Young Adults' Attitudes Toward Same-sex Marriage And Polygamy As A Function Of Demographic, Gender, And Personality Variables

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YOUNG ADULTS’ ATTITUDES TOWARD SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND POLYGAMY
AS A FUNCTION OF DEMOGRAPHIC, GENDER, AND PERSONALITY VARIABLES

by

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B.A. University of Central Florida 2004

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ABSTRACT

Based on a sample of 814 university students, pro- and anti-same-sex marriage and polygamous marriage groups were established based on students scoring >1 SD above (n = 145; n = 132, respectively) and < 1 SD below the group mean (n = 127; n = 126) on the Attitudes Toward Same-Sex Marriage Scale (ATSSM: Pearl & Paz-Galupo, 2007) and Attitudes Toward Polygamy Scale, which was generated by modifying the ATSSM (ATPM). Compared to pro-same-sex marriage students, anti-same-sex marriage students were significantly more prejudiced against gays and lesbians, authoritarian, religious, and politically conservative. Anti-same-sex marriage students also had less contact with and appreciation for diverse cultural groups, more desire to dominate out-groups, were less autonomous in their thinking, and were more likely to be men. Anti-polygamous students were more strongly opposed same-sex marriage, idealized the traditional family, authoritarian, religious, less autonomous in their thinking, desire to dominate minority groups, and were more likely to be female compared to those who were pro-polygamous marriage. Results further indicated that, polygamy and same-sex marriage are predicted by different variables, with same-sex marriage being more strongly tied to prejudice against gays and lesbians and polygamous marriage being more strongly tied to beliefs about the inherent morality of conventions surrounding the traditional family. A regression analysis using data from all 814 students yielded almost identical results with regards to identifying variables most predictive of ATSSM. Follow-up analyses revealed that prejudice against gays and lesbians was the single best predictor of opposition to same-sex marriage and even accounted for the associations between opposition to same-sex marriage and religiosity, political conservatism, and support of traditional marriage and family. With respect to polygamy, data from regression analyses revealed that ATSSM was the best predictor of ATPM. Despite the cultural focus on this variable, however, controlling for ATSSM did not reduce the predictive power of critical variables to a non-significant level. Recommendations for challenging opposition to marriage equality are discussed.
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CHAPTER ONE: SAME-SEX MARRIAGE IN THE UNITED STATES

Approximately 1% of couples in the world are same-sex (Ambert, 2005). This includes 600,000 same-sex couples in the United States (Peplau & Fingerhut, 2007). In the United States, same-sex couples have met considerable opposition in their struggle for the legal right to marry (Gallup, 2006; Gallup, 2008). Opponents appear to believe that same-sex marriage potentially alters the definition of marriage as a procreative relationship between one man and one woman (Somerville, 2007). Further, some argue that the legalization of same-sex marriage potentially paves the way for polygamy, which is met with considerably more hostility than same-sex marriage (Somerville, 2007; Stacey & Meadow, 2009).

Recent data suggest an overall increase in tolerance of homosexuality (Craig, Martinez, Kane, & Gainous, 2005). According to a recent survey, (Gallup, 2009) 48% of United States citizens are not morally opposed to homosexuality, 55% believe that homosexuality should be legal, and 57% believe it should be accepted as an alternative lifestyle. Moreover, over one-third of those living in the United States, Canada, and Britain would like homosexuality to be more widely accepted (Gallup, 2008) and a growing majority is unwilling to restrict the civil liberties of gay and lesbian people (Loftus, 2001; Peplau & Fingerhut, 2007). Even though many individuals seems to agree that there should be laws against discrimination and are willing to grant homosexuals some civil liberties, granting this minority group the right to engage in a same-sex marriage or civil union has been debated domestically and internationally (Haeberle, 1999; Loftus, 2001; Sherrill & Yang, 2000; Wilcox & Norrander, 2002; Wilcox & Wolpert, 2000).

With few exceptions, The United States does not recognize same-sex marriage (Ronner, 2005) yet as many as 74% of lesbians and gay men in the United States indicated they would like to have the freedom to marry a same-sex partner (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2001 cited in Kurdek, 2004). Gay couples believe that being allowed to marry would validate their relationships to themselves and to others, and would provide them with numerous civil rights and benefits (Alderson, 2004). They also argue that
the lack of legal recognition threatens their rights as a couple, fosters a lingering lack of acceptance of homosexuality, affords gay couples less respect than heterosexual couples, stigmatizes gay people, and perpetuates discrimination that some have likened to the country’s past treatment of ethnic minorities (Harding, 2006; Ronner, 2005).

Currently, there are only five states in the U.S. along with Washington D.C. that legally permit same-sex marriages. Massachusetts was the first of those states when in 2003, the state’s courts decided that a ban on same-sex marriage violates the state constitution (Ronner, 2005). There is a handful of states that allow either civil unions or domestic partnerships. In the state of Washington, voters have extended all legal rights granted to heterosexually married couples to same-sex couples with the exception of the word ‘marriage.’ Although same-sex marriage advocates have criticized civil unions and domestic partnerships for not affording gay couples the same social status as marriage does for heterosexual couples, civil unions (and to a lesser extent, domestic partnerships) do offer some of the benefits and protections associated with marriage (Harding, 2006). Other states, such as Hawaii, allow members of domestic partnerships to register so that they may be afforded most of the same rights as married couples such as survivorship rights, health-related benefits, benefits related to jointly held property, legal status for wrongful death, victims’ rights, and protection against domestic violence (Ronner).

Even states that do not allow gay marriage or civil unions have taken steps to protect the rights of those in a committed same-sex relationship. For example, New Hampshire’s employers have extended health insurance to same-sex couples (House Bill 1605-FN, 2008). Maryland has granted same-sex couples the right to make major medical decisions on each other’s behalf (House Bill, 1174, 2008). These gradual recognitions of same-sex couples’ relationships offer hope to those who are in support of legal recognition of same-sex marriage. However, these changes also have spawned what has been described as an “ideological firestorm” (Gallup, 2004).

Although gay and lesbian organizations and individuals are using legislatures to advance their case
for same-sex marriage, opponents have fought for ballot initiatives as well as state and federal legislation that effectively have banned same-sex marriage (Gallup, 2004; Ronner, 2005; Werum & Winders, 2001). In 2004, members of the U.S. Senate proposed an amendment to the Constitution of the United States that is considered to be one of the strongest reactions against the same-sex marriage movement to date (Ronner). This legislation reads as follows: Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a man and a woman. Neither this Constitution, nor the constitution of any State, shall be construed to require that marriage or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon any union other than the union of a man and a woman (Senate Joint Resolution 30, 2004). In addition to the introduction of policies and laws that would ban same-sex marriage, researchers believe that the growing interest in policies that seek to promote heterosexual marriage and make it more difficult to end a heterosexual marriage have been due, in part, to the same-sex marriage movement (Bogenschneider, 2000).

Despite higher levels of support for same-sex marriage compared with years past (Avery et al., 2007; Gallup, 2008), roughly half of United States citizens are in favor of the aforementioned amendment that would define marriage exclusively as being between a man and a woman, thus barring marriages between gay and lesbian couples (specifically, 49% favor, 48% opposed; Gallup, 2008). Fifty-six percent of United States citizens oppose the extension of full marriage rights to same-gender couples leaving only 40% in favor of same-sex marriage, and just 3-6% with no opinion on the issue (Gallup, 2008). Further, 48% of United States citizens believe that legalizing same-sex marriage would change society for the worse (Avery et al., 2007; Gallup, 2005;). Recent polls also indicate that United States citizens are only slightly more likely to oppose rather than favor formalized civil unions between same-sex partners (Gallup, 2003; Gallup, 2008). This represents an increase in the tolerance for civil unions from years in the past (Avery et al., 2007).

The United States clearly is divided over legalization of civil unions and same-sex marriage. Some researchers attribute this division to United States citizens’ attempt to balance the value of individualism
and personal choice with their desire to protect traditional values and the sanctity of marriage and family (Craig et al., 2005). Individual attitudes toward legalization of same sex marriage and civil unions are influenced further by a variety of demographic factors (e.g. political affiliation, region, gender, religious beliefs, race, education level and age) as well as attitudes toward and experiences with marriage in general.

Regarding political affiliations, Democrats and Independents are more likely than Republicans to believe that same-sex marriages should be recognized as a legal form of marriage (Gallup, 2003) and are less likely to favor a constitutional amendment that would define marriage as a heterosexual institution (Gallup, 2006). Political conservatism seems particularly important to those who are opposed to same-sex marriage (e.g., Brumbaugh, Sanchez, Nock, & Wright, 2008). Twenty-six percent of those who are opposed to the legal recognition of same-sex marriages report that they will vote only for candidates for major office who share their views on this matter. However, only two percent of those who favor legalizing same-sex marriage define themselves as one-issue voters on the subject (Gallup, 2008).

Women are more in favor of same-sex marriage than men (Brumbaugh et al., 2008; Steffens & Wagner, 2004) particularly women between the ages of 18-49 (Gallup, 2006). Age seems to be particularly important to individual attitudes regarding same-sex marriage irrespective of gender. Sixty-one percent of young adults between the ages of 18-29 hold the view that gay marriages should be recognized legally, compared to 22% of those over age 65 (Gallup, 2003). United States citizens with higher levels of education, particularly those with a postgraduate education, are more likely to believe that homosexual marriage should be legalized compared with those with a high school education or less (Gallup, 2003). Last, support for legally recognizing same-sex marriages varies by geographic region. Those living in Western and Eastern parts of the United States are more likely to support same-sex marriage than those living in the Midwest and Southern regions. The latter regions also are more likely to hold views reflective of clear opposition to same-sex marriage (Gallup, 2008).
Studies examining the relation between ethnicity and attitudes toward homosexuality have indicated that African Americans, on average, have more negative attitudes toward homosexuals than Hispanics and non-Hispanic Whites (Lewis, 2003; Negy & Eisenman, 2005; Waldner, Sikka, & Baig, 1999). However, few studies have investigated the relation between ethnicity and attitudes toward same-sex marriage. The limited research suggests that, although African Americans may be in favor of granting homosexuals equal civil rights, their tolerance stops at granting same-sex couples the right to marry. Specifically, African Americans are less likely than Whites to approve of same-sex marriage (Brumbaugh et al., 2008). Also, Latinos are more likely to oppose same-sex marriage than Whites as evidenced by their votes on a recent amendment that banned same-sex marriage in California (61% and 50%, respectively; Public Policy Institute of California, 2008).

Since opposition to same-sex marriage sometimes stems from the religious belief that homosexuality is immoral (Haywood, 2008; Herman, 1997), it is not surprising that attitudes about marriage are influenced uniquely by religiosity (Brumbaugh et al., 2008; Pearl & Paz Galupo, 2007). As a group, those who are members of a non-Protestant religion are less likely to oppose both same-sex marriage and civil unions compared with those who ascribe to beliefs that are more consistent with mainstream Christian religions (Olson, Cadge, & Harrison, 2006). Apart from religious affiliation, the degree of religiosity also influences individuals’ attitudes toward same-sex marriage. Those who self-describe as highly religious are much more likely to oppose same-sex marriages than those who are less religious (Brumbaugh et al.; Gallup, 2006).

In addition to demographic variables, attitudes about traditional marriage, experience with cohabiting with a partner outside of wedlock, attitudes about divorce, a desire to enter into a heterosexual marriage in the future, and current involvement in parenthood, influence attitudes toward same-sex marriage. More specifically those who want to enter into a heterosexual marriage, support traditional covenant marriage, disapprove of divorce, or are parents, are less likely to support same-sex marriage
(Brumbaugh, et al., 2008). By contrast, those who have lived with a partner out of wedlock—arguably a type of relationship that reflects a willingness to embrace non-traditional relationships—are more likely to support same-sex marriage (Brumbaugh, et al.).

Curiously, there are some members of the gay community who oppose same-sex marriage. Some gay men and lesbians view marriage as a heterosexual union (Haywood, 2008) and seem to hold the view that same-sex marriage would diminish the affirmation of gay identity and culture (Ronner, 2005). For example, Poliff (1993) writes that some individuals from the gay community believe that same-sex marriage is “an attempt to mimic the worst of mainstream society, an effort to fit into an inherently problematic institution that betrays the promise of both lesbian and gay liberation” (p. 1536).

Same-sex marriage clearly is a matter about which both the same-sex community and general public seem to have reservations. Nevertheless, it appears that being in a legally recognized same-sex partnership or participating in a committed same-sex relationship is not associated with negative consequences for the individuals. Homosexual partners report similar relationship quality regardless of the legal status of their relationships (Herek, 2006; Kurdek 2006; Solomon, Rothblum &, Balsam, 2004). Also, partners from gay and lesbian couples do not appear to have personality traits or engage in interaction styles that place them at risk for relationship distress or individual psychological problems any more than partners in a heterosexual relationship (Kurdek, 2004). Moreover, although a full discussion of the numerous studies that concern children of homosexual parents is beyond the scope of this review, it is important to note, particularly given that 34% of lesbian couples who live together and 22% of gay male couples who live together are raising children (Gates & Ost, 2004; Peplau & Fingerhut, 2007), that these children’s functioning is comparable to children of heterosexual parents in terms of psychological well-being, self-esteem, cognitive abilities, and interpersonal functioning with peers (Fulcher, Suftin, Chen, Scheib, & Patterson, 2006; Patterson, 2003, Tasker, 2005). Children reared by one or more gay parents also do not differ in terms of reports of victimization at school, experience of common social concerns, or
prospective use of support outlets provided by families and peers (Rivers, Poteat, & Noret, 2008). As such, it seems unlikely that children reared by couples in a civil union or same-sex marriage would suffer negative consequences disproportionately.
CHAPTER TWO: POLYGAMY IN THE UNITED STATES

Polygamy refers to a husband with more than one wife. For comparative purposes, polyandry refers to a wife with more than one husband, and polygynandry refers to two or more wives married to two or more husbands simultaneously (Sinha & Bharat, 1985; Valsiner, 1989). The most common marital arrangement among these three types is polygamy (Al-Krenawi & Lightman, 2000). Even though polygamy is illegal in most Western countries, with the United States being among them, it is legally practiced and accepted in approximately 850 societies worldwide, particularly in the Middle East, Africa, Asia, and the Pacific Islands (Broude, 1994; Dodoo, 1998; Hayase & Liaw, 1997). In African countries, as many as 20-50% of all marriages are polygamous. Polygamy is most common in communities comprised of multiple ethnic and religious minorities (Al-Krenawi et al., 1997; Bergstrom, 1994; Hartung, 1982; Phillips, 1999 cited in Hassouneh-Phillips, 2001). Polygamy also is common in Muslim countries where an estimated 2-12% of married men live in polygamous families with two wives being the average number of wives (Slonim-Nevo & Al-Krenawi, 2006).

A full review of polygamy as practiced in countries around the world is beyond the scope of this paper. In brief, polygamy in non-U.S. countries often is linked to economic hardships, practical considerations, or social status. For example, in some societies women’s domestic labor generates income for a family. As a result, a man may elect to marry multiple wives as a means of augmenting the family’s financial situation (White et al., 1988). In those cases, families also frequently depend on the labor of their children who may work on farms or in various industries. Thus, having more wives typically leads to more children who may contribute to the family income. In some circumstances, women who support polygamy have indicated that polygamy allows for a husband’s domestic and sexual demands to be shared across wives, thereby lowering the burden a single wife would have ordinarily (Agadjanian & Ezeh, 2000; Ware, 1979). Women in polygamous families also have reported that they
feel a sense of protection and security within such families (Kilbride & Kilbride, 1990). In contrast to economic hardships underlying polygamy is the situation whereby more wives are associated with increases in social and economic privilege. In some societies, such as Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, and so on, men demonstrate their economic advantage by having more than one wife (Ware, 1979). In those cases, the family, including the wives, enjoy a higher standard of living and higher social status than wives who are not in a polygamous marriage. Even when a woman’s societal rank or social class does not change as the result of entering into a polygamous marriage, she still may benefit from varying degrees of increases in opportunities for socialization and economic control within her family structure (Sigman, 2005).

Although polygamy in non-U.S. countries has been found to be associated with domestic abuse, spousal jealousies or competition, and behavioral disorders in their children (Al-Krewnawi, Graham, & Izzeldin, 2001; Elbedour, Onwuegbuzie, & Alatamin, 2003; Hassouneh-Phillips, 2001; Kilbride & Kilbride, 1990), it is difficult to attribute those problems to polygamy given the complexity of the interplay of cultural, religious, political, and socioeconomic status variables on marital and family relationships. Moreover, the range of interspousal and family problems observed in polygamous families is observed commonly in non-polygamous marriages and families (Cummings, 1998; Puente & Cohen, 2003).

The legalization of polygamy is likely to be an uphill battle; roughly 93% of United States citizens oppose polygamous marriage. Although the lack of research on the mechanism by which attitudes toward polygamous marriage are affected forces researchers and the public to rely on their own inference in order to make decisions regarding the social rights of a group. As it stands, it seems that the objection to polygamous marriage is mostly due to moral conflict or concerns over the violation of ideals related to egalitarianism as well as feminism (Gallup, 2009; Johnson, 2007; Richards, 2010; Stacey & Meadow, 2009). That said, polygamy is not without its supporters, some of whom feel as though polygamy has been unfairly judged. In fact, Sigman (2009), an advocate for polygamous marriage, directly communicated her feelings about the jurisprudence and existing literature that she feels has
contributed to polygamy’s criminalization and has neglected full understanding the causes or merits of the practice through her article’s title: “Everything Lawyers Know About Polygamy is Wrong.” Moreover, since polygamy is primarily rooted in religious practice (Altman & Ginat, 1996; Kilbride, 1994) some U.S. polygamists perceive polygamy as an expression of religious expression (Myers & Bradington, 2002); others argue that as free citizens they ought to be permitted to live a life style of their choosing with all the privacy and sexual rights that are afforded to heterosexual couples (Pomfret, 2002; Richards, 2010).

Despite social and legal prohibitions against polygamy, it is estimated that between 11,000-50,000 of U.S. citizens practice polygamy (Altman & Ginat, 1996; Chambers, 2005 cited in Stacey & Meadows, 2009). In fact, one researcher estimates that there are 50,000 polygamists living in the Rocky Mountains region alone (Johnson, 1991 as cited in Kilbride, 1994). One of the most active polygamist groups in the United States is the Fundamentalist Church of Latter Day Saints—a church not affiliated with the Mormon Church (Gaynor, 2007). This sect’s teachings state that a man must have at least three wives to reach the highest realms of Heaven. In one polygamous community in the west, 30% of men had married two wives, 43% had three or four wives, and 26% had five wives or more (Altman & Ginat, 1996). The sect left the mainstream Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints in 1890. The mainstream church excommunicates anyone practicing polygamy (Dougherty, 2007). This distinction is of particular importance since Fundamentalist Church of Latter Day Saints recently has been implicated not only in the crime of bigamy but also of varying degrees of sexual misconduct with minors (Gallup, 2006). For example, Fundamentalist Church of Latter Day Saints prophet Warren Jeffs was recently sentenced to 10 years to life for two counts of rape related to performing a marriage of a 15-year-old girl to her older cousin (Dougherty, 2008; Murr, 2008). Five other members were accused of sexually assaulting girls under 17 and one also charged with bigamy (Dougherty, 2008).
Although the psychological, behavioral, and emotional consequences of being a part of a polygamous marriage have been studied in other countries, the emotional and psychological consequences for women and children living in these sects within the United States are less clear. According to the limited research directly studying members of polygamous communities, it appears these groups, including the Fundamentalist Church of Latter Day Saints, have not been well studied and the only documented effects of polygamous families seem to be limited to court proceedings and comments from select current and former members of the sects. At the very least, those currently practicing polygamy have admitted that they often struggle with considerable financial difficulty. Some wives even reported that they and their children go without food and health care at times (Bennion, 1998). In addition to the financial struggles, as is the case in other countries that allow citizens to practice polygamy, often there is varying degrees of jealousy and conflict between wives (Altman & Ginat, 1996; Bennion, 1998; Kilbride, 1994). These reports from current members do not cast a favorable light on the practice of polygamy but the comments from former members are particularly troubling. For example, apart from encouraging teenagers to marry older men and bear children, women say that refusal of marriage was either forbidden or resulted in severe consequences such as losing custody of children acquired in a previous marriage (Dougherty, 2007; Fahrenthold, 2008). They also have reported that children raised in these sects have difficulty bonding with or relating to others and that the Fundamentalist Church of Latter Day Saints’ restrictive lifestyle made life difficult for individuals wanting to leave the sect (Vere, 2008). Moreover, former members report that some of those who leave acquire alcohol and drug problems while others turn to prostitution and other crimes. Some have attempted suicide; one woman claimed to have first attempted suicide when she was just six years old (Dougherty, 2007; Vere, 2008).

Despite the grim stories of former members of polygamous families and the public prosecution of the sect’s crimes against children, there also are those in polygamous marriages in the United States who
argue that when conducted responsibly, it is a positive practice that gives women opportunities to bond with women and their husbands (Pomfret, 2006). In fact, the television series "Big Love” portrayed plural marriage as challenging but minimally deviant (The Economist, 2006). Further, these individuals and those who research such polygamous communities report that both husbands and co-wives do their best to ensure that all wives are treated comparatively with respect to housework, financial support, and the amount of time husbands allocate to spend with each individual wife (Kilbride, 1994).

Given the number of practicing polygamists compared to the minimal number of individuals implicated in crimes and questionable treatment of fellow members, it seems that the sects that have received public attention for crimes and maltreatment of members represent a minority. Most importantly, there also is a need to distinguish under-age sex, forced marriage, spousal abuse and child abuse from polygamy itself (Somerville, 2007). Research examining polygamy or general attitudes toward polygamy must operationalize polygamy for participants in ways consistent with its traditional definition (e.g. a man married to more than one wife).
CHAPTER THREE: THE CURRENT STUDY

There is evidence that polygamy is readily associated with same-sex marriage, particularly with respect to presumed similarities as communicated from members of the United States’ judicial system (Stacey & Meadow, 2009; Calhoun, 2005). That said, advocates of each respective form of marriage often deny any similarity between the two practices. Differences certainly exist between the practices, with same-sex marriage being rooted in the perpetuation of idealism surrounding marriage based on romantic love and egalitarianism (Wolkimir, 2009) while polygamy is rooted in religious doctrine. However, both of these forms of marriage challenge the idealization of monogamous heterosexual marriage and make the gaps between the nation’s ideologies and their translation into legislation glaringly apparent (Stacey & Meadow, 2009). Although there are those who are frustrated by the hypocrisy in the United States’ permissive attitudes regarding engagement in consecutive marriages (Tierney, 2006) and willingness to accept same-sex marriage while denying marriage rights to those who wish to engage in other forms of marriage (Stacey & Meadow, 2009). In addition to differences inherent to these diverse types of marriages, there are differences in public opinion and in related effects on those involved in these forms of marriage. Although people in the United States are divided over same-sex marriages and unions, they are far more accepting of same-sex marriages than they are of polygamy. In light of contemporary discourse over same-sex marriage and by extension, albeit to a much lesser degree, polygamy, the purpose of this study is to examine simultaneously an array of variables that may influence individuals’ attitudes toward same-sex marriage and polygamy.

This study is important for several reasons. The debate over the legalization of same-sex marriage has intensified in response to the outcomes of recent referendums across the United States to make same-sex marriage a constitutional violation in the states where the referendums occurred (The Economist, 2007; Kornblum, 2008; McKinley, 2008; McKinley & Goldestein, 2008). Also,
demographics in the United States continue to change dramatically, potentially paving the way for more
tolerance to diverse life styles. For example, people from Muslim cultures, where polygamy generally is
accepted, continue to immigrate to the United States (Wilgoren, 2001). Pressures for legal and social
acceptance from a coalition of Muslim and non-Muslim polygamists alongside demands by the gay and
lesbian community can be expected to persist and increase over the years, particularly since there South
Africa has set a precedent for legalization of both practices on the grounds that denying same-sex
marriage rights (polygamy was already legal) violates values consistent with the relatively new
constitution, which recognizes and prohibits behaviors that are not consistent with the advancement of
human rights (e.g. racism and sexism; South African Constitution, 1996; Stacey & Meadows, 2009). This
makes it arguably harder for the United States, which boasts egalitarianism and equal rights, to continue
to shy away from a civil rights issue relating to marriage since public discourse has already been braved
by legislators in a much more tempestuous cultural climate (Stacey & Meadow, 2009).

All considered, understanding people’s resistance to alternative life styles—in this case, same-sex
and polygamous marriages—is warranted. As reviewed earlier, religiosity, social conservatism, and
prejudice against homosexuality already have been linked either anecdotally or empirically to the
rejection of same-sex marriages (Gallup, 2003; Gallup, 2006, Gallup, 2008; Pearl & Paz-Galupo, 2007).
However, other variables may underlie people’s resistance to diverse relationships that thus far have been
ignored or underestimated. These variables include constructs that broadly relate to tolerance toward
dissimilar people and non-adherence to conventional thinking.

Both gay couples and those in polygamous relationships represent a minority of citizens in the
United States and are apt to be judged as deviant by the majority (LeVine & Campbell, 1972 cited in
Hammond & Axelrod, 2006; Sumner, 1906. Authoritarianism and social dominance relate to how
members of one group judge another. By definition, an authoritarian mindset is characterized by a high
degree of submission to established and legitimate authorities, aggressiveness toward out-groups, and
adherence to conventions perceived to be endorsed by society and its authorities (Altemeyer, 1998).
Social dominance is a distinct but related construct (Altemeyer, 1998; Goodman & Moradi, 2008; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Male, 1994). Social dominance orientation is defined as the desire for one’s in-group to dominate and be superior to out-groups (Pratto, et al., 1994). Researchers have posited that authoritarianism and social dominance orientation affect members of the presumably prejudiced majority by different mechanisms. With respect to authoritarianism, members’ attitudes are affected by concerns regarding social cohesion, stability and security (Duckitt, 2001 cited in Duckitt & Sibley, 2007). Social dominance orientation, however, uniquely affects prejudice directed at minority groups through concerns regarding members of the out-group as potential competitors for power and social equality (Cohrs & Asbrock, 2009). These constructs are often studied concurrently and recent studies have related these constructs to heterosexism and have corroborated the view that social dominance and authoritarianism are related to negative attitudes toward gay men and lesbians (Altemeyer, 1998; Basow & Johnson, 2000; Goodman & Moradi, 2008; Haslem & Levy, 2006; Morrison, Kenny, & Harrington, 2005; Whitley, 1999; Whitley & Ægisdóttir, Stefánía, 2000; Whitley & Lee, 2000). Although neither construct has been studied as they relate to polygamous marriage, researchers who have studied this effect as it directly related to attitudes toward same-sex marriage have found that social dominance orientation is particularly sensitive to the context as it relates to same-sex marriage (e.g. primed with a passage about same-sex marriage before being asked to indicate their favor of same-sex marriage (Lehmiller & Schmitt, 2007).

Moreover, researchers have found that the extent to which one values traditionalism, which is closely related to the conventionalism component of authoritarianism, was better able to predict attitudes toward same-sex marriage when it was tailored to be specific to adherence to traditional roles as they relate to the traditional family (Henry & Reyna, 2007) presumably because of same-sex marriage’s specific threat to traditional family structure which is defined by a monogamous couple raising their own biological children within the context of marriage. Given the apparent importance of idealization of the
traditional family as reflected by aforementioned findings and the centrality of family values to the same-sex marriage debate, (Stacey & Meadow, 2009) this construct was also assessed as part of this investigation. A distinct type of orientation, which has been characterized as the opposite of authoritarianism, and social dominance orientation, is universal–diverse orientation, which reflects an attitude of awareness and acceptance of both the similarities and differences among people (Donovan, Jessor, & Costa, 1991). Universal-diverse orientation has been found to be associated with tolerant attitudes toward race, gender, and sexual orientation (Miville, et al., 1999).

In order to be tolerant of same-sex marriage and polygamy, logically, it would be necessary to resist the social biases generally held by the dominant society. Moreover, tolerance of diversity would be facilitated by an ability to think independently. Stated differently, individuals would have to function autonomously and be able to dismiss tendencies toward conventional notions of social behavior. The inclusion of measures of autonomy and conventionalism in conjunction with measures of religiosity, conservatism, and homonegativity may facilitate the identification of each construct’s unique contribution toward the prediction of attitudes toward same-sex marriage and polygamy as well as identifying a smaller set of constructs that best predict those attitudes. With respect to same-sex marriage, we explored the links between opposition to same-sex marriage and religiosity, political conservatism, and beliefs in traditional marriage and family as a function of prejudice against gays and lesbians. Those three variables in particular (i.e., religiosity, political conservatism, and belief in traditional marriage) consistently have been emphasized in the literature and social discourse as opponents’ primary motives for resisting legal recognition of same-sex marriage (e.g. Brumbaugh et al., 2008; Gallup, 2003; 2006; 2008; 2009; Haywood, 2008; Herek, 1987; Herman, 1997; Olson, Cadge, & Harrison, 2006; Pearl & Paz-Galupo, 2007). We also explored evidence of group overlap between proponents of same-sex and polygamous marriage in an effort to critically examine the argument that same-sex marriage is a “slippery slope” to
polygamy since it seems that this belief is startlingly common given that it is not based on empiricism as much as it is emotionally-based scare tactics (Stacey & Meadows, 2009).
CHAPTER FOUR: METHOD

Participants

The original sample of participants included 1156 undergraduate students. In accordance with procedures agreed upon by the supervising committee, data belonging to those participants who fell below an agreed upon criterion (less than 20% of responses indicated) of either the overall battery or scales relating to alternative marriage, were not used in these analyses. Additionally, those who endorsed more than one item on the internal validity check were not included in this analysis per the consensus of the committee. Subsequent to violation of these criteria, 277 participants’ data were not included in final analyses. Additionally, since the experience of being married or having children could logically affect attitudes regarding marriage and pose a subsequent threat to internal validity, participants who indicated they were married, divorced, separated, or had children (n = 65) were not included in the final analyses. Remaining participants were 814 undergraduate students (263 males, 548 females, 3 unreported) at a large, state university in the southeastern region of the United States. Their mean age was 20.13 years (SD = 2.47). Regarding ethnicity, 563 (69.2%) participants self-identified as non-Hispanic White, 130 (16%) as Hispanic/Latino/a, 34 (4.2%) as African American, 38 (4.7%) as Asian American, and 63 (5.3%) as “Other.” Regarding religious affiliation, 445 (54.6%) reported being Christian, 99 (12%) as Agnostic, 58 (7%) as Atheist, 24 (2.9%) as Jewish, 7 (<.1%) as Islamic, 7 (<.1%) as Buddhist, 9 (1.1%) as Hindu, and 134 (16.4%) as “Other” (31 [3.8%] did not report a religious affiliation). Based on their responses to the modified Kinsey Heterosexual-Homosexual Rating Scale (Kinsey, Pomeroy, & Martin, 1948; see below for description), 755 (92.7%) of the participants self-identified as either exclusively or almost exclusively heterosexual, whereas 12 (1.4%) self-identified as either exclusively or almost exclusively homosexual (47 [5.7%] self-identified their sexual orientation as being somewhere between those two categories,
suggesting some level of bisexuality). The majority (54\%) were either first- or second-year college students. Also, all of the students reported being single. Participation was voluntary and was compensated with extra credit in students’ respective general psychology courses.

**Measures**

**Demographic Information**

On a demographic sheet, participants were asked to indicate their age, gender, income level, political affiliation, race/ethnicity, religious affiliation, as well as their relationship status (e.g., single, married, living together, divorced).

**Attitudes Toward Same-Sex Marriage.**

Attitudes toward same-sex marriage were assessed using the *Attitudes Toward Same-Sex Marriage* scale (ATSSM; Pearl & Paz-Galupo, 2007). This scale consists of 17 items that are measured on a five-point Likert-type scale with response options ranging from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 5 (Strongly agree). A total score is obtained by summing scores across items and dividing by 17, with higher scores reflecting more tolerance of same-sex marriages. It also demonstrates construct validity given that scores on this measure are highly correlated with a widely used measure of attitudes toward lesbians and gay men (ATLG; Herek, 1988). Based on the present sample of participants, this scale obtained a Cronbach reliability estimate of .89.

**Attitudes Toward Polygamous Marriage.**

To measure attitudes toward polygamy, all participants will complete the *Attitudes Toward Polygamy* scale (ATPM). This 17-item scale was adapted from the ATSSM of Pearl and Paz-Galupo (2007) that measures attitudes toward same-sex marriage. Each item was modified so that instead of referring to
same-sex-marriage or a couple in a same-sex marriage, the item was written in reference to polygamy or a polygamous family. As an example, the item “Same-sex marriage undermines the meaning of the traditional family” was reworded as “Polygamy undermines the meaning of the traditional family.” Response options range from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 5 (Strongly agree). A total score is obtained by summing scores across the items and dividing by 17, with higher scores reflecting tolerance toward polygamy. Based on the present sample of participants, this scale obtained a Cronbach reliability estimate of .85.

**Kinsey Heterosexual-Homosexual Rating Scale.**

A modified version of the Kinsey Heterosexual-Homosexual Rating Scale (Kinsey et al., 1948) was used to assess self-reported sexual orientation. Participants respond to this 2-item measure by using a 7-point scale to report their sexual arousal experiences (e.g., dreams, fantasies, etc.) and prior sexual experiences. Response options range from 1 (“exclusively heterosexual”) to 7 (“exclusively homosexual”). Consistent with other researchers’ usage of this scale (e.g., Adams, Wright, & Lohr, 1996), each participants’ rating was derived from their average rating on the two items. Although shortcomings of the Kinsey scale have been noted by some researchers (e.g., Sell, 1993), other researchers have indicated that the scale is useful for classifying participants on sexual orientation. For example, Gangestad, Bailey, and Martin (2000) have suggested the Kinsey scale is pragmatic and frees participants to denote themselves on continua that assess fantasies and actual behaviors (rather than pressuring participants to label themselves in accordance to social conventions).

**Religiosity.**

The *Duke University Religion Index* (DRI; Koenig, Parkerson, & Meador, 1997) was used to measure participants’ religiosity. The five-item scale is comprised of three subscales: organization...
religious activities (ORA), non-organizational religious activities (NORA), and intrinsic religiosity (IR).

Items on the ORA and NORA subscales are measures using a 6-point scale and the IR subscale is measured using a 5-point scale. The total score can range from 3 to 15 with higher scores indicating a higher degree of religiosity (Yohannes, Koenig, Baldwin, & Connolly, 2008). The scale has been demonstrated to be reliable and valid. Internal consistency scores have been high in previous studies (.72 - .83; Dedert et al., 2004; Klemmack et al., 2007; Steffen & Fearing, 2007) and the scale demonstrates construct validity and convergent validity (Storch, et al., 2004). Based on the present sample of participants, this scale obtained a Cronbach alpha reliability estimate of .90.

**Heterosexism.**

The *Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men* Scale (ATLG; Herek, 1988) was utilized to measure the degree to which participants hold negative attitudes toward gays and lesbians (Goodham & Moradi, 2008). The 20-item scale is comprised of 10 items that measure attitudes toward gay men and 10 items that measure attitudes toward lesbian women. Items are rated on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (disagree strongly) to 5 (agree strongly). A total score is derived from summing responses to items and dividing by 20, with higher scores reflective of higher heterosexism or homonegativity. The scale demonstrates good reliability and validity. Researchers have found that the alpha values typically exceed .80; Herek, 1994; Herek & Glunt, 1991). Additionally, the scale has been demonstrated convergent and discriminant validity (Herek, 1987, 1988, 1994; Herek & Capitanio, 1995, 1996). Based on the present sample of participants, this scale obtained a Cronbach reliability estimate of .96.

**Conservative-Liberalism Scale.**

To measure participants’ relative position on the construct of “conservatism-liberalism,” they completed the 7-item *Conservatism-Liberalism* scale (Mehrabian, 1996). This scale was developed to
assess general “right-left” political orientation without reliance on specific and period-sensitive political issues. Participants indicate their level of agreement with statements using a 5-point Likert-type scale, with response options ranging from “Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree.” This scale was scored so that higher scores reflect more liberal political inclinations. A sample item is, “I cannot see myself ever voting to elect conservative candidates.” This scale has been found to have adequate reliability (Mehrabian; Negy & Winton, 2008). Based on the present sample of participants, this scale obtained a Cronbach reliability estimate of .81.

**Autonomy**

Autonomy was measured using Ryff’s (1989) Autonomy subscale of *The Psychological Well-being* scale. The Autonomy subscale measures one’s ability to be self-determining and independent, resist societal pressures to think and act in certain ways, regulate behavior from within, and evaluate one’s self by his or her own personal standards. The scale is comprised of 14 items, which are rated on a 6-point Likert-type scale, ranging from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 6 (Strongly agree). Higher scores reflect a higher degree of autonomy. The scale has demonstrated adequate internal consistency (.83) and discriminant validity (Ryff). Based on the present sample of participants, this scale obtained a Cronbach reliability estimate of .87.

**Authoritarianism.**

Authoritarianism was assessed by Altemeyer’s (1988) *Right-wing Authoritarianism Scale*. This scale is comprised of 30 items that are rated on a 9-point scale (1 = very strongly disagree to 9 = very strongly agree). The scale yields a total score as well as three subscale scores (authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, and conventionalism; Altemeyer 1981; 1996). Authoritarian submission is the tendency to idealize and submit to established societal authorities. Authoritarian aggression is the
tendency to use aggression as perceived to be sanctioned by legitimate societal authorities. Conventionalism is the idealization of societal conventions and those who support them (Altemeyer 1981; 1996). Consistent with other research (e.g., Goodman & Moradi, 2008; Whitley & Lee, 2000), the one item in this scale that assesses views of lesbians and gays was omitted in the scoring in order to avoid an inflated correlation with scores on the heterosexism scale used in this study (ATLG). Higher total scores indicate a higher level of authoritarianism (McHoskey, 1996). The subscales and overall scale has demonstrated strong internal consistency (.71-.90) as well as strong convergent validity (Goodman & Moradi, 2008; Kossowska, Bukowski, & Van Hiel, 2008; McHoskey; Pratto et al., 1994; Strube & Rahimi, 2006). Based on the present sample of participants, this scale obtained a Cronbach reliability estimate of .93.

Social Dominance Orientation.

Social dominance orientation was measured using the Social Dominance Orientation Scale (Platto et al., 1994). The 14-item scale measures the extent to which respondents desire that their in-group dominates and be superior to out-groups. Items are measured on a 7-point Likert-type scale (1 = very negative to 7 = very positive), with higher scores indicating a stronger social dominance orientation. The scale has been demonstrated to be internally consistent (.83). It also has demonstrated predictive validity and discriminant validity (Pratto et al.). Based on the present sample of participants, this scale obtained a Cronbach reliability estimate of .94.

Universal-Diverse Orientation.

A person’s inclination to an attitude of awareness and acceptance of the similarities and differences between others was measured by the Miville-Guzman Universality-Diversity Scale (M-GUDS; Miville et al., 1999). This measure is comprised of 45 items, with response options ranging from 1 (Strongly
disagree) to 6 (Strongly agree). The measure yields a total score and three subscale scores (diversity of contact, relativistic appreciation, and sense of connection) with higher scores indicating more awareness and acceptance of differences between others. The measure is reliable as evidenced by internal consistency and retest reliability scores ranging from .89-.95 (Miville et al.). The measure also has demonstrated adequate discriminant validity, convergent validity, and construct validity (Thompson et al., 2002). Based on the present sample of participants, this scale obtained a Cronbach reliability estimate of .94.

**Support for Traditional Marriage and Family.**

To assess participants’ attitudes toward traditional marriage and family, they completed a modified version of the parenting subscale of the Life Role Salience Scale (LRSS-m; Amatea et al., 1986). The parenting subscale of the LRSS contains 5 items assessing respondents’ investment in parenting (e.g. “If I did not have children, my life would be empty”) and 5 items assessing commitment to parenting (e.g. “I expect to devote a significant amount of my time and energy to the rearing of children of my own”). The 10 items are measured on a five point Likert-type scale ranging from *Strongly Disagree* (1) to *Strongly Agree* (5). The scales have been demonstrated to have adequate discriminatory and convergent validity (Amate et al.). We modified the LRSS parenting scale by adding an additional item to assess the extent to which respondents desire to be heterosexually married. This modified parenting subscale of the LRSS served as a proxy measure for individuals’ support for traditional (heterosexual) marriage and family. Based on the present sample of participants, this modified subscale obtained a Cronbach reliability estimate of .86.
Social Desirability.

Because prejudicial attitudes generally are considered socially unacceptable, assessing such attitudes in the form of self-reports may be compromised by participants responding to such questions in a socially desirable manner (Cozby, 2003; Paulhus, 1991). Because of this concern, participants completed the *Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale – Short Form* (M-C SDS). The M-C SDS is a True-False, 13-item abbreviated version of the *Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale* (Reynolds, 1982), and is designed to measure attempts by participants to be perceived in a positive manner. A sample item is “No matter who I’m talking to, I’m always a good listener.” Higher scores reflect a greater tendency to respond to test items in a socially desirable manner. Based on the present sample of participants, this scale obtained a Cronbach reliability estimate of .72

Procedure

All data were collected electronically using a secure internet response system (SONA). Prior to data collection, this study was reviewed and approved by the university institutional review board. Participants were provided with an informed consent that outlines their rights and responsibilities as participants in the study. Upon completion of the measures, participants received an electronic debriefing.
CHAPTER FIVE: RESULTS

ATSSM: Establishing “pro-” and “anti-same sex marriage” Comparison Groups

Possible scores on the ATSSM scale ranged from 1 (opposed to same-sex marriage) to 5 (accepting of same-sex marriage). Obtained ATSSM scores from all 814 participants ranged from 1.65 to 4.76 ($M = 3.57; SD = .71$). Statistical tests indicated scores on the ATSSM were mildly skewed (Skew test statistic = -.563 [SE =.09]; Kurtosis test statistic = -.450 [SE = .17). However, Tabachnik and Fidell (2007) suggest that when the sample size is large and the skew and kurtosis statistics are less than one, the likelihood of the impact of the skew and kurtosis diminishes. As such, no transformation of the data was performed and data were examined using parametric tests.

To establish two groups of participants that appropriately could be characterized as “pro-same-sex marriage” and “anti-same-sex marriage,” participants were divided into groups based on the entire sample’s mean and standard deviation on the ATSSM scale. Specifically, those who scored greater than one standard deviation above the ATSSM mean (i.e., > 4.28) formed the “pro-same-sex marriage group” ($n = 145$). They represented 17.87% of the entire sample and their mean ATSSM score = 4.47 ($SD = .09$). Those who scored less than -1 standard deviation of the ATSSM mean (i.e., < 2.86) formed the “anti-same-sex marriage” group ($n = 127$). They represented 15.6% of the sample and their mean ATSSM score = 2.41 ($SD = .35$). Data from participants whose scores fell between +/- 1 standard deviation of the mean were not included in this analysis. For this comparison, only data from participants who self-identified as either exclusively or almost exclusively heterosexual were included for analysis.

Table 1 shows the correlations between all study variables. With the exception of age, all study variables, including gender, correlated significantly with ATSSM and ATPM, respectively. As a result, all variables except age were included in this analysis. To determine if pro- and anti-same-sex marriage
participants differed significantly on the study variables, a multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) was performed on the data. The independent variable (IV) was participant group (pro- vs. anti-same-sex marriage). Dependent variables (DV) were: gender, contact with and appreciation of diverse others (M-GUDS), authoritarianism (RWA), political ideology (liberalism vs. conservatism), autonomy, social dominance orientation (SDO), religiosity, prejudice toward lesbians and gays (heterosexism), and the belief in the importance of traditional (heterosexual) marriage and parenting. Social desirability (MC-SDS) was treated as a covariate.

Table 2 shows the means and standard deviations on the ATSSM scale obtained by pro- and anti-same-sex marriage participants. Overall, ATSSM was associated with a significant effect on the DVs (using Wilks’ Lambda, $F[9, 261] = 187.98, p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .87$). Univariate tests indicated that those who opposed same-sex marriage were significantly more prejudiced against LGs than those who were relatively accepting of same-sex marriage ($M_s = 3.43$ and 1.22 [$SD_s = .64$ and .19], respectively), $F[1, 269] = 1589.14, p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .86$. Moreover, participants who opposed same-sex marriage—relative to participants who were relatively accepting of same-sex marriage—were significantly more likely to endorse authoritarian views ($M_s = 5.64$ and 3.49 [$SD_s = .91$ and 1.14], respectively; $F[1, 269] = 291.17, p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .52$), to be more religious ($M_s = 3.88$ and 2.13 [$SD_s = 1.11$ and 1.07], respectively, $F[1, 269] = 171.07, p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .39$), to have had less contact with or appreciation for diverse others ($M_s = 4.06$ and 4.59 [$SD_s = .66$ and .60], respectively, $F[1, 269] = 51.32, p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .16$), to wish to dominate minority social groups ($M_s = 3.03$ and 2.07 [$SD_s = 1.22$ and 1.03], respectively, $F[1, 269] = 52.18, p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .16$), to be more politically conservative ($M_s = 2.90$ and 3.18 [$SD_s = .38$ and .35], respectively, $F[1, 269] = 41.83, p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .14$), to be less autonomous attitudinally ($M_s = 4.29$ and 4.60 [$SD_s = .78$ and .76], respectively, $F[1, 269] = 13.68, p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .05$), and more likely to be male $F[1, 269] = 17.43, p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .06$).
Because prejudice against LG individuals would be expected to manifest itself in opposition to same-sex marriage, a follow-up MANCOVA was conducted to control for heterosexism. The IV was participant group (pro- vs. anti-same sex marriage). The DVs were the same as the DVs in the previous MANCOVA with the exception of heterosexism. Heterosexism and social desirability (MC-SDS) were treated as covariates. Overall, ATSSM continued being associated with a significant effect on the DVs ($F [8, 261] = 2.71, p < .01, \text{partial } \eta^2 = .08$). However, with heterosexism covaried, pro- and anti-same sex marriage participants differed significantly on three variables only. Univariate tests indicated that those who opposed same-sex marriage were significantly less likely to have had contact with or appreciation for diverse others ($F [1, 268] = 10.90, p < .01, \text{partial } \eta^2 = .04$) and were more likely to want to dominate minority social groups ($F [1, 268] = 7.89, p < .01, \text{partial } \eta^2 = .03$), and to be more conservative politically ($F [1, 268] = 4.51, p < .05, \text{partial } \eta^2 = .02$).

**Predicting ATSSM**

To examine the findings further, a standard multiple regression was performed using data from all 814 participants. We elected to include data from all participants irrespective of sexual orientation given that the aim of this analysis was to determine linear relations between the predictor variables and attitudes toward same-sex marriage. The criterion variable, ATSSM, was treated as a continuous variable. Predictor variables were: gender, contact with and appreciation of diverse others (M-GUDS), authoritarianism (RWA), political ideology (liberalism vs. conservatisim), autonomy, social dominance orientation (SDO), religiosity, prejudice toward lesbians and gays (heterosexism), and the belief in the importance of traditional (heterosexual) marriage and parenting. Social desirability (MC-SDS) was force-entered into the regression equation at block one. Examination of indicators suggestive of problems with collinearity among the predictor variables (e.g., small tolerance values, beta coefficients greater than 1, relatively large variance inflation factors [Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007]) showed no indication of apparent
difficulties of collinearity. Table 3 shows the correlations between variables, the unstandardized regression coefficients ($B$), the standardized regression coefficients ($\beta$), significance levels, the multiple $R$, $R^2$, and adjusted $R^2$. Taken together, the study variables predicted ATSSM (Multiple $R^2 = .82$, $F [10, 797] = 359.70, p < .001$). The variables that individually contributed to the prediction of ATSSM were (in order of magnitude): heterosexism ($\beta = -.84; t = -36.66, p < .001$), contact with and appreciation of diverse others ($\beta = .04; t = 2.30, p < .05$), social dominance orientation ($\beta = -.04; t = -2.09, p < .05$), authoritarianism ($\beta = -.05; t = -2.19, p = .05$), and the belief in the importance of traditional marriage and parenting ($\beta = .03; t = 2.09, p < .05$). The direction of the relationships indicate that opposition to same-sex marriage was associated with higher levels of heterosexism, lower levels of contact with and appreciation of diverse others, higher desires for social dominance, higher levels of authoritarianism, and relatively higher beliefs in the importance of traditional marriage and parenting.

**Exploring Opposition to Same-Sex Marriage and Popular Variables of Concern**

In the popular literature, including some social scientific literature (e.g. Brumbaugh et al., 2008; Gallup, 2003; 2006; 2008; 2009; Haywood, 2008; Herek, 1987; Herman, 1997; Olson et al., 2006; Pearl & Paz-Galupo, 2007), much attention has been paid to the role of people’s religious convictions and political leanings (e.g., conservatism) relative to both homophobia and opposition to same-sex marriage. Also, opponents of same-sex marriage commonly report that their resistance to extend marriage equality to same-sex couples is based on their belief in the sanctity of traditional marriage and family (Brumbaugh et al.; Stacey & Meadow, 2009; Stivers & Valls, 2007; Kline, 2004).

To explore the associations between opposition to same-sex marriage and individuals’ religiosity, conservatism, and belief in traditional marriage and family vis-à-vis prejudice against LGs (heterosexism), a series of zero-order and partial correlational analyses were conducted. As shown in Table 1, religiosity, political ideology, and the belief in the importance of traditional marriage and parenting individually correlated significantly with attitudes toward same-sex marriages ($rs = -.48, -.26,$
and -.10 \([ps < .001, .001, and .01]\), respectively), suggesting that individuals who are religious, politically conservative, and believe in the importance of the traditional marriage and family are more likely to oppose same-sex marriage. However, with heterosexism partialed, the correlations between attitudes toward same-sex marriage and religiosity (partial \(r = .01\)), conservatism (partial \(r = .07\)), and the belief in the importance of traditional marriage and family (partial \(r = .06\)) were no longer significant statistically (all \(ps > .05\)). By contrast, the correlation between attitudes toward same-sex marriage and heterosexism \((r = .90, p < .001)\) remained almost unchanged after partialing religiosity (partial \(r = -.87, p < .001\)), political ideology (partial \(r = -.89, p < .001\)), and the belief in the importance of traditional marriage and family (partial \(r = -.90, p < .001\)), even when all three study variables were partialed simultaneously (partial \(r = -.86, p < .001\)).

**ATPM: Establishing “pro-” and “anti-polygamous marriage” groups**

Possible scores on the ATPM scale ranged from 1 (opposed to polygamous marriage) to 5 (accepting of polygamous marriage). Obtained ATPM scores from all 814 participants ranged from 1.41 to 4.59 \((M = 2.89; SD = .61)\). Observation of a frequency table revealed that the distribution of scores resembled a normal bell-shaped curve. To establish groups that could be characterized as “pro-polygamous marriage” and “anti-polygamous marriage,” students were divided into two groups based on the entire sample’s mean and standard deviation on the ATPM scale. Specifically, those whose score fell greater than one standard deviation above the mean (i.e., >3.15) formed the “pro-polygamous marriage group” \((n = 132)\). They represented 16.2\% of the entire sample and their mean ATPM score = 3.89 \((SD = .30)\). Those whose mean ATPM fell more than one standard deviation below the overall mean (i.e., < 2.28) formed the “anti-polygamous marriage” group \((n = 126)\). They represented 15.5\% of the sample and their mean ATPM score = 1.99 \((SD = .17)\). Data from students falling within one standard deviation of the mean were not included in this analysis.
Table 4 shows the means and standard deviations on the ATPM scale obtained by pro- and anti-polygamous marriage participants. To determine if pro- and anti-polygamous marriage participants differed significantly on the study variables, a multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) was performed on the data. The independent variable (IV) was stance on polygamous marriage (pro- vs. anti-same-sex marriage). Dependent variables (DVs) were: gender, diversity of contact, conventionalism, political conservatism, autonomy, social dominance, religiosity, valuing the traditional family, and attitudes toward same-sex marriage (ATSSM). Social desirability was treated as a covariate.

Overall, ATPM were associated with a significant effect on the dependent variables (using Wilks’ Lambda, $F[9, 243] = 37.73, p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .58$). Univariate tests indicated that those who were pro-polygamous marriage had significantly more diversity of contact ($M = 4.26, SD = .70$) than those who were anti-polygamous marriage ($M = 4.61, SD = .60$), $F(2, 251) = 18.90, p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .07$. Pro-polygamous marriage participants were significantly more autonomous ($M = 4.71, SD = .70$) than those who were anti-polygamous marriage ($M = 4.39, SD = .85$), $F(2, 251) = 13.09, p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .05$. Pro-polygamous marriage participants were significantly less likely to report authoritarian attitudes ($M = 3.16, SD = .12$) than those who were anti-polygamous marriage ($M = 5.27, SD = 1.13$), $F(2, 251) = 227.94, p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .48$. Pro-polygamous marriage participants were significantly less likely to desire to dominate minority social groups ($M = 2.10, SD = 1.04$) than those who were anti-polygamous marriage ($M = 2.62, SD = 1.63$), $F(2, 251) = 13.09, p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .05$. Pro-polygamous marriage participants were significantly less religious ($M = 1.97, SD = 1.02$) than those who were anti-polygamous marriage ($M = 3.47, SD = 1.21$), $F(2, 251) = 115.18, p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .32$. Pro-polygamous participants were less likely to idealize the traditional family ($M = 3.16, SD = 1.12$), than those who were anti-polygamous marriage ($M = 5.28; SD = 1.13$), $F(2, 251) = 20.16, p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .07$. Pro-polygamous participants were much more likely to have positive a positive attitude toward same-sex marriage ($M = 4.19; SD = .31$) than those participants who were anti-polygamous marriage ($M = 3.07; SD = .47$).
.89) $F(2, 251) = 173.59, p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .41$. Last, pro-polygamous participants were more likely to be male ($M = .43, SD = .50$) than female ($M = .22, SD = .42$), $F(2, 251) = 12.48, p < .01$, partial $\eta^2 = .05$.

**Predicting ATPM**

A standard multiple regression was performed in order to identify which variables best predicted the 814 participants’ ATPMs given the presence of other study variables. Heterosexism was excluded due to its close relationship with ATSSM. Table 5 shows the correlations between variables, the unstandardized regression coefficients ($B$) and intercept, the standardized regression coefficients ($\beta$), significance levels, the multiple $R$, $R^2$, and adjusted $R^2$ after entry of all five variables. Social desirability was force-entered into this and all subsequent regression equations at block one. Overall, the variables conjointly predicted ATPM (Multiple $R^2 = .34, F(10, 797) = 42.59, p < .001$). The variables that individually contributed to the prediction of ATPM were (in order of predictive power): ATSSM ($\beta = .35; t = 8.59, p < .001$), gender ($\beta = .17; t = 5.67, p < .001$), authoritarianism ($\beta = -.21; t = -4.60, p < .001$), and the idealization of the traditional family ($\beta = -.13; t = -3.67, p < .001$).

**Exploring Opposition to Polygamous Marriage and Popular Variables of Concern**

Given the strong correlation between ATPM and ATSSM ($r = .50, p < .001$), partial correlations were conducted to explore the correlation between ATPM and gender, authoritarianism, and support of traditional marriage and family while controlling for ATSSM. Results indicated that after controlling for ATSSM, the correlation between the critical variables maintained statistical significance ($rs$ ranged from $- .2$ to $.2, p < .05$). In order to further distill the validity of the belief that the legalization of polygamy, the overlap between those who were in favor of the legalization of both same-sex marriage and polygamy was explored. Of the 132 people who are pro-polygamous marriage, 70 (53%) of the total pro-polygamous and 41% of pro-same-sex marriage participants) also were pro-polygamy. It seems that there
is some support for the idea those who are pro-polygamous are more likely to have favorable ATSSM. That said, a further 10% of those who were pro-same-sex marriage were included in the anti-polygamy group. Although the previous examination of overlap between groups was purely descriptive and could not indicate causality, the group overlap does seem to indicate a trend for the generalization of pro-same-sex attitudes to pro-polygamy attitudes.
CHAPTER SIX: DISCUSSION

As expected, the results indicated that there is a confluence of variables that correlate with both attitudes toward same-sex marriage and polygamous marriage, respectively. Given differences in the origin, practice, and opinion of these constructs, as well as idiosyncrasies in relationships between study variables and each form of marriage, they will first be discussed separately.

With respect to attitudes toward same-sex marriage, based on an initial analysis in which two groups of participants were established based on their relatively high or low support for same-sex marriage, it was found that those who opposed same-sex marriage were significantly more prejudiced against LG individuals than those who were relatively supportive of same-sex marriage. Participants who opposed same-sex marriage also expressed more agreement with the importance of submitting to authority and respecting and conforming to conventional social norms, were relatively religious, and even expressed a relative interest in maintaining a social hierarchy by preserving the social privilege afforded to the majority group at the expense of minority groups. Moreover, opponents of same-sex marriage reported having less experience and contact with individuals who differ from themselves on cultural and sociodemographical dimensions, were more politically conservative, and obtained significantly lower scores on a scale that measures the ability to think independently. The comparison of these two groups also revealed that opponents to same-sex marriage were more likely to be men.

When heterosexism was covaried in a follow-up analysis, proponents and opponents of same-sex marriage continued to differ significantly, but on a much smaller subset of variables. Specifically, when controlling statistically for heterosexism, the two groups differed on experience and contact with individuals who are culturally diverse, interest in maintaining a social hierarchy in which the majority group dominates, and on political ideology (with opponents to same-sex marriage being more conservative).
The results from a standard regression analysis using data from all participants generally were comparable to the results of the comparison between proponents and opponents of same-sex marriage but with some exceptions. Consistent with the variables on which same-sex opponents and proponents differed, the regression analysis revealed that opposition to same-sex marriage correlated positively with prejudice against LG individuals, authoritarianism, and social dominance orientation. Opposition to same-sex marriage also correlated negatively with the appreciation of diverse social experiences. However, unlike the results from the comparison of pro- and anti-same-sex marriage participants, the regression analysis did not reveal a significant correlation between attitudes toward same-sex marriage and political ideology (conservatism-liberalism), autonomous thinking, or gender, but did reveal a negative correlation with traditional family values as measured by interest in becoming married heterosexually and holding favorable views toward parenting (i.e., less acceptance of same-sex marriage was associated with more support for traditional family values).

Based on these findings, collectively it appears that attitudes toward same-sex marriage may not be influenced by any single variable, necessarily, but by a host of variables that individually or in conjunction with other variables. Further, some variables, such as religiosity, political ideology, and autonomous thinking may only distinguish relatively extreme groups of individuals who fall exclusively into either the pro- or anti-same-sex marriage camps. By contrast, other variables appear to be more robust in terms of their link with attitudes toward same-sex marriage. For example, authoritarianism—the belief in the importance of adhering to social conventions (such as norms associated with a heterosexual society), submission to authorities (such as religious leaders, politicians, law enforcement, etc.), and aggressiveness toward dissimilar groups—along with and social dominance orientation—the wish that either one’s group or the prevailing dominant group maintains power and privileges not extended to minority groups—consistently were critical correlates with opposition to same-sex marriage. These latter
two variables have been well-established as correlates with prejudice toward LG individuals (e.g.,

To the best of our knowledge, the variable of experience and interest in contact with diverse
individuals and cultures has not been examined previously as a correlate with heterosexism or attitudes
toward same-sex marriage, yet emerged as a robust correlate with attitudes toward same-sex marriage. As
expected, individuals who manifested more awareness and appreciation for cultural diversity were more
likely to be supportive of same-sex marriage. This finding is consistent with intergroup contact hypothesis
delineated originally by Allport (1954) and promoted relatively recently by multiculturalists (e.g.,
Messick & Mackie, 1989; Ponterotto & Pedersen, 1993; Phinney, Ferguson, & Tate, 1997). Specifically,
the more individuals have positive contact and interaction with dissimilar people, the less likely they
maintain negative stereotypes about the group to which the individuals belong, and in turn, are more
likely to appreciate and respect dissimilar others.

Although our data suggest that multiple variables likely underlie people’s attitudes toward same-
sex marriage, the role of prejudice toward LG individuals warrants special attention. First, it is important
to note that prejudice toward LG individuals (i.e., heterosexism) correlated exceptionally high with
attitudes toward same-sex marriage. A similar high correlation between attitudes toward same-sex
marriage and heterosexism was reported by Pearl and Paz-Galupo (2007). From a traditional
psychometric standpoint, two highly correlated variables generally indicate that the two variables likely
measure the same construct and thus, one of the variables may be considered a redundant variable and
discarded (Tabachnik & Fidell, 2007). Yet, theoretically, attitudes toward LG individuals should be
distinct from attitudes toward same-sex marriage. Stated differently, individuals may be relatively
accepting of LG individuals, yet oppose same-sex marriage on any of a number of grounds, such as
interest in preserving traditional marriage, concern for children who grow up in non-traditional families,
and so on (Craig et al., 2005). The very strong correlation between heterosexism and attitudes toward
same-sex marriage suggests that opposition to same-sex marriage seems highly predicated on prejudice against LG individuals.

This possibility became more apparent when attempting to disentangle the role of heterosexism, religiosity, political conservatism, and belief in the importance of traditional marriage and family on attitudes toward same-sex marriage. As discussed earlier, it is common in contemporary discourse on same-sex marriage in the U.S. to focus on religious principles, conservatism, and the wish to preserve traditional marriage as the bases on which individuals oppose same-sex marriage (Brumbaugh et al., 2008; Gallup, 2009; Haywood, 2008; Herek, 1987; Herman, 1997; Kline, 2004; Olson et al., 2006; Pearl & Paz-Galupo, 2007). Yet, findings from a series of partial correlations were rather remarkable. Although zero-order correlation analyses indicated that individuals who are more religious, politically conservative, and supportive of traditional marriage and family are indeed more likely to oppose same-sex marriage, the link between those variables and attitudes toward same-sex marriage almost vanished completely once heterosexism was partialed from the analyses. Yet, the very strong correlation between heterosexism and opposition to same-sex marriage remained almost completely intact after partialing out religiosity, political conservatism, and support for traditional marriage and family. Taken together, these results suggest that prejudice against LGs (i.e., heterosexism) may account almost entirely for the link between opposition to same-sex marriage and religiosity, conservatism, and the belief in the importance of traditional marriage and family. By contrast, the latter three variables appear to have almost no bearing on the link between prejudice against LGs and opposition to same-sex marriage.

Discrimination against LG individuals is well documented in the literature (e.g., Balsam & Mohr, 2007; Huebner, Nemeroff, & Davis, 2005; Szymanski & Owens, 2008; Meyer, 2003). Studies also have found that LG individuals perceive state marriage amendments that have occurred across the United States as prejudicial events (Riggle et al., 2010). Moreover, a recent study has found that same-sex couples residing in states where constitutional amendments barring same-sex marriage were passed suffer
heightened negative affect, stress, and symptoms of depression relative to same-sex couples residing in states that do not, as of yet, have similar constitutional amendments (Rostosky et al., 2009).

All considered, we believe these findings cast those who oppose same-sex marriage in a less than favorable light. The claim by many opponents of same-sex marriage that they hold nothing against LG individuals (as was argued by supporters of California’s Proposition 8 during its most recent legal challenge), but that their opposition to same-sex marriage is guided by religious convictions and their beliefs in the sanctity of traditional marriage possibly reflects a lack of awareness of their true motives or disingenuity on their part. Due to the socially undesirable nature of being prejudiced against minority groups, desiring a social order whereby majority groups dominate others, and being inexperienced and possibly incurious about people from diverse backgrounds, opponents of same-sex marriage may be—even if unwittingly—cloaking such characteristics with what they view as virtuous rationales for their opposition to same-sex marriage (i.e., religious morals, pro-family values, etc.).

With respect to polygamous marriage, although overall attitudes toward polygamous marriage were negative, the practice was not met with the unilateral negativity that has been observed in social surveys (Gallup, 2007; 2009). As is the case with attitudes toward same-sex marriage, participants’ age and education level may contribute to an apparent higher degree of tolerance for polygamy compared to the general population (Gallup, 2003). Despite this group’s relative tolerance, extremely negative and positive attitudes were present and allowed for classification as pro or anti-polygamous marriage in the same manner that was used for same-sex marriage. The most striking difference between the pro and anti-polygamous groups was the nature of their attitudes toward same-sex marriage with anti-polygamous participants exhibiting significantly higher levels of negativity. The strength and direction of the observed relationship corroborates past research that indicates the strength of the public’s association between polygamous marriage and same-sex marriage (e.g. Stacey & Meadows, 2009; Calhoun, 2005; Gallup, 2009). Like those who were opposed to same-sex marriage, opponents of polygamous marriage
were far more likely to emphasize the importance of submitting to authority and respecting and conforming to conventional social norms particularly with respect to family values and practices, and were invested in maintaining a social hierarchy that contributes to the subordination and marginalization of minority groups. Opponents were more likely to be religious but less likely to exhibit tolerance or appreciation of diversity and think in an autonomous fashion. The direction of these relationships is congruent with past research with indicates a converse relationship between authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, universal-diversity orientation, and autonomous thinking and prejudice toward minority groups (Altemeyer, 1998; Basow & Johnson, 2000; Goodman & Moradi, 2008; Haslem & Levy, 2006; Morrison, Kenny, & Harrington, 2005; Whitley, 1999; Whitley & Ugisdottir, Stefania, 2000; Whitley & Lee, 2000; Henry & Reyna, 2007; Donovan, Jessor, & Costa, 1991). Contrary to findings regarding same-sex marriage (Brumbaugh et al., 2008, those who opposed polygamy were more likely to be female and were not more politically conservative than proponents of polygamy.

With respect to the separate examination of overlap between pro-same-sex marriage and pro-polygamy groups, over half of those in the pro-same-sex marriage group also were classified into the pro-polygamous marriage group. Those who are convinced of the utility of the “slippery slope” argument may take the observed group overlap and relationship between attitudes toward polygamous marriage and attitudes toward same-sex marriage as evidence for the veracity of their concerns. However, the group overlap was not perfect and critical variables maintained their predictive power even after controlling for the effect of attitudes toward same-sex marriage. That said, the support and prevalence of the practice of polygamy throughout the world and within the one country that allows same-sex marriage and polygamous marriage, has actually declined rather than inclined despite the fact that same-sex marriage rights have increased dramatically in the recent past (Stacey & Meadows, 2009). As such, the public’s notion that same-sex marriage can be expected to lead to polygamy seems to be nothing more than an illusory correlation. As such, there is a need, particularly for leaders whose influence is apt to weigh in
on the opinion of the public, to consider pragmatic reasons why these relationships were observed instead of relying on explanations that seem to be fear-based and lack empirical support. For instance, even though marital infidelity is a separate subject and a full review would be beyond the scope of this study, the intolerance associated with having and extra-marital relationship that surpasses the rates of those observed for polygamy, is one of the most common reasons for couples to seek therapy, and is a strong predictor of divorce (Amato & Rogers, 1997; Gallup, 2009; Laumann, Gagnon, Michael, & Michael, 1994 cited in Previti & Amato, 2004). Even though we in no way equate extra-marital affairs with polygamy, it may be that the similarity in the behaviors and feelings that often occur within a context of a polygamous marriage courtship (e.g. sexual intercourse, possible development of romantic feelings, sharing financial resources, participation in a second family) bear such a resemblance to those that would be indicative of infidelity within the context of a monogamous relationship, that polygamy evokes a negative emotional reaction by association with the hurt, and anger that so often occur following infidelity in Western culture (Cann, Mangum, & Wells, 2001; Cramer, Lipinski, Meteer, Hoska, 2008; Sabini & Green, 2004).

Attitudes toward same-sex marriage did, however, emerge as one of several predictors of attitudes toward polygamous marriage. The emergence of several variables as predictors indicates that it is clusters of attitudes rather than the singular influence of one variable that most accurately predict attitudes toward polygamous marriage. With the exception of gender, this interpretation is congruent with the current cultural climate which made family values as they pertain to morality the central issue of the same-sex marriage debate (Stacey & Meadow, 2009; Calhoun, 2005; Craig, Martinez, & Kane, 2005). Stated differently, opposition to polygamous marriage depends on the view that the necessary redefinition of family values, and inherent deviation from the opinions of the majority and societal leaders, would threaten society’s moral foundation (Dru, 2007; Duckitt & Sibley, 2007). Participants’ moral evaluation of those who wish to engage in polygamy was not directly measured but extant theory (Duckitt, 2001
cited in Duckitt & Sibley, 2007; Altemeyer, 1981) and research suggest that those who violate cultural norms in a way that challenges practices tied to morality and are apt to be judged to be immoral, uncaring people whose rights should be marginalized to protect those who are upholding practices that presumably foster morality (Cohrs & Asbrock, 2009; Henry & Reyna, 2007).

Gender’s negative predictive relationship with attitudes toward polygamous marriage warrants further attention, particularly since, in addition to differentiating between those who were pro and anti-polygamous marriage, it emerged as the most powerful predictor within the composite next to attitudes toward same-sex marriage. The direction of these relationships with attitudes toward polygamous marriage and concurrent emergence with variables related to prejudice is contrary to what one may expect given previous research which indicates that women typically exhibit a lesser degree of prejudicial attitudes toward minority groups, particularly with respect to the group’s plight to secure equal marriage rights (Gallup, 2009; Whitley, 1999; Whitley & Ægisdóttir, 2000). Although one may speculate that women are opposed polygamy as a function of feminism, the direction of the relationships between female gender and other variables in the composite contradict this assertion. For example, results indicate that women who oppose polygamous marriage are more likely to idealize patriarchal social institutions such as heterosexual, monogamous marriage (Stacey & Meadows, 2009). Regarding an alternative explanation, details regarding allegations of violence against women within these sects have been made available to the public through a variety of media (Stacey & Meadows, 2009; Moore-Emmett, 2007; Altman & Ginat, 1996) and may contribute to a conscious or unconscious pairing with domestic violence, which tends to evoke more sympathy from women than men (Locke & Richman, 1999). As previously discussed with respect to polygamous marriage being coupled with same-sex marriage in so many people’s minds despite evidence to the contrary, it may be feelings surrounding infidelity may affect women’s attitudes uniquely since it is women who would have to cope with what many theorists would call an evolutionary threat posed by polygamy in that she would have to share her husband’s emotional,
sexual, and financial resources with another wife (Buss, 2000). In line with this interpretation, these presumably monogamous women, may empathize with women in polygamous marriages as though they were women in monogamous marriages who were hurt by the experience of emotional and sexual infidelity. Although this has not been directly studied, there is extant research that indicates women are more likely to empathize with victims of infidelity then men (Orsolya, Josephs, Jost, 2008).

Since polygamy inherently challenges the idealization of monogamous, heterosexual marriage, which one author describes as “central to the nation’s republican identity” (Stacey & Meadow, 2009), and recent polls have indicated that those who are politically conservative are more apt to harbor negative attitudes toward polygamy than they had been in the past (Gallup, 2009), the fact that political conservatism did not differentiate between pro and anti-polygamous groups and did not emerge as a predictor, was unexpected. The sample of participants was comprised entirely of college students, who are apt to ascribe to more politically liberal viewpoints as they progress through their higher education (Lottes & Kuriloff, 1994). It is plausible that even those participants who identify as politically conservative are still more liberal than political conservatives who currently are not college students. That said, when predominant political liberals and conservatives (e.g. those whose total scores fell above or beneath the central point on the scale, respectively) were examined in relation to the frequency with which they would be classified as pro and anti-polygamous marriage, it was apparent hat no participants who were predominantly politically conservative fell into the pro-polygamous marriage group.

Apart from political conservatism, religiosity, autonomy, social dominance orientation, and tolerance for diversity differentiated the extreme groups but did not emerge as significant predictors. Even though religious variables are one of the only variables other than political conservatism that have been studied as they relate to attitudes toward polygamy within the United States, religiosity did not emerge as a predictor and only was useful in discriminating between extreme beliefs. It may be that the emphasis that active members of religious communities inherently place on practices that foster convention, cohesion, and
consensus within their congregations (Olson, Cadge, & Harrison, 2006) has a similar effect to that which is observed with authoritarianism, a seemingly related construct given the common interest in morality and convention and the tendency to marginalize those groups that pose a perceived threat to society and the nuclear family as a function of their violation of these principles (Burdette, Ellison, & Hill, 2005; Duckitt, 2001 cited in Duckitt & Sibley, 2007). The fact that authoritarianism but not social dominance orientation arose as a significant predictor supports the view that these constructs manifest as a function of different mechanisms and further indicates that objection to polygamous marriage may result from concern secondary to the perception of a presumed threat society’s moral foundation rather than out of concern over competitive threat (Duckitt, 2001 cited in Duckitt & Sibley, 2007; Duckitt & Sibley, 2007; Cohrs & Asbrock, 2009). With this interpretation in mind, if the scarcity of people who belong to religious or cultural groups that embrace the practice within the United States is indicative of low interest in entering into a polygamous marriage, there would indeed be little cause for concern regarding competition for romantic partners.

The rarity of polygamous marriage was likely related to the non-significant predictive power of tolerance of diversity. That is, the opportunity to engage in informal and formal diversity experiences, which foster tolerance toward marginalized groups in those who harbor prejudicial attitudes, (Spanierman, Todd, & Anderson, 2009; Wright, Aron, McLaughlin-Volpe & Ropp, 1997) are limited if not just by the fact that the practice is illegal and stigmatized. As such, it is not likely that the majority’s attitudes would be affected by this variable. With respect to autonomy, although the United States values are closely tied to individualism and autonomy, when it comes to making moral decisions, young adults are paradoxically encouraged to use autonomous thinking in order to uphold an implied moral consensus (Rutherford, 2004). If the moral consensus is indicated by the seemingly omnipresent abhorrence to polygamy, an individual would be hard-pressed to isolate their opinion from the majority in such a way that would allow them to form opinions using their own values alone, (Godwin, Godwin, & Martinz-
Ebers, 2004; Starks & Robinson, 2007; Shibutani, 1987) which is perhaps why this variable is only useful in differentiating between extreme attitudes toward polygamy.

Advocates of marriage equality will be challenged as they endeavor to gain public favor toward same-sex marriage and polygamous marriage given the array of variables seeming to underlie resistance to both respective forms of marriage. Some of the critical variables that correlated with opposition to same-sex and polygamous marriage may be more amenable to change than others. For example, it probably is unrealistic that individual intervention (e.g., counseling) or group-based psychoeducational intervention will affect significantly certain personality styles such as authoritarianism (Berman, 2009; Stone, Lederer, & Christie, 1993; Tyrer, 2000). Further, it is unlikely and arguably unethical to attempt to modify people’s religious convictions and political inclinations (e.g., conservatism). However, either at an individual or group-based level, teachers and professors, counselors, community leaders, politicians, and even religious leaders may have success at challenging prejudice and discriminatory behavior against gays and lesbians and same-sex couples but not to polygamous families. In addition to addressing the immorality of prejudice and discrimination, such interventions may address the benefits of being able to think and evaluate information based on evidence rather than in response to social or external pressures, as well as the intrinsic enrichment derived from learning about and interacting with people of diverse backgrounds (Ponterotto, Utsey, & Pedersen, 2006).

Moreover, the belief that same-sex and polygamous marriage will somehow threaten or undermine the legitimacy of heterosexual marriage can be explored and challenged based on empirical grounds. This and one other study (Stacey & Meadow, 2009) contribute to a growing body of literature that further indicate that there is no evidence that the legalization of same-sex marriages has had any impact (neither negatively nor positively) on heterosexual marriages in the states and countries that now recognize same-sex marriage. Such education can include the emerging body of empirical literature carried out in the United States and elsewhere that documents that children reared by gay couples are no
different on any psycho-social dimension than children reared by heterosexual parents (for a review of some of those studies, see Negy & McKinney, 2006). These collective interventions may be effective in modifying resistive attitudes toward same-sex and polygamous marriage so that the United States can live up to its promise of being a nation that values individual liberties and embraces cultural diversity.
APPENDIX A:
IRB APPROVAL LETTER
Notice of Expedited Initial Review and Approval

From: UCF Institutional Review Board  
FWA0000351, Exp. 10/8/11, IRB00001138

To: Catherine Pearte

Date: April 08, 2009

IRB Number: SBE-09-06193

Study Title: Young Adults’ Attitudes Toward Same-sex Marriage and Polygamy as a Function of Demographic, Gender, and Personality Variables

Dear Researcher:

Your research protocol noted above was approved by expedited review by the UCF IRB Vice-Chair on 4/8/2009. The expiration date is 4/7/2010. Your study was determined to be minimal risk for human subjects and expeditable per federal regulations, 45 CFR 46.110. The category for which this study qualifies as expeditable research is as follows:

7. Research on individual or group characteristics or behavior (including, but not limited to, research on perception, cognition, motivation, identity, language, communication, cultural beliefs or practices, and social behavior) or research employing survey, interview, oral history, focus group, program evaluation, human factors evaluation, or quality assurance methodologies.

The IRB has approved a waiver of documentation of consent for all subjects. Participants do not have to sign a consent form, but the IRB requires that you give participants a copy of the IRB-approved consent form, letter, information sheet. For online surveys, please advise participants to print out the consent document for their files.

All data, which may include signed consent form documents, must be retained in a locked file cabinet for a minimum of three years (six if HIPAA applies) past the completion of this research. Any links to the identification of participants should be maintained on a password-protected computer if electronic information is used. Additional requirements may be imposed by your funding agency, your department, or other entities. Access to data is limited to authorized individuals listed as key study personnel.

To continue this research beyond the expiration date, a Continuing Review Form must be submitted 2 – 4 weeks prior to the expiration date. Advise the IRB if you receive a subpoena for the release of this information, or if a breach of confidentiality occurs. Also report any unanticipated problems or serious adverse events (within 5 working days). Do not make changes to the protocol methodology or consent form before obtaining IRB approval. Changes can be submitted for IRB review using the Addendum/Modification Request Form. An Addendum/Modification Request Form cannot be used to extend the approval period of a study. All forms may be completed and submitted online at http://iris.research.ucf.edu.

Failure to provide a continuing review report could lead to study suspension, a loss of funding and/or publication possibilities, or reporting of noncompliance to sponsors or funding agencies. The IRB maintains the authority under 45 CFR 46.110(c) to observe or have a third party observe the consent process and the research.

On behalf of Tracy Dietz, Ph.D., UCF IRB Chair, this letter is signed by:

Signature applied by Joanne Muratori on 04/08/2009 09:54:58 AM EDT

IRB Coordinator
APPENDIX B:
CORRELATIONS MATRIX OF STUDY VARIABLES
Table 1. Correlations Matrix of Study Variables

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Notes: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001,

ATSSM; ATPM = Attitudes Toward Same-Sex Marriage; Polygamous Marriage (Pearl & Paz-Galupo, 2007; Pear & Paz-Galupo, 2007, modified)

SDO = Social Dominance Orientation (Platto et al., 1994).

M-GUDS = Miville-Guzman Universal-Diversity Scale (Miville et al., 1999).

Traditional Family measured by LRSS-modified (Amatea et al., 1986).
APPENDIX C:
DIFFERENCES AMONG PRO AND ANTI SAME-SEX MARRIAGE PARTICIPANTS
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLE</th>
<th>Pro-Same-Sex Marriage</th>
<th>Anti-Same-Sex Marriage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(n = 145)</td>
<td>(n = 127)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heterosexism</td>
<td>Mean 1.22 (SD .19)</td>
<td>3.43*** (.64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M-GUDS(^a) 4.59 (SD .60)</td>
<td>4.06*** (.66)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarianism</td>
<td>3.49 (1.14)</td>
<td>5.64*** (.91)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Ideology</td>
<td>3.18 (SD .35)</td>
<td>2.90*** (.38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomy</td>
<td>4.60 (SD .76)</td>
<td>4.29*** (.78)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDO(^b)</td>
<td>2.07 (SD 1.02)</td>
<td>3.03*** (1.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>2.13 (SD 1.07)</td>
<td>3.88*** (1.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional Family(^c)</td>
<td>4.10 (SD .82)</td>
<td>4.25 (.67)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: ***p < .001

\(^a\) M-GUDS = Mivillie-Guzman Universal-Diversity Scale (Miville et al., 1999).

\(^b\) SDO = Social Dominance Orientation (Platto et al., 1994).

\(^c\) Traditional Family measured by LRSS-modified (Amatea et al., 1986).
APPENDIX D:
STANDARD REGRESSION OF STUDY VARIABLES ON ATSSM
Table 3. Standard Regression of Study Variables on ATSSM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>$B$</th>
<th>$\beta$</th>
<th>$t$-test</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Gender</td>
<td>-.041</td>
<td>-.027</td>
<td>-1.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Heterosexism</td>
<td>-.673</td>
<td>-.834</td>
<td>-36.66***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Political Ideology</td>
<td>.039</td>
<td>.020</td>
<td>1.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Autonomy</td>
<td>-.024</td>
<td>-.026</td>
<td>-1.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) SDO$^b$</td>
<td>-.026</td>
<td>-.039</td>
<td>-2.09*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) M-GUDS$^c$</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.043</td>
<td>2.30*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7) Authoritarianism</td>
<td>-.006</td>
<td>-.053</td>
<td>-2.19*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8) Religiosity</td>
<td>-.003</td>
<td>-.005</td>
<td>-.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(9) Traditional Family$^d$</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>.033</td>
<td>2.09*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$R^2 = .82***$
Adjusted $R^2 = .82***$
$R = .91***$

Notes: * $p < .05$. *** $p < .001$
Social Desirability (MC-SDS; Reynolds, 1982) controlled for by entering at block 1.
a ATSSM = Attitudes Toward Same-Sex Marriage (Pearl & Paz-Galupo, 2007).
b SDO = Social Dominance Orientation (Platto et al., 1994).
c M-GUDS = Miville-Guzman Universal-Diversity Scale (Miville et al., 1999).
d Traditional Family measured by LRSS-modified (Amatea et al., 1986).
APPENDIX E:
DIFFERENCES AMONG POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGE PARTICIPANTS
### Table 4. Means and Standard Deviations of Pro and Anti Polygamous Participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GROUP</th>
<th>Pro-Polygamous Marriage ($n = 131$)</th>
<th>Anti-Polygamous Marriage ($n = 125$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VARIABLE</td>
<td>ATSSM&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt; Mean ($SD$)</td>
<td>4.19 (.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M-GUDS&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>4.26 (.70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Authoritarianism</td>
<td>3.18 (1.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political Ideology</td>
<td>3.00 (.42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Autonomy</td>
<td>4.71 (.70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SDO&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2.10 (1.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>1.97 (1.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Traditional Family&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3.16 (1.12)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** ***$p < .001$**

<sup>a</sup> ATSSM= Attitudes Toward Same-Sex Marriage (Pearl & Paz-Galupo, 2007).

<sup>b</sup>M-GUDS = Miville-Guzman Universal-Diversity Scale (Miville et al., 1999).

<sup>c</sup>SDO = Social Dominance Orientation (Platto et al., 1994).

<sup>d</sup>Traditional Family measured by LRSS-modified (Amatea et al., 1986).
APPENDIX F:
STANDARD MULTIPLE REGRESSION OF STUDY VARIABLES ON ATPM
Table 5. Standard Multiple Regression of Study Variables on ATPM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>β</th>
<th>t-test</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Gender</td>
<td>.220</td>
<td>.170</td>
<td>5.66***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) ATSSM</td>
<td>.303</td>
<td>.352</td>
<td>8.59***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Political Ideology</td>
<td>-.044</td>
<td>-.026</td>
<td>- .878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Autonomy</td>
<td>.022</td>
<td>.028</td>
<td>.866</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) SDO&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>.019</td>
<td>.033</td>
<td>.919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) M-GUDS&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>.042</td>
<td>.044</td>
<td>1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7) Authoritarianism</td>
<td>-.099</td>
<td>-.207</td>
<td>-4.60***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8) Religiosity</td>
<td>-.026</td>
<td>-.054</td>
<td>-1.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(9) Traditional Family&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-.088</td>
<td>-.111</td>
<td>-3.66***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$R^2 = .35***$

Adjusted $R^2 = .34***$

$R = .59***$

Notes: * $p < .05$. *** $p < .001$
Social Desirability (MC-SDS; Reynolds, 1982) controlled for by entering at block 1.
<sup>a</sup> ATPM = Attitudes Toward Polygamous Marriage measured by ATSSM-modified (Pearl & Paz-Galupo, 2007).
<sup>b</sup> ATSSM = Attitudes Toward Same-Sex Marriage (Pearl & Paz-Galupo, 2007).
SDO = Social Dominance Orientation (Platto et al., 1994).
<sup>c</sup> M-GUDS = Miville-Guzman Universal-Diversity Scale (Miville et al., 1999).
<sup>d</sup> Traditional Family measured by LRSS-modified (Amatea et al., 1986).
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