Comparative Analysis of the Relationship between State Security and Ethnic Minority Oppression

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COMPARITIVE ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STATE SECURITY AND ETHNIC MINORITY OPPRESSION

by

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ABSTRACT

This research investigates the relationship between the state economic outlook, state security apparatus and the presence of ethnic minority oppression within the state’s borders. Modern states have developed extensive security apparatuses as they have developed their economies and this research intended to identify the possibility of a connection between the development of these aspects of the state in relation to ethnic minority repression. The research is broken up into a research design and introductory section, a case study section, and a final analysis and conclusion section. Each of the four case studies studied a and ethnic minority relationship, and in total there were three states and four ethnic minorities researched.

The research analyzed four studies and studied relationships between the economic outlook of the state, its security outlook, cultural issues, and how these relate to ethnic minority oppression. The findings of the study indicate some degree of relationship between all the aforementioned variables. The study suggests that the relationship between the state security apparatus and ethnic minority oppression is second to that of a state’s economic outlook and ethnic minority oppression and that the security outlook of a state is not an alternative explanation for state repression.

Future research questions recommended suggestions are predicated off the results of this research that showed the primacy of state economic outlook. It is recommended for further research into the spatial relationship between ethnic minorities and the productive forces of states, if and how colonial theories can be applied to states that are not settler-colonial in their foundation in relation to ethnic minorities, and how state security apparatuses have developed and how they interact with ethnic minorities.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

The conceptualization of an ethnic minority as an entity is relatively recent in human history. Prior the Treaty of Westphalia, governing entities were often run and ruled by elites that shared little to no cultural similarity with the various populations that fell under their rule. Over time, as the concept of a “nation-state” coalesced, elites began to dictate cultural norms like language downwards. In many instances, this meant the wiping out of many regional dialects and smaller languages. It also meant that larger groups that could not be assimilated so easily and had a distinct culture of their own were now ruled by another such group. Essentially, ethnic minorities were borne out of the creation of states. Even in states that had never placed much emphasis on the delineation of cultures in an official sense would be affected by this, as worldwide entire political systems were built around ethnic identity. The development of state security, itself likely an even younger concept then ethnic minorities, was early on set for a crash cross in ham-fisted interactions with ethnic minorities. Throughout the 20th and 21st century, state-minority conflicts have often dominated headlines. Following the fall of the Soviet Union, brutal warfare broke out between Chechen separatists and the Russian military. As Turkey formed out of the carcass of the Ottoman Empire, it was quickly beset by dissatisfaction and resistance by a Kurdish population that found itself in newfound borders. After several decades of warfare and instability, the People’s Republic of China finally managed to govern the historic China. Despite their quickly found authority, resident Uyghurs to the West quickly chafed under their rule. Yet the Miao, a group known to prior Chinese governing entities as practically ungovernable, have lived peacefully under the PRC. Many states justify billions of dollars of their budgets off the need for security, often with vague allusions to outside threats. In some, such as in China, Russia, and Turkey, those security threats are seen domestically, arising out of native minority
populations. All three of these states have pursued intensive economic plans in the past few decades and all three have utilized their security apparatuses against minority populations that reside within them as they have pursued economic development.

**Significance of the Research**

This research bares significance due the prevalence of minority rights suppression across the world regardless of state government, culture, or level of economic activity. Understanding why the state sees a benefit to ostracizing an entire resident population rather than integrating them is a question worth answering. Most, if not all, of the ethnic minorities that will be analyzed in this research will have lived in the existing states for a significant portion of their existence. Ethnic minorities tend to be the worst performing groups economically, politically, and educationally. This is the case in an overwhelming amount of multi-ethnic states, with the exceptions tending to be post-colonial states where a minority group was installed into power by the former colonial power. Despite most of the world participating in the global, liberal economic order, the socio-political situation of minorities throughout the globe has fluctuated and there is little case to be made that there has been relative improvement. The topic deserves further interest due to the massive expansion of the state security apparatuses of much of the world’s regional and global powers due to the War on Terrorism and the reigning neoliberal economic order. The impact of the globally more prevalent security state on long-standing tensions between a state and minority population has relevance in helping scholars better contextualize the security situation in area of significance throughout the world. Considering the expansion of developmental efforts, how states utilize their security apparatuses in relation to their economic interests is important research.
Research Design

In all, there will be a total of eight chapters. There will be an introductory chapter, which will lay out the basics of analysis (research design) and discussion on events occurring at the time of the writing that are relevant to the research. Following the introduction there will be a chapter dedicated to a literature review and then a chapter for the theoretical argument. There will then be four case studies, with each case study one chapter dedicated to the analysis of a specific state and minority within that state. The three states and the four minorities that will be analyzed are China and the Uyghurs, Russia and the Chechens, Turkey and the Kurds, and China and the Miao. The three states that are to be studied were picked because all three are either contemporarily officially multi-ethnic states or they are continuations of multi-ethnic governing entities. Both China and Russia formally consider themselves to be multi-ethnic societies and constitutionally recognize this as much to varying degrees. Turkey, which tends to attempt to identify itself as a nation-state for the Turkish people on and off throughout its history, is the official successor state to the multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire. The minorities that were selected all meet their own set of criteria. All four are ethnic minorities within a state but are native to regions within said states borders, all four are ethnic minorities, all four have been involved in varying degrees of violence with their respective states, and all four live on the border of their respective states.

Each case study will be broken up into four to five sections, with three of the sections specifically for analysis of the proposed variables. A history section that gives an overview of state security and minority interactions up until the contemporary period. A section will be dedicated to analyzing the economic outlook of the state (the independent variable), including how the state perceives the minority group from this perspective and how the minority group
interacts with the state-security apparatus. The predominate economic industry that will be discussed is that of the state’s energy sector. There will be a section on the security outlook of the state (the alternative explanation), which will include how the minority is considered with the security situation of the minority and the overall security climate within the state. Border security will be the predominate form of security analyzed. Another section will be focused on potential interceding variables, specifically outside state involvement with the minority population and antagonism toward a state’s security and the intercultural divides that exist within the analyzed state. The final section for the case study chapters will be a detailing the results of the analysis. The final chapter will be the conclusion which will include a summary of the case study results, whether the hypothesis will be rejected, analysis of the results in relation to the hypothesis, and recommendations for future research.

*Alternative Explanation: Security outlook of the state*

The security outlook of the state will be inferred from the research itself. It is unlikely in the modern day for states to identify a minority as a security threat as this would be openly racist. Instead, a security outlook of the state will be how it utilizes its military and/or police forces in the regions these minorities predominately live in, what their functional rights are relative to the rest of the state’s population, and the state’s anti-terrorism initiatives. The predominant analysis of state security outlook will be that of the state’s border security measures, as all four ethnic minorities live in border regions. The purpose of including an alternative explanation in this research is to make prominent the effect of the state security outlook on both the dependent and independent variables. While it is not assumed that the security outlook of a state is alternative to the economic outlook as to what causes the state oppression of minorities, the utilization of the state security apparatus as a method of oppression on ethnic minorities makes it apparent that
there is an effect on our dependent and independent variables because of its importance in the relationship. It should be emphasized that while the security outlook of the state is a potential other explanation for the repression of ethnic minorities it is not considered a predominant reason for this and the results of the research shall indicate as much.

*Independent Variable: Economic outlook of the state*

The economic outlook of the state will be considered the state’s official economic policies, how well its economy has been doing contemporarily, and the minority population’s relative economic success. The economic outlook of the state will be specifically analyzed in relation to their energy industry. As the independent variable, the economic outlook of states is considered the main cause and explanation for ethnic minority repression in our case studies and its relationship with other variables will be defined by its affect upon them.

*Dependent Variable: Relative rights status of the minority population*

Every state in the world has different legal systems and it is unfair to set a generalized standard researching these states. Instead, the rights of the minority populations will be considered relative to those of the predominant ethnicity in their respective states. Minority education and economic attainment relative to the rest of state’s will also be considered in evaluating this variable.

*Interceding Variables:*

Outside state involvement
Cultural divides

Outside state involvement will be considered any level of involvement of an outside state with another state’s resident minority population. This could include anything from verbal support of a minority to the funding, training, and facilitation of minority separatist groups. Cultural divides
will be considered distinctions between the majority ethnic group in the state and the minority ethnicity. This can/will include language differences, cultural practices, religion, and way-of-life.
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

In China's Policy Towards Uyghur Nationalism’s, author Eric Hyer analyzes the Chinese state’s policy toward Uyghur nationalism in the context of collapse of the Soviet Union and the development of the Central Asian states. Hyer relates China’s economic plan and its energy needs to its security policies toward the Uyghurs. Although this article was written 12 years ago and three years prior to the 2009 Ürümqi riots, it is remarkably prescient about the urgency the Chinese state will treat its security concerns in the region with. The article does center the issue around Uyghur nationalism and Chinese state policies as being a reaction to it, which may overlook the origin of Uyghur nationalism.

Evan McKinney wrote China's Muslims Separatism and Prospects for Ethnic Peace to compare the differing situations of the two most prominent Muslim minorities in China, the Uyghurs and Hui. McKinney discusses the security situation and the Chinese state’s prospects for that but focuses predominantly on the ability for the Hui to conform to Chinese state policy unlike the Uyghurs. The article is mostly identity oriented, looking to situate the two groups in relation to their perception of their identity and its place within Chinese society.

Author Michael Clarke has the most written on the subject of Uyghurs, spanning several years of research. His article China's Internal Security Dilemma and the "Great Western Development” takes the stance that China’s security efforts are explicitly in an effort to protect the dominant Han majority group. This comes at the expense of minorities, particularly the Uyghurs as China views them as a source of potential terrorism and violence. The economic issues of the Uyghurs, among other minorities, is also discussed in relation to the tensions between the PRC and the Uyghurs. While Xinjiang is shown to have become a rapidly developing transit and resource hub
for China and neighboring Caspian states, the native Uyghurs in the region have seen little to no benefit from these economic gains.

In *The Decline and Shifting Geography of Violence in Russia’s North Caucasus* by Edward Holland, a spatial analysis on violence in the North Caucasus between 2010 and 2016 is performed. Holland analyses data that suggests that violence in the region has declined although it has spread out from Chechnya. The 2014 Sochi Olympics is noted as a large contributor to this change, as Russia switched to a policy of securitization in the region and moved away from economic based incentives. This article provides a good overview of the North Caucuses as a whole, with a focus on Chechnya that makes it particularly relevant to this research. Holland is careful to discuss not only the potential causes of the drops in violence but the differences in policies used over time in the region.

From 1994 to 2000, Chechnya was the site of two brutal wars as Chechen separatist groups fought the Russian military. Marat Iliyasov analyses the potential impact of these conflicts and their resulting outcomes on Chechen ethnic identity in *Chechen ethnic identity: assessing the shift from resistance to submission*. Iliyasov surveys the Chechen attitude toward Russian state authority and the level of resistance that Chechen militias still provide. The article provides an interesting insight into the Chechen identity, especially in relation to the Russian state’s security apparatus. Iliyasov does well to present the Chechen ethnic identity and identify any potential changes it has had considering the change in community behavior, however it is apparent that he has an affinity for the Chechen’s and some of that bias bleeds into the work. Regardless, the article stands out as one of the most explicit analyses of ethnic identity and the security state.

Tod Reed and Diana Raschke provide an analysis on a specific group dedicated to Uyghur separatism in their book *The Etim: China's Islamic Militants and the Global Terrorist Threat*: 
China's Islamic Militants and the Global Terrorist Threat. While less focused on the relationship between the Chinese state and the Uyghur, this source provides an important understanding of the motivations and ideology of the most prominent Uyghur separatist group, ETIM. Reed and Rascke discuss the development of ETIM, its ideological underpinnings, and the efforts it has made against the central Chinese state. While ETIM may not be representative of the sentiment of all Uyghurs, it could be viewed as one form of an expression of the feelings the Uyghurs have towards their socio-political situation in China, analogous to the IRA in Northern Ireland and Hamas in Palestine.

Kurdish resistance groups in Turkey have often gone defunct, split, or evolved. Seevan Saeed analyzes the latest development in the organizing of Kurdish resistance to the Turkish state in *Kurdish politics in Turkey: from the PKK to the KCK*. While the book is for the most part informational on the status and structure of contemporary Kurdish organizations in Turkey, its ascribing of the Communities in Kurdistan (KCK) as a social-movement rather than a militia or political party. Saeed takes an identity-focused angle in his analysis of the organization and what exactly is entailed by a social movement. How the Turkish state-security apparatus has reacted to the KCK is discussed in a limited manner, too. Due to the unstable nature of minority resistance movements due to state pressures, Saeed’s book is helpful in giving some of the most recent analysis of what is happening in Kurdish populated Turkey now.

The Uyghurs in Xinjiang are not alone in the oppressive state policies toward them within China, with Tibetans similarly being faced with restrictive policies toward them. These two regions and their people are compared in Jungmin Seo and Young Chul Cho’s article *Rethinking Beijing's Geostrategic Sensibilities to Tibet and Xinjiang: Images and Interests* compares China’s differing understanding of the two regions. The authors suggest that energy security is the primary driver
behind Chinese policies in Xinjiang. China’s ever-so-fast economic development requires fuel, much of which flows through pipelines that cross the far-Western province. The article raises the interesting question of how prominent the role of the prevailing economic situation is on the Chinese security outlook.

In Elena Zhirukhina’s *Protecting the state: Russian repressive tactics in the North Caucasus*, the Russian state security apparatus is scrutinized. Specifically, Zhirukhina analyzes the tactics Russia developed over the course of two decades of dealing with Chechen insurgencies. Much of the article is focused on the changes that the Russian security agencies took in their development to address the insurgency, such as a focus on preventative operations. Zhirukhina finds that the Russian state has become more selective in its use of violence, however it still uses repressive policies toward the Chechen population. This article provides a detailed security perspective of the Russian state which is one of the main variables to be analyzed.

Michael Clarke writes again on the subject of the Uyghurs, comparing the developing situation of them to Palestinians in China and the Uyghurs: The 'Palestinization' of Xinjiang? Despite being obviously far away from each other and culturally distinct, the policies of isolation, economic limitation, and displacement are both featured prominently in the Israeli treatment of Palestinians and Chinese treatment of Uyghurs. Under the guise of security concerns, both Israel and China seek to assert their economic and social control over territory for preservation of state aims. The utilization of both Palestinians and Uyghurs in state economic projects in conjunction with increasing the securitization of their spaces is discussed in depth in this article. Clarke provides an excellent addition to the literature on Uyghurs through this comparison and to the body of work on state security and minority relations.
An article that directly addresses the question of Uyghurs and Chinese state security is by Kilic Bugra Kanat, who wrote The Securitization of the Uyghur Question and Its Challenges. This article addresses directly what the securitization of the Uyghur within China and the tensions it has caused between the Chinese state and the Uyghur population. Kanat is one of the few sources that suggests that the Chinese state policy towards the Uyghur is a contributing factor to the tensions and Uyghur alienation, recommending that the state changes its policies.

The return of Michael Clarke is rounded off in his work The Impact of Ethnic Minorities on China’s Foreign Policy, which examines the role China’s ethnic minorities play in its foreign policy. The Uyghurs are used as a case study, and building upon his prior works, they are viewed as part of a security issue that the state must combat through domestic security policies and relation with Central Asian states. Clarke takes a more research design-oriented take to this topic, utilizing five different aspects of the Uyghur-China situation in relation to its impact on Chinese foreign policy.

In Fevzi Bilgin and Ali Sarıhan’s book Understanding Turkey's Kurdish question, the history and development of the Kurdish separatist movement within Turkey is analyzed. Kurdish resistance to Turkey began at the outset of the establishment of Turkey in the ashes of the Ottoman Empire. While initially based off Islamic resistance to the new secular state, the Kurdish ethnic identity over time became progressively solid and the separatist movements diverged from religious inspiration. The book is primarily a historical overview of the different stages of Kurdish resistance to the Turkish state and the Turkish state’s reaction to it. Overall, it is mostly informational and does not provide any grand analysis of the relationship between the state and the Kurds. Despite the vaguely dark allusion made in the title, the book is mostly focused on
detailing the situation for the Turkish state in relation to the Kurds. It still provides helpful background to analysis of the Turkish security outlook and the Kurds. Meil Ding provides an anthropological perspective on Chinese state security policies in relation to the Uyghur populace in Security Matters in Marriage: Uyghurs’ Perceptions of Security in Xinjiang, China. The “securitization” of daily life for Uyghurs is observed through Uyghur marriages, with what makes a couple appropriate for marriage dependent on additional, security driven matters. The article provides perspective of the impact of state security on minority culture. While not a political science article, Ding’s work is important to contextualize and humanize the issues facing the Uyghurs. More than merely another community with issues with extremism, the humanization of the Uyghurs also works to better understand the impact of Chinese policies. Perhaps as a result of the simply long length of time that organized resistance from the Kurds to the Turkish state, the state of Kurdish interactions with the state is likely the most advanced of any minority group in a parallel situation. Cengiz Gunes analyzes this development in his book, The Kurdish national movement in Turkey: from protest to resistance. After decades of on-and-off clashes between Kurdish communities and the Turkish military, resistance coalesced around the Kurdish Worker’s Party (PKK), originally a Marxist-Leninist liberation party. Gunes analyzes how the PKK went from a fringe group to one of the primary targets of the Turkish security apparatus. Support and opposition for the Kurdish community for the PKK and how that itself is developed is discussed by Gunes within the book. The book is an in-depth dive into the Kurdish identity of resistance and how it was expressed in relation to the Turkish state. A major contributor to the literature on state-minority relationships in a security context.
Since Mao secured control over China and drove the remnants of the Nationalist military forces off the mainland into Taiwan, the CCP has grappled with how to handle the Uyghur population which has generally never been interested in Chinese assimilationist policies. Ondřej Klimeš analyzes the relationship of the Chinese state and the Uyghurs since 1949. He also does contextualize the policies introduced against the Uyghurs since 2012 as being specific to Xi’s leadership, connecting the policy to ideology. While my research will be focused primarily on security and economic outlooks, ideological underpinnings of the state impact both and is important to include in my analysis.

In S. Fogden’s Writing Insecurity: The PRC’s Push to Modernize China and the Politics of Uyghur Identity, the Chinese state’s urge to “modernize” the country has often come into conflict with the Uyghurs populace due to the state’s views on what exactly modernization entails. Modernization is often a charged term because “modernity” is most often understood as the aims of the presiding power of a population, not necessarily what is in the best interests of it. Despite decades of Chinese assimilation policy, the Uyghurs have mostly resisted the project. Understanding their motivation, and the Chinese state’s motivation, is paramount to give a historical contextualization to my research.

Security issues are preeminent in the Chinese state’s concerns over Uyghur nationalist tendencies and their Silk Road Economic Belt initiative. In The evolving terrorist threat to China’s Central Asia projects, Federica Reccia describes China’s urgency in grappling with the Uyghur unrest, particularly the attacks by the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), on their rail lines connecting China to the western Central Asian states through the region. The most revealing aspect of the situation is just how many people have been claimed to have been killed so far, with a death toll of 468 between 2010 and 2014. Reccia’s analysis of the security situation heavily incorporates the
economic concerns of China; mineral and energy resources coming from the west are critical for China’s continued economic growth. However, the Uyghur’s are not discussed as much more than antagonists to China’s economic aspirations and need to ensure citizenry security, with no attempt made to delve into the motivations of the Uyghurs and what is facilitating the violence. Like much of the existing literature, the focus of this article is from the perspective of the Chinese state’s security outlook.

One of the pre-eminent scholars on inequality, Charles Tilly’s *Durable Inequality* examines how inequalities in society, ranging from gender to minorities, are “durable” through time and laws. Tilly introduces his four-part causes of inequality, exploitation, opportunity hoarding, emulation, and adaptation. Within *Durable Inequality* there is discussion on the nation building predicated off international norms, which in turn institutionalizes what is a “citizen”. Tilly manages to develop a framework of analysis for inequality in relationships, a framework that is essential to analyzing the relationships of states and their minority populations. The development of the concept of “transactional costs” in relation to the relationship between two entities gives framing for the continued oppression of minorities within my case studies that my research is analyzing. *Durable Inequality* provides a strong theoretical foundation to the research to be done in this paper.

The progenitor of intra-state conflict, Ted Gurr’s *Why Men Rebel*, analyzes and discusses at length about the reasons why rebellions occur. Gurr discusses emotive, psychological, non-rational causes of political violence and the underlying reasons that in trigger rebellions. One of the most important concepts that Gurr develops is relative deprivation. Relative deprivation defined in *Why Men Rebel* as an actor’s perception of their situation and what they believe their situation could possibly be. One of the most relevant aspects of Gurr’s work is his discussion
state capability to respond to rebellions. In all four case studies to be analyzed there have been significant rebellions by the ethnic minority against the state at some point in history. Gurr’s work provides a framework to explain in part that ethnic minorities understanding of their tension with their respective central states.

In Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde’s book *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, as the title is explicit about, a comprehensive framework for analyzing security issues is built out. The authors discuss the concepts of sectoral analysis and securitization, the latter of which is an important concept to the research in this paper. Securitization, the concept that states will craft different subjects into issues of security for ulterior purposes. Wæver’s development of securitization is immediately applicable to the interactions of the central state with three of the ethnic minority case studies present in this research. An important aspect of securitization that is discussed at length in *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* are the reasons that a state will “securitize” an issue, which is examined within this research as to why state’s view certain ethnic minorities within their borders as a security issue.

In Donald Horowitz’s work *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* he tackles how ethnic groups operate within conflict. One of the most important contribution Horowitz makes is his analysis of conflict theory through the perspective of ethnic groups instead of the internationalist bent it typical had at the time of his writing. Who, why, and how ethnic groups get involved in conflicts are discussed with comparative case studies. One of the aspects of ethnic conflict that Horowitz touches on is the varying economic reasons that ethnically based conflicts occur. While he does not go into depth on state antagonism of ethnic groups, his work provides theoretical grounding for ethnic conflict that is predicated from questions of status and to a lesser extent economic issues. His analysis of modernization theories and how they relate to ethnic conflict much of the
discussion revolves around class distinctions within ethnic groups and what role they have, indicative of the role status plays in minority community outlook and how economic topics relate to these questions of status.

The security outlooks of states have a significant role in this research as a variable that affects both our independent and dependent variables. Barry Buzan and Ole Waever discuss the differing regional security frameworks that emerged following the collapse of the Soviet Union in *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*. Buzan and Waever propose the Regional Security Complex Theory, which proposes that there are specific regional security complexes defined by the states have a high amount of interactions amongst themselves. Within this research all three states that are analyzed either border each other or are relatively close, however according to the theory they are all three in different RSC’s. RSC theory does provide some background to the security outlooks of the three states analyzed and suggests that these states should have different security needs and/or wants for their states.

Nationalism is inevitably associated with ethnic conflict and minority ethnic-state tensions, and for good reason. Benedict Anderson discusses how ethnic groups begin to perceive themselves and how they form identities in *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. Anderson proposes the concept of “horizontal comradeship”, which is how members of an ethnic group that may not have ever met each other can associate and empathize with each other’s condition. In the discussion of minority ethnic group tensions with the state’s that they inhabit, this horizontal comradeship surely plays a role in the grievances that the ethnic groups discussed in this research have with their respective states. This theory of ethnic group identification is relevant to the research in numerous ways, particularly in the observations of
cultural norms and how they interact with state economic programs and the state security apparatus.
CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL

With the fall of the Soviet Union and 9/11 in the United States, the world’s powers have moved quickly to expand state security apparatuses ostensibly for the protection of their citizens. Whether the world is a safer place today is dependent on one’s perspective and where they fall within their country’s hierarchy and where they fall within the economic plans of the state. The fall of the Soviet Union and transition to the Russian Federation was almost immediately beset by intense resistance, and the breakout of outright war, by ethnic Chechens in Chechnya who sought independence (Sanz, 2017). In China, Uyghur resistance to Chinese state policy has boiled over several times in the past few decades into riots and an Islamist Uyghur independence armed group has gained notoriety (Clarke, 2015). The Miao in China have a long history of violent uprisings against Chinese government, and to this day have a relatively poor socio-economic standing in China (McCord, 2011). Turkey’s ongoing issues with its Kurdish population have been a running theme of its existence since the Ottoman Empire fell (Gunes, 2011). All four-minority population held relatively less power and economic wealth compared to the predominate ethnic groups in their respective states, however as these state security apparatuses have expanded, there appears to be a trend of furthered state repression and worsened socio-political outcomes for minorities where this significant economic interest for the state. That is why this research proposes the following hypothesis for its basis: If a state’s government views an ethnic minority as a potential threat to an important economic industry, then the state will utilize the security apparatus to repress the ethnic minority.

Tensions between minority populations and their ruling governments are not a new occurrence in human history. Jewish and Roman tensions that often spilled over into intense periods of repression are well documented despite occurring thousands of years ago. However, the
dynamics of these tensions have likely changed in the time since then. In the age of empires, without strong centralized bureaucracies or a national character, minority oppression was predominately about limiting political rights and perhaps a special tax. The Ottoman Empire, the last of the old imperial regimes common from the 15th century onward, was very ethnically diverse. Composed of Turks, Arabs, Kurds, Greeks, Armenians, Jews, Bulgarians and other Slavic cultures, the Ottomans tended to be relatively fair to their minority subjects (Isom-Verhaaren and Schull, 2016). Outside of the jizya (tax) levied on non-Muslim peoples, there was little state antagonism toward minority populations. China, one of the oldest continuous existing countries in the world despite dozens of iterations, was for the most part a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual country. Two of the last ruling Imperial dynasties, the Yuan and Qing, were both founded and ruled by not only minority populations but minority populations that were not originally subject to Chinese rule (Zhang 2018)(Anert, 2013). The direct conflicts between a minority population and its central government that has become more conflict is a result of the formation of states as the primary mode of governance in world. In this research, the state will be the level of focus.

State security is a similarly newer concept in world history. Governing entities rarely had professionalized, large, standing militaries throughout human history. Even a formal police force was not the norm. Today, nearly every state on earth maintains a professionalized standing military. As communication technology has developed and diversified, domestic security forces have increasingly been grown to secure state interests. The modern security state has no significant precedent, due in part to technological advances and the centralization of government functions in the state structure. How the security state interacts, and views, minority populations is a relatively recent consideration to be made by scholars. Due to being more recently developed
and its importance in modern state structure, the security outlook of the state is the alternative explanation. As proposed in the hypothesis, a state’s security outlook will be the effective tool the state uses to justify and carry out the oppression of ethnic minority populations. However, there is potential for the states to have some justifiable security concerns regarding ethnic minorities. State security outlook is typically the tool of the state to enforce the economic order, but to some extent the security apparatus of the state exists outside of this relationship and effects minority oppression and the state’s economic outlook. This potential effect on both the independent and dependent variable is why it is an alternative explanation. As a result of this potential effect, it will be considered an alternative explanation to the repression of ethnic minorities. Minority populations, who for the most already had an inequal relationship with the state, have these inequalities enhanced in their limited ability to respond or influence the state security apparatus (Tilly, 1998). In their limited capacity, minority populations clearly fit the dependent variable role.

Naturally, there are variables that play a more significant role in the resulting outcomes of the state-minority relationship. That is why the economic outlook of the state is considered the independent variable. It is unlikely that state security apparatuses exist as an essential aspect of the state structure, and it is often argued that state security is built up in response to threats to the state itself. While the state security apparatus can possibly have an effect and will be considered an alternative explanation for state repression of ethnic minorities, the economic outlook of states is considered the progenitor of minority oppression in this research. What and how these threats are perceived to be plays a significant role in state security policies. Why the security state, and the threats that it is supposedly addressing, exist in the first place will be explored in this research, and it will be presupposed that the economic outlook of the state is the reason as it is
most likely the biggest security threat to a modern state. Ethnic minorities are then securitized due to the state fearing a threat to its economic situation, particularly threats to their energy industry. Traditional warfare is gone for the most part, and most wars of the past two decades have been asymmetric or civil wars. Protecting the state’s economic interests, a major part of any state’s legitimacy, is a strong potential reason for the build out of the security state and in turn could glean why states interact with their minority populations with a security perspective. Therefore, a state’s economic outlook plays a role in relationship of the state and minority populations.

There are factors that are to be considered interceding variables in this research. These variables function outside of the state itself, whether it is another state or cultures/diasporas that interact with a minority population. States, specifically nation states, that share cultural affinities with a minority group or stand to benefit from ethnic tensions in another state may lend support to minority groups seeking independence. In the many ethnically driven wars in the Balkans throughout the 1990’s, states like Croatia, Serbia, and Albania would support militias that shared their identity in civil conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo. In some cases, a state itself may not involve itself but its own public may support separatist movements in other countries. In the United States, Irish-American communities often provided notable amounts of material support, be it money or weapons, the Irish Republican Army and its campaign against the Irish Partition despite their being little material impact either way for them in the outcome of the conflict (Wilson, 1995). Both interceding variables are identity based, an identity as a factor in state-minority relationships cannot be ignored.
CHAPTER 4: CHINA AND THE UYGHURS

Introduction

In 2009, riots broke out in the western Chinese city of Ürümqi. Located in Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, the farthest northwestern province in the People’s Republic of China, the riots were neither the first nor the last of the social unrest that had faced the region. Xinjiang is predominately populated by the Uyghur people, a Turkic group that are for the most part identify as Muslims. Long living in the periphery of Chinese society and chafing under strict state controls, unrest has been an issue in Xinjiang. That is why this paper hypothesizes that if the Chinese government views the Uyghur population as a security issue, then it will maintain policies that limit Uyghur political access to the state. Other variables to consider include outside state interference, such as funding for separatist groups or public agitation, and cultural divides driven by ethnic tension.

The 2009 Ürümqi riots were unique. For the first time in contemporary Chinese history, the dissatisfaction of the Uyghur populace was in international news as the full weight of the Chinese state security apparatus cracked down. Tensions that had been kept under the wrap of state censorship and the general remoteness of Xinjiang were on full display, with Western media happily attaching the situation in Xinjiang to the unrest seen in Tibet, one of the highlights of 2008. While Tibetans and Uyghurs both are long suffering minorities in the PRC and face similar issues, why they face them is not particularly similar. Somewhat naïve headlines scattered across Western media, questioning the “Chinese unraveling” driven by minority unrest. While these articles were jumping the gun, there are real state legitimacy issues at stake. Xinjiang, bereft of typical economic drivers like arable land and manufacturing, finds its
economy driven instead by resource extraction and location. It is home to natural gas and mineral deposits that help fuel the Chinese economy. It also borders seven different countries, Russia, Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. Several of these bordering countries are important to Chinese transit endeavors part of its broad economic policy of “Belt Road Initiative”, seeking to establish Chinese influence abroad. Countries like Kazakhstan have been enthusiastic receptors of Chinese investment. Xinjiang is home to a majority population of Uyghur’s; however, Han Chinese make up a significant portion of the population too. Unlike the Uyghurs, the Xinjiang Han are typically economically ascendant and for the most part left alone by the government. This paper will explore why the Uyghurs are considered a security threat by the Chinese government, and how the securitization of the Uyghur’s affects their rights and privileges within Chinese society.

**History**

There is some irony about the PRC’s treatment of the Uyghur’s. Hundreds of years ago, Turkic nomadic groups that eventually would become the Uyghur were purposely settled in what is now Xinjiang after the Qing Empire’s genocide of the Dzungar people in the 18th century (Guo, 2015). The Dzungar people and the Dzungar Khanate were led by Mongol Buddhists that had long inhabited the region (Klimeš, 2012). The Qing’s campaign of conquest against the Khanate led to the region’s depopulation, which the Qing resolved by settling the nomadic Turkic groups that would later become known as Uyghurs and Han (Guo, 2015). At this time, the Muslim Uyghurs were considered far more trustworthy by the Qing. Approximately 150 years later in the beginning years of the PRC, surveys of the Xinjiang province showed it to be overwhelmingly populated by Uyghurs. For the most part, the PRC had little economic investment and
involvement in the region, making the already isolated region even less accessible (Castets, 2003). With the loosening of economic controls and shift in policy country wide, similar changes took place in Xinjiang. The increased development of the region also meant that the Han began to move to it, taking up residence predominately in cities, mostly Ürümqi. The first notable incidence of civil unrest in Xinjiang came in 1990 in what would be called the “Barren riot” (Guo, 2015). Approximately 200 Uyghur men, members of the recently established East Turkistan Islamic Party, protested outside of the local PRC office against the supposed forced abortions that Uyghur women were forced to undergo and the mass migration of the Han into Xinjiang that was displacing the local Uyghur’s (Castets, 2003). The PLA quickly sent out to the town and put down the protest, with many members of the group arrested and sentenced to death (Guo, 2015). Just across the Western border, the collapse of the Soviet Union led to the creation of several new Central Asian states, many of which having close cultural connections to the Uyghurs and perhaps inspiring the renewed interest in independence.

In the ensuing decades, sporadic protests and violence was met with consistent shows of strength by the PRC and little change in the direction of the province. The 2009 Ürümqi riots by local Uyghur’s were sparked in part by the attacks on Uyghur workers in Guangdong by the local Han population over claims of sexual assault (Castets, 2003). Dissatisfaction with state treatment and poor economic prospects were drivers of the initial protests, as the workers themselves were transported from Xinjiang to Guangdong to work in the factories to make up for labor shortages in the region. Several days of protests, both by Uyghurs and the Han populations of the city, were cut off from the outside world with the near instantaneous cessation of internet and radio access by the state (Guo, 2015). Ürümqi marked a turning point for Uyghur-PRC interactions, as
the Chinese state has since rapidly expanded the scope and scale of its security apparatus in the province and conflict has become more frequent. At the time of this writing, there are reports that the PRC has been sending tens of thousands of Uyghurs to “re-education” centers (Wong, 2017). Movement of Uyghurs in Xinjiang, already limited, is now completely restricted and communication difficult. Many Uyghurs had sought work in outside provinces have been allegedly taken and sent back to Xinjiang (Wong, 2017). The escalation in securitization has made the question of state security and Uyghur relations with the state a more pressing question to broach.

**Chinese Security Policy and Outlook**

Xinjiang has become the highest security priority of the PRC. Dramatically scaling up the presence of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and police forces in 2018, the Xinjiang province is controlled more tightly than Tibet has ever been. Communication is incredibly limited both within the province and those trying to contact family and friends within it. Travel to the province for non-citizens has ceased for the most part (Wong, 2017). These actions, which has caught little traction among international media outlets, are not generalizable for the entire population, however. Xinjiang’s large Han population is not experiencing the upscale of state presence in the way the Uyghur population has, which is reportedly being sent to large scale camps for “education”. While there has been little to no acknowledgement of these actions by the PRC elite, in the past the justification for security-based moves against the Uyghurs has been justified by the typical line of preserving state harmony. The Uyghurs pose a security issue to the government, and what this means for the Uyghurs and the PRC is important to understanding the security outlook of China is.
The Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), the newest iteration of what has long been referred to as the East Turkistan Islamic Party, tends to capture the focus of security justification for the PRC both by the state and by many authors in who have written on this topic. For good reason, too, as what is now called TIP is considered a terrorist organization by not only China, but prominently the European Union, the US, and Russia (Clarke, 2015). With connections al-Qaeda and ISIS, TIP has been involved not only in militant agitation within Xinjiang but also as far away as Syria and Vietnam. Terrorist attacks in Xinjiang have increased in frequency since the 2009 riots. TIP is far from a new organization, with its oldest predecessor founded in the late 1980’s and existing since then to varying degrees of activity (Reed and Raschke, 2010). TIP’s attacks are often focused on government administrative centers, such as a party office in town or a security checkpoint (Reed, 2010). While TIP is an ostensibly Islamist organization, it has little to no following or interaction with other native Chinese Muslim populations, like the Hui. The division between the Uyghur and other Chinese Muslim populations belays an important point that will be explored in depth later. TIP is for the most part composed of ethnic Uyghurs from Xinjiang or the Uyghur diaspora (Reed and Raschke, 2010). Its main goal is for the independence of Xinjiang and the establishment of a caliphate in the region. Despite the universalizing nature of Islam, TIP is notably focused on the plight of Uyghurs and other Turkic peoples under the banner of Islam rather than the more general aims of ISIS, which sought to establish a state for all Muslim people’s regardless of ethnicity (Reed and Raschke, 2010). TIP is the primary agitator against the Chinese state, and in turn receives the brunt of its security apparatus. While TIP is a genuine threat and its attacks are not justifiable, the organizations existence alone is not satisfactory enough to justify to securitization of the Uyghurs and Xinjiang as a whole. There is little evidence to suggest that TIP enjoys widespread support among the
Uyghur population, and abroad its branches are mostly filled by Uyghurs who reside in Turkey or Central Asian states (Clarke, 2011).

Under the PRC, China has long been concerned with its territorial integrity. From the outset this was an issue due to the de facto independence of Taiwan under its vanquished Nationalist foes. In the immediate aftermath of the chaos of the Chinese Civil War, the PRC worked to secure much of the borders that composed of the fallen Qing Empire, with the PLA entering Inner Mongolia, Tibet, and Xinjiang. While the Han, who are often regarded as “Chinese” by those outside of the country, make up most of the population, over 300 million Chinese citizens come from at least one of the 52 constitutionally recognized minorities in the PRC (Lilly, 2009). China has long viewed itself as a multi-ethnic state, and the formal recognition within the country’s institutions indicates as much (Lilly, 2009). However, like countries like the United States and Russia, how these institutions function regarding the minority populations often diverges greatly from perceived intent. In China, major minority populations like the Uyghur, Miao, and Mongolians lay far away from the densely populated, Han dominated coasts. Xinjiang, bordering seven different countries, likely would be a top security issue for China even without the Uyghurs due to the sensitivity of the Caspian Region. Border security, long an issue for the PRC as exemplified by the brief Sino-Indian war over a small stretch of Western border demarcation (Chakravorty, 2015), is perhaps a more significant reason for the securitization of the Uyghurs and Xinjiang than TIP. Along with border security, the states beyond the border are important aspects of Chinese foreign policy. Relations with Central Asian states, many of which border Xinjiang, are important for Chinese economic development and general regional stability (Clarke, 2015). It could be inferred that the Uyghurs are simply in the wrong place at the wrong
time, occupying a geographically and economically strategic region for the PRC that contains a
significant amount of the country’s energy resources (Reccia, 2018). However, this would not
explain the state actions against Uyghurs outside of Xinjiang alone, and the drastic difference in
treatment between Uyghurs and Han in Xinjiang suggests a role identity issues being an
undergirding aspect of China’s security outlook towards the Uyghur.

The PRC has never been very accommodating toward organized religion, regardless of its origin
or background (Farr, 2008). Despite this blanket policy toward religion, there is not much
information to suggest that religion is the predominate antagonization towards the Chinese
security apparatus and the Uyghur. Despite also being Muslim, the Hui have had significantly
less chafing under the country’s policies (McKinney, 2006). Unlike the Uyghurs, the Hui are for
the most part ethnically Han and speaking Mandarin Chinese (McKinney, 2006). Outside of their
religion, the Hui occupy a cultural identity much more in line with the overarching national
character. The Uyghur for the most part are unable to speak Mandarin and do not share much in
physical or cultural characteristics with the Han. This has helped them partly fall victim to the
security apparatus due to being an “other”. Despite being a part of the Chinese state since the
Qing era, the Uyghur have occupied a fringe geographic, social, and economic role within
Chinese society (Guo, 2015). From the outset of the PRC, the Uyghurs were viewed with
suspicion due to collaboration with the Soviet Union in the establishment of a nominally
independent Uyghur territory in what would eventually become northern Xinjiang (Kanat, 2016).
Despite the quickly subsuming to the newly established PRC, the Uyghur dominated Xinjiang
was kept at arms by the state. Undoubtedly, Uyghur alienation to the PRC had been facilitated in
part by the decades of relative apathy the population was treated with by the central state (Kanat,
As the PRC encouraged the migration of Han citizens to Xinjiang, viewed by the Uyghurs as at the expense of them, this alienation has increased. While it has been suggested by Uyghur culture is simply not compatible with the PRC’s culture (McKinney, 2006), the treatment of the Uyghur’s by the PRC would suggest that the issue more likely because the PRC itself has not been accommodating toward the Uyghurs. Rather than pursuing accommodation, the PRC has sought to instead shape the culture of the Uyghurs to fit better within state policy (Klimeš, 2012). China has been willing to build mosques for the Uyghurs and its Muslim population, but as Uyghurs have generally still not fallen in line, we have seen a continued securitization of their space. The level of securitization is so noticeable that it has, in a roundabout way, impact Uyghur culture unintentionally. This is most notable in how marriage works now in Uyghur social circles, with the perception of security risk of marrying an individual playing one of the largest roles in whether a couple is to be wed (Ding, 2018). The long-standing troubled relationship between the Uyghurs and the PRC, which predates both any organized Uyghur resistance groups or the existence of the Central Asian states, presupposes a Chinese security outlook that is driven by ethnic biases. The Uyghurs are a minority in a state run by and run for the Han. Occupying a region that has proven to be important to both Chinese foreign and domestic policy has come to their detriment driving a security policy that has little consideration for them. The official PRC policy of pursuing “ethnic harmony” is also characteristic of Han chauvinism (Klimeš, 2012). For the Uyghur’s this has meant being given only the option of falling in line with PRC policy regardless of its effects on them. Over time this has increased Uyghur resistance to PRC policy, which creates a vicious cycle of securitization by the state under the justification of Uyghur militancy and securing the domestic tranquility of domestic China (Klimeš, 2012).
Identity plays an important role in China’s security outlook towards the Uyghur’s. Lack of understanding and alienation from the state for the Uyghurs is nicely explanatory for creation of groups like TIP and China’s securitization of the Uyghurs. However, one should still question why identity plays such a role and for what purpose. Is the Chinese state merely discriminatory for discrimination sake? To conclude as much would de facto essentialize both the Uyghurs and the Han as simply two ethnic groups that cannot coexist. In a way, it insinuates that the Han have bigotry built in to their culture. However, China has a long history of inter-ethnic relations, and the final Chinese dynasty was founded and ruled by those from the Manchu minority (Michael, 1965). The Silk Road involved interactions with an incredibly diverse array of cultures, and for the most part this was successful. The idea of a Han-characterized China was specifically rejected by Qing rulers, and the PRC itself took formal steps to recognize the native minority populations (Klimeš, 2012). Right-winger leaders within the Nationalist party in their brief rule over China did tend to struggle with minority acceptance, and this played a role in the eventual victory of the PRC. There is more to explore when it comes to Chinese security police and the Uyghurs, however it seems that there is a limit to the security outlook. The Uyghurs are viewed as a security issue by China, but the underlying reasons are more complicated than from a traditional state security policy.

**Chinese Economic Policy and Outlook**

The Chinese drive to modernization is undoubtedly the greatest economic project undertaken by any state since the Soviet Union transformed the old Russian empire from a serf-dominated backwater to an industrial hub. Like the industrialization drive undertaken by the Soviets, Chinese society has experienced social upheaval due to the pace and scale of the project. What
modernity entails, however, is also subject to the perception of the ruling elite in charge of the project. It is unlikely that the PRC has purposely pursued a policy of modernization that conflicts with Uyghur interests. Intentions are one thing, though, and the continued concentration of wealth in Xinjiang among the Han population that dominate the urban areas of the province have played an increasingly large role in driving tensions (Fogden, 2003). China’s economic pursuits have meant often the transfer of prevailing Han populations to existing peripheral urban areas to take advantage of resource wealth. The Uyghur, in part due to decades of state failure to alleviate these issues, are less educated than their Han counterparts and have the disadvantage of not speaking Mandarin (Fogden, 2003). For a state that has little time to waste in building out its economic agenda, moving more culturally fitting Han people to maximize potential simply is the most convenient option. General apprehension of the Uyghurs has also played a role in economically marginalizing them, as the lack of willingness by the Chinese state to bridge the cultural gap facilitates a mistrusting attitude toward giving Uyghurs more influence over state policy (Fogden, 2003). The drive to modernity is planned and carried out by Han Chinese government officials, and the lack of diversity in perspective has led this drive to meet the Uyghurs in a ham-fisted fashion. Being economically isolated through a variety of cultural and political policies, the Uyghur exist essentially outside of the socio-political sphere of the PRC. Institutionalized by the existence of the Chinese Hukou system (Zhang, 2014). Not only are Han Chinese encouraged to or moved by the government to move cities like Ürümqi, there is little opportunity for the rural Uyghurs to move into the city despite already living in the province. The Hukou system separates Chinese citizens into two classifications: rural and urban (Zhang, 2014). Your classification is determinant of where you can reside and what access to rights you get. Within China, minorities are overwhelmingly classed as rural, and due to Hukou often
cannot reside within urban centers unless their classification is changed. While the process for classification change has become easier in recent years, language and educational barriers make it virtually impossible for minorities like the Uyghur to change their classification. As Xinjiang has grown in importance for its position as a transportation hub and large reserves of fuel and mineral resources, the need for an urban working population has grown. Despite living already within the province, the Uyghurs are functionally shut out of these economic gains simply because they cannot live where they are taking place. As more Han move into Xinjiang, there are is fear by Uyghurs that they are being purposely displaced by the shift in demographics, leading to further alienation and potential for radicalization (Fogden, 2003). Like the use of Palestinians by Israel as a workforce, Uyghurs are also used as cheap labor for work by the Chinese state and transported throughout the country to work (Clarke, 2015). It is important to note the perception of this by Uyghurs, as the 2009 Ürümqi riots were kicked off by the assaults against several young Uyghur men for alleged sexual assault in a factory all the way in Guangdong.

Having a cheap labor force without any significant access to capital is good for maximizing the returns on economic growth in any macro-sense. The US’s treatment of its black population is one of the best historical examples of this. While there were social and identity factors at play that often were used as the outward justification for the continuation of the oppression of black Americans, the system was ultimately kept in place for several hundred years, from slavery through sharecropping, as it allowed for an incredibly cheap workforce with little to no leverage in relationship to the state (Stella). While arguably not as purposefully developed as slavery, the development of minority populations like the Palestinians and Uyghurs into cheap workforces in seems to follow a similar pattern (Clarke, 2015). The economic status quo for the Uyghurs is
now justified through the need to maintain security domestically and abroad for China. While it is too much to suggest that the securitization of the Uyghurs is purely a result of the economic outlook of the PRC, it playing a larger than acknowledged role could potentially explain China’s unwillingness to cooperate in broader regional security arrangements (Wallace, 2014). Even the United States, often an oppositional force in China’s drive to develop its economy and power in world affairs, has long been interested in cooperating in Central Asian anti-terror initiatives in part to its perception of the Uyghurs also being a security threat (Smith, 2009). While the US is not being altruistic in its overtures seeing a benefit from bettered regional anti-terror programs for itself, there has been little to suggest a good reason for China’s lack of response.

China’s drive to modernity and economic development further necessitates the strict control of the Uyghurs due to where they themselves live. While there is some benefit to having them as a cheap labor force, there is the genuine issue of the militant groups like TIP disrupting the economic activities happening in and through Xinjiang to the detriment of the rest of the country (Hyer, 2006). China has worked to develop close relations with neighboring Central Asian states, in part for regional stability and its own economic expansion (Seo and Cho, 2013). These Central Asian states have become some of China’s largest suppliers of its favorite fuel: natural gas (Reccia, 2018). China’s expansive “Belt Road Initiative” is its re-integration into global trade, following a remarkably similar path to the old Silk Road. The gas pipelines and trade routes all happen to have to go through Xinjiang, and in turn where the Uyghurs reside. Rail lines connecting Central Asia to China have been attacked on occasion by TIP, and the threat of even a temporary severing of these transportation links would have devastating economic effect in China (Reccia, 2018). Having massively important economic drivers cross directly through one
of your most volatile domestic region is not ideal for China let alone any country, and understandably is a driving force in the securitization of the Uyghur populace (Seo and Cho, 2013). As we examine the economic forces at play for China and specifically in Xinjiang, the extent and specificity of the security measures that take place seem to make more sense. While the social issues in Xinjiang are a headache, the social issues that the state would be face if it could not feed the economic engine it has built in the rest of the country would destroy its legitimacy. Perhaps a calculated trade-off has been made by the PRC.

**Outside Influences**

The Uyghurs do not live in a cultural vacuum. In fact, they share many cultural commonalities with other Central Asian groups, specifically those of a Turkic background. Uyghur ethnic identity is a relatively new one, with its development coalescing around the labeling of a myriad of Turkic Muslim groups that the Qing moved into the region many years ago. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the creation of several new states, the years of isolation from the rest of the Turkic cultural world ended practically overnight for the Uyghurs (Hyer, 2006). Interest in independence by the Uyghurs, with the public support for Uyghurs by the populace of countries like Kazakhstan, picked up quickly in the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. TIP’s continued existence is facilitated in part due to the sympathetic attitudes of much of the Central Asian and Turkish publics toward the cause of the Uyghurs, viewing them as oppressed cousins and allowing for the organization to continue its existence in these countries despite being labeled as a terrorist organization by the governments in all of them (Clarke, 2007). Turkey, emerging out of the chaotic 1990’s as a regional power, has also been willing to put its finger on the scale for the Uyghur cause, primarily to appease to public appetite. While there is no
evidence of Turkey having significant involvement in Xinjiang beyond, there have been indications of its support for Uyghur independence causes to the chagrin of China.

Some of the outside support for Uyghur independence is more insidious than just the shared cultural norms. A little over three years ago, a bombing was carried out in Bangkok, Thailand. Authorities for the most part could not parse the reason for the bombing immediately, further hampered by no militant groups claiming responsibility. Following an investigation, Thai authorities would reveal that members of the Turkish islamist-nationalist group the Grey Wolves had carried out the bombing (Murdoch, 2015). The bombing was suspected to have been carried out because of the agreed deportation of 109 ethnically Uyghur Chinese nationals to China, where they faced potential arrest and certain separation from their families (Murdoch, 2015). While Turkey does not officially condone the Grey Wolves or any Uyghur independence activity, it has been more than willing to look the other way for Turkic-nationalist groups. The 2009 Ürümqi riots and the Chinese response saw outcry in parts of the Turkic world, with large rallies for the Uyghur held throughout Turkey. The Grey Wolves, notorious for their willingness to involve themselves with Turkic group issues abroad and for being responsible for attacks like the attempted murder of Pope John Paul II, were going to bat for their Uyghur cousins.

Analysis

From Uyghur marriages to their residences, the scope and scale of the Chinese securitization within Uyghur society proves to be one of the most intrusive in recent history. The Uyghurs historically uneasy position within the PRC has given way to modern security concerns operated through the contemporary strategy and lingo of the day. Getting in the way of China’s ascendancy domestically has never been a particularly successful position, and the Uyghurs are
no exception to the evidence of the PRC’s willingness to go to great lengths to maintain its legitimacy. Rounding up tens of thousands of Uyghurs and putting them through “education centers” is a policy that bears reminiscence to state-minority disasters that occurred throughout the 20th century. Like most subjects in the field of political science, there is not one answer for the current relationship between the Uyghurs and the PRC. The research in this paper indicates that a confluence of security, economic, and outside actor factors play significant roles in the rapidly deteriorating position of the Uyghurs. As of this writing, there is still little widespread information available on the extent of the reported re-education centers and the escalation of Chinese security policy towards the Uyghurs.

The security outlook was shown to clearly affect the rights of the Uyghur within the PRC and their relationship with the PRC. China’s need for border security and regional stability has come at the consequence of the rights like freedom of movement and participation in traditional Uyghur cultural norms. The Uyghur independence movement threatens to damage core PRC values, ethnic harmony and state integrity. However, despite the observable effect of the securitization of the Uyghurs within Chinese society, the security outlook variable alone is not a strong enough variable to account for the development of the state security apparatus for the Uyghurs. As an alternative explanation, the security outlook of the Chinese state should be rejected. While analyzing the security outlook of the PRC, it became apparent that it was important to understand why the PRC has the security outlook that it does. China’s economic outlook, our independent variable, proved to give consistently better answers to the development of the Chinese-Uyghur relationship and what was driving the securitization of the Uyghurs. The increase in security measures was not proven alone to be necessitated from the attacks of a single
fringe militant group. While the 2009 Ürümqi riots were notable and a significant event, there has likely been more race-related riots in the US since 2009 than what was seen in China. However, when the securitization of the Uyghur is analyzed through the economic perspective, the reason the lengths the state has taken against the Uyghurs have become more apparent. Michael Clarke’s relation of the situation to the dynamics present between Israel and Palestinians drove home the role of economic exploitation in the security outlook of China and its impact on the Uyghurs. The Uyghurs, an isolated minority that has little social capital within Chinese society, have no recourse other than agitation outside of the state. For the Chinese state, the Uyghurs are only good for cheap labor and getting out of the way of their energy production. This outside agitation development is further shown by the involvement of outside actors like the Grey Wolves, who act as outlets for the intense repression Uyghurs experience in China. Unlike within the Han core, where the PRC tends to be much more willing to respond to the whims of the public, the Uyghurs have no leverage in their relationship with the PRC. With China in a position of playing catch-up regarding the rest of the industrialized world, the Uyghurs are an easily sacrificed group on its path forward. China’s economic perspective, specifically its need to satisfy considerable energy needs, mean that the Chinese state will utilize its security apparatus to maintain the inequal socio-economic relationship it has with the Uyghurs to maximize capital accumulation. While apathy was long the implicit policy of the PRC toward the region, the economic importance of Xinjiang that has emerged in the past two decades has necessitated the PRC needing to exercise more direct, forceful control over the non-Han inhabitants. As a result of these findings, this case study supports our hypothesis.
If China were serious about pursuing ethnic harmony, rather than ethnic compromising, it should pursue a policy of economic integration for the Uyghur. This would require access and distribution to the wealth generated by resource extraction and transportation in Xinjiang for them. To accomplish this, China could work to change its administrative functions in the region to allow for bilingual work environments and an explicit program of rural-to-urban reclassification for Uyghurs who would be interested in moving into the city. Bettering the educational opportunities for Uyghurs would also go a long way to allowing Uyghurs better ability to work in positions outside of menial labor. Re-defining what modernization means for the PRC, with input and inclusion of the Uyghurs, is necessary to alleviate much of the tensions that exist. Instead of viewing the Uyghurs as a workforce to cheaply exploit, the PRC should view integrating the native Uyghur population within the state as part of China’s modernity project. Minority populations will not be satisfied with their position within their respective country unless they have some form of representation and opportunity within it. While Chinese officials bemoan the lack of Uyghurs willingness to conform to state measures, the PRC has given Uyghurs no real material incentive to do so. In the United States, the inflammation of racial tensions was cooled for decades by the passage of the Civil Rights Acts, which brought immediate material changes for black Americans throughout the country. While no minority is necessarily disenfranchised in a similar sense in China due to the lack of an electoral system, disenfranchisement in China takes on a more explicitly economic character. Getting minority buy-in also means killing any existing support for militant groups and is likely the single most effective policy for permanently shutting them.
It is probably more likely that the PRC’s relationship with the Uyghurs as of now is not deliberately developed and executed, but instead an occurrence of circumstances and an expected aspect of capital accumulation that will occur under capitalism. This does not excuse the state’s treatment of the Uyghurs, however, as the Uyghur population does not deserve the treatment it receives.
CHAPTER 5: TURKEY AND THE KURDS

Introduction

Kurds have long inhabited the lands that make up what is today’s Turkey’s southeastern borderland. The ethnic strife between the Kurds and the Turkish central government predates most minority conflicts that are ongoing today by decades. From the very outset of the Turkish state’s inception, it has grappled with a self-imposed question: what to do with its Kurds? Out of any state that is discussed in this research, Turkey and its relationship with the Kurds has the largest body of work available due to the length of the tensions. The history of rebellions and protracted domestic conflicts by Kurdish forces in Turkey have necessitated the central state to develop an extensive security apparatus for use internally. Kurdish inhabited regions of Turkey have long been economic backwaters, and until relatively recently the Turkish state saw little economic use of the regions. However, today the region serves as an important transportation hub for oil and gas throughout the region. The development of oil and gas pipelines has greatly increased the influence of the Turkish state over the region but has also added a new dynamic to the tenuous security situation it maintains with the Kurdish locals.

Today, the HDP, a predominately Kurdish left-wing party, has managed to gain a foothold in the Turkish legislative body despite numerous attempts to weaken its position and prevent it from passing the necessary vote threshold. At the same time, sporadic violence has continued in the Kurdish populated southeast, led predominately by the renewed PKK. Despite years of a renewed peace process initiated by the religiously conservative AKP party’s rise to power, the potential for peace was derailed largely in part to the ramifications of the Syrian Civil War. Under Erdogan and the AKP rule, Turkey has looked to assert itself economically and culturally
among the rest of the Middle East, and the proliferation and strength of PKK affiliate PYD in northern Syria came into conflict with these goals. The collapse of the peace process, and the strain Turkish aims in Syria have placed on its relationship with allies like the US, has pushed the Turkish state under the AKP into a dynamic previously the republic has avoided.

The question of identity has continued to be an undergirding topic in any analysis of the Turkish security outlook on the Kurds, and laws and actions in this vein have long been informed by the explicit identification of Turkey being a country of and for Turkish people. Despite the overtures initially made by the moderate Islamist AKP towards religious Kurds, ethnic identity has managed to trump this. It would be disingenuous to not consider that identity, rather than security outlook, drives the Turkish state’s antagonism towards its Kurds.

**History**

The collapse of the Ottoman Empire in the wake of its defeat in World War 1 wrought intense conflict throughout the scraps of the remainder of its lands. Eventually, through military prowess, Turkish national hero Ataturk and his nationalist forces rallied enough support to take control over Istanbul and the entirety of Anatolia. In doing so, Ataturk had begun the process of creating the Republic of Turkey (Lanza, 2017). Inspired to “modernize”, Ataturk worked to form the newly established republic in the traditional nation state model, including a secular constitution. This was a radical departure from the officially Muslim Ottoman Empire. The Kurds at this time were overwhelming rural and still lived according to tribal codes. (Bilgin and Sarhan, 2013). In 1925, the Sheikh Said rebellion, led by Kurds, brought the onus of the Turkish government onto the backwater southeast. Having just pushed out occupying forces and crushing Greek uprisings in the coastal Anatolia regions, further ethnic strife was planned to be put down
with haste. The Turkish state’s early security policy of identifying and repressing ethnic Kurds helped foment the previously vacuous ethnic identity of the Kurds in Turkey. Several decades later, the Turkish state’s main Kurdish antagonist would be formed. The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) was founded as a Marxist-Leninist organization that looked to achieve national liberation for the Kurdish people in Turkey (Özcan, 2006). In 1983, the Language Ban Act was passed by the Turkish government (Natali, 2005). As a result of this new law, made to target specifically the Kurdish population, the Turkish language was the only language legally allowed to be taught, spoken, or written (McDowall, 1996). Due to the bordering Syria’s machinations against Turkey, the PKK leadership would successfully operate out of Syria. With how remote eastern Turkey is, and effective guerrilla tactics of the PKK, the Turkish military struggled (Özcan, 2006). New strategies were sought to combat the threat, and military officials would devise a tactic with “divide and conquer” in mind. The Village Guard system would be introduced in the 1980’s implemented in Kurdish regions of Turkey. It was set up to allow for the Turkish military to more easily flush out PKK militants, tasking the village guards with preventing locals in the village from joining the PKK or harboring them. Village guards were to be Kurdish villagers who were picked or volunteered for the job. Over time, the implementation of the village guard system and Turkey’s campaign against the PKK resulted in the forcible displacement of between 380,000 and 1.5 million Kurds from their homes in the southeast (HRW, 2002). According to Human Rights Watch, these forcible expulsions were done through the torching of homes, crops, and livestock to terrify and undermine the economic base of Kurdish citizens, driving them westward into the slums of cities. Humans Rights Watch stated that “by 1994, more than 3,000 villages had been virtually wiped from the map and more than a quarter of a million peasants had been made homeless” (HRW, 2002). A ceasefire would be called following the successful
capture of Ocalan, the PKK’s leader, in Nairobi in 1999. Ocalan would be imprisoned in solitary confinement, eventually commuted to life in prison, and the PKK ceased all fighting (Lanza, 2017). Still, Turkey had failed to facilitate a long-term peace process with the PKK (Gunes, 2011).

In 2001, various conservative parties in Turkey merged to create the moderate Islamist party the Justice and Development Party (AKP). It did not take long for the AKP to secure a majority in the Turkish parliament. Under AKP leadership, Turkey generally experienced economic growth and would pursue large infrastructure projects throughout the country (Lanza, 2017). The AKP would gain electoral popularity with large populations of Kurds despite not being a Kurdish party (Cavanaugh and Hughes, 2015). This is likely a result of the large population of more religiously inclined Kurds and their identification with Islam over their ethnicity. It helped that the AKP were willing to pursue meaningful economic development of Kurdish inhabited regions. A political niche, the conservative Kurdish vote, was filled by the AKP. (Cavanaugh and Hughes, 2015). The AKP-led Turkish government entered negotiations with Ocalan in 2012 with the intention of finding a final resolution to the long-running conflict.

During this time, another important political party would be formed in Turkey. The Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) is a left-wing party in favor of Kurdish rights and generalized left-wing economic and social policy for all of Turkey, another in a long line of political parties (Cavanaugh and Hughes, 2015). As the peace negotiations moved along, the Syrian Civil War led to the rise of the PKK affiliates in Syria and in Iraq. Turkey grew increasingly concerned over the increasing influence PYD exerted in Syria. The ensuing tension PKK and AKP interrupted what had previously been fruitful negotiations (Lanza, 2017). Despite years of work, the peace process would again be ended by a renewal of the insurgency within Turkey towards
the end of 2015 (Saeed, 2017). Returning from the Qandil mountains, the PKK would descend on southeastern Turkey to engage the Turkish military once again.

**Turkish Security Policy and Outlook**

As of this writing, the Turkish state faces existential conflicts at its doorstep for the first time since the war waged to form the republic. The devolution of the Syrian Civil War into a grinding stalemate and the collapse of the Islamic State (ISIS) has helped Turkey position itself for an increased presence in Syria and Iraq, especially as the United States has pulled back on its forward involvement in the conflict (C. Phillips, 2017). Turkey has been a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) since 1952, mostly operating under the direction of the treaty organization since then (Atanisiu). Under the direction of Erdogan and the ruling AKP party, Turkish security policy has detached itself from the NATO direction and instead has pursued a more assertive security policy (Atanisiu). This increasing independence of Turkish security policy became clear with the Turkish parliaments vote to deny the host and transfer of US troops for the invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Ozcan, 2011). A more autonomous security policy from NATO even included the development of a larger, more privatized military-defense industry within Turkey (Kurç, 2017). After the stalling of integration within the European community, Turkey has made explicit moves into establishing itself as a regional power. Neo-ottomanism is often the term used to refer to these efforts by the Turkish state in the past decade, however much of its efforts have retained the Turkish nationalist tints of the other, secular Turkish political parties. This has been done predominately through economic and diplomatic means, however the conflict that ruptured throughout Syria and Iraq has provided space for Turkey to assert its military power in the region openly (Todorova, 2015). It also meant that Turkey would look to reincorporate NATO more prominently into its security policy (Kogan,
While traditionally this meant taking the lead of the US, Turkey has used its membership in the alliance to leverage support for its own aims in the Middle East, particularly in Syria (Kogan, 2015). While Turkey has been successful in growing its profile in military matters in the region, it has come at a cost.

Bordering Syria and Iraq has long presented the Turkish state a myriad of security issues. Whether it was the harboring of groups like the PKK across their borders or the general antagonism between the states toward each other over different points in history, securing its eastern neighborhood has become an increasingly prominent aspect of Turkish security policy (Todorova, 2015). With the ending of Syrian state support for the PKK and the capture of Ocalan, Turkish security policy has become more dynamic regarding its neighbors (Ozcan, 2011). Turkish security policy had long struggled to with the dynamics of eastern neighbors due to large part that is borders with these neighbors were also predominately populated ethnic Kurds. Kurdish separatism had been most prominent and prevalent historically in Iraq, and historically the Turkish state has viewed this as a security threat and potential for emboldening separatists within its own borders.

However, just like the rest of the world, the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States and ensuing wars greatly changed the security environment for Turkey (Ayman and Gunluk-Senesen, 2016). Notably, Turkey’s relationship with the ruling Kurdish party in the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) of Iraq has blossomed in the past decade (Ozcan, 2011). Through mutual support for each other’s regimes and Turkey’s willingness to cut the KRG in on the gas and oil pipeline wealth it has been generating, it has secured a reliable neighbor at long last on its Iraqi border. Turkey has inserted itself into regional disputes and conflicts often as a mediator, a stark
contrast to its typical policy of ignorance and focus on securing its domestic security (Ozcan, 2011). These changes have led to Turkey playing a larger role in the region, but with a larger role it has also meant that its obligations have increased. At its high point, Turkey has hosted approximately three million refugees fleeing the violence in Syria (Atanansiu). These refugees have presented a heightened security threat to Turkey, as concerns about their economic issues has pushed Turkey to more aggressively pursue control over northern Syria.

Initially, the AKP’s willingness to engage with the PKK and better the status of Kurds within Turkey came out of strategy and empathy due to the restrictions the AKP’s Islamist predecessors had long faced by the Turkish security apparatus (Brakel, 2016). The AKP had long prioritized domestically ending the armed Kurdish struggle in the southeastern portion of the country, initiating a ceasefire with the PKK and beginning a new accord. It has attempted to do so through not only the peace process, but also allowing for limited Kurdish civic engagement in the country via the legalization of the Kurdish language in schools and targeted social assistance programs (Yörük, 2012). However, the process has also been impugned upon by the willingness of the AKP, as it has progressively become more ingrained into the Turkish state, to continue to utilize the Turkish state security apparatus to arrest and harass Kurdish political leaders (Yörük, 2012).

Turkey’s domestic Kurdish inhabitants have continued to play an outsized role and focus on its security policy. Despite the civic and economic overtures utilized by the AKP led Turkish government and the pickup of religiously Kurds as a part of its constituency, ironically Turkey’s attempts to pacify its Kurdish population has been mostly ended because of Kurds across its Syrian border (Brakel, 2016). Exacerbated by its often-unstable or antagonistic neighbors to its east, Turkey has always struggled with the presence of Kurds on both sides of its borders. Unlike
most states with a large minority population, Turkey has never seriously sought out any sort of recognition or devolution of power to its Kurdish residents. While the border between Iraq and Turkey has always been relatively porous due to the Qandil mountains and therefore a convenient staging location for the PKK, Syria’s Kurds have become the Turkish state’s predominant security threat (Phillips, 2017). The success of Syrian Kurds, affiliates of the PKK, in pushing out ISIS and setting up its own autonomous government has meant for not only a threat of Kurdish self-government outside of its control has had far-reaching security consequences for Kurds domestically (Brakel, 2016).

For a brief moment in time, the Turkish security apparatus was not focused on its domestic Kurdish population. The consolidation of northern Syria under Kurdish socialist led control was deemed to significant of a threat to Turkey to allow for its continuance. However clear it was that antagonizing the Syrian Kurds would hurt the peace process with the PKK, the AKP led Turkish state took the familiar security route in dealing with the issue. When it became clear to the PKK that Turkey was no longer seriously pursuing the peace process, the ceasefire was declared dead and Kurdish populated towns across the southeast were taken over by PKK-affiliated Kurdish youth (Brakel, 2016). While Kurdish militias within and bordering Turkey pre-empted much of the re-introduction of securitization of the Kurds within Turkey, it would be misleading to not acknowledge the general trend since the 2011 for the Turkish state has been to curtail general citizenry rights and strengthen the power of the state (Rubin, 2017). Protests in Turkey and the Arab Spring were viewed as security threats to the burgeoning regional power of Turkey, and this trend of securitization has swept up much of the country (Rubin, 2017). The Kurdish citizenry has been, however, the most heavily focused on by the encroachment of the state. As
peace negotiations stalled, arbitrary raids on HDP offices and arrests of party officials and MPs caused chaos across their base of support after a general state of emergency was declared by the Turkish government (Rubin, 2017). Due to sheer electoral popularity, the HDP has managed to continue despite the state’s attempts to undermine it. With the ramping up of Turkish military involvement in Syria and the displacement of Kurds from Afrin in Syria, it is likely that the Turkish security outlook will continue to understand the Kurdish minority as a security issue.

**Turkish Economic Policy and Outlook**

Similar to the other states that are discussed in this paper, China and Russia, Turkey is in the midst of a burgeoning economy that it has fueled heavily through trade and fossil fuel extraction and transportation (Kirisci and Kaptanoğlu, 2011). Turkey had long utilized a state-centered economy policy, with most industry under the control of the government. Since the rise of the AKP, Turkey has pursued a more liberal economic policy (Dorlach and Savaşkan, 2018). This has meant for increasing privatization of industry throughout the country, including some of Turkey’s most economically productive. Under the direction of the AKP, Turkey has experienced some of its most consistent and prolonged periods of economic growth (Kirisci and Kaptangolu, 2011). Despite the major worldwide recession in 2008, Turkey’s economy managed the downturn relatively better than comparable developing states. This economic growth has included the Kurdish population to a certain extent, with a general bettering of their economic position across the country. Most Kurds work now in the low-level labor force, predominately the informal field (Yörük, 2012). While far from the most economically prosperous of jobs, this increase in economic status is still a better position than prior, where much of the Kurdish population had little to no economic opportunities. The AKP has utilized the expansion of means
tested welfare programs to help uplift low-income citizens, with a large portion of the benefit going to Kurds in the southeastern portion of the country (Yörük, 2012). These targeted economic programs for Kurdish people were seen as overtures to solidify the relatively large sized Kurdish portion of the AKP based. Despite the rhetorical overtures to an empathetic, more charitable state, the AKP has continued to increase the rate of privatization of industry following in line with a liberal economic line. This is despite the tendency of successful developing states to utilize centralized planning more heavily in aiding their development (Kutlay and Karaoğuz, 2018). Turkish economic policy has also expanded in scope, tying in diplomatic relations with neighboring states in its development (Ozcan, 2017). This is an especially important development for its status as a trading hub (Kirisci and Kaptanoglu, 2011). Bettered relations with neighboring states have been a specific policy of Turkey, predominately on a basis of security but also for the expansion of its economy.

Turkey’s aims to grow into a regional economic hub have been driven predominately by its utilization of its location to act as a transport corridor for oil and gas from the rest of the Middle East to Europe (Bilgin, 2011). It has also been driven by its population’s needs. Since 1973 to 2000, the energy needs of the population has more than tripled (Bilgin, 2011). While the AKP led government has managed to keep up energy production to match the expansion of the economy and of the needs of the population, it is a constant battle to keep up. Of major European gas importers, Turkey far outpaces the others in its gas intensity, or rate of population use of gas (Dastan and Selcuk). Turkey is one of the fastest growing energy markets “in terms of natural gas and electricity demand growth (Newman, 2017). It is second only to China, on top of the fact that ninety-nine percent of its gas consumed is imported (Newman, 2017). Natural gas shortages
have impacted Turkey, particularly in the colder winters (Dastan and Selcuk). For any government concerned with maintaining its legitimacy, especially considering contentious elections, this is a significant issue. Balancing the consumption needs of the population and the economic growth has driven much of Turkey’s economic policy and outlook. Through 2023, it is expected that Turkey will have to invest upwards to 130 billion dollars into its energy infrastructure to keep up with demand (Akbalik and Kavcioglu, 2014). The energy sector plays an increasingly large role in Turkey’s economy, especially as it has become more dependent on it for economic health and to meet the country’s energy needs (Yorucu and Mehmet, 2018). Turkey’s goals in becoming an energy hub are colored increasingly by the need to secure its infrastructure from security risks (Iseri, 2012).

Two of the most productive pipelines Turkey has go through to Iraqi Kurdistan, which has been a productive relationship for both parties. These pipelines mostly go through ethnically Kurdish populated regions, which has presented Turkey an increasingly difficult economic security situation. As discussed previously, Turkey has managed to leverage a good relationship with the Kurdish Regional Government of Iraq through its development of the pipelines and willingness to give legitimacy toward the Barzani-led government (Bilgin, 2011). Despite the bettering of intergovernmental relations, the Kurdish public in Iraq still view Turkey with suspicion. The gap in perception between the KRG government and its people has allowed PKK members to still utilize the Qandil mountains as a base of operations and has allowed for successful attacks on the pipelines at the cost of millions of dollars (Iseri, 2012). The attacks are not isolated to just near the Turkey-Iraq border, with pipeline sabotage occurring at the Iranian border as recently as 2015 (Middle East Eye). The mountainous, rural area between Iran and Turkey is also heavily
inhabited by ethnic Kurds. Between 1987 and 2010, Turkey reported 59 sabotages of pipelines by the PKK, or about two to three attacks a year (Iseri, 2012). Essentially, any region that has a large Kurdish population presents a significant threat to Turkey’s economic aims. For the PKK, its ability to damage important gas and oil pipelines with relative ease was a large part of the leverage it had in getting Turkey to the negotiating table for a permanent peace process. It is unlikely that it was a coincidence that pipeline attacks started up at major pipeline routes again when the peace process fell apart. As the AKP led Turkish government’s relationship with the Kurdish population has worsened due to its efforts in Syria, it has undoubtedly internally had to grapple with the fact that its economic arteries are surrounded by a population that has chafed under state control for several decades. The Turkish-state’s relationship with its Kurdish population is defined by its inequality, and the lack of any fundamental change to the socio-economic status of the Kurdish population has again found the Kurds as a barrier to economic prosperity, rather as a group to be uplifted.

Analysis

The Turkish’s state’s relationship with the Kurds is undoubtedly one defined by how fraught it has been. While the history of any state is important and informative to present day relations, the history of the Turkish state’s oppositional position with its Kurdish inhabitants is particularly interesting. Emerging from a multi-ethnic, Muslim empire that had ruled the region for several hundred years, it is well known that Ataturk took Turkey in a specifically secular, Turkish direction. Long the arbiter of the Muslim world, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire had much greater implications than the formation of dozens of new countries. Fighting to establish the Turkish identity alongside its borders, the founders of the modern Turkish state were quickly at
odds with the Kurdish inhabitants simply due to their differing ethnicity. Minorities in Turkey were generally viewed as a security threat by the new republic, but the Kurds were unique in that they were also Muslims and composed by far the largest share of the minority populace. Therefore, they were the largest threat to the security of Turkey. In the decades that have followed there has been little to challenge the Kurds position on this. The economic outlook of it has clearly played a meaningful role the relationship of the state and the Kurds. Historically the country’s poorest inhabitants, for most of the 20th century the Kurds existed outside Turkey’s economic mainstream living rural, village style lives.

Unity of the state is a definitive aspect of Turkey. Specifically, unity under a Turkish identity. The security threat posed to the Kurds to this explicit pursuit of the nation-state by Turkey is clear through their very existence. Perhaps the intent of the Turkish state is explained in part of the attempts of the Entente at the end of World War 1 to split up the Ottoman Empire based off its ethnic composition through the Treaty of Sèvres. The Turkish state was founded through military conflict by military officers in specific pursuit of establishing a Turkish state. Minorities were the initial security threat and remained as much, the Kurds being the largest and most resilient. The banning of Kurdish language and cultural norms, the razing of thousands of villages, and the decades of criminalization of Kurdish-specific political parties has reinforced the fact that Turkey has no interest in even feigning that it is a multi-ethnic state. Dissent through existence is more than enough to justify being a security threat in any regime, and resistance in any capacity will be viewed at best suspicion. The Kurdish willingness to resist through military means is up for debate for its effectiveness, but it does justify more easily state repression against the Kurds. Turkey has developed an intense, extensive securitization of the
Kurdish population through its village guard program and large-scale military presence in the southeast. With the movement of many Kurds to urban centers throughout Turkey the scope of the security threat Kurds present to Turkey has expanded. Efforts to assimilate the population mostly stagnated, and in turn there is always the potential in the Turkish security apparatuses analysis for an attack far outside of the rural southeast. The security outlook of the Turkish state is easily discernible. Unlike in our other case studies, the security outlook variable does have a better case for being an alternative explanation to the state repression of Kurds.

Turkey’s economic policy and outlook does play a role, however, and likely more than it used to in relation to the Kurds. The impact of the economic situation that the Kurds faced is best articulated by the fact that the most successful Kurdish organization, at least regarding sustaining itself, is the PKK. Originally a Marxist-Leninist national liberation organization, it still maintains socialist principals in its organizing even as it has evolved ideologically. Up until recently, the Kurds were so economically disenfranchised that they were hardly even part of the broader Turkish proletariat (Yörük, 2012). For the Turkish state, the Kurds were of little use economically historically due to their inhabitance of the rural southeast which holds no resources even for extraction. The economic issues were more one-sided in this relationship, and that lends credence to the idea that the Kurdish people are predominately a security issue for the Turkish state. In the latter portion of the 20th century and throughout the 21st century, an economic element has been become prominent through the locations of the oil and gas pipelines. Simply through sheer geography and resource locations, Turkey has been in the position that its largest suppliers of gas and oil must travel predominately through Kurdish inhabited regions. A growing population and a foreign policy predicated off of building up regional authority has driven this
development. While the security threat is readily apparent, the economic implications are less so outside of the risks of disrupted oil supplies. The pipelines must be built near Kurdish villages and towns, and the economic benefit of the pipelines are not beyond the local’s comprehension. The modest economic gains of a large portion of the Kurdish population ironically make it likelier for them to seek inclusion in these economic benefits of fuel transportation. Another mouth to feed at the table that is already struggling to be fed strains the Turkish government and incentivizes economic exclusion of the Kurdish population.

For Turkey, its pursuit of regional influence and specific formation as a state plays an outsized role in its efforts to restrict Kurdish rights. The existence of the Kurds is antithetical to the founding principles of Turkey, which play a major cultural role in Turkish culture and informs the state’s actions. The economic outlook of the state variable, especially in more recent times, has played a larger role in the relationship between the state and the Kurds. While the Kurdish people have long been motivated in their resistance, exemplified by the ideology of the PKK and the leftist HDP, to the state by their economic conditions, this still played little role in the decision making of the Turkish state towards them. Our alternative explanation, the security outlook of the Turkish state, has something of a case due to the historic underpinnings of Turkish state repression. However, an important perspective in support of the independent variable, the economic outlook of the state, is that in the formation of the Turkish state the expelling of and repression of ethnic minorities did have substantial economic incentive. Through expulsions and repression, new property and farmland could be freed up for ethnic Turks, making easier for this new state to justify its national character. In the case of the Kurds, keeping Kurds repressed has meant that Turkey has been able to expend less capital on their development. In the case of
Turkey, this paper’s hypothesis is not necessarily rejected nor supported, as the historic reasons for the securitization of the Kurds were not economic in nature until the Turkish state expanded its economic efforts eastward.
CHAPTER 6: RUSSIA AND THE CHECHENS

Introduction
The Russian Federation, the largest country by landmass in the entire world, is predominately populated by ethnic Russians. Eighty-one percent of the country’s 140 million or so residents are ethnic Russians, mostly living in the European portion of the country. While Russians are the dominant ethnic group, the country is still very ethnically and religiously diverse. Ukrainians, Germans, Armenians, Chechens, Kazakhs, and many more groups compose upwards of 185 ethnic groups that reside within its borders. While the Russian Federation is a relatively young country, only coming into existence in 1991 with the breakup of the Soviet Union, it retained the defunct country’s federated form of governance despite the substantial reduction in borders. Russia is federated in republics and oblasts, with 28 official ethnically based republics. While the ethnic republics are historically a play to alleviate potential nationalist sentiment among the diverse population, they have not been without their issues. This includes one of the most ethnic republics contentious in the country: Chechnya. Chechnya is an ethnic republic of Russia in the North Caucasus region mostly populated by ethnic Chechens. Most Chechens are Sunni Muslims and speak both Russian and the native Chechen language. Chechnya has about 1.2 million residents, 95% of which are ethnically Chechen and Sunni Muslims. With the breakup of the Soviet Union, most of the ethnic Russian population that once inhabited Chechnya has left in light of the violence that befell the republic with the secessionist movement.

Chechnya was site to intense violence following the dissolution of the Soviet Union due to its declaration of independence from the newly formed Russian Federation. While the Soviet Union had officially dissolved on the lines of the now former Soviet Republics is was composed of, the
Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR’s) were to be retained. Chechyna was one of these many ASSR’s, but the only one to seriously pursue breaking away. What followed was two intense wars between Chechen secessionist forces and the Russian state. The first war left Chechnya outside of the control of Russia but broken by the violence, the second war ending its resistance in an official capacity but beginning a prolonged period of militia violence in Chechnya and the rest of the North Caucasus. The wars and ensuing violence destroyed the economy of Chechnya and has had a clear shaping effect on the direction of the republic since then. Today, Chechnya is led by Ramzan Kadyrov, who has run it through varying positions since 2011. The small republic has continued to garner serious attention from Moscow, with Kadyrov running Chechnya with its blessing. While the militia led violence has been less commonplace in Chechnya, most of the state repression against the populace is done through official state faculties. Chechnya garnered worldwide interest again when it was revealed that under Ramzan Kadyrov the republic was targeting LGBT Chechens and placing them in “concentration camps”. Reports on potential state sanctioned murders of accused gay Chechens have again brought attention to a part of the world that has known considerable amounts of violence.

History

The relationship of the modern Russian state and its Chechen inhabitants is historically fraught, comparable to the typically poor relations between Turkey and its Kurdish population. Tsarist Russia underwent a massive expansion in territorial control beginning in the 17th century, leading its military and allies to the Caspian Sea. The first clashes between Russians and Chechens occurred during the First Russo-Persian when the Russian military entered the mountains of the
North Caucasus to secure a better foothold at the Caspian Sea. There they were met by Chechen mountain tribes that strongly resisted their incursion (Schaefer, 2011). Control over the north Caucasus region fluctuated between Russia and Iran for the rest of the 17th century. By the turn of the 18th century, Russia’s intent on securing a border with the Caspian Sea was solidified and entailed successive wars against Persia and the Ottoman Empire. Despite the success of the Russians in expanding their control over the region, they were continually met with sustained resistance by the Chechens and other North Caucasuses ethnic groups. Chechen and related Caucasian resistance to Russian rule was so intense that by the mid-18th century, the Russian empire looked to repopulate the region with different ethnic groups through settlement and expulsion (Schaefer, 2011). This culminated with what is referred to as the Circassian Genocide, which involved the ethnic cleansing of predominately the Circassian peoples but also the expelling of many other Caucasian ethnic groups, including the Chechens. This resulted in a massive depopulation of the region and resulted in its intended effect of easing Russian rule of the region. Many Chechens would be sent to the Ottoman Empire due to them being Sunni Muslims and the interest of the Ottomans for settling the Chechens in borderlands of their own empire. At this time the Chechen population that remained in the North Caucasus would partake in what is now referred to insurgent warfare against its Russian rulers due to the change in demographics (Schaefer, 2011).

After several decades of solidified Russian rule over the North Caucasus, World War 1 and the ensuing collapse of the Russian Empire in civil war led to the independence of several new countries. Included in this would be the United Mountain Dwellers of the North Caucasus, a newly formed state composed of Chechen, Ingush, and Dagestani territories. Officially founded
in 1917, the newly formed North Caucasus state was started as a democracy and held official elections (Sakwa, 2005). Despite its brief existence, it would be recognized officially by several major states. This would come to an end with the defeat of the White Army that had been attempting to invade the Mountain Republic by the Red Army and the takeover of the state by the victorious Soviet forces (Schaefer, 2011). The Chechens would again resume their generalized resistance to Russian rule, despite it occurring now under the secular Soviet Union. Most of this resistance entailed ignoring Soviet cultural policies, such as the implementation of Russian language learning and the secularization of Soviet society. However, despite this chafing, Chechens and other northern Caucasus groups would participate in the Red Army’s fight against Nazi Germany in World War 2. Despite their participation in the war effort, the long history of resistance to Russian rule culminated in the closing acts of World War 2 with the deportation of essentially the entire population of Chechens from their homeland to Siberia (Sakwa 2005). A majority would die as a result of this forced movement. In 1956 the Chechen population were allowed to return to their homes, although for many they found that ethnic Russians now occupied where they had once lived. The Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic that had existed prior to the deportation was re-established, however ethnic Russians would dominate its bureaucracy and leaderships throughout much of the rest its existence.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union several decades later sparked off another round of the near-continuous fighting between Chechens and the Russian state. While the Soviet Republics could split off into independent countries, the Chechen-Ingush ASSR was technically a part of the larger Russian Soviet and, according to the Russian state, not under the same conditions. Despite
this, Chechen leaders pushed for secession and established a mostly un-recognized independent democracy. In the chaos of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the initial Russian response was slow and ineffective. Finally, Russian president Boris Yeltsin would send in the Russian military in 1994 to Chechnya, kicking off the first Chechen war. Despite overwhelmingly numbers and military hardware, the Russian military would fail to maintain control over Grozny, the Chechen capital, forcing the Russian government to declare a ceasefire in 1996. The war destroyed Chechnya’s infrastructure and economy, with the small country completely destabilized (Vasili and Duerr, 2016). Only three years after the ceasefire was declared, the Russian military again mobilized into Chechnya, this time successfully taking Grozny after virtually flattening the city through an intense aerial bombardment. While an insurgency would ensue the ending of the second war, Chechen resistance was broken and the region has since been re-incorporated into the Russian Federation. Not until 2009 would the Russian military remove its large presence throughout the territory, indicative of the danger posed by insurgent forces that remain to this day.

**Security Outlook of Russia**

In the contemporary, the violence that had beset Chechnya is at a low-point especially considering the past two decades. As of this writing, Russia’s security apparatus views Chechnya as a lower level threat and its concerns have predominately refocused into Syria and eastern Ukraine (Zhirukhina, 2018). This does not mean that the securitization of Chechnya and the surrounding North Caucasus region has been discontinued. To the Russian government, the Chechen region’s biggest threat has been its ability to export fighters to other parts of the North Caucasus, Syria, and even Ukraine (Holland, 2010). Chechen resistance, via primarily Islamist
groups like the Caucasian Emirate and to a lesser extent secular nationalist, have been becoming more discrete and less acceptable to operate in Chechen space. Much of the actual security operations have been outsourced to Chechnya’s leader and Russian ally Ramzan Kadyrov (Iliyasov, 2018). Installed in part by the Russian government when it became clear that he was loyal to Russian interests, Kadyrov has become the face of the securitization of Chechnya. Under Kadyrov, the number of arrests of Chechens has skyrocketed. In recent years, arrests appear to make up the majority of engagements in the conflict, accounting for more than half of the “conflict events” in 2015 (Holland, 2010). These arrests extend to more than just military targets. As part of the securitization of the region, civilians are often included in mass detainments as a means of intimidation by the Kadyrov regime (Holland, 2010). This marks a recent, notable shift in the handling of security in Chechnya.

Russian security operations in Chechnya in the contemporary period of analysis begin with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the ensuing chaos throughout the post-Soviet sphere. In this chaos, Chechnya functionally realized the populations quest for independence since the 18th century (Rukhadze and Duerr). Under the leadership of Dudaev, an ex-Soviet official, Chechnya continually rejected any participation in the newly founded Russian Federation. As Chechnya continued to stand firm in its question independence, Russian president Boris Yeltsin initiated a large-scale invasion of Chechnya. The invasion initiated by the Russians was followed according to conventional warfare tactics, with large-scale movement of Russian soldiers into Chechnya and aerial bombardment of targets (Iliyasov, 2018). The Chechens, out-gunned and out-manned, resorted to mostly guerrilla warfare. Russia’s pursuit of conventional warfare was perhaps informed in part to the Chechnya, while unrecognized, being a de facto state that had
successfully held democratic elections and had the beginnings of a functional civic society. The First Chechen War was incredibly destructive, with the Russian military’s tactics being indiscriminate and functionally destroying most of Chechnya’s infrastructure. Approximately 100,000 Chechens would be killed in the war, with the death toll of Russians estimated to top out at 14,000 (Rukhadze and Duerr). While the Russian military would ultimately be defeated and forced to withdraw from Chechnya to the shock of the world, Chechnya’s capital Grozny was in ruins and its economy functionally nonexistent. The results of the first war would facilitate the conditions that plague the region to this day, with formal and informal chaos pushed to disorient the Chechen population and weaken support for resistance (Rigi, 2007).

The chaos left by the vacuum of the First Chechen War was filled with the rise of warlords and an Islamist bent to Chechen military resistance that has colored it since then. The rise of the violent Islamist militias also pre-empted the spread of the violence to the rest of the North Caucasus (Holland, 2010). Chechnya’s second war was kicked off by the invasion of neighboring Dagestan by an Islamist Chechen militia, provoking another large-scale Russian military response. The convenience of the Islamist incursion outside of Chechnya was speculated as being influenced by the Russian security apparatus through the FSB (Rukhadze and Duerr). The beleaguered Chechen government did deny any involvement in the spilling over of violence into other parts of Russia, but that fell on unwilling ears. The Second Chechen War was also incredibly violent, this time being shorter and more targeted by the Russian military. While the Russian military would still operate in a large capacity as it did in the first war, the second war belied their approach to Chechnya as it employed counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism tactics (Rukhadze and Duerr). Chechnya was finally back under the administration of Russia, but
it required a large-scale military presence that would last through 2009 to keep the prevent the
outbreak of any large-scale resistance. Regular state functions of Chechnya existed but for all
intents and purposes the Russian military ran Republic. The pullout of the Russian military and
handover to regional and federal police forces did mean for a new phase of Russian security
policy in the region but mostly in who exactly was enacted state security policies. Russia’s
security outlook toward Chechnya has since then been focused on suppressing Chechen and
installing native Chechens to enforce these suppressive population tactics (Zhirukhina, 2018). In
the respect of quelling outward Chechen nationalist sentiment Russia has clearly succeeded in
the meantime, but it has come at a cost to the civilian Chechen population (Le Huerou, 2018).

Russia’s shift in focus on Chechen was largely a result of the 2014 Sochi Olympics. While not in
Chechnya itself, Sochi was close and offered a significant security concern due to the proximity
and the impact a successful attack on the Olympics would have for Russia’s image. The ramp up
of the policing of the Chechen population, regardless of their lack of involvement in any labeled
terrorist activities, is the tip of the spear of the securitization of Chechen life (Zhirukhina, 2018).

Under the Kadyrov regime, with assumed direction by the Russian government, Chechen social
and cultural space has become heavily scrutinized and controlled. In interviews with Chechen
immigrants in Europe, it is asserted that under that under Kadyrov, the security regime in
Chechnya is indiscriminate in who it targets (Iliyasov, 2018). In the time before and after the
Sochi Olympics, the continued bouts of violence by Islamists guerrillas indicated to the Russian
security apparatus that escalation was necessary. Russia’s security apparatus views the increasing
securitization of Chechen social space necessary considering the continued resistance of parts of
the Chechen population (Vatchagaev, 2012). In some respects, Russia’s security outlook on
Chechnya views it necessary to change culture itself of Chechens to subdue the population. Securing Chechnya is the key to securing the North Caucasus as a region for the Russian state.

**Economic Outlook of Russia**

Through the chaos of the 1990’s and the progressive stabilization of the Russia in the 2000’s, Russia’s economic outlook has been remained. The collapse of the Soviet Union invited economic destruction among the population and the creation of incredibly wealthy oligarchs. Privatization was done quickly and erratically, with no delineated plan outside of the wholesale sell-off of entire arms of the state (Nanay and Stegen, 2012). Energy production, specifically gas and oil extraction and refinement, was always a major industry under the Soviet Union. Under the Russian Federation it became the obvious captain of Russia’s economic policy. The opening of the former territories of the Soviet Union to private Western companies resulted in the discovery of the vast oil and gas deposits in the Caspian Sea to an extent never expected (Nanay and Stegen, 2012). As consequence of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russian access to the Caspian Sea had been reduced to its North Caucasus region. Russia has become the primary transporter of oil and gas to Europe, with the vast majority being sourced from Western Siberia despite the decreasing supplies available there (Nanay and Stegen, 2012). Due the importance of the hydrocarbon industry to the Russian economy and the decreasing supplies available in the Western Siberian region, securing access to the oil and gas in the Caspian Region is one of the pre-eminent long-term economic goals. To do so is complicated not only by the interests of the differing sovereign states in the region and the US and EU pursuing alternate routes for gas, but also the fact that the North Caucasus is also Russia’s least stable region due to continued insurgencies.
During the Soviet era Chechnya was home to a large portion of one of Russia’s only Caspian gas pipelines through the Caucasus. Connected between Baku in Azerbaijan and Grozny in Chechnya, it was a significant portion of Chechnya’s economy.

The pipeline was important, but as discussed earlier in the chapter, it was unknown to the Soviet Union and the rest of the world that the Caspian Sea contained more significant gas and oil deposits. With the independence of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, two of the Soviet Republics responsible for a significant portion of the Soviet Union’s energy production, the North Caucasus republics were the only option had for access to the deposits. Chechnya’s declaration of independence presented a significant economic threat to the Russian Federation which was already suffering dramatic economic issues. During the time of de fact independence for Chechnya, Russian president Boris Yeltsin appointed a former Soviet oil minister to head the Russian created Chechen government-in-exile to be installed in the presumed capitulation of Chechnya (Meier, 1995). While Russian interests in retain Chechnya were not solely predicated off the retention of the oil fields and pipelines, it was clear that it played an outsized role. The ensuing war and failure of the Russian state to retake Chechnya left the pipeline essentially unusable due to the complete collapse of Chechen infrastructure.

The failure of the Russian state shifted its economic outlook from reincorporating the Chechen region into the state for the pipeline to its mostly continued policy of economic sidelining of Chechnya. This began in earnest with the pursuing and creation of gas and oil pipelines in the Caspian Region that completely bypassed Chechnya in order to restore its oil and gas production. Even when the Second Chechen War ended Chechen de facto independence, the Russian state consciously decided against restoring the Grozny pipeline and would establish its first bypassed
pipelines at the turn of the century. As of this writing, the Chechnya is still home to significant oil fields and their wells, however most are not in working order (Goble, 2018). The destruction of the Chechen economy and their infrastructure worked to make the republic mostly dependent on Russian state subsidy. In 2015, 81% of Chechnya’s budget was sourced from Russian federal subsidy (Holland, 2010). This relationship has worked well regarding Moscow control over the region, making any serious pushes for independence unlikely as long the economic relationship goes one way. However, it is an expensive arrangement for Russia to maintain, and declining hydrocarbon revenues have put a strain on the Russian budget (Goble, 2018). Chechnya’s leader Kadyrov has pushed for the purchase and control of Chechenneftekhimprom, which “controls approximately 2,000 plots of land with a total area of 7,740 hectares on which there are more than 1,100 oil wells” (Goble, 2018). Most of these oil wells are however not in working operation and there is little to indicate any work to change that in the near future. Despite boasting of the purchase of the company for a couple of years, there is nothing to indicate that Kadyrov has taken control of it, likely due to the Russian state’s reluctance to afford Chechnya so much economic autonomy.

For a brief moment, the Russian state pursued a more economically inclined approach to dealing with what it views as the Chechen issue. This entailed higher infrastructure investment and higher rates of welfare to the populace. The strategy was pursued for Chechnya and the rest of the North Caucasus, with the aim of alleviating the poor economic conditions and reducing the levels of violence in the region. High rates of youth unemployment and poor economic prospects tend to be kindle for sustained violence, all issues that were pronounced in Chechnya. Medvedev, Russia’s president interspersed in Vladmir Putin’s leadership of the Russian state,
pursued this strategy most heavily through the “Strategy for the Socioeconomic Development of the North Caucasus Federal District Until 2025” (Holland, 2010). Operating the North Caucasus project as a federal district, despite retaining the Republics in the regions, was meant to better the resources the Caucasian republics would receive. Despite the heightened economic attention Chechnya and the rest of the region received, the general economic relationship between the Russian state and the Chechen Republic remain unchanged. Considering the development plan a failure, Russia has moved away from economic incentivization and pursued an explicitly security-based approach to dealing with Chechnya and the violence that surrounds it.

Analysis

In some respects, violence is the normative status of Chechnya. This is true when examining the history of Chechen-Russian relations, which were kicked off by warfare and continued to be defined by violence. This history is important to understand and plays a major contextualizing role in the analysis of Russian-Chechen relations, but what conclusion that one draws from this history is even more important. It is not far-fetched to conclude that ethnic Chechens are simply culturally diametrically opposed to the Russian state. With deeply held, distinct traditions and a strong adherence to their Muslim faith, Chechens are simply too different from the Russian Eastern Orthodox aesthetic to fit properly within a Russian state framework. While there have historically been conflicts that emerge from these cultural and religious differences, there are also distinct periods where Chechens were major participants in greater Russian conflicts. This is exemplified by the participation of 50,000 Chechens in the Red Army in World War 2 (Schaefer, 2011). There is also the fact that many other ethnicities reside within the Russian Federation and have little to no issues with the state or face similar levels of state repression. Even the rest of the
Caucasian republics, which now face heightened state repression due to violence that emanates from them respectively, do not have nearly the same amount of violent interactions with the Russian state since being incorporated. Cultural differences are typically cited by those willing to engage in a shallower understanding of the structural dynamics of an inequal relationship between a state power and a minority inhabitant. This thinking is borderline essentialism, and unhelpful and unscientific view of human culture.

The Russian security apparatus has been involved in Chechnya from the beginning of its incorporation in the Russian Empire. Imperial designs were the main driver through the 18th and 19th centuries, as expanding the realm of the Russian state was a longtime goal of the empire. Russian security-based oppression of Chechens could be considered a continual feedback loop. Violent Chechen resistance to incorporation within the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, and now the Russian Federation has been met with military and police force repeatedly. A state concerned with maintaining itself and setting an example for its other minority ethnic population, is one that will use force to maintain itself. Russian leaders have long argued that Chechen independence would be a threat to Russia due to a domino effect, invoked notably by Boris Yeltsin in the run up to the First Russo-Chechen War (Meier, 1995). It makes up a portion of Russia’s Caucasian border, and maintenance of a state’s borders is also often a justification for securitization. The heavy-handed treatment Chechens have received historically by the Russian state is so profound and extensive that it seems unlikely that the state would go to the lengths that it does to suppress any real autonomy by Chechnya.

Despite the small size of Chechnya, it does have an important geography. Its status as border territory for Russia is case enough for its securitization in the tenuous Caucasian region. Russia
has significant interests in nearby Abkhazia and South Ossetia, breakaway regions from Georgia. However, the securitization that Chechnya has undergone historically through today cannot be explained by this alone, especially considering that the Soviet Union and Russian Empire had borders in the Caucasus farther south than Chechnya. Its geography plays a different role than merely being a border state. Chechnya has always been an economically important region due to its geography. Even before oil fields were developed in Chechnya proper, its situation near Azerbaijan meant that it was always an important transit point for hydrocarbons for Russian use and export as industrialization swept through Europe. Chechnya’s move for independence in the 1990’s in the most economically perilous time for the Russian state since World War 2 presented a significant threat to the Russian economic system.

The Russian state’s security outlook is heavily occupied with Chechnya and the North Caucasian Republics as a whole. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the longest security project that the state has retained is that of pacifying Chechen nationalists and Islamists. The security outlook of Russia is clearly informed in part by the need to protect and maintain the state, and Chechen independence would undoubtedly call into question the legitimacy of the federation. However, Chechnya’s geographic proximity to major oil and gas pipelines are arguably a more significant factor in Russia’s continued efforts to pacify the Republic. The two major deportations of North Caucasians, particularly Chechens in the post-World War 2 period, came as a result of the perceived threat of their potential betrayal threatening the vital oil production taking place in nearby Baku. Chechen de facto independence in the 1990’s, despite claims about it causing a potential domino effect throughout Russia in minority republics declaring independence, did not come true. There is little evidence to suggest that any other ASSR’s actively sought
independence, and even SSR’s like Kazakhstan had initially preferred to maintain the USSR. Chechnya’s location as a major oil pipeline transit location was likely the single most important factor in spurring the Russian invasions of the republic and the re-integration of it within the Russian Federation. The economically fragile and struggling Russian state could not afford the lose its access to a major stream of state revenue. Despite the sidelining of Chechnya today economically because of its instability, securitization of the region is still necessary due to the geographic proximity it has to major pipelines that the Russian state relies on. In this case study our alternative explanation for state repression of the Chechens is made apparent as a tool for the state to enforce its economic order and does not displace our independent variable. Considering all these factors, in the case of the Russian-Chechen relationship, our hypothesis should not be rejected. The evidence indicates that the economic outlook of the state, specifically over its needs for access to energy resources, necessitates for the Russian state to securitize the Chechens and utilize the state security apparatus to oppress them.
CHAPTER 7: CHINA AND THE MIAO

Introduction

Within China, the southwestern mountain ranges are populated by ethnically diverse populations. These mountain ranges were long isolated from the rest of Chinese civilization, allowing for the development of many distinct cultures that have persisted to this day. One of the most prominent ethnic minorities found in the region are the Miao. The Miao reside in several Chinese provinces, specifically Guizhou, Yunnan, Sichuan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi, Guangdong and Hainan. Miao populations extend into other Asian states like Laos, Vietnam, and Myanmar (Chen, 2009). Guizhou is home to one of the largest populations of Miao people, with a significant portion of the province’s population composed of Miao (Harrell, 1994). Guizhou has perhaps one of the most ethnically diverse populations in all of China. Guizhou is a relatively poor and underdeveloped region within China that has been more slowly developed than others through the PRC’s economic development programs (Chen, 2009).

Recognized as one of the over fifty ethnic groups in the PRC, the Miao are composed of four distinct groups, the Hmong, Hmub, Xong, and A-Hmao (Harrell, 1994). Many Americans would potentially recognize the Hmong, as many Hmong immigrated from Laos to the United States following the close of the Vietnam War (Turner, 2015). For the most part, Hmong in the United States came from outside of the PRC in part from the lack of involvement of the PRC in the Vietnamese War and warming relations between it and the United States. Notably, these groups have cultural similarities and their respective languages are from the same family, however many of these languages are not mutually intelligible (Tap, 2002). Some within the Miao communities reject being labeled under the umbrella reference of Miao, but for the most part it is an issue with
little consequence for the four groups that compose the Miao (Tap, 2002). While the conditions of this minority groups are not necessarily of the highest quality, there is little tension that exists between the PRC and the Miao population. The Chinese government often attempts to promote Miao culture for tourist purposes, with Miao museums and folk-culture performances on display for travelers. The Miao are renowned for their traditional regalia, known for the distinguishable headgear and often bright, colorful fabrics worn (Kou, 2006). The differing features of the regalia often are used as stand-in term for the group, such as the long-horn Miao. Many Miao groups are known for their woodworking skills and are known to craft their residences almost entirely out of wood.

![Figure 1: The author with a Miao villager wearing traditional silver headgear](source: Author’s personal photo)

Like many other minorities within China, some issues between the state and the Miao do crop up. Due to their more isolated living circumstances, many Miao do not speak Mandarin Chinese (Chen, 2009). Communication difficulties between Han officials and Miao locals often arise as a result. The Miao have generally a poor economic standing, although this is in line with the rest of the population that resides in the region. Within certain provinces, such as Guizhou, minority
populations reside in autonomous zones (Chen, 2009). These zones are often treated with a relatively hands-off approach by the PRC, allowing for local populations to practice their culture and continue their way-of-life mostly undisturbed.

**History**

For the vast majority of the Miao’s existence within the Chinese civilization’s frontier, their relationship with the Chinese governing authority was defined by open revolt. Interactions between the various Chinese dynastic authorities and the indigenous Miao were fraught. A mountainous people, the Miao viewed themselves at the time as independent and chafed under Chinese rule. As far back as the 14th century there are records of Miao rebellions against the Ming dynasty, which were often put down at the cost of many human lives (Harrell, 1994). The 14th and 15th century consisted with sporadic small and large-scale rebellions by the Miao population, which in turn would be met with overwhelming force from the Ming dynasty (McMahon, 2016). As a means of population control and punishment, local governors would sometimes have large amounts of Miao men castrated as punishment for the rebellions and enslaved as eunuchs (Tsai, 1996). The Ming-era of Chinese-Miao relations also entailed the beginning of colonization of the Miao inhabited regions. This colonization effort was accompanied by large military garrisons as protections, which usually provoked violent interactions between the indigenous Miao and the encroaching Chinese forces (Harrell, 1994). To prevent the continued use of resources on the Miao’s frequent revolts, the Ming would establish a form of a “border wall” to maintain their frontier against Miao tribes (McMahon, 2016).

Under the Qing, the frequency of revolts by the Miao was reduced relative to the Ming Dynasty. Through the latter half of the 18th century, the Qing had greatly reformed its administrative
system and in turn had reopened settlement of the Miao frontier regions (McMahon, 2016). Han Chinese settlers exploded in numbers, and in turn began to take up much of the prime farming land that had previously been controlled by Miao clans. The Miao were increasingly economically precarious, and the breakdown of social norms incurred by the corrupt local administrators and economic displacement had a social toll on the local population (McMahon, 2016). Within Miao culture there was a myth of the “Miao Kings”, mythical figures who were supposed to return to lead the Miao to retake their sovereignty (McMahon, 2016). In the midst of the collapse of social order, a Miao tribal chieftain “abruptly went crazy and without being aware of it said that Heaven above was descending. He called on the Miao to assist [him] in becoming the Miao King.” (McMahon, 2016). This single incident rippled throughout Miao villages and prompted the Miao villagers to indiscriminately attack Han settlers in the frontier region. Upwards of 50,000 Miao villagers would loot and attack Han villages, with the scale of destruction so great that the Qing Dynasty was forced to draw up 180,000 soldiers to put down the rebellion (McMahon, 2016).

The frontier nature of the Miao populated region continued to be an issue for the Qing Empire. In the mid-19th century, tensions again flared to the point of rebellion. For approximately the next 20 years, various rebellions would rock the Guizhou province and surrounding regions (Jenks, 1994). While some of the rebellions were not ethnic in nature, for the most part they were characterized by Miao rebel leaders leading attacks against the Qing authorities throughout the southwest (Jenks, 1994). To the chagrin of the Qing, there success in putting down one rebellion would often be met with another kicking off soon thereafter. Long disposed and living in the periphery of Qing society, the Miao rebellions were likely stoked by the how little the local population felt it had at stake relative to the potential of throwing off the yoke of Qing rule.
(Jenks, 1994). Over the course of two decades, the cost in human life and material was tremendous in scale. One Qing official estimated that upwards of 4,900,000 people had died over the course of the rebellion period (Jenks, 1994). In light of the rebellions, the Qing would establish the tuntian land system as means of securing the region and mitigating Miao revolts (McCord, 2011). Under this system, large swathes of land would be essentially rented to the military for administration.

Through the fall of the Qing Dynasty, the tuntian system would be the defining characteristic of the relationship between the Miao and Chinese governing authority. It would also trigger the most recent revolt by the Miao people in 1937. With the final collapse of the Qing dynasty in the first decade of the 20th century, much of the Miao populated southwest would fall under the rule of local warlords as the Chinese Republic era began (McCord, 2011). Amidst the chaotic nature of the Republic era, exacerbated by the Japanese invasion of China, little had changed in Miao populated lands (McCord, 2011). The Japanese invasion of China would be only empowering the local warlords over the Miao further as the Japanese used them as a cudgel against Nationalist forces. In 1937, a revolt had been in quick development against the warlords and residual Tuntian system (McCord, 2011). Due to the Japanese invasion, local leaders incorporated ejecting the Japanese from the region as part of their goals, alongside the formal end of the tuntian system (McCord, 2011). The outbreak of the revolt would be utilized by Nationalist forces to better their position against the Japanese and integrate the frontier Miao groups into the general resistance movement. Eliminating the tuntian land rent system was beneficial to not only the local Miao, but also the Nationalists who sought to centralize China (McCord, 2011). The most recent and final Miao revolt would be also the first to be successful, ironically in large part
due to the intervention of Nationalists forces to aid it and begin negotiations for integrating the Miao populated provinces into the Republic (McCord, 2011). The elimination of the tuntian system and its replacement with a normalized and locally acceptable system of taxation finally brought the rebellious Miao frontier regions under formal control of the Chinese state. The defeat of the Nationalist forces by the Mao-led Communist party forces would continue the theme of integration and formalized state control over Miao populated regions of China. Since the 1937 revolt, large-scale violence against the Chinese authorities by Miao groups has ceased.

**Security Outlook**

The wide range of Miao population residence crosses several provincial borders in China. While the bulk of the population resides in Guizhou, which is not a border province, significant populations live on or near the Chinese border in the Guangxi and Yunnan provinces (Chen, 2009). Considering the long and violent history that the Miao have had with the Chinese state, one would figure that there would be potentially heightened security concerns by the government. For the most part, attempts to alleviate potential issues among the Miao community in regard to the Chinese state have been mainly predicated on reducing cultural barriers and expanding the scope of education in their communities (Wu, 2012). Curriculum reform in rural Miao regions was been introduced with the intention of lowering the gap in educational outcomes and bettering Miao community education (Wu, 2012). Education is compulsory throughout China, but the extent of implementation varied between ethnicity and the urban-rural divide. The “suzhi” method of education seeks to teach all Chinese citizens a similar set of values and norms (Wu, 2012). While this is a somewhat security-oriented approach of education,
it is not targeted specifically toward the Miao and is instead a generalized policy meant for country-wide normativity.

Border security is a known issue for China, as discussed within this paper extensively in the chapter analyzing the relationship of the Chinese state and the Uyghur ethnic minority. Border issues have been a large enough issue for China in the past that they have gone to war over it, both with India and Vietnam. The Sino-Vietnamese war, starting in 1978, is of particular interest due to Miao populations residing on both sides of the border. China’s invasion of northern Vietnam in response to Vietnam’s ousting of the Khmer Rouge did involve ethnic minorities like the Miao in it (O’Dowd, 2007). This involvement, at least for China, was in a supportive role. Miao across the border were contacted to aid the Chinese military invasion of Vietnam (O’Dowd, 2007). While the response was far from overwhelming, poor relations between the Vietnamese government and the Miao did entail some tactic support was given by border Miao populations to China (O’Dowd, 2007). The close of the war and the withdrawal of China left the border technically still up for debate until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. China’s security relationship with the Miao on the border has remained positive (Turner, 2015).

Interestingly, the finalization of the border with Vietnam has meant that both Chinese and Vietnamese authorities have allowed for extensive cross-border interactions between the Miao (Qian and Tang, 2017). There is an annual traditional Miao celebration, Huashan, that takes place across the border. Neither the Chinese government nor the Vietnamese government have issue with the large amount of undocumented border crossings that take place for the celebration (Qian and Tang, 2017). In fact, the Chinese government is very encouraging of it. Economic development on the Chinese side of the border has been better relative to the Miao in Vietnam, and Chinese officials see the cross-border interactions as a way for them to show the benefits of
Chinese citizenship (Qian and Tang, 2017). Although from a shallower analysis China and Vietnam share similar systems of government, their respective approaches to bringing their modernization projects to the Miao differed (Turner, 2015). For China, having in a relatively unsecured border with Vietnam, despite the presence of ethnic minorities on that border, is a convenient propaganda exercise.

**Economic Outlook**

The economic situation of the Miao in China is not a good one. High rates of poverty and poor economic productivity from the provinces they reside in are characteristic of most Miao populations in China (Feng, 2013). The largest population of Miao is found within the Guizhou province, which is also one of the poorer and lesser developed provinces found throughout China (Chen, 2009). There has been recent effort to alleviate this uneven development by the Chinese government, although there is still many prevailing economic issues for the ethnic Miao throughout southwestern China (Chen, 2009). Some of the lack of development comes in part due to the difficult geographic terrain of Miao inhabited regions, with Miao villages often found deep within forested mountain ranges. Resource-wise, the Miao populations resides in only modestly productive lands.

One of the largest industries for the Miao is that of the timber industry. Specifically, in Guizhou, the Miao have worked timber plots for over a thousand years (Lu, 2016). The timber industry has played not only an outsized economic role for the Miao, but also plays a significant cultural one as well. The Miao are well known for their woodworking abilities and building their households out of the timber they collect. The victory of Mao’s communist forces and the establishment of the People’s Republic of China meant that the historic forests that the Miao had tended to were transferred either to direct state control or to collective ownership. Before the economic reforms
of the 1980’s, about 58% of the forests throughout China were collectively owned (Lu, 2016). With the introduction of forest reform, much of the collectively owned forests were transferred to individual household ownership (Lu, 2016). The Chinese government viewed the transfer of state-owned and collectively owned forests as a means for maintaining healthier forests and economically benefiting the many minorities, particularly the Miao, who live heavily forested areas (Lu, 2016). Following reforms announced in 2005 and implemented in Guizhou in 2007, three forms of forest ownership models existed: state-ownership, collective ownership, and individual household ownership (Lu, 2016). Individual household ownership forests were still technically collectively owned, however individual households were able to exercise rights and utilization of their resources for them.

The other most productive economic activity that the Chinese state cultivates in Miao populated regions is tourism. As discussed earlier in the chapter, the Miao are renowned for their colorful and unique dress and rich traditions. Tourists to Miao populated regions are often solicited to take pictures in traditional Miao wear for a small fee (Feng, 2013). The modernization project that China has undergone has forced the formerly subsistence farming Miao communities to seek out sources of income, and tourism quickly became a source (Feng, 2013). Much of the tourist industry is carried out by women, although men are also participants. Provincial governors are generally encouraging of Miao tourist activities, often facilitating the permits for Miao performances to take place in urban centers (Feng, 2013).

Many Miao work as migrant laborers, moving to larger urban areas for years at a time to earn a stable income (Feng, 2013). This is not an ethnic specific activity however, as rural populations across the country engage in migrant work. For the Miao, migrant labor is usually initial wealth building, as most will leave the cities after a few years of work with the money they have saved
to invest in local economic activities (Feng, 2013). Despite the poorer economic situation of the Miao, their economic lot is relatively similar to other rural populations, ethnic minority or Han, and therefore not a source of great tension. As China’s economic plan has continued to develop, more peripheral provinces where minorities like the Miao reside have been given increasing attention by the state.

Analysis

Bereft of the conflict observed and analyzed in this research’s other case studies, there is a clear delineation between this case study and the rest of the work. The Miao, a minority with an incredibly blood historical relationship with Chinese governing authorities for several hundred years, today have a peaceful and more hands-off existence under the PRC. This relationship was not exclusive to just the PRC, as the relationship the Miao people established with the Nationalists was also a positive one. Although the Nationalists sought to make China into a state structured with a strong, universal character, the Miao had no problem collaborating with the Nationalists to end warlord rule in the southwest and resist Japanese incursions from the coasts. As China violently moved away from the imperial system of governance and toward a more centralized state, the Miao seem to have benefited greatly from this shift.

Border security, as discussed previously in the chapter, has a long and significant history in the Chinese state’s security policy. Even in the history of the Chinese-Miao relationship did border security, albeit significantly less formal, play a belying role in the frequent violent interactions between the Chinese and Miao. Despite this history, and examples of border security even in the contemporary Chinese state being a security priority, the Sino-Vietnamese border is given such a loose security policy that it is less stringent than crossing the US-Canadian border. Almost daily, Miao on either side of the border will cross to visit, trade, and have general relations with each
other. This positive relationship is a stark contrast to the management of the border in Xinjiang, despite the presence of an ethnic minority that has perhaps some of the worst relationships with Chinese rule.

In Miao populated provinces, the Miao typically reside in the most mountainous and remote parts of said province. Although there is some mineral resource extraction that takes place, it is far from the biggest driver of the local economies. Most importantly, there are no significant sources of energy resources in Miao lands. Guizhou, the province that is home to most Miao, offers little more than a modest timber industry. The existence of some mineral deposits in the province is outweighed by the significant cost of extraction for these deposits due to the terrain. The lack of any significant energy industry in the southwest has meant that the modernization project China is undergoing has more lightly touched the region. Unlike peripheral provinces in other parts of China, there is no pressing need to develop local infrastructure and industry to an extent seen in provinces like Xinjiang. The Han population in the region has remained mostly stable, and the high birth rate of the Miao has meant that slowly they have taken up a larger portion of the overall population (Chen, 2009).

It is apparent that the virtual non-existence of securitization of the Miao community is in large due to the lack of any economic incentive to do so for the Chinese state. Miao communities are not near any hubs of energy extraction or transportation, instead tucked away deep in mountainous communities where rice farming is still a significant economic activity. The absence of an economic industry as valuable to the Chinese state as the energy industry is in large part why the Chinese state has little need to securitize the Miao. In fact, the Chinese state has found that reducing something as typically important as border security for their own benefit in relations with the Miao and to show neighboring states the economic power of the Chinese
state. The absence of an important economic incentive like energy extraction and transportation, our independent variable, means for the absence of the security apparatus of the state, our dependent variable, oppressing the Miao. Despite residing in a border region historically fraught with instability and violence, the Miao are engaged with by the Chinese state in good faith and at the worst with indifference. This case study is supportive of the hypothesis, as the lack of economic incentive is shown to be the likely reason that the Miao people are not oppressed through the Chinese security apparatus.
CHAPTER 8: ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

Analysis

Table 1 Comparison of Case Studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Comparative Case Studies</th>
<th>Security outlook of central state</th>
<th>Economic outlook of central state</th>
<th>Border Situation</th>
<th>Repression by the state?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uyghurs</td>
<td>Uyghurs heavily securitized due to claimed terror threat</td>
<td>Xinjiang site to significant oil and gas pipelines</td>
<td>Inhabit Xinjiang, a western border region in China</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurds</td>
<td>Kurds heavily securitized due to claimed terror threat</td>
<td>Southeastern and Eastern Turkey site to significant gas and oil pipelines</td>
<td>Inhabit Southeastern Turkey, border region in Turkey</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chechens</td>
<td>Chechens heavily securitized due to claimed terror threat</td>
<td>Chechnya formerly host to significant oil processing and wells</td>
<td>Inhabit the central portion of the North Caucasian border republics in Russia</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miao</td>
<td>No discernible securitization present</td>
<td>Southwestern region has little economic resources outside of modest mineral deposits</td>
<td>Inhabit several Chinese provinces, including border provinces of Yunnan and Guangxi</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The ethnic minorities and their respective countries of inhabitance were picked specifically because they were indigenous to the locales they reside in and there were clear issues of oppression towards them. All four case studies have other minority ethnic populations that reside in the state and a dominant ethnic population that occupy most of the state’s leadership. As the research went on, it became evident that there were more substantial patterns associated with three of the case studies and an indication that there could be potentially generalizable observations that can be made. This is difficult in the political science field due to the enormity of confounding and hidden variable due to the research being confined to human created social structures and states. However, recurrent patterns are typically the building blocks of science regardless of the field. In our attempt to look at the impact of a state’s security policy on ethnic minority rights and relations similar issues facing the state and the ethnic minority reappeared in
each case study. There are three discernible patterns that three of the studies shared: the minorities in these countries typically populated more rural regions, they lived in border regions of their states, and there were major resource extraction and transportation projects that went through where they reside.

All four case studies in this paper had ethnic minority populations that had a significant number of violent interactions with the central state. In China, Uyghur-related violence was intermittent until the fall of the Soviet Union in the 1990’s. Miao-related violence was commonplace up until World War 2. Kurdish-related violence in Turkey has been prolonged since the beginnings of Turkey. In Russia, Chechen related violence predates the existence of the Russian Federation and even the Soviet Union. The existence of the violent resistance movements in all four of these minority populations makes a case to analyze the security environment alone. The violence that is associated with these minority populations and their central states is what initially piqued my interest in studying the potential for the security apparatus to be uniquely responsible for the oppression these groups faced. Security studies have become an increasingly important study within political science and potentially identifying a connection between a state’s security outlook and minorities offers important insight into their operations.

Although not initially considered, spatiality clearly played a role in the relation of the state security apparatus and ethnic minority groups. In all four case studies analyzed, the ethnic minority group mainly inhabits a region of the state that is generally far from major urban centers, rural, and near or at the borders of the state. It is not especially surprising that the proximity to borders entails interactions between the populations and the state security apparatus as border security is a near-global issue. Minorities have often lived at the borders of state’s and
the empires that preceded them. Sometimes they would be placed there for security, otherwise representing the farthest reaches of control for a governing entity. The distance of the minority populations, however, from major urban centers and the rural characteristics of them begins to present a pattern of securitization that is economically informed, specifically in the interest of a major industry. The states analyzed had essentially used these economic concerns to securitize ethnic minorities. Urban areas typically are the site of the majority of capital production in an industrialized/industrializing state. In China, the hukou system officially segregates urban and rural populations, leaving rural populations effectively locked out to the wealth generated in China’s cities. Xinjiang’s capital Ürümqi has been growing economically, but the native Uyghur’s in Xinjiang compose a minority of the population in the capital. For the most part, Turkey’s Kurds do not reside near a comparable urban area that exists in Xinjiang and Chechnya. The stark divide between the rural and urban outcomes in Turkey is better connected to the expulsion of many Kurds from their rural village into slums of major Turkish urban areas. Even when residing nearer a city, Kurds are reduced to the periphery. While Chechnya does have a majority Chechen city in Grozny, this is a somewhat recent development. Chechens have a long history of rural residence and still many reside deep in the Caucasian mountains. During the Soviet era, Grozny would be built up in part through the migration of numerous ethnically Russian Soviet Citizens, splitting the population between the two ethnic groups but with leadership always ethnically Russian. The destruction of Grozny during the Chechen Wars only occurred after it became controlled by ethnic Chechens, a security tactic by the Russian state to cripple Chechnya economically. Chechens, like most of Russia’s minorities, do not live near Russia’s two largest cities, Moscow and St. Petersburg.
The tendency for securitized minorities to live in rural areas brings up the question of spatiality. Typically, the most economically productive areas of a state are its urban areas. Those that reside farther away from these economically productive centers often face worse socio-economic conditions. The urban-rural divide, and its relation to ethnicity and race, is tackled by Antonio Gramsci in The Southern Question. Born and raised in Sardinian, which “stood in a colonial relationship with the Italian mainland” (Hall, 1986). At the time of Gramsci’s writing, and to this day this can be observed, Italy was technically united but clearly divided by the urban north and rural south. Gramsci observed that the relationship was mediated often by military force by the northern controlled government for the maintenance of the economic situation and repression of worker and Southern right’s movements. Gramsci’s work suggests that the spatial distance between the analyzed ethnic minorities is a purposeful result of the state maintaining the economically lucrative position it has in the relationship and enforces through its security apparatus. The spatial distance between the major centers of capital production within these states and the residency of these ethnic minorities makes for a relationship that built off exploitation and alienation as the state hoards the economic benefits of productive economic sectors like energy extraction and transportation.

In the case of Turkey and the Kurds, I found that the relationship between the state and minority group was characterized by a long-running security struggle and was less economically inclined than either the Chinese or Russian case studies. The repression the Kurds faced initially came in large part of the reaction of nationalist Turkish forces seeking to crush any potential ethnic resistance in light of the Treaty of Sevres. The Kurds did not, however, seek to separate from the Turkish state initially. Kurdish bourgeoisie, mostly Ottoman military officials and intellectuals,
were mostly interested in maintaining the relationship they had with the state, similar to the reaction in Southern Italy by the land-owning classes to Italian unification (Gramsci). Social conditions that emerged from the old distribution of wealth and power under the Ottoman Empire played a major role in the initial stages of ethnic conflict in Turkey.

This analysis is further informed by the findings of Charles Tilly in Durable Inequality. In all three states observed, minorities are granted varying degrees of legal protections and autonomy. Of all three, Turkey provides the least amount of legal recognition and protection of ethnic and religious minorities. China has extensive references and codification of laws for ethnic minorities in its constitution. The Russian Federation is relatively the most decentralized form of government of the three states analyzed, wherein many ethnic minorities have their own autonomous oblasts for them to inhabit and manage affairs in. In both China and Russia, despite the existence of legal protections for minorities, state repression against Uyghurs and Chechens still exists. The relationships between these central states and the ethnic minorities were built off an inequal relationship initially, which are essentially “durable” regardless of the legal language granting equality (Tilly, 1998). With the Miao in China, despite their poor economic standing, there is not a stark difference in position when compared to local Han populations. As discussed by Ted Gurr in Peoples versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century, the lack of a pressing incentive to resist Chinese rule helps explain Miao passivity when compared to the Uyghur. This passivity is of course only possible because the Chinese state itself does view the Miao as a risk to its energy production like it does with the Uyghur’s. In Turkey, advancement of legal protections for Kurdish language and political participation under the AKP led government was quickly threatened and reduced when the Kurds were successful in establishing a political
party that was oppositional to the interests of the state. Despite newly minted legal protections, the inequality of the relationship remained.

Securitization is one of the central issues of this research, and in three out of four case studies the economic productivity of the regions the Uyghur, Chechens, and Kurds reside in provides the casus belli for their securitization. This dynamic is exemplified by the record of Uyghur-Chinese relations. Initially given a somewhat privileged position in Chinese society under the Qing dynasty, the Uyghur were mostly left alone by Chinese authorities. There is a clear change in the relationship when Xinjiang’s energy sector began to be heavily invested in by the Chinese state. Only within the past thirty years, or shortly after the economic reforms of the 1980’s the PRC underwent, did the Uyghur become an issue to securitize for the state.

The relationship between the central states and their ethnic minorities are practically colonial in nature. Heavy resource extraction and transportation goes out of the land these minority ethnic groups reside where the resources exist, with the infrastructure being built to direct these resources away from the locales rather than developing them. Do to the exclusionary nature of their relationship, the minority ethnic groups have no practical access to the capital development their states are performing. Further contrasting from the other case studies, the Miao have experienced some modest economic development, as emphasized by the Chinese government with the Miao Vietnam border villages.

**Conclusion**

The hypothesis of this paper, if a state’s government views an ethnic minority as a potential threat to an important economic industry, then the state will utilize the security apparatus to repress the ethnic minority, is not rejected. Through four case studies worth of research it is
evident that a state’s security outlook is notably impactful on the rights of ethnic minorities, albeit it is not the animating force in this oppression. As an alternative explanation it was assumed to have some potential effect on our independent and dependent variables, but this research shows that the security outlook of a state cannot be justified as an alternative explanation for the state repression of ethnic minorities. The security outlook of the states studied did not securitize the living situations of the observed ethnic minorities due to the consideration of them being a security issue, but instead a predominately an economic issue. The security apparatus is a tool of the state to maintain the prevailing economic order. In some instances this is readily apparent, as the Russian state has resisted re-developing the oil refinery sites throughout Chechnya despite having to subsidize the majority of its budgets. In Turkey, the oppression the native Kurds face is contrasted with the relatively warm relations between Turkey and the neighboring Kurdish Regional Government. This defrosting of the relationship was lubricated through the development of lucrative oil pipelines from the KRG to Turkey, underlining the prominence of the economic outlook of the state on the status of the minorities within them. The importance of the economic outlook of the state, in these case studies the state’s energy production and transportation, is highlighted by the absence of securitization in the Miao case study. Out of the four case studies, the Miao are the only ethnic minority that do not reside in a region of their country that has economically productive industries. One would, fairly, consider the possibility of the security outlook variable as an alternative explanation for state repression of ethnic minorities would be best proven by the case study of the Miao. Historically an ethnic minority that was in almost constant revolt against Chinese authorities, today the Chinese state security apparatus is so relaxed with the population that they allow for mostly unrestricted border travel for the Miao with a former military opponent. The economic outlook
variable, our independent variable for this research, is therefore confirmed in its role by the strength of the evidence in favor and the contrast provided through the absence of Miao securitization in light of the lack of economic resources in Miao inhabited regions. The security outlook of the states, considered our alternative explanation, is shown to be mostly little more than something states utilize for their economic concerns. However, considering the case of the Turkey-Kurd case study, the security outlook of a state does have some sort of impact its economic outlook due to longstanding hostility toward ethnic minorities, albeit not enough to justify the security outlook as an alternative explanation. Interceding variables, such as cultural differences between ethnic groups and outside involvement of other states, likely had some effect on the results of this research but are not prominent variables in the results to suggest that they are significant causes for minority oppression within the three case studies where economic incentive for the state existed. While the alternative explanation, the security outlook of a state, was shown to not be the primary effector of the dependent variable and therefore disproven as an alternative explanation for state repression of ethnic minorities, it still is an important aspect of this research.

**Recommendation for Future Research**

There a few directions for future research that could be taken from this work. The most significant I would argue would be a study on the spatial relations of ethnic minority groups and capital production. This was a pattern that emerged that drew much of my attention due to the lack of initial consideration for it. Understanding how the distances between these groups and why they exist would be important work. Another aspect that I would recommend future research into would doing an analysis of these minority groups and their central states from a
colonial-perspective. It is not often that colonialism is viewed to happen within a state’s borders, however the terms of the relationship between the ethnic minorities and appear to resemble most closely those of imperial states and their old colonies. Parsing out what colonialism really entails in relation to minority ethnic groups and the states they reside in, and whether it is applicable for domestic usage, would be interesting work. In-line with the security oriented bent of this research, researching the development of modern security apparatuses by states and how they are used against minorities is a pressing question. Considering more modern, technologically oriented strategies used to securitize the movement of certain ethnic minorities, how these tactics are developed and implemented is important to understand.
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