Explaining State Crisis Behavior Using the Operational Code

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EXPLAINING STATE CRISIS BEHAVIOR
USING THE OPERATIONAL CODE

by

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ABSTRACT

Does the operational code of a state’s leadership have an effect on its behavior during foreign policy crises? Specifically, do states with more conflictual operational codes opt for a more conflictual response to crises, or do systemic and structural variables intervene to limit their significance? While the study of individual level psychology in international relations has been gaining momentum, the causal links between beliefs and behavior have yet to be solidified. This study used ordered logistic regression across three models to determine the effect of the operational code on state crisis behavior while controlling for key domestic and crisis dimension variables. Predicted probabilities were also used to better demonstrate the variables’ substantive effects. The 50 cases used in this research are drawn from the International Crisis Behavior Dataset composed by Brecher and Wilkenfeld, and they focus on the United States as the major crisis actor. Operational code data were derived from computer-based content analysis using the Verbs In Context System (Walker, Schafer, and Young 1998). The theoretical goal of this paper was to explain variance in state crisis behavior through variations in the operational codes of US Presidents. The results demonstrate that the operational codes of leaders do affect state crisis behavior. Specifically, the operational code indices P1 and I1 show that a leader with a more conflictual view of the nature of the political universe and a conflictual direction of strategy is more likely to employ escalatory crisis behavior.
For my parents. Rest in Peace, Dad.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

The substantive research question explored in this project is: does the operational code of a state’s leadership have an effect on its behavior during foreign policy crises? Specifically, do state leaders with more conflictual operational codes opt for a more conflictual response to crises, or do systemic and structural variables intervene to limit their significance? This project aims to test the theory that the operational codes of leaders have an effect on their behavior. The majority of data used in this research, along with all of the case selections, are drawn from the International Crisis Behavior Dataset composed by Brecher and Wilkenfeld (2010), which houses data on 455 international crises from 1918-2007. The existing causal links between the operational code and behavior have been noted, but the empirical evidence is scarce. The purpose of this project is to further solidify those links.

First, this project will offer a substantive overview of the description and evolution of operational code theory, along with its evolution from qualitative typological studies to quantitative content analysis studies. Additionally, the ten operational code questions described by George (1969) will be discussed to improve the reader’s understanding of this theoretical framework. Because the unit of analysis for this project is the state during a foreign policy crisis, an overview of competing theories on state crisis behavior will also be given.

Second, the theoretical framework for this paper will be laid out, describing in detail the main dependent variable of the paper- a state’s principal crisis management technique- along with the independent variables of interest, the operational code of a state’s leadership (specifically P1, P4, and I1). Because cognitive and psychological variables cannot solely
account for the foreign policy decision making process, several systemic and structural control variables will be added to the study to account for additional variance in a state’s principal crisis management technique. These controls will be discussed at length at a later point.

To be sure, the theoretical goal of this paper is to explain variance in state crisis behavior through variations in the operational code of the state’s leadership. Again, cognitive variables like the operational code are not expected to solely account for a state’s crisis behavior, but results are expected to be significant. A state’s crisis behavior is a result of its foreign policy decision making, which is in turn influenced by leaders who make decisions through their belief systems. Indeed, individuals react to the world through their belief systems (Renshon 2008; Walker 1983). While the causal links between the operational code and behavior seem to be present, they are not easily identifiable (Schafer & Young 1998). It is the aim of this paper to more clearly identify this causal link.

Next, the methods of this project will be discussed at length, including case selection, data collection, the dependent and independent variables and the specific statistical models to be used. The variables will be individually discussed in detail, including their values and the justification for their inclusion in the project. The hypotheses posited in this study are also stated here. A subsequent results section will thoroughly explain the findings and their interpretation.

Finally, a concluding section will offer insights into future research, the limitations placed upon this study, and a summary statement reiterating the relevance of the operational code and its effects on state crisis behavior.
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

While a substantial amount of literature on state crisis behavior exists, there is little consensus over which types of variables best account for this behavior. Indeed, a state’s behavior during a crisis is an integral part of the study of international relations. The high stakes and threats to its security and future well-being prompt states to pursue the course of action that best meets their interests. Early efforts to study state behavior focused on key structural variables that limited state action, views that were reinforced by the Cold War environment and bipolar relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union (Waltz 1979; Mearshimer 2001). Following the abrupt end of the Cold War, scholars began to increasingly look inward, examining important domestic variables within states, including but not limited to regime type and economic standing. Eventually, calls for studies at the individual level of analysis led to the examination of agency-based explanations for state crisis behavior (Levy 1997).

While all of these structural theories have been substantiated in one way or another, they have failed to account for assessments of the decision makers of the states themselves. That is, they have treated the decision makers as constrained by the structure of the international system. It was not until Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin in their seminal article “Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics” (1954) that scholars began to look inside the proverbial “black box” of states in the international system. What follows is a review of the aforementioned literature on state crisis behavior.
Realism, Neorealism, and the Cold War World

One early and prominent paradigm was realism, which defined state relations as a series of power relationships. Here, states pursued “national interests” based on the constant human drive for power and security (Morgenthau 1973; Mearshimer 2001). Neorealist works redefined state relations not in terms of human nature but rather as a result of the international system that was in place. State behavior was expected to be the result of responses to constraints imposed by the international system (Waltz 1979). Some common analogies included viewing the state as a “black box” or “billiard ball,” meaning they are all functionally the same and devoid of any important domestic characteristics. Proponents of this theory suggested that the lack of a governing body above states fostered an environment of constant preparation for conflict within the international system, and states were expected to pursue economic and military security at all times. These systemic conditions were thought to explain a considerable amount of state behavior (Waltz 1979).

The Cold War environment reinforced these structural explanations of state behavior, suggesting that the very nature of the bipolar system that was in place and the action-reaction relationship that existed between the United States and the Soviet Union provided clear focal points off of which to base state behavior. In other words, the US and USSR faced a limited range of foreign policy choices in dealing with one another, and the credibility of these structural theories persisted. Some of these theories predicted alliance formations to balance against threats (Walt 1987), the ability of hegemonic powers to maintain superiority (Gilpin 1981), and the effect of the security dilemma on state behavior (Jervis 1978). Because the Cold War environment provided sufficient explanatory power for these theories, an examination of the
Looking Inward: Domestic and Agency-Based Explanations for State Behavior

However, the end of the Cold War called into question many of the foundational claims these theories made. No longer were there clear structural focal points off of which to base foreign policy decisions. For the US, there was no longer one clear enemy to be accounted for. Instead, the post-Cold War environment saw multiple threats to a state’s security in the form of institutions, non-state actors, and other international bodies (Schafer and Walker 2006). Because of the increasingly complex structure of the post-Cold War world and the lack of clear foreign policy choices, scholars were increasingly forced to look inward and examine domestic variables within the state to better determine its behavior.

Proponents of Democratic Peace Theory suggested that the nature of a state’s government was worth consideration. Champions of this theory posited that states with democratic governments are less likely to engage in conflict with one another. This reluctance stems from the high levels of accountability leaders face from their citizenry when using force abroad, coupled with the heavy losses these states would incur from war (Chan 1984; Maoz & Russett 1993; Russett 1994; Rousseau et al. 1996). Further, Bueno de Mesquita & Lalman (1992) suggest that the use of force abroad imposes heavy costs on democratic leaders, effectively limiting their territorial ambitions (Lake 1992). Thus, state crisis behavior can be explained in terms of their regime type.
Other theories suggest that state crisis behavior is a product of diversionary tactics taken by state leaders. Here, terrible domestic conditions within a state—economic woes, for example—would prompt leaders to use violent crisis behavior in otherwise nonviolent situations. These actions are thought to boost the leader’s popularity by shifting the focus of his state’s citizenry towards a clear and identifiable enemy overseas. With a threat to its security, the citizenry is expected to stand behind its leader (DeRouen 1995, 2000; Wilkenfeld 1991). Studies grounded in this diversionary theory of war have produced significant results. For instance, Ostrom and Job (1986) found that the level of support a US President receives is a major factor in his decisions on whether or not to use force abroad. Additionally, Lian and Oneal (1993) found that the public supports the President when force is used abroad.

Explanations for state behavior at the individual level of analysis were largely undertaken within the framework of the rational actor model. Here, the state’s decision makers were expected to analyze all incoming information and choose the course of action that maximized gains while minimizing losses (Levy 1997; Allison & Zelikow 1971). Regardless of the personal characteristics of the decision makers under study, they were all expected to adhere to this theory of utility function in an effort to maximize gains.

The ICB Project

This focus on state decision makers, coupled with an emphasis on state crisis behavior, led to the creation of the International Crisis Behavior Project (ICB hereafter) developed by Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld. In his earlier works, Brecher defined state crisis behavior in terms of the actions and responses taken by its decision makers (1974; 1977; 1979). He cites three necessary and sufficient conditions for an event to qualify as a crisis: a threat to
one or more basic values, a finite response time, and a heightened probability of involvement in military hostilities (Brecher 1997). Brecher and Wilkenfeld (1982) also note the significant impact that both stress and uncertainty have on state decision makers, affecting their crisis behavior. Indeed, Hermann suggests that leadership characteristics are accentuated during stressful situations (2005).

The ICB Project culminated in the creation of a major dataset, housing information on more than 400 international crises. A principal aim of the ICB project is to gain an advanced understanding of state behavior during international crises in an effort to mitigate their effects on global security (Brecher 1997). Multiple theories of state crisis behavior have been drawn from the ICB dataset. For example, Wilkenfeld (1991) found that states are most likely to display tit-for-tat, or matching behavior during crises. That is, a non-violent trigger act will most likely result in a non-violent response, while a violent trigger will provoke a violent response. Additionally, Hewitt and Wilkenfeld (1999) found that one-sided crises are less likely to lead to violence than two-sided crises due to the lack of reciprocal fears of military involvement.

Essentially, Brecher and Wilkenfeld’s work with the ICB dataset has determined that state decision maker’s principal crisis behavior is a product of the environmental constraints placed upon him/her. At no point do they theorize about the personality characteristics of the leaders themselves, specifically their beliefs about the political universe, as it relates to state crisis behavior.
While the structural and domestic variables mentioned above account for a portion of a state’s crisis behavior (Gelpi & Griesdorf 2001), they fail to take account of the decision makers within states. That is, existing theories suggested their behavior was a product of environmental constraints, placing no significance on the belief patterns or personality traits of leaders. In their seminal article “Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics,” Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin (SBS) issued a call to open up the proverbial “black box” and see what was inside (Pearlman 2010; Kelman & Fisher 2003). Positing that a state is its decision makers, SBS provided the framework for an emerging field of study focusing on individuals within the state. Scholars in this camp have suggested that state crisis behavior is partly a product of psychological and personality traits specific to each leader. Different leaders are expected to have different decision-making processes based on their views of the political universe (Hagan 1994), their misperception of signals (Jervis 1976), their information processing (Suedfeld & Tetlock 1977), and their leadership style (Keller 2005a; 2005b). These views are said to have an impact on a state’s crisis behavior (Hermann & Kegley 1995), specifically concerning whether leaders opt for a violent or non-violent course of action.

Recent research in this field has attempted to look at individual belief patterns and personality traits as casual mechanisms for state crisis behavior. These efforts have manifested themselves in the form of operational code analysis (Walker, Schafer, and Young 1998) and leadership trait analysis (Hermann 2005).

In summation, the existing literature on state crisis behavior is best explained in terms of structural, systemic, and domestic variables such as regime type, economic standing, and crisis
type. However, there is little research that takes into account the idiosyncratic tendencies of state leaders and how these tendencies affect state crisis behavior. While related research is mentioned above, it remains scarce. This study will employ the operational code indices developed by Walker, Schafer, and Young (1998) to evaluate leaders’ belief systems in an effort to further explain state behavior. Snyder, Bruck and Sapin posited that a state is its decision makers, and this study aims to test that idea.

**The Operational Code**

Broadly defined, the operational code consists of a set of beliefs a leader has about the nature of the political universe that influences his/her perception of political events, which in turn influences the direction and intensity of the tactics he/she pursues to carry out his/her decisions (Leites 1951; George 1969). While Nathan Leites and Alexander George provided the foundational basis for operational code analysis, there has since been a substantial amount of groundbreaking work done within this framework.

In his seminal volume (1951), Nathaniel Leites took a psychoanalytical and decision-making approach to the study of the operational code by applying it to the Soviet Politburo. In an effort to study Soviet bargaining behavior, Leites developed a set of “response repertoires” and common sayings among the Politburo members, and posited that these responses and beliefs constituted the “world view” through which they made decisions. Further, Leites examined the “motivational foundations” of this Bolshevik belief system by examining the personalities of leaders like Lenin and Stalin. Leites’ work was novel in the sense that it incorporated both cognitive and character-based traits to determine Soviet decision-making (Leites 1951; Walker 1990, pg. 403-4).
Years later, Alexander George would reformulate Leites’ approach to the operational code, removing the psychoanalytic dimension and focusing solely on the cognitive belief system aspects. George argued that focusing on the cognitive “maxims of political strategy” would open the operational code to analysis for future political scientists. George went on to define the operational code as a “a political leader’s beliefs about the nature of politics and political conflict, his views regarding the extent to which historical developments can be shaped, and his notions of correct strategies and tactics,” stating that “knowledge of the actors’ beliefs helps the investigator to clarify the general criteria, requirements, and norms the subject attempts to meet in assessing opportunities that arise to make desirable gains, in estimating the costs and risks associated with them, and in making utility calculations,” (1969 pg. 195-7, 200). Borrowing from Leites’ work, George developed ten questions based on an individual’s philosophical and instrumental beliefs, which have since become the basis for all operational code analyses. The philosophical questions pertain to a leader’s view of the nature of the political universe and other actors in that universe, while the instrumental questions describe how a leader plans to obtain his/her goals with the direction, intensity, and type of tactics he/she chooses (Walker 1990, 405; Walker, Schafer and Young 1998). The ten questions are listed below.

**Philosophical Questions**

1) What is the “essential” nature of political life? Is the political universe one of harmony or conflict? What is the fundamental character of one’s political opponents?

2) What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one’s fundamental political values and aspirations? Can one be optimistic or must one be pessimistic on this score, and in what respects the one and/or the other?
3) Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent?

4) How much “control” or “mastery” can one have over historical development? What is one’s role in “moving” and “shaping” history in the desired direction?

5) What is the role of “chance” in human affairs and in historical development?

**Instrumental Questions**

1) What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action?

2) How are the goals of action pursued most effectively?

3) How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted?

4) What is the best “timing” of action to advance one’s interests?

5) What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one’s interests?

The development of these ten questions by George opened up operational code theory to new analysis and interpretation. Early empirical work on the operational codes of John Foster Dulles (Holsti 1970) and Henry Kissinger (Walker 1977) featured the ten questions. In addition, Ole Holsti notably developed a typology of belief systems using two master beliefs from the operational code that was founded in cognitive consistency theory, stating that a leader’s beliefs reinforce each other and remain relatively stable over time (1977).

While the early analyses of operational code all offered different theoretical approaches, Walker noted an important consensus among the early researchers for its application to
international politics, stating “…the way national leaders view the world and each other fundamentally affects their policy choices” (1990, pg. 407).

The Operational Code Quantified

It was not until the critical contribution of Walker, Schafer, and Young (1998) that the operational code became quantifiable. Using George’s ten questions, Walker et al. developed indices for each question based on a subject’s verbal or written material. The verbs within the sample were examined using the Verbs in Context System (VICS) to identify power relationships between self and other. VICS was developed by Walker et al. (1998) as a content analysis method of inferring general beliefs from attribution patterns contained in a subject’s verbal or written material. The resulting scores are products of the number of attributions the speaker makes to self and/or other (Keck 2003). Walker et al. tested this method using verbal material collected from US President Jimmy Carter. In addition to quantifying the operational code, they also found through Carter’s scores that the operational code has domain-specific propensities. Specifically, Carter’s view of the USSR grew more conflictual following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, while his view on other pertinent issues such as human rights remained stable.

The contribution from Walker et al. provided the impetus for continued research using the operational code. For example, Robinson (2006) and Renshon (2008) used the indices to show significant changes in George W. Bush’s operational code following the events of 9/11, while Walker et. al (1999) used them to display US vulnerability levels in a post-Cold War environment.
A substantial amount of research has also focused on changes in the operational codes of individuals. For example, Walker and Schafer (2000) examined changes in US President Lyndon Johnson’s operational code throughout the Vietnam War, while Walker et al. (2005) suggested that some operational code beliefs are subject to change in response to changes in context. These changes are said to be representative of learning on the part of individuals, defined as a “change of beliefs or the development of new beliefs” (Levy 1994, pg. 283). These potential changes in the operational code cannot only be domain-specific, but it may also be a permanent change. Renshon (2008) argues that exogenous shocks can permanently alter one’s operational code.

When to use Operational Code

Now that a substantive background on the operational code has been offered, it is important to discuss when its application is considered most relevant and significant. So, in what instances does the operational code really affect the foreign policy decision-making process? Walker and Murphy suggest four situations where studying a leader’s operational code may yield significant results. These are complex and unanticipated circumstances, stressful situations, long-range policy planning situations, and when decisions are made by people at the top of a bureaucratic hierarchy (1981, pg. 28). Further, Walker and Murphy go on to suggest that an international crisis is a situation that could encompass all of these characteristics, describing it as a situation where a leader’s actions are “indispensable in determining the outcome of the future…” (pg. 52). Indeed, when a leader finds himself in a situation where the future of foreign relations with other countries or the security of his own country hinges on a decision he makes, assessing his operational code could prove to be vital.
CHAPTER 3: THEORY

So, given knowledge about the operational code, we can begin to theorize about the instances in which it has an effect on foreign policy decision-making. In other words, when are the effects of a leader’s operational code on his state’s foreign policy behavior most significant? Because international crises include all of the characteristics previously mentioned by Walker and Murphy (1981), the unit of analysis for this study will be the state in an international crisis. The weight of decisions made by state leaders during international crises is arguably never higher. Indeed, Walker and Murphy (1981, pg. 52) say these decisions are “indispensable in determining the outcome of the future.” When a leader is are placed in this situation- where the future of foreign relations with other states or the security of his state hinges on the outcome of his decisions- assessing his operational code could prove to be vital. Additionally, crisis situations accentuate key emotions that have an effect on stress, such as fear and anxiety (Stern 1997). It was already mentioned that stress accentuates personality characteristics, and these can undoubtedly include belief systems. Given these characteristics of international crises, they will theoretically serve as a good environment in which to study the impact of a leader’s operational code on his state’s foreign policy behavior.

The effects of international crises on foreign relations are well known, but how can one be sure that the operational code of a state’s leadership has a causal effect on its crisis behavior? Snyder, Bruck and Sapin (1954) highlight the importance of examining individuals to better determine state behavior, arguing that the state is its decision makers. The operational code is defined as a set of beliefs the leader has about the nature of the political universe, as well as the
direction and intensity of tactics he/she uses in carrying out his/her decisions. Therefore, it is logical to assume that the beliefs of leaders factor into a state’s foreign policy decision making, of which state foreign policy behavior is a product. Additionally, the operational code indices developed by Walker, Schafer and Young (1998) have added to its credibility as an analytical tool. This method has been used in many studies. For example, Keck (2003) used this method to display learning effects in Nikita Khrushchev’s operational code before and after the Cuban Missile Crisis, while Walker and Schafer (2000) used the operational code to display differences in belief systems between LBJ and his advisors. Still other aspects of the operational code provide justification for its use. The operational code is a cognitive measure that relies on conscious choices and behavior. This differentiates it from other psychological measures of leaders, including Hermann’s Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA), which focuses on largely unconscious behavior such as distrust and need for power (2005).

When examining international crises, it is important to note that no two crises are the same. Because of this, existing structural and systemic explanations may not be adequate in explaining the variance in a state’s crisis behavior. Thus, it seems appropriate to examine the belief systems of leaders involved in these crises. Walker and Murphy argue this notion as well, stating that “knowledge of the individual’s operational code enhances the analyst’s ability to anticipate the individual’s diagnosis of the situation and the decision to act one way rather than another” (1981, pg. 25).

The importance of studying individual leaders and their operational codes during international crises is readily apparent. Maoz describes leaders as “vigilant explorers of multiple options, competent information processors, and comprehensive evaluators of multiple values
under the most stressful circumstances” (1981, pg. 704). Again, the very nature of international crises demands the foremost attention of state leaders. The decisions they make, ranging from negotiation to full-scale military invasion, are a product of their operational codes. Renshon says these belief systems “structure and order reality for decision makers,” providing the lens through which they view the political universe (2008, pg. 821). The actions taken by leaders are both guided and constrained by these beliefs (Walker 1983; Walker 1990; Walker, Schafer and Young 2005). The way a leader views the political universe, coupled with the direction of strategy he thinks is best fundamentally affects the courses of action he takes. For example, a leader with a more conflictual view of the political universe may not be inclined to enter into alliances or form trade partnerships with other states than a leader with a more cooperative view of the political universe. These are two fundamental measures of an individual’s operational code and are elaborated upon in the methods section of this design.

In addition, there are attributes specific to leaders that can affect their belief systems over time, in turn affecting state crisis behavior. Brecher (1977) notes that the amount of crisis experience leaders have matters, as well as the amount of time they spend in power (James & Oneal 1991). The effects of learning come into play here. Levy (1994) notes that leaders learn more from failure than success. Failure prompts leaders to change beliefs (though not drastically), while success reinforces existing beliefs. Thus it is logical to assume that recent failures would lead to lower, more conflictual operational code scores, while past successes would promote little change in a leader’s beliefs.

Although the operational code measures act as the key explanatory variables for state crisis behavior in this study, they cannot possibly account for all of the variance. Levy discusses
this issue, stating that psychological variables “cannot by themselves provide a logically complete explanation of foreign policy, which is a state-level dependent variable” (2003, pg. 254). To that effect, one must account for other structural and/or domestic variables that can have an effect on state crisis behavior. The cases used in this study focus solely on the United States’ crisis behavior. Because the United States is a democratic state, existing literature tells us that a host of variables matter, including presidential approval ratings, the balance of seats in Congress and the period within the election cycle (Keller 2005b). These factors represent some of the domestic constraints placed upon the president, in turn affecting his foreign policy decision-making. Additional variables aside from the operational code measures will be discussed in the methods section.

In sum, a state’s crisis behavior is a result of its foreign policy decision making, which is in turn influenced by leaders who make decisions through their existing belief systems. It is expected that the operational codes of state leaders will have a significant effect on state crisis behavior. Should this prove correct, it would improve the operational code’s status as a causal mechanism.
CHAPTER 4: THE MODEL

The aim of this research project is to determine the effect that the operational code of a state’s leadership has on its crisis behavior. Thus, the unit of analysis for the forthcoming model is the state during an international crisis. All of the 50 cases used in this model come from the International Crisis Behavior Dataset developed by Brecher and Wilkenfeld (1982). The ICB dataset houses statistics on 455 international crises from 1918-2007. For this model, the 50 cases used encompass every crisis in which the United States was a major actor since 1950. A list of all cases used in the model can be found in Appendix A.

The model will test the relationship between the state’s principal crisis management technique (the dependent variable) and the operational code of that state’s leadership while controlling for other domestic and crisis dimension factors. The idea is that lower levels of the operational code indices in leaders, which indicate a more conflictual belief system, will correlate with more escalatory levels of crisis management during an international crisis. This section proceeds with a description of the dependent and independent variables for the model, followed by a description of methods for data collection and statistical analysis. Further theoretical justification for using the selected variables is woven throughout the following section.

Crisis Management Technique: The Dependent Variable

The dependent variable for this design is the principal management technique that is employed by the state during an international crisis. This measure specifies the state’s overall behavior in dealing with a crisis in the ICB dataset. Because this variable focuses on overall
behavior, it will represent an accurate measurement of the state’s behavior during the crisis, the main point of investigation (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2010, pg. 20).

The original coding for this variable was from 1 to 8, with 1 labeled as “Negotiation” and 8 labeled as “Violence.” For this study, the coding scheme will be modified to range from 1 to 4, with 1 representing “Negotiation/Mediation” and 4 representing “Violence.” The original 8-point coding scheme contained inconsistencies and did not represent a true ordinal scale. The new scale was created to better illustrate a more escalatory form of state crisis behavior. From the original scale, values 1 (Negotiation), 2 (Adjudication and Arbitration) and 3 (Mediation) will be collapsed into a single value, coded as “1” and labeled Negotiation/Mediation. The reason for this is twofold. First, all of these actions represent a form of dialogue between states, and there is not an ordinal distinction between the original values. Second, mediation and arbitration have very similar characteristics. Indeed, both involve the use of neutral third-parties and require voluntary participation from the two sides involved in a conflict (Janulis 2011). For example, crisis number 408- North Korea Nuclear I (1993-4) contained elements of both negotiation and mediation. The US engaged in negotiations with North Korea regarding its unchecked nuclear program and also sent former President Jimmy Carter to act as mediator between North and South Korea. While both values were clearly present, the crisis was only coded “1” for negotiation.

Next, the original values 4 (multiple not including violence) and 5 (non-military pressure) were collapsed into a single value, coded as 2 and labeled “Political/Economic Acts.” Both of these levels are, at their core, non-violent political acts, but do represent a significant jump towards a more escalatory crisis management technique when compared to the first value. For
example, in crisis number 303-Afghanistan Invasion of 1979, the United States issued a series of economic sanctions against the Soviet Union, including a ban on the export of grain and the sale of computers and other high tech equipment. This act was coded as a 4. Similarly, in crisis number 448-Iran Nuclear II, the United States’ primary technique in dealing with Iran was through a series of economic sanctions. This act, however, was coded as a 5. These actions are similar in terms of degree of aggression (namely political acts and economic sanctions).

Value 6 (non-violent military) is the only value from the original scale that was not collapsed with other values. This value by itself is coded 3 on the updated scale and uses the same label. This value indicates the use of a state’s military without engaging in violent action. For example, in crisis number 354- Nicaragua MIG-21S, the United States increased military exercises in Honduras to demonstrate its strength to the Soviet-backed Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. Though military posturing was evident, no direct violence took place.

Finally, values 7 (multiple including violence) and 8 (violence) were collapsed into a single value coded 4, labeled “Violence.” There is no significant difference between the two values as both indicate the direct involvement of a state’s military in a crisis. For example, President Nixon’s order to renew the aerial bombing of North Vietnam in 1972-3 was coded as a 7, while President Johnson’s 1964 order for an air attack on North Vietnam was coded as an 8. There is not a notable difference between values 7 and 8, so they are collapsed into a single value in this design.

It is important to note that while each case used in the design is qualified as an international crisis, the likelihood for violence is more prevalent in some than in others. For
example, the likelihood for the US to pursue violent action in Case 159: Syria-Turkey Confrontation was arguably less than other cases. In Case 159, a crisis was triggered for the US in response to the appointment of pro-Soviet officials in Syria, an apparent violation of the Eisenhower Doctrine to protect Middle Eastern countries from the threat of Communism. Although violence was an option, the threat of a looming confrontation with the USSR may have lessened the likelihood of such an action from the US. What follows is a description of each value for the dependent variable.

**Value 1- Negotiation/Mediation**

Described as “formal, informal, bilateral, multilateral, or international diplomatic exchanges” between the crisis actors. An example is the United States’ engagement in negotiations with the People’s Republic of China during crisis number 166- Taiwan Strait II (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2010, pg. 20). Further, mediation describes the use of third-parties in dealing with a crisis. An example would be President Kennedy’s special envoy that effectively ended a crisis between Pakistan and Afghanistan in 1961-2 (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2010, pg. 20).

**Value 2- Political/Economic Acts**

This includes the use of non-military pressure by the state during an international crisis. This can take the form of economic sanctions like the examples described above.
**Value 3- Non-violent Military**

This includes the use of a state’s military without directly engaging in action. Examples of this include but are not limited to the mobilization of a state’s armed forces, a display of force, and/or a declaration of war.

**Value 4- Violence**

This is the use of military force on the part of the state, and represents the most aggressive crisis management technique that a state can adopt. This technique can take the form of a military invasion, aerial bombing, or other violent action.

In sum, the four values for the dependent variable demonstrate an ordinal increase from peaceful negotiations to full-scale violence. The first value represents peaceful, non-physical acts, with the subsequent values increasing the potential for violence by becoming physical and more threatening in nature. Thus, a clear pattern of escalation is present, with the highest value indicating violence.

**Independent Variables**

**The Operational Code**

The main explanatory variables for this study are drawn from the operational code. They are the leader’s view of the nature of the political universe (this is the first Philosophical question, so it is coded P1), the direction of strategy he thinks is best in pursuing his goals (the first Instrumental question, coded I1), and the extent of control he believes he has over historical development (the fourth Philosophical question, coded P4).
The operational code is a set of beliefs that a leader has about the nature of the political universe coupled with the direction and intensity of the tactics he/she uses when making decisions. Two of the indices of interest for this design, P1 and I1, range from -1 to 1, while the values for P4 range from 0 to 1. The measure of each index is derived using the Verbs in Context (VICS) content analysis system. VICS produces values for six attributes for each verb and its surrounding context: subject, verb category, domain of politics, tense of the verb, intended target, and context. VICS acts to retrieve “belief patterns from a leader’s public statements” to draw “inferences about public behavior that are compatible with these beliefs.” Theoretically, these leaders are in control of, and responsible for, their state, so these measures of beliefs should form viable predictions about state behavior (Walker et al. 2005, pg. 224). VICS was later put into software form with the creation of Profiler Plus by Social Science Automation, Inc. Profiler Plus acts as a text coding platform that performs analysis based on whatever coding schemes are in place (Young 2001).

P1-Nature of the Political Universe

P1 is a measure of the leader’s view of the political universe and how he/she views others in that universe. The index for P1 was created by Walker et al. (1998) and ranges from -1 to 1. The scores for P1 are measured by assessing the balance between the frequencies of positive and negative verb attributions the leader makes about other and self respectively. They are calculated by subtracting the number of negative verb attributions made about others from the number of positive verb attributions and dividing the difference by the total number of verb attributions. High P1 scores indicate that a leader has more cooperative views of other in the political universe, while low scores indicate a more conflictual view. P1 is defined as a diagnostic
propensity by Walker et al. (1998) and was described by Holsti (1977) as a “master belief,”
governing the other operational code beliefs. P1 acts to “define the nature of politics, political
conflict, and the image of the opponent for the leader” (Walker et al. 1998, pg. 178). It is
expected that a leader’s P1 score will be negatively correlated with his/her crisis management
 technique, suggesting that: **H1: Low P1 scores will result in higher crisis management
technique scores, representing a more escalatory approach in a state’s crisis behavior.**

**P4: Control Over Historical Development and Political Outcomes**

P4 is a measure of a leader’s perceived control over historical development and political
outcomes. The scale ranges from 0 to 1. P4 is coded based on a proportion of self to other verb
attributions. Here, the number of self-attributions as a percentage of the total number of
attributions is scored to determine the amount of control self has over historical development. A
low score on this scale means that the leader attributes more words and deeds to others, and
therefore the leader sees others as having more control over historical development. A high score
on this scale means that the leader attributes more words and deeds to self, and sees self with
more control over historical development (Schafer and Walker 2006). During international
crises, leaders with low P4 scores may feel limited in their options in dealing with their
opponents, and may attempt to compensate for this lack of control with increasingly violent or
conflictual actions. To be sure, when a leader finds himself cornered and with no viable
alternatives, violent responses are often employed. In general terms, action is preferable to
inaction, so it is expected that leaders will opt for violence if it is the only choice. Jerrold Post
makes this case for Saddam Hussein in his noted psychological evaluation of the Arab leader
(2005). Thus, P4 scores are expected to negatively correlate with crisis management techniques,
suggesting that: **H2: Low P4 scores will result in higher crisis management technique scores, representing a more escalatory approach in a state’s crisis behavior.**

**I1-Strategy**

I1 is a measure of a leader’s beliefs about strategic choice in accomplishing political goals. The scale ranges from -1 to 1. Low I1 scores indicate that a leader views conflictual strategies as most effective while high I1 scores indicate a more cooperative strategy. The score for I1 is calculated by subtracting the total number of negative attributions made about self from the total number of positive attributions toward self and dividing the difference by the total number of verb attributions (Walker et al. in Post, 2005). Again, because a low score on this scale indicates a more conflictual strategy, it is expected to be negatively correlated with a leader’s crisis management techniques. **H3: Low I1 scores will result in higher crisis management technique scores, representing a more escalatory approach in a state’s crisis behavior.**

It should be noted that the instrumental beliefs of the operational code do not describe a leader’s **specific goals**, but rather beliefs about strategies in pursuance of goals (Walker and Murphy 1981).

**Control Variables**

Although the operational code’s effect on state crisis behavior is the central question posed in this design, other factors must be taken into account. While noting the relevance of psychological variables in explaining state foreign policy behavior, Levy (2003) posits that they are not sufficient, and additional state-level variables are necessary.
Crisis Dimension Variables:

International crises display certain situational factors that can affect a state’s crisis management techniques. This study takes note of such factors, namely: protracted conflicts, previous crisis involvement, and the power status and crisis behavior of the actor’s adversary, decision maker stress, initiator effects and level of threat. These factors are all expected to have an effect on a state’s crisis behavior and are discussed below.

Protracted Conflict

Because violence is often the norm for protracted conflicts, a state’s crisis management behavior is expected to be more aggressive (a higher value on the scale) during a crisis within a protracted conflict than in crises that take place out of a protracted conflict. Of the 50 cases used in this design, 38 take place during a protracted conflict while 12 take place outside. Therefore, it is important to note its potential impact on state crisis behavior. Protracted conflicts are unique in the sense that an extended history of fighting between familiar opponents fosters an atmosphere where violence is expected and mistrust is the norm. Indeed, conflictual behavior is often reinforced and repeated during protracted conflicts (Akbaba et al. 2006, pg. 237-8).

Brecher and Wilkenfeld describe protracted conflicts as “an environment of ongoing disputes among adversaries, with fluctuating interaction ranging from violence to near tranquility, multiple issues and spillover effects on all aspects of their relations, and the absence of mutually-recognized or anticipated termination,” (Actor Level Codebook, pg. 41). Azar et al. also offer a definition of protracted conflict, describing it as “hostile interactions which extend over long periods of time with sporadic outbreaks of open warfare fluctuating in frequency and intensity. They are conflict situations in which the stakes are very high- the conflicts involve whole
societies and act as agents for defining the scope of national identity and social solidarity. While they may exhibit some breakpoints during which there is a cessation of overt violence, they linger on in time and have no distinguishable point of termination…Protracted conflicts, that is to say, are not specific events or event cluster of events at a point in time; they are processes,” (1978, pg. 50).

For a conflict to qualify as protracted, it must contain at least three international crises between the same pair of adversaries over one or more recurring issues during a period of at least five years (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997, pg. 6). Conflict setting comes from the ICB dataset and is coded 1 to 3, with 1 representing a non-protracted conflict, 2 representing a protracted conflict, and 3 representing a long-war protracted conflict. For this design, values 2 and 3 will be collapsed and scored as “Protracted Conflict.” The values for the updated variable will read 0 for non-PCs and 1 for PCs.

**Previous Crisis Involvement**

This variable accounts for the state’s previous involvement in an international crisis. A crisis actor’s previous involvement in past crises is said to have an effect on its current crisis behavior. Indeed, Levy (1994, pg. 304-6) and Tetlock (1991) state that leaders learn from past experience in crises, and this experience shapes the way they operate in the future. Thus, recent involvement in an international crisis may affect current state crisis behavior. The unit of measurement for this variable will be the amount of months since the United States’ most recent crisis.
**Previous Outcome**

The outcome of the previous crisis in which a state was involved is also expected to have some effect on its future crisis behavior. Leaders often work to repeat past successes and learn from past mistakes. Therefore, states coming off a recent victory might feel more confident about their chances for repeating success, and are expected to be more willing to escalate than states coming off a recent defeat. This variable was coded 1 for victory, 2 for compromise, 3 for stalemate and 4 for defeat.

**Crisis Initiator**

The aforementioned confidence a state may feel about its chances for success in an international crisis can also affect its decision to initiate one. While it is rare for states to engage in war for the sake of war, there are instances that permit initiation of a crisis. You wouldn’t have to look further than the ICB prerequisites for a crisis to find such instances. Initiation may also provide a strategic advantage for a state. Given this, it is expected that the likelihood of the US using more escalatory crisis behavior will be higher in crises that it initiates. This is a simple dummy variable coded 0 if the US did not initiate the crisis and 1 if they did initiate.

**Adversary Crisis Behavior**

This variable measures the crisis management techniques employed by the adversary states in the 50 cases used in this design. The United States’ crisis behavior is likely to match other states’ behavior. Thus, violent crisis behavior levied against the US is expected to result in a violent response. Although instances occur where matching behavior is not seen, Wilkenfeld (1991) says matching behavior is the norm. This matching behavior is commonly referred to as
tit-for-tat, or TFT behavior in international relations. This variable will be measured on the same scale as the dependent variable, from 1 to 4.

**Power Relationship**

Power relationship refers to the power disparity between a state and its adversary. ICB divides states into four categories: Superpower, Great Power, Middle Power and Small Power (Brecher 1977). For example, in case 144-Guatemala, the United States is coded as a superpower and Guatemala is coded as a small power, indicating the highest possible level of power disparity. This study employs the same variable, but slightly alters the values. The modified values are defined here: Superpower vs. Superpower = 4; Superpower vs. Great Power =3; Superpower vs. Middle Power =2; Superpower vs. Small Power =1. Because all cases used in this study involve the United States, coded as a superpower in each, it is only necessary to know a superpower’s relationship to all other power levels.

**Threat Level**

One of the key components for an event to qualify as an international crisis is the perception of a threat to one or more of a state’s basic values. These threats range in severity and are expected to influence state crisis behavior. Indeed, a threat of grave damage as a result of nuclear weapons will provoke a more serious response than the threat of a limited military strike. The original values for this measure in ICB are not ordinalized on a true scale. For this study, they have been modified to read as follows: 1-Political/ Economic Threat; 2- Threat to Influence in Peripheral Interests; 3- Limited Military Threat; 4- Threat to Strategic Interests; 5- Threat of
Grave Damage/Existence. This scale represents a collapsed, ordinalized scale based on the summaries from all 50 cases used in the design.

**Leader Stress**

When facing high-stakes situations (in this case, international crises) that pose a significant threat to his country’s status quo, a leader may develop high levels of stress. Janis & Mann define a “stressful event” as “any change in the environment that typically induces a high degree of unpleasant emotion and affects normal patterns of information processing” (Janis & Mann 1977, pg. 50). The necessary conditions for an international crisis as defined in ICB are expected to produce this effect. Specifically, the threat to basic values coupled with a finite response time is expected to create “disturbances” in a leader’s “psychological systems” (Lazarus 1968, pg. 337-338). As stress levels increase, a leader’s perception of his range of options is narrowed and violence becomes a more credible course of action (Holsti 1965; Wilkenfeld, Brecher, and Hill 1989). Therefore, it is expected that higher stress levels will positively correlate with a more escalatory crisis management technique.

The measure for this variable is a combination of two other measures within ICB: threat level and power relationship. The values 1-5 for the threat variable are added to the power relationship score (1-4, listed above) for each individual crisis. The scores are then trichotomized into Low, Medium or High stress. For example, in Case 274- Poplar Tree, the perceived threat level was coded 4 and the power relationship was coded 2. A total score of 6 means the incident produced Medium levels of stress for the President. Additionally, in Case 196-Cuban Missiles, the perceived threat level was coded 4 while the power relationship was coded 5. This produces a maximum score of 9, meaning that the president was dealing with high levels of stress. Indeed,
the stress President Kennedy faced during the Cuban Missile Crisis is well documented. All stress scores are taken at the onset of the crisis, where stress is said to begin (Janis & Mann 1977).

**Domestic Dimension Variables**

There are several domestic variables within a state that may affect its behavior during an international crisis. According to Keller (2005b, pg 836-7), “numerous factors, including presidential approval ratings, period in the election cycle, and the balance of seats in Congress between Democrats and Republicans” all have a constraining effect on leaders in democratic states.

Taken together, many of these domestic variables fit under the umbrella of what is known as the diversionary theory of war in international relations (DeRouen 2000). Wilkenfeld (1991) describes many of the situations above as violent responses to a non-violent crisis trigger, so their importance in predicting state behavior during a crisis must be accounted for. A brief description of each variable and its operationalization is presented below.

**Economy**

The measure for this variable is the Misery Index created by economist Arthur Okun. The measure will consist of the three month rolling average prior to the crisis trigger date. The Misery Index is the unemployment rate added to the inflation rate, where increases in both are expected to provide an impetus for state leaders to use more violent crisis management techniques (Ostrom & Simon 1985). Poor economic conditions can drive the leader of a country to use force abroad in an effort to turn away attention from his/her own failed policies. These
poor economic conditions, indicated by an increase in one or both of the categories, are likely to have an effect on state crisis behavior. It is expected that higher measures on this index will lead to more escalatory crisis management techniques.

**Presidential Approval Rating**

This variable is a measure of the presidential approval rating from Gallup. Like the economy variable, it will consist of the three month rolling average prior to the crisis trigger date. Leaders facing declining approval ratings may opt for the use of force abroad in an otherwise non-violent situation. Research has shown, for example, that the US public will support the president when force is used abroad that is short of war (Lian and Oneal 1993; DeRouen 1995). This initial boost in popularity is known as the rally phenomenon described by Mueller (1970; 1973). Further, James and Oneal (1991, pg. 328) found that a president’s approval rating typically declines as he spends more time in office. Facing this decline, the president may use more escalatory crisis management techniques. Data for this variable will be collected from the Presidential Job Approval Center created by Gallup and used by Mueller (1970; 1973). Thus, presidents with low levels of approval are expected to adopt more escalatory crisis management techniques during an international crisis.

**Election Year**

Ostrom and Job (1986) found that a president is more likely to use force abroad during an election year. Facing the pressure of reelection, incumbent presidents have been shown to opt for the use of force abroad (DeRouen 1995, pg. 689). Therefore, presidents are expected to use more escalatory crisis management techniques during an election year to fend off any challenges to his
office (Ostrom and Job 1986). This variable will be coded 0 for a non-election year and 1 for an election year.

**Party Identification**

Party identification can also have an effect on state crisis behavior. While a quick review of congressional records shows that more Democratic presidents have formally waged wars, there is evidence that the foreign policy views of both parties have changed over time. Trubowitz (1998) attributes this change in policy to the changing interests of the regions where each party was strongest. Further, Cronin and Fordham (1999) found that conservative Republicans switched their views on the US Cold War policy from support to opposition. There is also evidence supporting the commonly held notion that politics ‘stop at the water’s edge.’ That is, partisanship and the election cycle don’t affect a president’s decision to use force abroad (Gowa 1998). A reexamination of this assumption found slightly modified results, suggesting that economic conditions play a larger factor than previously thought (Fordham 2002). Within the context of cases used in this design, it is expected that Democratic presidents will be more escalatory than Republican presidents- largely due to the effects of the Vietnam War (Fordham 2002). This variable is coded 1 for Democratic presidents and 2 for Republican presidents.

**Presidential Control over Congress**

This variable was a measure of partisanship in the United States during its involvement in international crises. This measure will be based on legislative control. Data was collected using historical records of party division from the House of Representatives and Senate archives.
The variable was coded 0 if the president’s party does not control either chamber, 1 if it controls 1 chamber and 2 if it controls both chambers. Howell and Pevehouse (2007) found that as congressional partisan support increased, so did the president’s use of military engagements. Thus, it is expected that when the president has more control over Congress he will opt for a more escalatory crisis response. If the president has more control over his government, he may feel he has more control over historical development as well.
CHAPTER 5: METHODS

The cases used in this study consist of 50 crises from Brecher and Wilkenfeld’s ICB dataset. The 50 cases include all crises in which the United States was involved as a major crisis actor from 1950 to 2006. While there were 58 total cases in which the United States was considered a crisis actor, six of the cases did not fit the criteria for study. In other words, six cases did not feature the United States as a major crisis actor (part of the main conflict dyad) and had to be eliminated from the design. In addition, lack of sufficient verbal data called for the removal of two other cases, leaving the sample size at 50.

Verbal and Written Data

The operational code indices were calculated using public speech and written material gathered from the American Presidency Project housed at the University of California, Santa Barbara. The use of planned material as opposed to spontaneous material was important in this study for three reasons. First, as Commander-in-Chief, presidents are responsible for the safety and security of the United States, and frequently give public speeches concerning such topics. In other words, public speech data are plentiful. Second, because public speeches are often planned, they are representative of the collective beliefs of the president and his advisory committee. This group effectively is the state, and their behavior is indicative of state behavior. Finally, Schafer and Crichlow (2000) noted significant differences in Bill Clinton’s operational code when comparing spontaneous versus planned speech material. Thus, the nature of source material is important and needs to be accounted for. Because this study was interested in the president’s belief concerning the international arena, only speeches that addressed foreign affairs were
selected for analysis. All material that fit the criteria (planned speeches and written letters addressing some foreign issue and within the appropriate timeframe) was analyzed to produce the operational code indices.

Once gathered, the data was coded using the Profiler Plus content analysis system. This program calculates the operational code indices of interest— in this case, P1, P4 and I1. The indices produced by Profiler Plus serve as the interval value for the operational code variables. To ensure accurate measurements, a minimum of 4,000 words of public speech and written material was used for each crisis in the sample. Measurements less than 4,000 words are thought to produce inaccurate scores that are not indicative of the belief system of the president in question. To avoid potential endogeneity issues, all data were taken prior to the trigger date of the crisis in question, collected up to three months beforehand. Because data was scarce for some cases, it was necessary to go back more than three months prior to the trigger date. Collecting data after the crisis trigger date would have created issues of causation. Specifically, it would have been difficult to distinguish whether the crisis situation affected the president’s operational code or vice versa. Measuring data prior to the trigger date eliminated this issue. All verbal data used in this study can be seen in Appendix B.

Control Variable Collection

The control variables were divided into two sections: crisis dimension variables and domestic dimension variables. All of the data for the crisis dimension variables was obtained from the ICB dataset. In some instances, the original values had to be altered to accommodate the model for this design. For example, original values for the crisis management technique variable had to be collapsed and ordinalized to display a natural progression to better
demonstrate the effects of the operational code on state crisis behavior. The data for the domestic dimension variables was collected from the various outlets specified in Chapter 4.

Following the data collection, a bivariate correlation test was conducted to identify any potential co-linearity issues in the subsequent regression models. This helped account for any variables that were too strongly correlated to be included in the same model.

The ordinal nature of the dependent variable for this study necessitated the use of ordered logistic regression. This method of analysis displays how well the dependent variable can be predicted by accounting for certain explanatory variables. The coefficients produced by this analysis represent the log-odds. The interpretation represented by these log-odds is that for a one unit increase in the independent variable of interest, the dependent variable is expected to change by its respective coefficient. For example, a coefficient of -1.01 for the operational code index P1 would indicate the following: for a one unit increase in P1 (a more cooperative view of the political universe), the log-odds of the president using a more escalatory crisis behavior will decrease by 1.01.

However, interpretation of logistic regression coefficients can prove to be troublesome and their interpretation may not necessarily demonstrate the substantive effects of the explanatory variables. Indeed, it may be more intuitive to think about the explanatory variables in terms of probability. That is, it might be easier to ask, “What is the effect of a one unit increase in P1 scores on the probability of using more escalatory crisis behavior?” In an effort to more clearly demonstrate these effects, the predicted probabilities were calculated for each variable following the logistic regression.
CHAPTER 6: FINDINGS

The results from three ordered logistic regressions are shown below in Table 1. The coefficients listed there display the log odds and standard error for each variable. Missing values for variables indicate that they were not used in that specific model for multicollinearity reasons. A bivariate correlation listed in Appendix C demonstrates the relationships between all independent variables used in the model.
Table 1: Ordinal Logistic Regression Results (Models 1-3)

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<tr>
<th>Variable Type</th>
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<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
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<tr>
<td>Psychological</td>
<td>Philosophical Belief 1</td>
<td>-9.80(4.63)**</td>
<td>-10.15(4.84)**</td>
<td>-7.97(3.41)**</td>
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<td>-8.20(3.57)**</td>
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<td>Philosophical Belief 4</td>
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<td>16.89(10.58)</td>
<td>1.17(6.96)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
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<td>4.21(1.89)**</td>
<td>1.73(1.00)*</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economic Standing</td>
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<td>-0.30(0.18)*</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Presidential Approval</td>
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<td>-10.55(5.86)*</td>
<td>0.98(3.23)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Congressional Control</td>
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<td>-2.66(0.75)**</td>
<td>-1.47(0.53)**</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Party ID</td>
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<td>-2.86(1.38)**</td>
<td>-3.28(1.21)**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Crisis</td>
<td>Previous Outcome</td>
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<td>-1.27(0.61)**</td>
<td>-0.24(0.40)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Crisis Initiator</td>
<td>4.13(1.78)**</td>
<td>4.74(1.93)**</td>
<td>2.64(1.41)*</td>
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<td>Power Relationship</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-1.20(0.54)**</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Protracted Conflict</td>
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<td>-2.64(1.41)*</td>
<td>-0.76(1.00)</td>
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<td>Previous Involvement</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Leader Stress</td>
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<td>-1.27(0.67)*</td>
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<td>Threat Level</td>
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<td>Adversary Behavior</td>
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<td>2.49(0.66)**</td>
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*p < 0.1; **p < .05; ***p < .01
Table 1 lists the results from three ordinal logistic regressions, all with significant results. Model 1 includes all variables with the exception of Leader Stress, which was highly correlated with Power Relationship and Threat Level. Model 2 swapped out these variables, and Model 3 was run without Adversary Behavior and Leader Stress. Adversary behavior is largely explained by tit-for-tat, or matching behavior, thus it can be expected to account for a large amount of the variance within the models. To better get at the effects of the principle variables of interest (the operational code indices), adversary behavior was removed in the third model. A quick glance at the results in Table 1 illustrates some interesting findings, particularly those associated with the operational code indices, the key explanatory variables of this study.

**Psychological Variable Results**

The central question asked in this study was: does the operational code of a state’s leadership have an effect on its behavior during foreign policy crises? It is evident from the results in all three models that the operational code does in fact produce significant effects. First, the operational code index P1 (a leader’s belief in the nature of the political universe) was significant in all models and in the expected direction. All three models in Table 1 show a negative relation between P1 scores (higher scores indicate a more cooperative view of the political universe) and escalatory crisis behavior. In other words, unit increases in P1 displayed a reduced likelihood of the United States using more escalatory crisis behavior. Using Model 1 from Table 1 as an example, a one unit increase in a president’s P1 scores—indicating a more cooperative view of the political universe—decreased the log odds of the United States using more escalatory crisis behavior by 9.8, ceteris paribus. Thus, support for H1 is confirmed, suggesting that a leader with a more conflictual view of the nature of the political universe (low
P1 scores) is more likely to escalate during an international crisis than those with higher P1 scores. The results for the fourth philosophical question (P4) did not reach significance in any of the models listed. Therefore, no support for H2 was found.

The results for the first instrumental belief (I1) displayed very similar characteristics to the results for P1. I1 was significant and in the expected direction in Models 1 and 2, but failed to reach significance in Model 3. Therefore, a one unit increase in a president’s I1 scores—indicating a more cooperative direction of strategy—coincided with a lessened likelihood of using more escalatory crisis behavior. In looking at the Table 1 coefficients, a unit increase in I1 scores decreased the log odds of a president using more escalatory crisis behavior by 8.3 and 8.2 respectively, ceteris paribus. These findings support H3, positing that a leader with a more conflictual strategy (low I1 scores) will employ a more escalatory crisis behavior.

These results carry some interesting implications. First and foremost, support was found for two of the three hypotheses, suggesting that the operational code of state leaders does have an effect on state crisis behavior. The results have shown that a more conflictual view of the nature of the political universe (low P1 scores) as well as a conflictual strategy in carrying out goals (low I1 scores) affects the president’s decision to use escalatory crisis behavior. Thus, an individual leader’s beliefs can be thought of as significant predictors of state behavior during international crises, providing support for the notion first posited by Snyder, Bruck and Sapin (1954). The results have demonstrated the operational code’s efficacy as a causal mechanism in predicting state crisis behavior and highlight the importance of accounting for individual level psychological traits and belief systems in relation to this behavior.
Domestic Variable Results

The results for the domestic dimension variables also include some interesting effects. Each of these variables was significant in at least one of the three models, and they are individually discussed at length below.

Election Year was among the most consistent variables in the model. Support was found for the notion that presidents are more prone to escalatory behavior during election years. Facing the pressures of reelection, incumbents may wish to demonstrate their worth or strength to the public via the use of force abroad. This projection of strength is thought to bolster their efforts at reelection (Ostrom and Job 1986; DeRouen 1995). In Table 1-Model 1, for example, an election year increased the log odds of a president using escalatory behavior during a crisis by 3.87, ceteris paribus. The log odds in Models 2 and 3 were 4.21 and 1.73, respectively.

The Congressional Control variable also reached significance in all three models, but was not in the expected direction. Specifically, Congressional Control was negatively correlated with escalatory crisis behavior, suggesting that presidents are less likely to escalate during crises when they have more control over Congress. This runs counter to the position taken by Howell and Pevehouse (2011) that more congressional control warrants more escalatory behavior from the president. Model 1 in Table 1 shows that more congressional control decreases the log odds of using escalatory crisis behavior by 2.9, ceteris paribus, while Models 2 and 3 show decreases of 2.66 and 1.47 respectively.

The Party ID variable was also significant in each of the three models and was in the expected direction. It was found that Democratic presidents are more prone to escalatory crisis
behavior than Republican presidents. Sticking with the first model in Table 1, a Republican president decreases the log odds of using escalatory crisis behavior by 3.79, ceteris paribus. Fordham (2002) describes a significant drop-off in the use of force following the Vietnam War. Prior to this drop-off, the American public placed a premium on demonstrative uses of force abroad, and Democratic presidents were in office for much of this time. Thus, within the context of this model, Democratic presidents were expected to be more escalatory.

The Economic Standing variable based on the Misery Index was significant in the second model only, and was not in the expected direction. Higher scores on the Misery Index were expected to correlate with a more escalatory crisis behavior, but opposing evidence was found. In the second model in Table 1, for example, higher scores on the Misery Index- indicating higher unemployment and inflation rates- decreased the log odds of using escalatory crisis behavior by -.30, ceteris paribus. Therefore, worsening economic conditions within the US were found to decrease the likelihood of the president using escalatory crisis behavior, contrary to the position taken by Ostrom & Simon (1985).

Results from the Presidential Approval variable were significant in Models 1 and 2 and in the expected direction. Here, increases in a president’s approval rating decrease the log odds of using escalatory crisis behavior by 9.98 and 10.55 respectively, ceteris paribus. Facing the threat of declining ratings, a president is expected to opt for the use of force abroad to build support at home (Lian & Oneal 1993). The findings here suggest that this is the case.
Crisis Variable Results

The unit of analysis for this model was the state in a crisis, specifically the United States as a major crisis actor, so accounting for the causal effects of the crises themselves was necessary. Specifically, the model adapted several key variables from the ICB dataset, including outcome and initiator effects, previous crisis involvement, the power relationship and behavior between adversaries, protracted conflict effects, leader stress and perception of threat.

The most consistent crisis variable was Initiator. It was significant in all three models and in the expected direction, suggesting that crises the United States initiated increased its likelihood of using escalatory behavior. In Table 1, the log odds of using escalatory behavior increased by 4.13, 4.74 and 2.64 when the United States initiated.

The Previous Outcome variable was significant in two of the three models and was in the expected direction in both, indicating that states coming off a recent victory will be more likely to escalate in future crises. Table 1 points out a negative relationship between Previous Outcome (1=victory, 2=compromise, 3=stalemate, 4=defeat) and escalatory crisis behavior. In other words, as the value of Previous Outcome increases (moving away from victory and toward defeat), the likelihood of a president using escalatory behavior decreases. In Models 1 and 2 for example, unit increases in Outcome decreased the log odds of using escalatory crisis behavior by 1.04 and 1.27, ceteris paribus.

Power relationship was also significant and in the expected direction in two of the three models. It was expected that high levels of the power relationship variable, suggesting a minimal power gap between the US and its adversary, would lead to decreased levels of escalatory crisis
behavior. The findings in Table 1 illustrate this effect, with unit increases in this variable decreasing the log odds of using escalatory crisis behavior by 1.32 and 1.20 respectively, ceteris paribus.

Adversary behavior was expected to directly correlate with the dependent variable because of tit-for-tat, or matching behavior (Wilkenfeld 1991). This variable was run in two models and was significant at the 1% level in both. Adversary behavior was coded the same as the dependent variable and was expected to produce a positive correlation. In Models 1 and 2 in Table 1, escalatory adversary behavior increased the log odds of the US using escalatory behavior by 2.25 and 2.49, ceteris paribus.

Leader Stress and Protracted Conflict were both significant in Model 2 but were not in the expected direction. For Protracted Conflict, the results from Table 1 indicate that crises within a protracted conflict decrease the log odds of escalatory behavior by 2.64, ceteris paribus. The results for Leader Stress tell a similar story, with higher stress levels decreasing the log odds of escalatory crisis behavior by 1.27, ceteris paribus.

In summation, the findings from Table 1 display some interesting results. Primarily, the psychological variables P1 and I1 were significant and in the expected direction, with P1 significant in all three models and I1 significant in models 1 and 2. Additionally, several domestic and crisis dimension variables reached significance in multiple models. Among the most consistent were Election Year, Party ID, Congressional Control, and Crisis Initiator.
Predicted Probabilities

While the results from Table 1 display some interesting findings, logistic regression coefficients can be somewhat ambiguous to interpret. Namely, they do not offer real insight into the substantive effects of the variables on state crisis behavior. For instance, we know that a unit increase in P1 decreases the log odds of using escalatory behavior by 9.8 in Model 1, but what is the magnitude of that change? In order to better get at these effects, the predicted probabilities for each of the three models in Table 1 are reported below. In addition to these, Appendix D reports the average change in probabilities for all significant variables in Models 1, 2 and 3.
Table 2: Predicted Probabilities for Model 1

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Table 3: Predicted Probabilities for Model 2

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Table 4: Predicted Probabilities for Model 3

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<td>Adversary Behavior</td>
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Tables 2, 3 and 4 display the predicted probabilities for the significant variables in Models 1, 2 and 3 respectively. Specifically, the pair of values listed within the set of parenthesis shows the predicted probabilities of each level of the dependent variable (numbers 1-4 at the top of the table) occurring at the minimum and maximum reported values of the independent variable in question, while holding all other variables at their means. These probabilities are
reported across all levels of the dependent variable. For example, in Table 2 the probability of the US opting for Political/Economic Acts (Level 2 of the dependent variable) when P1 is at its lowest reported value is .01, or 1%, while the probability of this behavior when P1 is at its highest reported value is .53, or 53%. In other words, presidents with the highest reported P1 scores—indicating a more cooperative view of the political universe—are likely to resort to non-violent political/economic acts a little more than half the time.

While the results from Table 1 concerning the Psychological, Domestic and Crisis variables have been thoroughly discussed, the predicted probabilities listed in Tables 2, 3 and 4 provide a more substantive interpretation of their effects on state crisis behavior and merit further discussion. The following section will proceed in similar fashion, starting with a discussion of the predicted probabilities for the psychological variables.

Probabilities: Psychological Variables

Results from the probabilities for the operational code indices provide further support for H1 and H3. Upon examination, it is clear that presidents with the lowest reported P1 scores have a much higher probability of using more escalatory crisis behavior than those with higher reported P1 scores. Indeed, the probability for those with low P1 scores to employ violent crisis behavior (coded 4) is 94% when compared to just 7% for those with higher P1 scores in Table 2. Similar results are found in Tables 3 and 4 as well. Finally, the probabilities for presidents with the lowest reported P1 values show a gradual increase across each level of the dependent variable, illustrating the idea that these leaders are more prone to escalatory behavior when dealing with an international crisis than those with higher P1 scores.
Similar patterns emerge when looking at the effects of the first Instrumental Belief (I1). When examining the predicted probabilities in Tables 2 and 3, it is clear that presidents with the lowest reported I1 scores were much more likely to use escalatory crisis behavior. Those with the lowest reported I1 scores were likely to use violent behavior 99% of the time, compared to roughly 9% for those with the highest reported I1 scores. Like P1, the probabilities associated with the lowest reported values of I1 (indicating a conflictual strategy) gradually increases across levels of the dependent variable. This pattern is illustrative of the expectations discussed in H3.

Next, it is interesting to note that the highest probabilities for the highest reported values of P1 and I1 both come at the second level of the dependent variable (Political/Economic Acts). This means that presidents with higher P1 scores, on average, prefer to issue some kind of economic or diplomatic sanction against their adversaries as opposed to any other course of action. This begs the obvious question: why would presidents be more willing to issue sanctions than enter into formal negotiations? An important distinction to make is the fact that, for all of the cases used in this model, the United States is already engaged in the crisis. That is, they are a formal crisis actor. Negotiations and mediation may have been the primary choice prior to entering the crisis, but a more aggressive approach is visibly taken once the United States is a formal crisis actor. Clearly, presidents with higher P1 and I1 scores want to be aggressive when dealing with a crisis, so warranted by the threat to their country’s values that a crisis presents, but understand that the commitment of troops into battle is a last resort with potentially heavy costs. The preference of sanctions and/or political threats provides the president with a muscle to flex while remaining conservative with his military. Simply, sanctions may be the most effective way to get involved in a crisis without the physical commitment of troops.
The probabilities for the domestic dimension variables also produced some interesting findings. Concerning Election Year, for example, the highest reported probabilities consistently fall under the fourth value of the dependent variable, Violence. This is true in Tables 2, 3 and 4. For instance, the probability of presidents using violent behavior increases fourfold, from 24% during a non-election year to 96% during an election year in Table 3. In Table 4 the same probabilities double, from 39% in a non-election year to 78% during an election year. Further, the probabilities associated with an election year (the second set of probabilities in the parenthesis) show a gradual increase through levels of the dependent variable. Clearly, presidents are more likely to escalate during an election year.

The probabilities associated with Congressional Control were also noteworthy. Specifically, the probability of a president with less congressional control using violent crisis behavior (level 4 of the dependent variable) is 92%, 91% and 81% in Tables 2, 3 and 4 respectively. The probabilities associated with higher levels of congressional control consistently occur at the second level of the dependent variable, Political/Economic Acts. Thus, it appears that presidents with more congressional control opt for the use of economic and diplomatic sanctions or political threats over the commitment of troops in any capacity (the third and fourth levels of the dependent variable). The heavy costs imposed on democracies by war and troop deployment due to issues including but not limited to casualty sensitivity and public opinion has already been discussed, so it is likely that presidents with more congressional control avoid direct conflict for some of these reasons.
A quick look at the probabilities for Party ID shows that while Republicans are more likely to use non-violent force, the probability of Democrats using violent crisis behavior is overwhelmingly higher. This pattern holds across all three models. It was expected that Democrats would be less likely to use escalatory crisis behavior than Republicans.

Because Economic Standing was significant in the second model alone, it is only necessary to examine its probabilities in Table 3. There, low scores on the Misery Index coincide with an 82% chance of the president using violent crisis behavior. When examining the probabilities of the highest reported values, the probability increases from 10% to 60% between levels one and two of the dependent variable, but significantly decrease at levels three and four. These findings suggest that presidents are less likely to commit troops in any capacity (levels 3 and 4 of the independent variable) when the state of the economy is worsening.

Finally, the probabilities for Presidential Approval in Tables 2 and 3 support its expected direction. Specifically, lower approval ratings were thought to increase the president’s chances of using escalatory behavior during an international crisis. Facing declining ratings, a president is expected to opt for the use of force abroad to build consensus at home (James & Oneal 1991). The probabilities for the lowest reported values of presidential approval ratings increase across each level of the dependent variable, demonstrating this effect.
Probabilities: Crisis Variables

The probabilities for the crisis dimension variables displayed interesting patterns as well. For instance, the probabilities associated with US initiation in Table 4 steadily increase across levels of the dependent variable, going from a 1% chance at level 1 (Negotiation) to a 90% chance at level 4 (Violence). Conversely, the probabilities in Tables 2, 3 and 4 show that presidents who do not initiate crises (the first set of probabilities) are more likely to use non-violent action than those presidents who initiate. The proactive effects- as opposed to reactive effects- of initiating a crisis can provide a state with a strategic advantage. The results here have indicated that the United States is more escalatory in a crisis it has initiated, with a specific reference to violent crisis behavior (level 4 of the dependent variable).

It was found that states coming off a recent victory are more prone to escalate in future crises. The probabilities associated with Crisis Outcome illustrate this effect. In Tables 2 and 3, the probabilities gradually increase across levels of the dependent variable. For example, the probabilities in Table 2 are 0%, 7%, 36% and 57% at the lower levels respectively. Again, increases in this variable indicate a move away from victory (coded 1) and towards defeat (coded 4). This increased probability across levels clearly illustrates a state’s willingness to use escalatory behavior if coming off a recent victory.

The probabilities for Power Relationship listed in Table 4 also provide a good measure of its effects on state crisis behavior. At lower reported levels of power relationship, indicating more power disparity, the probabilities gradually increase across all levels of the dependent variable, from 2% at level 1 (Negotiation) to 77% at level 4 (Violence). An inverse relationship is shown for the probabilities of the higher reported values, where it gradually decreases from
39% at level 1 to 8% at level 4. It was expected that higher levels of power disparity (low scores on the power relationship variable) would increase the likelihood of the US using escalatory crisis behavior. To be sure, presidents may feel more comfortable about escalating if they believe their chances of success are high. When facing a comparable adversary, however, chances for success become uncertain, and the propensity to escalate decreases, as evidenced by the probabilities in Tables 2 and 4.

Adversary Behavior was thought to be explained largely by tit-for-tat, or matching behavior (Wilkenfeld 1991). The probabilities listed in Tables 2 and 3 show that violent adversary behavior is likely to lead to violent US behavior 92% and 95% of the time. Further, the probabilities associated with more escalatory adversary behavior increase across levels of the dependent variable. Again, this was expected due to the principle of matching behavior. Very few states, if any, will stand idly by while they are threatened or attacked, particularly if they have the capability to retaliate.

The probabilities for Leader Stress and Protracted Conflict are both listed in Table 3. The probabilities associated with non-PC crises steadily rise across levels of the dependent variable, from 0% at level 1 to 85% at level 4, suggesting that presidents are less likely to escalate during crises that are part of a larger protracted conflict. Interestingly, presidents with lower stress levels are likely to use violent crisis behavior 74% of the time while the most likely course of action for those with high stress levels is a non-violent military act (50%). This may say more about the makeup of the stress variable than anything else. Previously mentioned, the stress variable was a combination of Threat Level and Power Disparity, meaning that it is structurally defined as opposed to psychologically defined. Indeed, JFK’s stress levels during the Bay of Pigs and
Cuban Missile Crisis are well documented, with the Bay of Pigs escalating to full-scale violence. So, in the context of its structural definition, the results from the stress variable may not be totally surprising.

**Discussion**

So, given these results from three models, what can be learned from them? Do the models serve as good predictors of state crisis behavior? Examining the results, we find several noteworthy implications.

First and foremost, the purpose of this study was to better demonstrate the effects that a president’s operational code has on US crisis behavior. The operational code indices P1, I1 and P4 were included in all of the models, and significant results were found for P1 and I1. Specifically, P1 was significant and in the expected direction in all three models while I1 was significant in two models, also in the expected direction. The negative correlation between P1, I1 and state crisis behavior provided support for H1 and H2. Specifically, a president’s beliefs about the nature of the political universe and the strategy he employs in dealing with others in that universe are found to have a casual effect on how he behaves during an international crisis. It was shown that a conflictual view of the political universe (low P1 scores) and a conflictual strategy (low I1 scores) increase the likelihood that a president will employ escalatory crisis management techniques.

These findings provide support for the notion first posited by Snyder, Bruck and Sapin (1954) that individual level psychology matters in determining state behavior. The operational code is defined as a set of beliefs an individual has about the nature of the political universe, and
the direction and intensity of tactics he employs in carrying out his goals. Here, it is shown that these belief systems are significant predictors of US crisis behavior across multiple models. An individual’s beliefs are said to “structure and order” their reality, providing the lens through which they view the world (Renshon 2008). The notion that these beliefs matter has always been relevant, but the idea that they can carry causal weight has not been mainstream.

Next, certain domestic variables carried consistent, significant weight throughout the models. It was found that presidents are more willing to employ violent crisis management techniques during an election year and when they have less control over Congress. Though the Election Year results were as predicted based off Ostrom and Job’s research (1986), the Congressional Control variable was in the opposite direction. Here, more congressional control decreased the likelihood of the president using violent crisis management techniques, counter to the position taken by Howell and Pevehouse (2007). Results from Party ID found that Democrats are more escalatory than Republicans, in line with expectations. Indeed, Democratic presidents were found to employ violent crisis behavior (level 4 of the dependent variable) about 84% of the time on average. Despite their direction, all three variables had a consistent effect across all of the models. The results carry with them the implication that, at least in the case of the United States, politics do not necessarily stop at the water’s edge. All domestic variables were shown to have significant effects on US crisis behavior in at least one model, indicating that the internal characteristics of a state do govern a portion of its foreign policy decision making process. The Presidential Approval and Economic Standing variables also produced significant results, though not with the same consistency as the Congressional Control, Party ID and Election Year
variables. It was found that lower approval ratings increase the president’s likelihood to use escalatory behavior, while a worsening economy proved the opposite.

The findings for several of the crisis dimension variables were also noteworthy. The results from several of these variables provide some structural explanation for state crisis behavior. Adversary Behavior was among the significant predictors of state crisis behavior. The common explanation for this occurrence is tit-for-tat, or matching behavior. Indeed, when the US is faced with a crisis where its opponent is using escalatory measures, odds are the US will employ the same behavior to maximize its security. This balancing of threat is a staple of structural theories in international relations, and rightfully so. The effects of other crisis variables are also worth noting. For example, the Initiator variable was significant in all three models, indicating that the US was more likely to employ escalatory behavior when it initiated the crisis. Further, the Outcome and Power Relationship variables were significant and in the expected direction in two models. It was thought that outcomes from past crises would affect a state’s willingness to escalate in subsequent crises. The results from Table 1 indicate such a relationship, suggesting that states coming off recent victories are more likely to escalate in future crises. Additionally, a significant power gap between states was found to increase the likelihood for escalatory behavior. Leader Stress and Protracted Conflict played less of a causal role in the model, only finding significance in Model 2 of Table 1 with neither in the expected direction.

The predicted probabilities listed for each variable provide a better interpretation of their substantive effects on US crisis behavior, but what about their effects across variable types? What can be said comparatively about the effects of the psychological variables and the effects
of the domestic and/or crisis dimension variables? Examining the psychological variables, the effects of P1 were among the most consistent. Specifically, P1 was significant in each of the three models despite the removal and addition of other explanatory variables, and was one of the most substantive predictors of violent crisis behavior (level 4 of the dependent variable) in terms of predicted probabilities. In Table 2, for example, the probability of a president choosing violent crisis behavior was 94% when P1 was at its minimum value. When compared to other probabilities at the fourth level of the dependent variable, only I1 had higher probabilities at the minimum reported value. Further, the predicted probabilities for I1 at its minimum reported value at the fourth level were the highest of any variable in the three models. In Tables 2 and 3, the probability of the US choosing violent crisis behavior was 99% when I1 was at its minimum value. Collectively, then, the psychological variables P1 and I1 were among the most consistent predictors of violent crisis behavior throughout all three models when compared to the other variable types.

Additionally, the domestic dimension variables reached significance more consistently throughout the three models than did the crisis dimension variables. The Election Year, Congressional Control and Party ID variables were significant in all three models. Thus, it appears that the internal makeup of a state- in this case, the US- is a more consistent predictor of crisis behavior than the characteristics of the crises themselves. For example, results from the second model produce significant results for all of the domestic dimension variables.

Finally, the comparative effects of variable types may be best explained by looking across levels of the dependent variable. Specifically, which variable types have the most consistent effects at the first level of the dependent variable versus the second, third or fourth
level? When examining the tables, it appears that the probabilities associated with lower levels of Adversary Behavior are the best predictors of level one of the dependent variable (Negotiation/Mediation). Indeed, Tables 2 and 3 display a 22% and a 33% chance of the US opting for negotiation/mediation if their adversary has displayed non-escalatory levels of behavior. The probabilities associated with the maximum reported values of P1 and I1 were found to be the most consistent predictors at level two of the dependent variable (Political/Economic Acts) at 46% and 50% on average, respectively. Additionally, the collective probabilities associated with the maximum reported values of the domestic dimension variables were found to be the best predictors of level three of the dependent variable (Non-Violent Military). Further, the probabilities associated with the minimum reported values for the psychological variables P1 and I1 were among the most significant predictors of violent crisis behavior (level 4 of the dependent variable) as mentioned in the previous paragraph.

In summation, the three models demonstrated that the operational code of US presidents does matter in determining US crisis behavior. Evidence was found in each of the three models that these belief systems carry causal weight when determining state behavior. Specific domestic and crisis variables were also found to have significant effects on state crisis behavior. Indeed, each variable type was found to have considerable substantive effects on state crisis behavior at one or more levels of the dependent variable. Specifically, the results demonstrated that the crisis dimension variable Adversary Behavior was the best predictor of level one behavior (Negotiation/Mediation) while the domestic dimension variables were consistent predictors at level three (Non-Violent Military). Finally, the psychological variables P1 and I1- the central
variables of this study—were found to best explain state crisis behavior at levels two (Political/Economic Acts) and four (Violence).
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION

The substantive research question posed in this paper was: does the operational code of a state’s leadership have an effect on its behavior during foreign policy crises? Examining the results from three ordinal logistic regressions, it appears evident that the operational code is indeed a significant predictor of state crisis behavior. The operational code index P1 was significant in all three models and in the expected direction. Thus, a president’s view of the nature of the political universe does affect the way in which he reacts to it. Further, the operational code index I1 was significant and in the expected direction in two of the three models, suggesting that the direction of strategy a presidents employs also affects his decision to use escalatory crisis behavior. These belief systems were said to “structure and order reality for decision makers,” who act based upon these systems (Renshon 2008, pg. 821). Considering the very nature of international crises- the high stakes, time constraints and heightened probability of military hostilities, decision makers must be at their most vigilant. Indeed, the structural and systemic constraints placed upon a state leader during a foreign policy crisis are almost palpable, and a considerable amount of theory attributes state crisis behavior solely to these constraints. In other words, the role of individual level psychology in predicting state crisis behavior has, until recently, been given little credibility. The results here suggest that, despite the effects of key domestic and crisis dimension variables, psychology does in fact play a significant role in determining how a state behaves during a foreign policy crisis.

Other factors were also found to have an effect on state crisis behavior. The internal makeup of a state and the characteristics of the crises themselves produced significant effects. To
highlight several examples, a president was found to be less escalatory if he had more control over Congress but was more likely to escalate if the US had initiated the crisis at hand. The domestic dimension variables proved to be more consistent than the crisis dimension variables, suggesting that politics may not in fact stop at the water’s edge.

It is also interesting to think about the potential effects of several domestic variables on the psychological variables themselves. For example, do the variables associated with diversionary theory have an effect on a president’s belief systems prior to a crisis? That is, do presidents alter their belief systems or rhetoric to appear tougher or more conflictual when/if the situation calls for it? How sensitive are the operational code indices to public opinion? Future studies could examine the operational code as dependent variable to get at these potential effects.

While international crises are ideal situations to study the effects of individual beliefs on state behavior, future research could apply these methods to leaders during peacetime affairs to see if the operational code produces similar effects. Additionally, room for expansion concerning any of the control variables is also readily available. For instance, an in-depth examination of the Crisis Outcome and Previous Involvement variables could be applied to test the effects of learning on the part of state leaders. Further, the relatively small sample size (N=50) used in this study could be seen as a limitation. Specifically, future research could test for operational code effects across multiple countries as opposed to a singular state. This would bring with it a new dynamic of variables as well, including but not limited to regime type, governmental instability, territory size, etc. Despite these limitations, the results from this study are considerably strong concerning the psychological variables P1 and I1. Their effects were significant across multiple models while controlling for key domestic and crisis dimension variables.
The causal link between the operational code and behavior has been historically hard to identify, and this study takes a step forward in helping to solidify that link. The results of this study reiterate the idea put forth by Snyder, Bruck and Sapin (1954) that careful examination of state leaders is a necessity because, in their words, leaders are the state. Examining the operational code of state leaders can prove to be vital in accomplishing this goal, as evidenced in this research. There is arguably no greater impetus to study leaders than the idea that individual level psychology has an effect on how a state may act during a crisis.

The operational code is a measure of conscious choices through analysis of the subject’s written and verbal material. Therefore, the latent content of the subject’s speech and written material (in this case, US presidents) was expected to be predictive of state behavior during a foreign policy crisis, and the results from this study provide strong support for that expectation. It has been shown that the belief systems of state leaders have a causal effect on how they act during international crises. Another step has been taken towards solidifying the relationship between beliefs and behavior concerning the study of international relations, specifically at the individual level of analysis. Indeed, the walls of the proverbial black box may not be as dark as previously thought.
APPENDIX A: LIST OF CASES FROM ICB
132-Korean War I/1950/4
133-Korean War II/1950/4
140-Korean War III/1953/4
144-Guatemala/1953/2
152-Suez Nationalization-War/1956/3
159-Syria-Turkey Confrontation/1956/2
165-Iraq-Lebanon Upheaval/1958/3
168-Berlin Deadline/1958/1
180-Pathet Lao Offensive/1961/1
181-Bay of Pigs/1961/2
185-Berlin Wall/1961/1
186-Vietcong Attack/1961/3
193-Nam Tha/1962/3
196-Cuban Missiles/1962/3
206-Panama Flag/1964/4
210-Gulf of Tonkin/1964/4
211-CongoII/1964/4
213-Pleiku/1965/4
215-Dominican Intervention/1965/4
222-Six Day War/1967/2
224-Pueblo/1968/2
225-Tet Offensive/1968/4
233-EC-121 Spy Plane/1969/3
237-Invasion of Cambodia/1970/4
239-Cienfuegos Submarine Base/1970/1
246-Vietnam Ports Mining/1972/4
249-Christmas Bombing/1972/4
255-October-Yom Kippur War/1973/2
259-Mayaguez/1975/4
274-Poplar Tree/1976/3
303-Afghanistan Invasion/1979/2
309-US Hostages in Iran/1979/2
343-Invasion of Grenada/1983/4
354-Nicaragua MIG-21S/1984/3
363-Gulf of Syrte II/1986/4
386-Libyan Jets/1988/4
391-Invasion of Panama/1989/4
393-Gulf War/1990/4
411-Haiti Military Regime/1994/1
412-Iraq Troop Deployment/1994/3
419-Desert Strike/1996/4
422-UNSCOM I/1997/3
427-US Embassy Bombings/1998/4
429-UNSCOM II-Operation Desert Fox/1998/4
430-Kosovo/1999/4
434-Afghanistan-USA/2001/4
440-Iraq Regime Change/2002/4
441-North Korea Nuclear II/2002/1
448-Iran Nuclear II/2006/2
450-North Korea Nuclear III/2006/1

DEPENDENT VARIABLE DISTRIBUTION
1= 7 cases
2= 9 cases
3=10 cases
4= 24 cases
N=50
APPENDIX B: VERBAL DATA FOR ICB CASES
Crisis Number/Name/P1, P4, I1 Score

132-Korean War I/1950 (P1=.40, P4= .23, I1 =.64)
  - Statement on Importance of Bipartisan foreign policy- April 18 1950
  - Address on US Foreign Policy- April 20 1950
  - Announcement of plans for bipartisan foreign policy- April 27 1950
  - Letter on Free Europe Group- May 1 1950
  - Letter to Prime Minister of Pakistan- May 3 1950
  - Speech in Illinois- May 8 1950
  - Remarks at Armed Forces Dinner- May 19 1950
  - Message to Congress on US Participation in UN- May 22 1950
  - Message to Congress on Military Aid- June 1 1950
  - Statement upon signing Foreign Economic Assistance Act- June 5 1950

133-Korean War II/1950 (P1=.27, P4=.32, I1 =.59)
  - Message to South Korean president on 2nd anniversary of Korea- August 14 1950
  - Letter to Speaker of the House on Appropriation for foreign aid- August 25 1950
  - Letter to Committee Chairman on universal military training- August 29 1950
  - Statement to public on Labor Day- August 31 1950
  - Letter to Ambassador restating US position on Formosa- August 27 1950
  - Address to US public on situation in Korea- September 1 1950
  - Message congratulating General MacArthur on liberation of Seoul- September 29 1950
  - Remarks at Pearl Harbor- October 13 1950
  - Meeting with General MacArthur- October 15 1950
  - Address in San Francisco at War Memorial Opera House- October 17 1950

140-Korean War III/1953 (P1=.42, P4=.16, I1 =.64)
  - State of the Union- February 2 1953
  - Letter to Queen Elizabeth II- March 24 1953
  - Statement on anniversary of NATO treaty- April 4 1953
  - Message to UN Commission on Human Rights- April 7 1953

144-Guatemala/1953 (P1=.58, P4=.17, I1 =.78)
  - Letter on Philippine Elections- November 6 1953
  - Speech to UN General Assembly on Atomic Energy- December 8 1953
  - State of the Union- January 7 1954
152-Suez Nationalization-War/1956 (P1=.39, P4=.28, I1 =.74)

- Remarks about Suez situation- August 3 1956
- Letter to Chairman of Council of Ministers for USSR- August 7 1956
- Updates on Suez situation- August 29 1956
- Letter about mutual security assistance in Yugoslavia- October 16 1956
- Letter to Chairman of Council of Ministers for USSR- October 21 1956
- Statement on developments in Hungary- October 25 1956
- Letter to President of Vietnam on country’s first anniversary- October 25 1956
- Statement at IAEA Conference- October 26 1956
- Statement on Middle East/ Israeli mobilization- October 28 1956
- Report to Americans on Eastern Europe and Middle East- October 31, 1956
- Statement on relief of Hungarian people- November 2 1956
- Statement on USSR force in Hungary- November 4 1956
- Note to USSR urging withdrawal from Hungary- November 4 1956

159-Syria-Turkey Confrontation/1956 (P1=.48, P4=.09, I1 =.40)

- Radio address on Middle East- February 20 1957
- Letter to Israeli Prime Minister on withdrawal behind armistice lines- March 2 1957
- Letter to Ghana on independence- March 6 1957
- Statement on signing joint resolution on Middle East- March 9 1957
- Statement on 8th anniversary of NATO- April 4 1957
- Letter to King of Tunisia- May 29 1957
- Statement on Mutual Security Bill- July 17 1957
- Message to Congress on Peace/Stability in Middle East- August 5 1957

165- Iraq-Lebanon Upheaval/1958 (P1=.37, P4=.11, I1 =.53)

- Letter to Khrushchev on nuclear testing- April 8 1958
- Letter to Khrushchev on disarmament- April 28 1958
- Letter to Congress on US membership in UN- June 26 1958
- Statement on Mutual Security/Waging Peace- July 2 1958
- Letter to Nikita Khrushchev- July 2 1958
- Message to UK on atomic energy and security- July 3 1958
- Letter to President of Argentina- July 12 1958

168-Berlin Deadline/1958 (P1=.15, P4=.19, I1 =.57)

- Statement on 4th anniversary of SEATO- September 8 1958
• Radio/TV report on Formosa situation- September 11 1958
• Letter to Khrushchev on Formosa situation- September 12 1958
• Message to troops withdrawing from Lebanon- October 18 1958
• Statement on nuclear testing- October 25 1958
• Statement on Soviet nuclear tests- November 7 1958

180-Pathet Lao Offensive/1961 (P1=.55, P4=.31, I1 =.59)
• State of the Union- January 30 1961
• Message to permanent council of NATO- February 15 1961
• Statement on Dean Rusk attending SEATO in Bangkok- February 16 1961
• Letter to Senate on economic aid for Eastern Europe- March 7 1961

181-Bay of Pigs/1961 (P1=.51, P4=.21, I1 =.68)
• Signing of Mutual Defense Agreement with West Indies- February 16 1961
• Address for Diplomatic Corps of Latin American states- March 13 1961
• Statement on discontinuance of nuclear tests- March 14 1961
• Remarks at NATO session- April 10 1961
• Proclamation of Loyalty Day- April 12 1961
• Statement on OEEC-April 14 1961

185-Berlin Wall/1961 (P1=.25, P4=.26, I1 =.36)
• Statement on signing of Antarctic Treaty- June 23 1961
• Statement on economic cooperation with Pakistan- July 1 1961
• Statement on USSR aid memoire on Germany and Berlin- July 19 1961
• Message to American people on Berlin crisis- July 25 1961
• Message to inter-American economic/social conference in Uruguay- August 5 1961

186-Vietcong Attack/1961 (P1=.33, P4=.28, I1 =.51)
• Statement on USSR aid memoire on Germany and Berlin- July 19 1961
• Report to American people on Berlin crisis- July 25 1961
• Message to Congress on agreement with France for atomic energy/defense- September 7 1961
• Remarks at US swearing in to UN- September 12 1961
• Letter to President of Indonesia and Mali- September 14 1961
193-Nam Tha/1962 (P1=.41, P4=.15, I1 =1.0)

- Message to Turkey and Greece on Truman Doctrine anniversary- March 12 1962
- Message to American Association for UN- March 12 1962
- Message to Congress on foreign aid- March 13 1962
- Message to Congress on US participation in UN- March 15 1962
- Statement on French-Algerian ceasefire- March 18 1962
- Welcoming remarks for President of Togo- March 20 1962
- Remarks on 20th anniversary of Inter-American Defense Board- March 29 1962
- Statement with UK on nuclear testing- April 10 1962
- Remarks on USS Enterprise- April 14 1962

196-Cuban Missiles/1962 (P1=.29, P4=.24, I1 =.45)

- Letter from President- July 16 1961
- Remarks to Brazilian ambassador and students- July 31 1962
- Message to Congress on US participation in UN- August 2 1962
- Message to President of Indonesia- August 17 1962
- Statement removing restrictions on entry into Guam and pacific islands trust territory- August 23 1962
- Message to Shah of Iran following earthquake- September 6 1962
- Statement on foreign aid- September 19 1962
- Remarks on trade and foreign aid- September 23 1962
- Message to Prime Minister of Burundi- September 27 1962

206-Panama Flag/1964 (P1=.42, P4=.39, I1 =.54)

- Message to members of Armed Forces- November 25 1963
- Remarks to employees at State Department- December 5 1963
- Statement on IAEA- December 8 1963
- Statement on signing of Foreign Assistance Act- December 16 1963
- Messages to Presidents of Turkey and Cyprus and VP of Cypress- December 26 1963
- New Year’s greeting to USSR- January 1 1964
- State of the Union- January 8 1964

210-Gulf of Tonkin/1964 (P1=.37, P4=.31, I1 =.58)

- Remarks on Foreign Affairs- April 20 1964
- Remarks to a group of foreign students- May 5 1964
- Message to Congress- Request for additional funds for Vietnam- May 18 1964
- Statement on US-Soviet Consular Convention- May 27 1964
• Message to President of Ireland- May 30 1964
• Message to Prime Minister of India- June 3 1964
• Message to Congress on Atomic energy with NATO- June 30 1964
• Message to Egyptian President Nasser- July 17 1964

211-CongoII/1964 (P1=.57, P4=.19, I1 =.67)
• Message to Egyptian President Nasser- July 17 1964
• Report to American people on situation in Tonkin- August 4 1964
• Message to Congress on US policy in Southeast Asia- August 5 1964
• Remarks on singing peace/security resolution in Southeast Asia- August 10 1964
• Message to Congress on US participation in UN- August 20 1964
• Statement on establishment of global comm. Satellite system- August 20 1964
• Message to delegates of intl. conference on atomic energy- August 30 1964
• Message to Congress on US policy/cooperation in Antarctica- September 2 1964
• Remarks on NATO- September 18 1964
• Message to Prime Minister of Malta- September 20 1964
• Remarks from meeting with peace/natl. security consultants- September 23 1964

213-Pleiku/1965 (P1=.52, P4=.30, I1 =.45)
• Remarks on treaty with Panama/new canal- December 18 1964
• Christmas message to Americans in Vietnam- December 23 1964
• New Year’s greetings to Soviet leaders- December 30 1964
• Message to Congress on state of the nation’s defenses- January 18 1965

215-Dominican Intervention/1965 (P1=.23, P4=.26, I1 =.41)
• Statement ordering withdrawal of American dependents from South Vietnam- February 7 1965
• Statement on Vietnam- March 25 1965
• Statement on US Embassy bombing in Saigon- March 30 1965
• Address at Johns Hopkins on Vietnam- April 7 1965
• Statement on Vietnam- April 17 1965
• Statement on economic progress in Southeast Asia- April 20 1965
222-Six Day War/1967 (P1=.36, P4=.28, I1 =.38)

• Address to Tennessee state legislature on Vietnam- March 15 1967
• Statement following new constitution in South Vietnam- March 20 1967
• Remarks upon return from Guam conference- March 21 1967
• Remarks following meeting with NATO group- April 7 1967
• Statement on trust territory of Pacific islands- May 10 1967
• Statement on rising tensions in Near East- May 23 1967

224-Pueblo/1968 (P1=.47, P4=.36, I1 =.82)

• Statement about Agency for Intl. Development in Iran- November 29 1967
• Remarks at foreign policy conference for business executives- December 4 1967
• Statement on situation in Cypress- December 5 1967
• State of the Union- January 17 1968
• Statement on Nonproliferation Treaty- January 18 1968

225-Tet Offensive/1968 (P1=.49, P4=.27, I1 =.77)

• Statement on situation in Cypress- December 5 1967
• State of the Union- January 17 1968
• Address to nation on situation in North Korea- January 26 1968
• Statement to Congress on Foreign Assistance Programs- February 8 1968
• Statement on Nuclear Prohibition in Latin America- February 14 1968

233-EC-121 Spy Plane/1969 (P1=.45, P4=.29, I1 =.74)

• Remarks on upcoming trip to Europe- February 22 1969
• Remarks on departing for Europe- February 23 1969
• Remarks to North Atlantic Council in Brussels- February 24 1969
• Remarks at US Embassy in Paris- March 2 1969
• Remarks on return from Europe- March 2 1969
• Statement on deployment of ABM systems- March 14 1969
• Letter to head of US delegation at 18-nation disarmament conference- March 18 1969
237-Invasion of Cambodia/1970 (P1=.17, P4=.24, I1 =.58)
   • Report to Congress on US Foreign Policy for 1970s- February 18 1970
   • Statement about situation in Laos- March 6 1970
   • Toast at dinner for Ambassadors of Org. of African Unity- March 23 1970
   • Message to US Ambassador at SALT Talks- April 16 1970
   • Address to nation on progress toward peace in Vietnam- April 20 1970

239-Cienfuegos Submarine Base/1970 (P1=.24, P4=.29, I1 =.25)
   • Report on Cambodian operation- June 30 1970
   • Remarks about acceptance by Middle East of US ceasefire proposal- July 31 1970
   • Message about reform of the foreign assistance program- September 15 1970

246-Vietnam Ports Mining/1972 (P1=.36, P4=.28, I1 =.56)
   • Statement on US policy on economic assistance for developing nations- January 19 1972
   • Address to nation on plan for peace in Vietnam- January 25 1972
   • Annual report to Congress on US foreign policy- February 9 1972
   • Radio address on US Foreign Policy- February 9 1972
   • Remarks on departure for China- February 17 1972
   • Remarks at Veterans of Foreign Wars Congressional Banquet- March 7 1972

249-Christmas Bombing/1972 (P1=.45, P4=.35, I1 =.73)
   • Address to Congress on US participation in UN- September 8 1972
   • Remarks on signing joint resolution approval interim agreement with the USSR on limitation of nuclear weapons- September 30 1972
   • Remarks to foreign labor leaders- October 17 1972
   • Address to the nation- Look to the Future- November 2 1972
   • Radio address on foreign policy- November 4 1972

255-October-Yom Kippur War/1973 (P1=.27, P4=.19, I1 =.79)
   • Remarks at Veterans of Foreign Wars National Convention- August 20 1973
   • Statement about flood relief for Pakistani people- August 29 1973
   • Message to Congress about US Participation in UN- September 6 1973
   • Remarks about US actions following fighting in the Middle East- October 8 1973
259-Mayaguez/1975 (P1=.48, P4=.30, I1 =.54)
- Address to Congress on US Foreign Policy- April 10 1975
- Statement on US mission in Cambodia- April 12 1975
- Letter to Speaker and Senate President on evacuation of US mission in Cambodia- April 14 1975
- Statement on fall of Cambodian government- April 17 1975
- Statement calling for Vietnam immigrant assistance- May 1 1975
- Statement on Vietnam immigrant assistance- May 1 1975

274-Poplar Tree/1976 (P1=.52, P4=.23, I1 =.76)
- Remarks on Japanese Diet’s approval for ratification of Nonproliferation Treaty- May 24 1976
- Remarks on signing of US-USSR underground nuclear tests treaty- May 28 1976
- Message to Congress on Cypress conflict- June 7 1976
- Message to Congress on US-Turkey defense cooperation agreement- June 16 1976
- Remarks on assassination of US embassy officials in Lebanon- June 16 1976
- Letter to Congressional Chairmen on Indochina refugees- June 22 1976
- Statement on signing Intl. security assistance and arms control act- July 1 1976
- Remarks to Congress on efforts to end Cypress conflict- August 6 1976

303-Afghanistan Invasion/1979 (P1=.28, P4=.29, I1 =.50)
- Address to nation on Soviets in Cuba and SALT- October 1 1979
- Letter on US-China trade relations- October 23 1979
- Remarks on aid for Kämpucheans- October 26 1979
- Message to Congress on US assistance to Central America and the Caribbean- November 9 1979
- Remarks about Iranian oil imports- November 12 1979
- Remarks on Iranian situation- November 16 1979
- Letter to Speaker and SFRC Chairman on Cyprus- November 28 1979
- Remarks on US defense policy- December 12 1979
- Remarks on SALT letter- December 17 1979
- Remarks against Iran trying to seek UN action- December 21 1979

309-US Hostages in Iran/1979 (P1=.55, P4=.30, I1 =.40)
- Message to Senate on US-Norway treaty- August 10 1979
- Address to nation on Soviets in Cuba and SALT- October 1 1979
• Letter on US-China trade relations- October 23 1979
• Remarks on aid for Kampucheans- October 26 1979

343-Invasion of Grenada/1983 (P1=.16, P4=.22, I1 =.63)
• Address to nation on situation in Central America- August 13 1983
• Remarks on Soviet attack of Korean airliner- September 17 1983
• Address to American public on peace- September 24 1983
• Address at UN in New York City- September 26 1983
• Letter to congressional leaders on US participation in Lebanon- Sept27 1983
• Statement condemning Soviet attack on Korean airliner- Sept28 1983
• Address to nation on Lebanon situation- October 8 1983
• Statement on multinational force in Lebanon resolution- October 12 1983
• Statement on Soviet human rights policies- October 18 1983

354-Nicaragua MIG-21S/1984 (P1=.41, P4=.22, I1 =.46)
• Message to Senate on US-China agreement on taxation- August 10 1984
• Address to UN- September 24 1984
• Address to nation on US-Soviet relations- September 29 1984
• Statement on international terrorism- October 19 1984
• Address to nation on US Foreign policy- October 20 1984
• Statement on East-West space cooperation- October 30 1984
• Letter to Speaker and Senate President on Iran- October 31 1984

363-Gulf of Syrte II/1986 (P1=.21, P4=.23, I1 =.48)
• Message to Congress on freedom, security and global peace- March 14 1986
• Address to nation on Nicaraguan situation- March 16 1986
• Message to Congress on US assistance for Nicaraguans- March 19 1986
• Statement on House approval of Nicaraguan resistance support- March 20 1986
• Remarks about support for Nicaraguan domestic resistance- March 21 1986
• Address to nation on Nicaraguan situation- March 22 1986
• Statement on Conference on Cooperation and Security in Europe- March 27 1986

386-Libyan Jets/1988 (P1=.17, P4=.23, I1 =.62)
• Address to nation on US foreign policy- September 24 1988
• Address to UN- September 26 1988
• Statement on aid to Nicaragua- October 14 1988
• Statement on US-Soviet arms control negotiations- November 16 1988
• Address to nation on US-Soviet relations- December 3 1988
• Address to nation on US-Soviet relations- December 10 1988
• Statement on talks with PLO- December 14 1988

391-Invasion of Panama/1989 (P1=.09, P4=.05, I1 =0)

• Statement on US- Panama relations- September 1 1989
• Message to Congress on economic sanctions against Panama- October 19 1989
• Message to Congress about economic sanctions against Nicaragua- October 25 1989
• Message to Congress on national emergency with respect to Iran- November 14 1989
• Letter to Congress on military assistance to Philippines- December 2 1989

393-Gulf War/1990 (P1=.16, P4=.23, I1 =.67)

• Letter to Congressional leaders on economic measures dealing with Iran and Kuwait- August 9 1990
• Remarks on Persian Gulf Crisis- August 28 1990
• Address to US forces stationed in Persian Gulf region- August 29 1990
• Address to people of Iraq on Persian Gulf Crisis- September 16 1990
• Remarks to Amir of Kuwait- September 28 1990
• Address at UN- October 1 1990
• Remarks on conventional armed forces in Europe negotiations- October 4 1990

411-Haiti Military Regime/1994 (P1=.50, P4=.29, I1 =.84)

• Letter to Congress on evacuation of Americans from Rwanda- April 12 1994
• Statement on bombing in Israel- April 13 1994
• Remarks on South African election- April 26 1994
• Radio Address on Rwanda- April 30 1994
• Statement on implementation of Israel-Palestine declaration of principles- May 4 1994
• Message to Congress on sanctions against Haiti- May 7 1994
• Statement on Cuban independence day- May 20 1994
• Remarks to French National Assembly- June 7 1994
• Remarks at dinner in Paris- June 7 1994
• Address to people of Baltic nations- June 27 1994
• Address to people in Berlin, Germany- June 27 1994
• Message to people in Riga- July 6 1994
• Remarks at dinner in Poland- July 6 1994
412-Iraq Troop Deployment/1994 (P1=.43, P4=.17, I1 =.63)

- Remarks to people of Berlin, Germany- July 12 1994
- Remarks at Israel-Jordan signing ceremony- July 25 1994
- Statement on Cuba- August 20 1994
- Statement on withdrawal of Russian troops from Eastern Europe- August 31 1994
- Address to nation on Haiti- September 15 1994
- Radio report on Haiti- September 17 1994
- Address to nation on Haiti- September 18 1994
- Letter to Congress on deployment of troops to Haiti- September 21 1994
- Radio address to American people- September 24 1994
- Statement on Haiti- September 25 1994
- Address to UN- September 26 1994
- Radio address to US troops in Haiti- October 1 1994

419-Desert Strike/1996 (P1=.40, P4=.11, I1 =.86)

- Continuation of emergency with Yugoslavia and Bosnian Serbs- May 24 1996
- Statement on arms reduction with Russia and Ukraine- June 1 1996
- Statement on Northern Ireland peace process- June 6 1996
- Remarks on terrorist attack in UK- June 15 1996
- Remarks on terrorist attack in Saudi Arabia- June 25 1996
- Statement on Russian presidential election- July 3 1996
- Statement on Russian presidential election- July 4 1996
- Statement on training of Bosnian forces- July 9 1996
- Statement on most-favored nation trade status for Bulgaria- July 18 1996
- Message to Congress on economic sanctions against Libya- July 22 1996
- Message to Senate on UN efforts at combating desertification- August 2 1996

422-UNSCOM I/1997 (P1=.28, P4=.22, I1 =.60)

- Message to Congress on national emergency with respect to Iraq- July 31 1997
- Statement on terrorist organizations- October 8 1997
- Remarks on US-China relations and Asia Society- October 24 1997
- Message to Congress on national emergency with respect to Sudan- November 3 1997
- Statement to UN Security Council on Iraq- November 12 1997

- Continuation of emergency with Yugoslavia and Bosnian Serbs
- Statement on situation in Kosovo- May 13 1998
- Statement on situation in Indonesia- May 15 1998
- Radio address to American people- May 16 1998
- Remarks on Northern Ireland Peace Accord referendum- May 20 1998
- Statement on Russia’s economic situation- May 29 1998
- Statement on nuclear testing by Pakistan- May 30 1998
- Statement of support for Russian reform- May 31 1998
- Letter on Guinea-Bissau situation- June 12 1998
- Remarks to people of Xiahe, China- June 26 1998
- Continuation of emergency with respect to Iraq- July 28 1998
- Message to Congress about achieving peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina- July 28 1998
- Statement on Iraq’s failure to comply with UN inspections- August 6 1998

429-UNSCOM II-Operation Desert Fox/1998 (P1=.36, P4=.22, I1 =.63)

- Statement on Iraq’s failure to comply with UN inspections- August 6 1998
- Address to nation on terrorism in Sudan and Afghanistan- August 20 1998
- Letter to Congress on Terrorists who threaten the Middle Eastern peace process- August 20 1998
- Letter to Congressional leaders reporting on action against terrorist sites in Afghanistan and Sudan- August 21 1998
- Statement on bombings in South Africa and Uganda- August 26 1998
- Remarks to future Russian leaders in Moscow- September 1 1998
- Statement on UN Security Council vote on Iraq- September 9 1998
- Remarks to Council on Foreign Relations- September 14 1998
- Statement on UN Security Council resolution in Kosovo- September 23 1998
- Remarks on situation in Kosovo- October 12 1998
- Statement on violence in Republic of Georgia- October 19 1998

430-Kosovo/1999 (P1=.38, P4=.27, I1 =.61)

- Remarks to people of Israel in Jerusalem- December 13 1998
- Address to nation announcing military strikes against Iraq- December 16 1998
- US-EU declaration of Middle East peace process- December 18 1998
- Address to Arab nations- December 19 1998
- Address on completion of military strikes in Iraq- December 19 1998
- Statement on US policy towards Cuba- January 5 1999
• Statement on situation in Kosovo- January 16 1999
• State of the Union- January 19 1999
• Statement on Eritrea-Ethiopia border conflict- January 9 1999
• Statement on assistance to Jordan- February 6 1990
• Statement on Eritrea-Ethiopia border conflict- February 9 1999
• Radio address on Kosovo- February 13 1998

434-Afghanistan-USA/2001 (P1=.32, P4=.26, I1 =.68)
• Remarks at opening of NATO meeting- June 13 2001
• Address at Warsaw University- June 15 2001
• Continuation of emergency with Taliban- June 30 2001
• Statement on Cuba- July 13 2001
• Statement on the Balkans- July 24 2001
• Statement on Northern Ireland- August 1 2001
• Statement on floods in Thailand- August 16 2001

440-Iraq Regime Change/2002 (P1=.04, P4=.20, I1 =.67)
• Address to nation in Iraq- October 7 2002
• Remarks on authorization of use of military force in Iraq- October 10 2002
• Statement on terrorist attacks in Indonesia- October 13 2002
• Statement on Sudan Peace Act- October 21 2002
• Statement on elections in Bahrain- November 14 2002
• Remarks to people of Lithuania- November 23 2002
• Remarks to people of Romania- November 23 2002
• Statement on terrorist attacks in Israel and Kenya- November 28 2002
• Statement on peace agreement in Indonesia- December 9 2002
• Statement on national missile defense initiative- December 17 2002
• Remarks to people of Iran- December 21 2002
• Statement on terrorist attack in Israel- January 5 2003

441-North Korea Nuclear II/2002 (P1=.36, P4=.22, I1 =.72)
• Statement on new strategic relationship between US and Russia- May 24 2002
• Remarks at NATO-Russia meeting in Rome- May 28 2002
• Statement on Iran- July 12 2002
• Statement on Tel Aviv and West Bank terrorist attacks- July 17 2002
• Letter to Congressional leaders on US operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina- July 22 2002
• Statement on Northern Ireland- July 24 2002
• Statement on terrorist attacks in Colombia- August 8 2002
• Letter to Congressional leaders on response to 9/11 attacks- September 20 2002
• Letter to Congressional leaders on US troops in Ivory Coast- September 26 2002
• Remarks on bipartisan agreement for use of US forces in Iraq- October 2 2002

448-Iran Nuclear II/2006 (P1=.18, P4=.21, I1 =.25)
• Remarks on War on Terror- October 28 2005
• Remarks on War on Terror- November 11 2005
• Remarks in Kyoto- November 16 2005
• Remarks in Mongolia- November 21 2005
• Remarks on War on Terror- November 30 2005
• Address to nation on Iraq and War on Terror- December 18 2005

450-North Korea Nuclear III/2006 (P1=.28, P4=.24, I1 =.64)
• Remarks after meeting on War on Terror- January 4 2006
• Statement on bombing in Iraq- February 22 2006
• Radio address- March 4 2006
• Radio address- March 11 2006
• Remarks after meeting with North Korean defectors- April 28 2006
APPENDIX C: BIVARIATE CORRELATION
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*Probabilities listed indicate average min/max change in probabilities for significant variables in Models 1, 2 and 3. Specifically, findings display the average change in probabilities as the variables change from their minimum to maximum reported values across all levels of the dependent variable.*
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