad support.

Significantly, the Soviets rallied their supporters more effectively in this struggle with the Vatican than in any of the other events characterizing their conflict.
They likewise received coverage almost equal to the supporters of the Vatican. The Soviet countercampaign included using prominent Orthodox clergymen. Metropolitan Sergius (1867-1944) denounced Pius XI, and he denied reports in the Western press of Soviet persecution. Reportedly, he had the support of his clergy. These clergy, however, held their posts at the behest of the Soviet government. Sergius held an interview with members of the Western press and recited prepared comments. The charges presented stated that:

The Pope considers himself the vicar of Christ, but Christ suffered for the oppressed and downtrodden, whereas the Pope in his declaration proved himself to be in the same camp with the English landowners and the Franco-Italian 'Money-bags.'

Sergius claimed further that Pius XI was a warmonger, and that the Orthodox did not need the prayers or protection of the Catholic Church. The Pope desired only to exploit the Orthodox Church, Sergius noted, in order to extend his authority. Significantly, no one surmized in the American press, at the time of the interview, that Soviet authorities instructed Sergius. The Metropolitan's remarks were attributed rather as genuine and a reflection of the historical animosity between the Orthodox Church and the Roman Catholic Church.
The American Catholic press examined the entire Soviet anti-religious campaign, but it did not respond to Sergius' charges which many considered sacrilegious. In the December 1929 issue of Catholic World, an article titled, "Soviet Anti-God Laws," outlined the 8 April 1929 decrees.89 A detailed report on the condition of Russian churches also appeared in the Catholic press. It was reported that the international neglect and closing of the churches threatened the existence of the nearly 1,000 year history of Christian worship in Russia.90 The practice of 'saving' churches by converting them into theaters or museums with anti-religious exhibitions was excoriated as a sacrilegious policy.

Enthusiastic reports appeared in the American Catholic press on the worldwide reaction favoring Pius XI's crusade. An article in the Catholic World titled, "Protests against Soviet war on Religion," noted that the unity of faiths, begun after the 1923 clergy show trials, still existed and continued to manifest itself. Awareness of Soviet persecution was at its height, and the support from Protestant churches for the Pope was an untold historical event.91

Two critical commentaries on religious conditions in the Soviet Union appeared in Commonweal. An article published on 2 April 1930 on pages 605 and 606 titled,
"Russia without God," lamented that the sacraments were no longer dispensed freely. Births, marriages and deaths were recorded by civil register, sans benefit of clergy. Religious processions were banned. Religious education, moreover, for children was proscribed, and the Soviets restricted publication of religious literature. Only the government press printed Bibles and never an adequate supply.

Another article in Commonweal titled, "Moscow and the Churches," offered a more objective analysis on the Soviet anti-religious attitude than any article in the Catholic press during the 1930 prayer crusade. The author, Paul Scheffer, a correspondent for the Berlin Tageblatt stationed in Moscow until December 1929, wrote the article when he arrived in Washington, D.C. He was not a Catholic, but the editors of the Commonweal valued his commentary.

He concluded that religious persecution had been "systematically and purposefully carried on since the creation of the Bolshevist state, even though with varying degrees of severity." Scheffer depicted the anti-religious drive in terms of social struggle. The Soviets desired to end the influence of religion and the idea of private property which Judeo-Christian theology and practice supported. The Soviets, he concluded, would persist in their campaign, and pressure was likely to increase due
to the goals set under the Five Year Plan, notably the collectivization of agriculture and the industrialization of the country.

Overall, the American Catholic community adopted without question Pius XI's prayer crusade. The campaign squarely placed the Soviet Union as an outcast nation. As a political doctrine, Communism in practice became anathema to Roman Catholics. The Catholic clergy in America derided the doctrines and practices of Communism with increasing frequency. Led by Father Walsh's substantial research and informed commentary, there was no debate as to whether or not Soviet persecutions were real or fictitious. The *New York Times* carried the most in-depth Walsh commentary in articles from January to March 1930 concerning the Vatican's crusade.93

In summary, the increasing reports on religious persecution in the Soviet Union found in the American press greatly reinforced the idea of a Soviet/Vatican struggle. In this upheaval, many journalists undertook an objective assessment of the situation. Facts on the Russification of the Soviet culture revealed a secularization of society. The policy of self-determination was also debated in the press, and more sympathy was accorded the Soviets than in previous encounters with the Roman Catholic Church. One important outcome was that Stalin
appeared as the undisputed ruler of the Soviet Union. The quasi-collegiate leadership after Lenin's death in 1924 no longer remained. The Catholic press acknowledged this change by dropping its vague charges that a 'secularized Jewish conspiracy' operated the Soviet government.

Although lambasting the anti-religious policy of the Soviets was widely accepted in the American press, a great deal of commentary examined more closely the Vatican's attitude. Such journalists as Duranty and Fischer discounted many of the accusations, and Fischer went so far as to label the Roman Church an opportunistic power. Despite the Pope's crusade, the debate over recognition of the Soviets continued to be raised. Although this debate was dampened by the 1930 crusade, the worsening economic depression and a change in the Presidency in 1932 once again brought the question of recognition before the American public.
CHAPTER VII
THE RECOGNITION DEBATE, 1933

The debate concerning the recognition of the Soviet Union began in earnest during the 1932 presidential campaign. Father Walsh approved President Hoover's policy of nonrecognition, and he encouraged Catholics to support this position. Walsh analyzed the Soviets' desire for American recognition in a 14 October 1932 speech before the Civic Federation of the Lawyers' Club in New York City. His statements about the conditions in the Soviet Union were accurate. He asserted that Soviet finances were in a critical situation owing to the global depression. They needed additional capital to achieve the goals of their Five Year Plan, Walsh noted, and moreover, increased credits and trade might come with American recognition. Finally, Walsh surmized that the specter of famine loomed in the Soviet Union due to the harsh measures of collectivization. The Soviets needed American grain.94

The missing element in the presidential election, Walsh noted, was the Democratic party's nominee Franklin Delano Roosevelt's (1882-1945) attitude on recognition. Walsh suggested that, if Roosevelt became president, he
should set certain conditions if he decided to favor a recognition policy. The primary condition in Walsh's opinion was that the dissolution of the Comintern or Third International must occur before the United States accredited an ambassador to the Soviet Union. Walsh had the Vatican's support in this matter as Pius XI understood the power of government sponsored propaganda from the Soviet Union, and the Pope would welcome any help in silencing it.

After the election and Roosevelt's victory, Walsh publicly chided members of the United States Senate for encouraging recognition without stipulations. He saw their efforts as a usurpation of presidential authority which alone should conduct foreign relations with the Senate's advice and consent. He objected to certain members taking a leading role and trying to sway public opinion. 95

It was important that Roosevelt neutralize Walsh's influence if he were to pursue recognition. Significantly, Roman Catholics were a large group in the Democratic coalition which Roosevelt could not afford to ignore. The task of appeasing this group was delicate and complicated since by 1933 the American Catholic Church was one of the strongest and most articulate anti-Communist religious organization due largely to Walsh's influence.
Since the 1923 Catholic clergy trial in Moscow, Walsh had been a staunch opponent of recognition. His knowledge of the Soviet Union was substantial. He was not a demagogue invoking 'red scare' tactics. Rather, he took the moral position and cited documented cases of Soviet religious persecution. Thus, his opposition on recognition was a matter to be dealt with seriously.

When Roosevelt announced his intentions to negotiate with Maxim Litvinov (1876-1951), the Soviet Foreign Minister, he arranged a meeting with Walsh at the White House to seek his support. Walsh concurred with the President's plan to meet with Litvinov. He understood that Roosevelt would ask for the dissolution of the Third International along with guarantees that Americans could exercise religious freedom when in the Soviet Union. Furthermore, in his own words, Walsh claimed that he would not oppose subsequent negotiations since he believed that the "President should not be embarrassed in the exercise of his constitutional prerogative of conducting foreign affairs."96

When recognition occurred in late November 1933, however, Walsh waited in vain to learn of the disbanding of the Comintern. Not until 1943 would Stalin, out of requests from the Western Allies, close the organization. Walsh demanded that recognition be withdrawn since the
Soviets violated their pledge. For ten years, dating from his dual appointment as director of the Papal famine relief mission and as Papal representative in 1923, Walsh opposed recognition because of the power of the Comintern's propaganda. He stated publicly that:

If the Soviet pleads inability to control the Third International, it makes virtual confession that there is a political power within its territorial jurisdiction superior to and dominating government, hence the real sovereign. In that case, the Soviet Government does not exercise sovereignty, and the United States should withdraw recognition and treat with the indicated ruler, not with a subordinate. 97

Supporting Walsh's opinion on recognition was the Catholic press commentary. The Catholic World and Commonweal editors opposed recognition until outstanding problems were negotiated. Editors of America, however, were ambivalent since many Jesuits were unsure if formal recognition would allow them greater access into the Soviet Union as American citizens, or if they would still face persecution. The most succinct commentary came from the Commonweal which published seven articles in 1933. In its 12 April 1933 issue, Commonweal questioned if recognition would be beneficial to the United States. It also questioned the motivation of people and organizations which supported recognition. There were five reasons why the Commonweal opposed recognition.
First, the editors claimed that the Soviets did not respect the obligations of international law. Second, no body of laws or judicial system existed in the Soviet Union to guarantee the protection of the contractual rights of foreigners. Third, the Soviets opposed liberty of conscience and the exercise of religious worship. Fourth, the editors noted the difficulties of the English and French in their diplomatic relations with the Soviets. Finally, on largely moral grounds, it was felt that it would be "illogical, stultifying and shameful for the United States to extend recognition."\(^{98}\)

The *Commonweal* also carried Walsh's objections. The periodical noted the improved trade possibilities favored by some people should recognition occur, but the periodical dismissed them as speculation. It was primarily the moral objection to the Soviets' persecution of religion that the editors stressed. They concurred with Walsh's moral argument and offered this summary.

"He is bitterly and unjustly opposed to the war upon religion, to the suppression of the fundamental rights of the Christian conscience, which prevail there. He believes that if the government of the United States were to recognize, after fourteen years of silence, a social order guilty of persecution in the worst sense, the effect would be to endorse spiritual tyranny."\(^{99}\)
In its 16 June 1933 issue, the Commonweal reported on the 23 April 1933 radio program, "Church of the Air." On the program, the issue of trade relations became the most important angle of the supporters of recognition. The editors dismissed accusations in the secular press after the program that Catholics were not objective about trade relations. Being objective, they noted, did not bar definite conclusions or convictions. Furthermore, Catholics had as much right as anyone to warn that investment in the Soviet Union was too uncertain. 100

When addressing the issue of trade, Commonweal opposed extending credits to the Soviets. The editors saw this proposed transaction as too risky, and they believed that the Soviets would default. The editors also noted that propaganda from the Third International urged that the Communist movement should overthrow capitalist countries by exploiting economic benefits from them. Overall, then, their assessment doubted that formal recognition would improve the balance of trade. 101

Despite these economic objections, which were largely speculative, the historical arguments launched by the Commonweal were accurate and objective. In its 6 October 1933 issue, the periodical examined American/
Russian relations from 1780 to the present. It concluded that:

It is obvious that the friendliness displayed in Russian-American relations for over a century was not motivated by any sympathy for the respective political institutions of either of the two countries. The reason for this friendliness lies much deeper. It is to be found mainly in the geo-political similarity of Russia and America.\(^{102}\)

This was a sound appraisal because in western Asia and the Pacific, both Russia and the United States sought to expand their territory and influence. By 1933, both were concerned by Japanese expansion in these regions. Thus, a Soviet/American rapprochement might indeed curb any imperialist designs by a third party.

When the Roosevelt/Litvinov meeting was announced, the *Commonweal* responded emphatically again that it opposed recognition. Taking a moral stance, the editors assessed the Communist movement in these terms:

> It is the growth of militant atheism - of a contagious spirit of the repudiation of all forms of belief in God - which is more dangerous to the nations of the western world, our own among them, than the Red Army of Soviet Russia.\(^{103}\)

Sensing that the debate was leaning toward those favoring recognition, the *Commonweal* provided a definitive statement on recognition. Significantly, the objections raised did not suggest that Catholics must withdraw from participating in American politics or in their support of the Roosevelt administration. Rather,
the statement demonstrated the active response of the Catholic Church which was not in any way divorcing itself from delicate political issues. The editors declared that:

The Commonweal has over and over again published its own appeal, and the arguments of other writers, against the recognition of Russia by this country. We have considered that the enhanced world prestige which the organized atheism of Russia would gain by such a formal recognition would be a loss to religion, and to all forms of civilization based upon or still influenced by religion, outweighing all the advantages in trade or in the arena of international politics which the proponents of recognition claim for that policy.  

When recognition occurred, the editors maintained their moral objections but remained moderate in their tone. They appraised the President's actions and concluded that he "did what he could and secured reasonable conditions for civilized human intercourse between Russia and the United States." The editors also approved the assurance given by the Soviets that Americans would be granted liberty of conscience in Russia. They concluded that the power of the United States would insure Soviet compliance. The Vatican had likewise set similar conditions in the Treaty of Riga in 1921 for Catholics in the Soviet Union only to see them disappear during the show trials of 1923.

In summary, the editors concluded that Roosevelt would intervene to mitigate for the persecuted. They also awaited the announcement of the dissolution of the
Comintern. The editors believed, as did Walsh, that Roosevelt mentioned the condition to Litvinov and that the Soviets agreed to the stipulation. There was no statement in the Commonweal when the dissolution failed to materialize.

Not surprisingly, the leading American journalist in the secular press favoring recognition was Fischer. He wrote several articles for the Nation during 1932 and 1933 on recognition. His conclusions were almost opposite the opinions in the Catholic press. Fischer assessed that Communist propaganda had no significant impact in America. Furthermore, he claimed that the Comintern no longer posed the threat of revolution in capitalist nations as it did in 1919. Europe was no longer economically and politically devastated from World War I, noted Fischer, and the Soviets were stable and powerful, thus, unlikely to want revolutions occurring in countries it needed as trading partners. He excoriated the 'red scare' tactics used by opponents of recognition and declared that "Communism in the United States is a minor movement which demagogues use as a bogey to frighten the stupid and attain their own ends."106

Not all of Fischer's assessments diverged from the Commonweal's appraisals. He too agreed that Japanese expansion caused alarm in the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.
An alliance might thwart the imperialist designs of Japan especially in China, noted Fischer. This appraisal was Fischer's main point. He saw the rise of Japan as the most important reason for recognition, concluding that the U.S. needed to protect its Pacific interests.

Fischer was less gracious in criticizing the opponents of recognition. He derided Hoover's nonrecognition policy, claiming that the former President's "innate conservatism" and "imperialist tendencies" prevented him from viewing the Soviets pragmatically. Fischer also speculated that Hoover's vanity was wounded when the Soviets failed to show sufficient gratitude for American relief during the famine in the early 1920's. Significantly, these charges were the same ones Fischer leveled at the Vatican during its struggle with the Soviets especially during Pius XI's 1930 prayer crusade.

The editor of the Nation supported Fischer's viewpoint. Oswald Garrison Villard (1872-1949) favored the improved trade possibilities that recognition would incur. He disregarded much of the Western churches' polemics against the Soviets, and he sarcastically dubbed the Bolsheviks as "the would be destroyers of the sacred Christian religion." Villard believed
that the churches were too vociferous in their attack. Their charges created the threat of a Communist menace which fueled in turn a backlash and gave rise to such men as Adolf Hitler (1889-1945) in Germany. Conclusively, he felt that the religious counterpropaganda was unnecessary and potentially dangerous. Villard believed that equating Communism with the entire political left's social agenda caused a polarization, and one outcome was that people supported positions of the extreme right as their salvation rather than seeking a moderate consensus of progressive reforms.

Compared to the Catholic press' assessment, the secular press viewed recognition in more pragmatic and not moral terms. The economic benefits from recognition were considered more obtainable by both the Nation and the New Republic than by the Commonweal. In its 29 November 1933 issue, the New Republic published an article titled, "Russia and America Strike Hands." In its commentary, it recalled that it had favored recognition almost from the beginning of the Soviet Union's existence. Increased trade gained by the rapprochement could only help abate the economic ills in America. Moreover the war debt questioned proved an outdated issue as the Allies' debt was largely cancelled, why not Russia's, declared the article.
The article approved the Soviets' pledge to end the Third International and cease all revolution propaganda. It cited also that "the great campaign for religious freedom for foreigners in Russia ... turns out to have been painfully unnecessary." This judgement came after Litvinov read a host of Soviet decrees and laws allowing the exercise of religious expression in the Soviet Union to the western press. What the New Republic failed to note was the costs to individuals who chose to exercise their religious rights.

The periodical favored an American/Soviet understanding because Germany and Japan became further isolated. The danger of war seemed averted because the two largest land powers, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. sought common ground. Part of the formal recognition might entail discussions on curbing Japanese expansion in Asia and the Pacific and German threats to redraw the map of Eastern Europe.

In conclusion, the overall coverage on the recognition debate revealed two distinct opinions. First, the Catholic press raised moral objections. The statistics on persecution were there, and it looked unlikely that Joseph Stalin would honor the religious freedoms outlined in Lenin's 1918 constitution or the Treaty of
Riga. Second, the secular press took a more pragmatic view. The Soviets were a world power, and recognition would benefit America in terms of trade and checking the expansion of Germany and Japan. The secular press discounted the moral objections of the churches as early as the prayer crusade of 1930. The Catholic press discounted the envisioned trade surplus. The only area of agreement was that the dissolution of the Third International would ease concern over Soviet calls for world revolution. The virulent propaganda was disliked and feared in the West, thus its end would create a calmer, more rational climate for mutual relations. Only the Catholic press lamented when the Soviets failed to close the Comintern.
Conclusion

Although ending this study in 1933 may seem arbitrary, there are sound reasons for selecting this date. With the recognition question settled in 1933, America began a new chapter in its relations with the Soviets. The Vatican adapted to this new circumstance, and Pius XI encouraged the American Catholic hierarchy to have the U.S. government intercede on behalf of the persecuted in the Soviet Union. Stalin had virtually consolidated the state's power over the Roman Catholic Church in 1933, and he saw little need to increase any restrictions. Also, the rise of Hitler and his concordat with the Vatican moved the Church further away from a modus vivendi with the Soviets.

Significantly, the seven events which characterized the Soviet/Vatican conflict in the American press did not always reveal the animosity between the two powers. The two 1917 revolutions seemed to offer a unique opportunity to expand Catholicism. The Genoa Conference and to some extent the Papal famine relief mission also reportedly created favorable contacts whereby a concordat might ensue. It was not until the 1923 Petrograd clergy trial that the Soviets and the Vatican appeared as irreconcilable parties.
After examining American opinion on the Soviet/Vatican conflict from 1917 to 1933, six important consequences are discernible. First, the Roman Catholic Church emerged as the staunchest religious opponent of the Communist movement. Pope Pius XI became a leading opposition figure which was significant for several reasons. To begin with, although the Catholic Church suffered under the Soviets, the losses incurred in no way compared to the huge sacrifices made by the Russian Orthodox Church. Indeed, the Orthodox clergy led by Patriarch Tikhon failed to unite against the Soviets. Tikhon's successor, Metropolitan Sergius, avoided confrontation and sought a rapprochement with Stalin. Finally, the émigré clergy in Europe and North and South America failed to agree on whether to support Sergius or oppose the modus vivendi. Thus, the Orthodox Church, which had substantial reasons for denouncing the Soviets, abdicated its role to the more organized and worldly Holy See.

Another noticeable consequence arising from the Soviet/Vatican conflict was the growing ecumenical movement in America. Leading bishops and rabbis from Protestant and Jewish churches agreed with the Pope that Communism threatened religious liberty. This common cause/common enemy approach was unique in the U.S. Catholics in Poland and the Baltic states failed to unite with the
Eastern Orthodox in defying the Soviets. Instead, Catholic officials in Poland seized Orthodox churches in the Belorussian and Ukrainian territories won in the 1919-1921 Soviet/Polish war. Many Catholics in Eastern Europe also believed that the Jews were responsible for the spread of the Bolshevik armies, thus no one sought Jewish support in protesting Soviet atrocities. Only in America did substantial dialogue among the various churches arise from the perceived Soviet threat.

Perhaps the most devastating consequence from the Vatican's disapproval of the Soviets was the anti-Semitic accusations raised by the Church in defining Communism. Commentary in the Jesuit periodical America made many claims of a Bolshevist/Jewish conspiracy. For its part, the Holy See did little to enlighten Catholics that Bolsheviks who were ethnic Jews were also completely secularized. This distortion was partially responsible for the Holocaust because many Catholics in Eastern Europe remained indifferent to the plight of the Jews during World War II.

Indifference to the Jews' plight was likewise noticeable in the American Catholic Church. No prominent Catholic leader objected to the American immigration quotas for Jews when evidence from Nazi Germany in the 1930's suggested that they were in peril. American
Catholic radio commentators repeated, rather, the belief that a Bolshevik-Jewish plot threatened Europe, and that Hitler stood as a defender of the West.

Because the previous legacy was inconsistent with what Church leaders knew, the failure of the Holy See to dispel the Bolshevik-Jewish conspiracy myth cost many lives. Ignorance was not an excuse. The study of the Soviets had become a priority of the Holy See. The Russicum Collegium in Rome and the School for Foreign Service at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C. were but two institutions where the Church trained its clergy about the Soviets. The extensive collections on the Soviets should have made clear to Catholic scholars that the Jews were in no way responsible for the rise of Communism. Thus, although the Catholic Church promoted the in-depth study of the Soviet Union, Catholic scholars failed to discount the Bolshevik-Jewish conspiracy myth.

The last two consequences are related. Because of the Soviet/Vatican struggle, American Catholics emerged from their exclusiveness, and they became a strong political force. Despite the resurgence in anti-Catholicism during the 1920's, Catholic leaders expanded missions and charitable foundations in the U.S. Catholic leaders encouraged their fellow members to unite with other Christians in opposing the Communist movement. Hence,
Catholics became moral leaders. Roman Catholics had also become an important part of the Democratic party coalition in 1932. Although their efforts to block the recognition of Soviet Russia failed, their opinion was not ignored. Catholic leaders received invitations to the White House, and they were briefed by President Roosevelt. They were part of the establishment and no longer considered outsiders in a predominantly Protestant America.

Overall, then, American opinion on the first sixteen years of the Soviet/Vatican struggle saw the Catholic Church emerge as the defender of religious liberty and a staunch opponent of the political left. The Holy See was successful in creating for itself a moral leadership role against the spread of Communism. By emphasizing the importance of traditional values, the Vatican became a more tolerable symbol in America. The moral authority of the Pope became respected as he undertook the task of articulating against the Soviets. In America, then, Catholics began to enjoy an increased stature due in part to their united front against the spread of Communism.
NOTES


2. Independent, 309.


4. Review of Reviews, 540.

5. Ibid., 541.


7. Ibid., 339.

8. Ibid., 347.

9. Ibid., August 1917, 563.


11. America, 14.


15. ____, "Reorganization of the Russian Church and the General Council of Moscow," Ibid., 790.

18. America, 17 November 1917, 124.
22. "Failure of Religion in Russia," Ibid., 14 June 1919, 32.
23. "Going to Church in Russia," Ibid., 36.
24. Ibid., 37.
28. America, 16 February 1918, 462.
29. Ibid., 22 June 1918, 252.
30. Ibid., 2 September 1918, 515.
31. Ibid., 7 September 1918, 568.
32. Ibid., 26 October 1918, 125.


37. America, 20 August 1921, 414.


42. Ibid., 309.

43. Ibid., 310.

44. Ibid., 311.

45. Ibid.


50. Walter Duranty, I write as I please, 206.


52. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 2 April 1923, 16.

53. Ibid., 3 April 1923, 15.

54. Ibid., 4 April 1923, 18.

55. "All Faiths United by the Red Assault on Religion," Literary Digest, 21 April 1923, 34.


57. "Religious Mêlée in Russia," Literary Digest, 26 May 1923, 32.


61. America, 14 April 1923, 603.

62. Ibid., 21 April 1923, 4.

63. Ibid.


71. Ibid., 15 May 1923, 3; 9 June 1923, 13, 13; 11 November 1923, section II, 1.


74. "Another famine year in Russia," Ibid., 8 November 1922, 508.


83. Ibid., 11 February 1930, 4.
88. Ibid., 11 February 1930, 5.
89. Catholic World, 8 April 1929, 348.
90. C. Radziwill, "Russia's Holy Shrines," Commonweal, 19 March 1930, 556.
91. Catholic World, March 1930, 750.
92. Commonweal, 23 April 1930, 702.


96. "President's Hands Free, Says Walsh," Ibid., 22 October 1933, 12.


98. "Shall We Recognize Russia?" Commonweal, 646.


100. "Father Walsh on Russia, Reply," Ibid., 187.


102. L. I. Strakhovski, "Should Russia be Recognized?" Ibid., 527.


104. Ibid., 3 November 1933, 6.

106. Louis Fischer, "Recognize Russia Now," Nation, 28 December 1932, 635.

107. Ibid., 28 December 1932, 633.


110. Ibid.
APPENDICES
APPENDIX I

WALSH TO CREEDEN, 27 SEPTEMBER 1923

Your very welcome letter of August 18 reached me today, September 27, and I am hurrying to get a few lines to you by the next courier who leaves in a few hours for Warsaw. I do not trust the Russian post, as the few letters which have come that way bear clear signs of having been opened and read by the "C.P.U." (Bolshevik Secret Police). Hence we send the mail to Vatican by courier and it is posted from the Vatican. That is why the time is so long.

As you can readily imagine, I was delighted to have the letter with the very intimate news of things American especially Foreign Service news. ... I have been trying my best to get back but the Vatican does not seem to want to let me go yet. I was in Rome in July and made tentative arrangements to finish as soon as possible and get back to the U.S.A. But despite the promise which the Holy Father made himself, i.e. to appoint a Bishop or Apostolic Delegate who would take over the half hundred different jobs I have been holding here, nothing has been done yet. Until that is done, I cannot hold out much hope.

As you may suspect, relief work for the starving forms but a small fraction of my work at present, the chief occupations being rather those of an unofficial representative of the Vatican in dealings with the Soviet government. At present the Holy See is negotiating the liberation of Archbishop Cieplak and some 22 Catholic priests imprisoned by the Bolsheviks, and until that is successfully accomplished, I know they want me to keep on the job. But it is a continual penance of the most pronounced type as the Bolsheviks are the lowest type of humanity I can imagine. I have been instructed by the Holy See to keep up the usual diplomatic form in dealing with them but I assure you it is like casting the proverbial pearls before swine. I shall have much to tell you when I return which one does not commit to paper in Russia.

I have just succeeded in obtaining one thing which the Vatican wanted. When the Bolsheviks were driven back from Poland two years ago they brought many treasures from robbed churches. Among other things they desecrated the relics of Blessed Andrew Bobola (of the Society) which
were highly venerated in Poland. They brought the relics to Moscow and have them on exhibition as a sort of ridicule of holy things. I have just succeeded in getting them away from them and am sending them to the Vatican. The Bolsheviks had always refused the request of the Polish government but I have been able to persuade them to give the relics to the Vatican. They have agreed, on the condition that in transporting them to Rome I do not permit them to pass through Polish territory. So I am sending P. Gallagher with them to Odessa, thence by Black Sea to Constantinople and thence to Brindisi in Italy.

In order to procure the release of Archbishop Cieplak it will be necessary to get certain Communists in exchange, i.e., Communists held by various governments abroad. So we are treating at present with two governments, and when that is successfully finished, I hope I will be one step nearer home and Foreign Service.

In the process of reorganizing the Pontifical Relief Mission, I have just taken over a new house that had been half wrecked during the Revolution and am engaged in restoring it. After digging the bullets out of the wall and plastering up shell holes on the outside, as well as spending about $10,000 in general repairs, the Holy See now has a Moscow headquarters not inferior to any foreign Mission in Moscow. . . . In this new house, once one of the great mansions of Moscow and about as big as the Old North Building, I shall hold forth in papal splendor. I have a suit of 7 rooms, and with Gallagher about to leave for good next Wednesday, I shall be alone. My office is about as big as the Riggs annex. With one private secretary, two typists, a cook, housekeeper, and one maid, I will try to worry along in the vita secularis which we live here among the Bolsheviks. There is not another S.J. within a thousand miles.

To this office are now being referred all questions between the Vatican and the Soviets, questions which are daily increasing as the Vatican is endeavoring to reorganize and save the churches after the storm of the Revolution and the present equally destructive religious oppression of the Bolsheviks. *Vera est persecutio et diabolica.* For that reason the Vatican *videtur velle potius Americanum ut legatum suum.* P. Maas and the General were concerned when I was in Rome in July as it looked as if the Vatican were seriously thinking of naming E.A.W. Episcopum vel Delegatum Apostolicum (Episcopiem) in Russia. I had a long audience with the Holy Father on the whole situation, one hour and thirty minutes, and He promised to
appoint a Bishop or other representative within the next week or so. But now almost three months have passed and nobody has shown up and as a result the old fears are beginning to be felt that the Vatican may say that E.A.W. has been there almost two years and knows the situation etc. These are not vain fears, nor what Shyne would call "B.S." but hard facts. The only thing to do is to "pull a bone" at once.

I understand all you write about Foreign Service and am very uneasy. ... I will certainly make a determined effort to settle up the Vatican affairs here in time to get back by second term if humanly possible. I have never asked to be relieved as so many have failed on this Russian mission that I could not in conscience add another to the embarrassments of the Vatican. But at the first indication that the job is done, I will be on my way. ("The Rev. Edmund A. Walsh, S.J., Papers," Box 2 Folder 94, Special Collections Division, Georgetown University Library.)
APPENDIX II
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