The Limits of the Effects of Machiavellianism on Bargaining Success in Triads

1978

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THE LIMITS OF THE EFFECTS OF MACHIAVELLIANISM ON BARGAINING SUCCESS IN TRIADS

BY

HARRY M. LEITH
B.A., University of South Florida, 1976

THESIS
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts: Communication in the Graduate Studies Program of the College of Social Sciences of Florida Technological University at Orlando, Florida

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ABSTRACT

Understanding the processes of communication during mixed-motive bargaining in coalition depends to a great extent upon comprehension of the variables which affect it. Certainly one of the most important variables of such communication is the influence of personality effect upon the bargaining outcomes. One personality variable, Machiavellianism, is strongly related to manipulative behavior. This thesis examines both the effects of Machiavellianism on bargaining success in face-to-face triads, and explores the limits of those effects relative to task orientation and personality type disclosure.

It was found that Machiavellians are more able bargainers only so long as the nature and identity of their personality type is not revealed to their opponents. Machiavellian bargaining tactics, power strategies, styles of communication, and a variety of factors related to bargaining success are analyzed and a theory of ordering these results in terms of conflict resolution is discussed.
To Niccolo Machiavelli,
I dedicate this Thesis
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Completion of this research was dependent upon the combined inputs of over five hundred people, to whom I am indebted for giving so graciously of their time.

My most heartfelt thanks, however, must go to the Orlando Advertising Federation, Mr. Norm Knighton, President 1977-78, for their generous research stipend/educational scholarship; to the Orange County Sheriff's Department, Melvin G. Coleman, Sheriff, for granting the sanction to utilize patrol personnel for research purposes; and especially to Sergeant Herbert A. Tillman for his assistance in scheduling, coordination and workload flexibility without which this study would not now exist.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**LIST OF TABLES** ......................................................... vi

Chapter

I  THE EFFECTS OF MACHIAVELLIANISM ON BARGAINING SUCCESS IN TRIADS; A PILOT STUDY .......... 1

  Introduction ......................................................... 1
  General Background and Supportive Research ........... 2
  Research Vehicle; "The Game" .................................... 10
  Statement of Pilot Study Hypotheses .................. 11
  Methodology ....................................................... 13
  Procedure ......................................................... 14
  Results of the Pilot Study .................................... 15
  Power Strategy ..................................................... 17
  Discussion ........................................................... 21

II  EXPANDING UPON THE PILOT STUDY ......................... 26

  Coalition in Triads; the Bargaining Process ........ 27
  Variables ........................................................... 33
  Statement of Hypothesis .................................... 34
  Testable Research Predictions .......................... 35
  Operationalization .............................................. 36

III  STRUCTURE, PURPOSE AND IMPLEMENTATION ........ 38

  Game Theory and Communication ....................... 38
  Methodology ....................................................... 42
  Procedure ........................................................... 44

IV  RESULTS AND ANALYSIS ........................................... 49

  Results ............................................................. 49
  Power Strategy Analysis .................................... 55
  Analysis of Other Factors Influencing Outcomes .... 60
  Speed Factor ....................................................... 61
  Cooperation .......................................................... 63
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fairness</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toughness</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V DISCUSSION</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restatement of Major Findings</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condition 1; Pilot Study Revisited</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condition 2; A Closer Look</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condition 3; Affecting the Effect</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusions</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX A Rotation Procedure and Rules</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX B</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REFERENCES</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF TABLES

Table | Description                                                                 | Page |
------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
1     | Pilot Study; Chi-Square Comparison of Bargaining Success as a Function of Machiavellianism | 16   |
2     | Pilot Study; Raw Score Group Comparisons for Game Strategy Frequency         | 18   |
3     | Pilot Study; Mach Group Efficiency Summary                                  | 22   |
4     | Raw Total Points Scored by Each Subject                                     | 49   |
5     | One-Way Analysis of Variance of Bargaining Success as a Function of Machiavellianism | 51   |
6     | Chi-Square Comparison of Bargaining Success as a Function of Machiavellianism | 53   |
7     | Raw Score Comparison of Bargaining Strategies by Mach Group                 | 56   |
8     | Power Strategy Significant Factor Chi-Square Contingency Analysis Bold Challenge Mode | 59   |
CHAPTER I

THE EFFECTS OF MACHIAVELLIANISM ON BARGAINING SUCCESS IN TRIADS; A PILOT STUDY

Introduction

"Machiavellianism" as a definition of behavior type, is derived from research which relies upon scales drawn from philosophical assertions espoused by Niccolo Machiavelli in 1532; Mach scales (as they are known) measure the level of endorsement of manipulative attitudes with regard to interpersonal relationships. Self-perceived manipulative attitudes are in agreement with Machiavellian precepts concerning behavior; hence, high scorers (by definition those who do not take an overly social or moralistic view of themselves) behave markedly more manipulatively than low scorers in behavioral testing situations. In the past two decades several constructs in which individuals engage in social interactions which elicit interpersonal manipulations have been developed . . . one, the triad, lends itself especially well to small group Mach studies. It is the purpose of this research study to further investigate the Machiavellian phenomenon in a triad situation in which subjects perpetrate manipulative attempts upon one another while engaging in a competitive activity specifically orientated to the examination and comprehension of the
persuasive/manipulative techniques of exploitation.

Generally stated, the main hypothesis of this pilot study posits a significant correlation between self-reports by a subject on the Mach IV and Mach V tests (Christie and Geis, 1970, 1968 test editions) and degree of successful manipulations/persuasions as reflected in point score during "conflict of interest" bargaining for coalition within a triad; influencing the distribution of point score so that "higher Machs" win significantly more frequently. Winning per se is predicated upon manipulative and persuasive abilities, formation of coalitions, control of power during play, and awareness of exploitative or propagandistic techniques.

General Background and Supportive Research

The triad, when designed as a three person bargaining coalition in competition, may be likened to the Roman Gladiatorial Triangle; exercises in forced alliances. These high conflict situations tend to produce a series of tenuous and constantly changing strategic maneuvers in which are manifested interpersonal manipulations initiated by each bargainer at another bargainer's expense. Coalition research therefore has examined how persons choose between alternative coalitions in situations where coalitions are necessary for persons to attain outcomes (see Gamison, 1964; Komorita and Chertkoff, 1973; for reviews). Caplow's (1959) expanded theory of coalitions in the triad, includes four
four criteria for comprehension of the motivational aspects of coalition:

1. Members of a triad may differ in strength. A stronger member can control a weaker member and will seek to do so.

2. Each member of the triad seeks a position of advantage with respect to each distribution of rewards. A larger share of reward is preferred to a smaller share; any share is preferred to no share.

3. The strength of the coalition is equal to the strength of its two members.

4. The formation of coalitions takes place in an existing triad, so there is a precoalitional condition in every triad.

Anatol Rapoport (1960) discussing the viability of game theory research remarked that an empirical approach to bargaining situations through study of coalition formation seem full of promise, asking whether a general (probabilistic) law can be observed (not derived) which would assign frequency distributions to all possible triplets? If indeed such a law were observed could we not derive from it a set of reasonable postulates which govern bargaining behavior? Taking this line of reasoning one step further, if different population samples show different distributions of rewards can these differences be attributed to different norms of bargaining behavior and manipulative skill?

It is precisely this type of inquiry which prompted researchers in the Social Sciences to develop experimental designs integrating coalition game theory and scientific
observation of small group interaction into bargaining coalition triad research. Further defining the behavioral implications on this type research by defining specific criteria established prior to subject selection for triad inclusion, resulted in several applications of game theory research designs in studies investigating behavioral correlations to successful bargaining . . . among them, Machiavellianism.

Under the broad category pertaining to propaganda, research abounds in the annals of communication. However, comparatively little has been conducted which measured or analyzed an individual's persuasive/manipulative abilities relative to bargaining success in small group situations. The personality characteristics of individuals in these groups undoubtedly affected any communication therein; however, substantial evidence exists which suggests that the interaction of personality types has a major effect on the outcome of the bargaining process (see Tedeschi, Schlenker and Bonoma 1973; p. 128-153 for reviews). This process-X-personality interaction is particularly observable when bargaining success is examined as a function of Machiavellianism.

The following list of research studies, which is by no means exhaustive, substantiates the behavioral and conceptual validity of Machiavellianism as a personality type. In each case, people scoring highly on a paper-and-pencil self test in concurrence with Machiavellian precepts - manipulative
attitudes, lack of conventional morality, low ideological commitments, and a generally cynical assessment of others—have come to be known as high Machs. Past research which applies to the present study can be grouped according to two broad categories: persuasion and manipulation/exploitation where (high) Machiavellians exhibit some very different behaviors than (low) non-Machiavellians. Persuasion Mach studies: Braginsky, 1966; Bogart, 1968; Geis, Levy and Weinheimer, 1966; Harris, 1966; Jones, Gergen and Davis, 1962; Novielli, 1968; and Rim, 1966. Manipulation/exploitation Mach studies: Christie and Geis, 1970; Exline, Gray and Schuette, 1965; Geis, 1964a, 1964b, 1968; Geis, Christie and Nelson, 1970; Geis, Weinheimer and Berger, 1966; Weinstein, Berkhouser, Blumstein and Stein, 1968.

According to Burgoon, Heston and McCroskey (1974) "Not only is the high Machiavellian willing to manipulate others, he is more successful at it and enjoys it" (p. 33). In all of the previously cited experiments, high Machs proved to be more effective than low Machs in exhibiting the communication skills necessary to control others.

Situational criteria relevant to establishing conditions under which high and low Mach behavior most observably differs include: physical confrontation in face-to-face environment, latitude for improvisational interpretation of response, and available affective distraction.
Vinacke and Arkoff (1957) testing an equal power triad developed a three person situation in which serious manipulative attempts were elicited from each player, who (in turn) attempted to resist being manipulated by the other players. They concluded that equal power weights resulted in equal division of rewards. Applying this conclusion to manipulation research, Geis (1964) successfully developed a sophisticated "Con Game," the first triad Mach type research based on coalition game design. Her results reveal a positive correlation between high Mach scores and the successful manipulation of others. Rapoport (1960) describes a triad situation which was adapted by Christie and Geis (1970 Chapter IX) into the "Ten Dollar Game," a situation where three players split $10 between two partners, excluding the third. High Machs won excessively; the losers were not randomly distributed between the Middle and Low groups, but statistically were more apparent in the Low group. Conclusions drawn from this study suggest that "... winning via bargaining, appears to be directly related to Machiavellianism, and losing inversely related" (Christie and Geis, 1970, p. 166).

Various independent research conclusions reveal no apparent differences between high and low Machs in standardized intelligence test scores (Singer, 1964, Wrightsman and Cook, 1965, Christie and Geis, 1970), birth rank (Newcomb, 1963), or education level; sex, race, religion or any other demographic variable except perhaps age/population of area
where subjects spent most of their adolescence (Guterman, 1970). Hence, cosmopolitanism or urbanization may be a factor inversely relating "traditionalism" and Machiavellianism.

If indeed the dissimilarities between individuals (other than Machiavellianism quotient) are insignificant, how then does one account for the disparity observed between bargaining success frequencies? Conclusions concerning the "reasons" behind high vs. low Mach game-playing deviations have been interpreted by Christie and Geis (1970, p. 209) as: Manifestations of low Mach distraction by ego-involving elements in the bargaining context," or because high Machs are better strategists because they "... act by what they know makes them effective in exploiting whatever resources the situation provides (including low Machs)" (Christie and Geis, 1970, p. 312). Is it knowledge or manipulation and persuasion or a proclivity for exploitation (or both) which helps to give high Machs an advantage over lower Machs who, it is theorized, are personally more distracted and perhaps less motivated or perceptive?

Persuasion implies the intentional influencing of another person to an action, belief, etc., by appealing to his reason or emotion; while exploitation infers making "unethical" use of someone or something to one's own advantage ... both factors combined, form a semantic composite which yields a variable, albeit derogatory, definition of propagandizing.
Though much propaganda type research has been conducted, conclusions which can be applied to Machiavellianism are general and fragmentary. Examining specific Mach investigations and inductively generalizing on subject propagandistic ability is more common, but difficult to substantiate. A notable characteristic of past research in this vein has been the attempt to disguise investigation of manipulative behavior or persuasive affect, by directing the subject's attention to some other plausible interpretation of experimental objectives. Hence, utilization of a context where the subjects are informed that the experiment not only deals with, but requires active participation in, persuasive manipulations (i.e. propagandistic orientation) has been limited. In addition to contextual disguises, most experimental methodologies refrain from giving subjects any specific advance base of common relevant information. Thus the subjects are not only obliged to accept a deceptive "smoke screen" experimental purpose, but also to enter into that construct uninformed. It is one thing to conclude that high Machs, by whatever exploitative/persuasive means at their disposal, are able to "win" (perhaps by default) over low Machs in an experimental situation which purports to be measuring something else . . . and quite another to support that same conclusion in a situation where all subjects are not only informed as to the manipulative/persuasive nature of the experiment, but also
have a common base of information, and are actively aware of and participating in propagandistic assessments with manipulative/persuasive interactions. It is precisely to investigate and further define the limits of behavioral generalizations applied to the phenomenon of Machiavellianism vis-a-vis enhanced bargaining success ratios, that the "The People Mover Game" (aka PMG) was devised.

The research vehicle to be used in this study is a construct which includes all of the mandatory situational criteria to promote bargaining and operates in a setting which explicitly investigates the "techniques of propaganda." The PMG, whose experimental design is based upon game theory style small group interaction, is a bargaining-coalition triad constructed to remove any pretenses or "smoke-screen" issues from the persuasive nature of the experimental environment. Gallo, Funk and Levine (1969) analyzed experimental environments which truly promoted reciprocity behavior and allocated responsibility for control, concluding that for an experimental vehicle to effectively fulfill their game theory mandate it must be "enhanced,""enriched" and provide a "decomposed matrix" of outcomes; the PMG meets all of these criteria. Lastly, from a bargaining coalition standpoint conducive to Machiavellian behavior, the PMG is three-person (triad) small group, mixed-motive (where players have partially common/partially opposed interests), non-zero-sum situation
which provides face-to-face confrontation, latitude for distributive and integrative bargaining (improvisational elements), and attitudinal structuring for irrelevant affect (see Walton and Mckersie, 1965).

**Research Vehicle: "The Game"**

From G.H. Moulds' *Thinking Straighter*, Allen and Green (1966) developed *The Propaganda Game* as an "introduction" to propagandistic techniques which distort the thinking process. This author modified *The Propaganda Game* into a bargaining coalition triad format suitable for research manipulation. From *The Propaganda Game's* 240 examples sub-divided into fifty-five technique types; 60 examples were drawn, the technique types were condensed to twenty-one and categorized into nine distinct groups. These groups were arbitrarily assigned a reference number, 1-9, and a group containing "no technique" was assigned number 10. Technique groupings:

1. Prejudice/ridicule
2. Abstraction-ambiguity-diversion
3. Rationalization/pity
4. Wishful thinking/oversimplification
5. Flattery-status-manner
6. Acceptable to the dubious/draw the line, moderatism/radicalism
7. Practical consequences/attacking a straw man
8. Bandwagon/bargain
9. Beginning or leading the question
10. "No technique"

(See Appendix A for rules, examples, definitions, etc., given each subject prior to participation in the People Mover Game). Several modifications of the "rules" governing play in
The Propaganda Game were necessary to assure that coalition bargaining would occur, but that no coalition would be any more likely, during play, than any other. Though some coalition alliance is mandatory for play to occur, specific strategy in the People Mover Game is left to the discretion of each player. Scoring is weighted: to encourage bargaining, to balance for risk-taking, and enhance speed of play while penalizing hasty or impetuous judgment the "Controller" function offers game flexibility, acting as both a score/status enhancer and an impetus for non-Controllers to form "revolutionary" coalitions against the "Group Leader" (see Caplow, 1968; Michner and Lyons, 1972; and Lawler, 1975)

Therefore, bargaining participation by any player in any coalition is based on at least one of three assumptions:

I) Maximum advantage/minimum disadvantage of strength relative to coalition partner(s).

II) Maximize strength of the coalition in relation to the excluded triad member.

III) Avoidance (of either exclusion or inclusion depending upon specific strategic decisions made by any player).

Statement of Pilot Study Hypotheses

To summarize thus far, Machiavellianism generally should correlate with successful manipulation during conflict of interest bargaining coalitions with a triad, reflected in point score and win-loss ratios. By inference, supported by past research, successful bargaining is predicted upon
manipulative and persuasive communication abilities, formation of coalitions, control of power, judgment or leadership, awareness of exploitative or propagandistic techniques and concentration on the conflict resolution or goal without becoming distracted by the processes which lead to that resolution.

The above stated assumptions combined with evidence supported by past research yielded several testable predictions:

1. High Machs will win more points than low Machs, even though the game is structured for equalization among all subjects.

2. Use of the power position of "Controller" will be more prevalent among high Machs, even though that position is equally available to all players.

3. High Machs will participate in a greater number of stable coalitions.

4. High Machs will make significantly more Plea Bargains, than either middle or low machs, because that variable is more readily manipulated, and will opt for any point score over none.

(Post hoc analysis of pilot study data revealed a combination or interaction of predictions 2, 3, and 4 such that the balance of power position/play (i.e. controller/bold challenge, coalition for majority, and plea bargaining) be more ably controlled to optimum advantage of a player in proportion to the strength of his Machiavellianism Quotient).
Methodology

The selection of subjects was accomplished by administration of the Mach IV test (7 point bipolar Likert-type scale; 20 X item mean + 20) and the Mach V test (forced choice, 20 question most/least weighted score + 20, 1968 edition) as contained in Christie and Geis (1970) (see Appendix B), to thirty-seven (37) subjects; fifteen (15) females and twenty-two (22) males, aged 19-56. After the scores were tabulated, it was obvious that initial intent to group subjects into high, middle and low groupings by quartile distribution (i.e. 40-70 = #1, 70-100 = #2, 100-130 = #3, 130-160 = #4) for each test, choosing 4/4 or 4/3 as high; 1/1 or 1/2 as low; and the remainder as middle ... would have yielded only two low Machs and one high Mach. This resulted in an immediate modification of the grouping procedure prior to conducting the experiment. The criteria used to establish Mach grouping was to accumulate the scores of both tests using 210 as the median, 30 points = Z (one standard deviation); hence: high Mach scores were greater than or equal to 240, low Machs were less than or equal to 180, and middle Machs scored between 181-239.

The selection of five triads with one high, one middle and one low Mach in each resulted in comparisons being drawn from 15 subjects, all subjects being randomly assigned to groups.
**Procedure**

All subjects were given full formal instructions in the form of a hand-out (see rules, Appendix A) and allotted 10-15 minutes of individual study before engaging in a verbal recap of game procedures, expectations, and purposes, to minimize subject disorientation and establish a common base of knowledge. All subjects were given the information that in order to score points some sort of coalition must be formed during each "reading," however no subject was required to join one if he chose not to do so.

Each reading constituted a new condition subject to no restrictions from any previous coalitions, and that each participant was to accrue as many points as possible per reading; maximizing scoring to its full potential (i.e. winning) without regard to the other players. One trial reading was conducted to acquaint subjects with the "feel" of the game, after which any final questions were answered.

The scoreboard was a three foot high X one foot wide vertical simple linear scale, from -5 to +21 inclusive. This scale was divided vertically into equal thirds, with each of the three subjects per triad having one column designated by his name written in at the "zero" space. The order from left to right was alternated from game to game, so that no Mach group's subjects were assigned to a specific board position. The subjects sat within arms length of one another facing each other and the control block (a standard
2" x 6" chalk board eraser) was centered among them. The experimenter read each selection chosen at random from the 60 possible choices. If a re-reading was requested, the request was granted. Readings continued and points accumulated until one (or more, if simultaneously) advanced across the +21 mark to WIN, at which point the game was officially declared over. (None of the experimental runs exceeded 20 reading selections before sufficient points were accumulated to produce a winner).

Results of the Pilot Study

As shown in Table 1, by summing the individual scores together, a cumulative total score is derived which, when calculated against the expected value of 69.67 for each Mach group (i.e. 33.33% of the total, each group should receive one third of the points/rewards), a Chi-Square reveals significance in support of the main hypothesis beyond the .01 percent confidence level ($\chi^2 = 12.12$ df 2 $p<.01$).
Table 1
PILOT STUDY; CHI-SQUARE COMPARISON OF BARGAINING SUCCESS AS A FUNCTION OF MACHIAVELLIANISM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mach Group</th>
<th>Sum Totals</th>
<th>% Total</th>
<th>Fo-Fe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>91/209</td>
<td>43.54%</td>
<td>21.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(10.21%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>68/209</td>
<td>32.53%</td>
<td>-1.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(- .80%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>50/209</td>
<td>23.92%</td>
<td>19.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>( 9.41%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In an attempt to further evaluate the relationship between the Mach test scores and successful point score in the PMG, a Pearson "r" was calculated for all subjects, yielding a correlation coefficient of .67 (hypothesis accepted beyond the .01 confidence level). This correlation compares favorably with the .71 correlation between subjects' scores on the Mach V and the Mach IV tests. Again using the technique of accumulating individual scores into high, middle and low Mach composite scores a Pearson "r" was calculated between group Mach test sum totals and cumulative total points scored in "The People Mover Game" by each group . . . yielding correlation of .99 (significant beyond .05 confidence level). Strictly speaking, this correlation is based on a rather arbitrary scale; hence, .99, while perhaps indicating that by high, middle and low groups, "Mach-ness" and success
rate in "The People Mover Game" go hand in hand — exactly how profound a revelation this relationship is, may be rather difficult to assess.

Examination of the correlation coefficient calculated between the differences in Mach scores and point scores within each triad for all conditions yielded $r = .57$ significant beyond the .05 level of confidence in support of the main hypothesis.

To further substantiate this correlation without using Pearson's product-moment principle, Kendall's Tau formula for use with tied ranks produced $\tau = .61 (p<.01)$. The hypothesis that Mach score and game score would be related is clearly confirmed.

**Power Strategy**

As shown in Table 2, no Mach classification significantly opted for the Controller position more often than did any other classification. However, low Machs appeared to be more restrained — tending to seek the position slightly more often than either highs or lows. The actual results of how often the Controllers were correct is not particularly relevant, because only in the "Bold Challenge" mode would this be tested in the game situation. Analysis of correct responses reveals no indication that the efficacy ratio of initial responses was greater for one group than another (one way ANOVA yielded N.S.D. $p<.20$). There is an interesting
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mach Group</th>
<th>Controller</th>
<th>Plea Bargain Made Accepted</th>
<th>Coalition</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>16-3.2/game</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>37%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>18-3.6/game</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>40%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>10-2/game</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>23%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mach Group</th>
<th>Bold Challenge</th>
<th>Correct BC</th>
<th>Incorrect BC</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>8-1.6/game</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>9-1.8/game</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>7-1.4/game</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mach Group</th>
<th>Advance</th>
<th>Sum Total</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
<th>Penalty-Points</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>95/105</td>
<td>86.6%</td>
<td>-22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>68/105</td>
<td>64.7%</td>
<td>-36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>50/105</td>
<td>47.6%</td>
<td>-36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
phenomenon, however, which suggests that the higher Machs may use the Controller position to coax bargaining for coalition among the other players and then boldly challenge their majority to secure the optimum point count possible. This strategy occurred a total of four times (in three of five trials), once by a middle Mach and three times by high Machs. Insufficient data exists at this point in time to claim this strategy supports the second prediction; quite frankly, in retrospect, "The People Mover Game" is not constructed in such a manner as to distinguish between points gained in power position (i.e. Controller) and points gained in power play (i.e. Plea Bargain or Bold Challenge).

Examination of power play strategy reveals, contrary to what was expected in prediction #4, high Machs did not make more plea bargains, only more successful ones. Completing 80% of those attempted, being refused only once in all trials, Table 2 shows that while the middle Mach group used Plea Bargain option most, they had less success than high Machs, completing slightly over 60% of their attempts. Low Machs made least use of the Plea Bargain, rejected as often as accepted. However, to a great extent low Machs were responsible for swaying their partners to accept the pleas made by the non-coalition member. In terms of persuasive ability, low Machs in this condition avoided carrying the plea to the Reader, promoting the acceptance of the bargain
in 11 of the 13 instances and successfully accomplishing this end in at least 8 successful bargains! The unsuccessful Plea Bargains were rejected by pressure from high Machs in 4 of the 5 cases. Middle Mach rejection accounted for one unsuccessful low Mach attempted Plea Bargain, and low Mach rejection accounted for the one unsuccessful high Mach attempt.

It is interesting to note that of 17 Plea Bargain attempts, in all but one case, the "correct" decision was made to accept or reject the Plea Bargain, not that accepted Plea Bargainers were more often correct, but rather, if the plea had been carried to the Readers, all players would suffer penalty points. These results suggest that the Plea Bargain condition is actually less readily manipulated than had been initially predicted. While anticipated Machiavellian bargaining success did occur, it is certainly as much a function of lower Mach intra-coalition persuasive amenabilities as it is of higher Mach persuasive manipulations.

Perhaps the most revealing indicator of differences between Mach levels, are the results obtained from Bold Challenge tabulations, which provide an index representative of balances between risk, knowledge and willingness to manipulate. As was anticipated, there was a lack of significant difference between groups concerning use of the Bold Challenge, only slight motivational differences occurred as indicated by
frequency of use and this was manifested in the middle Mach group. Mach group efficacy ratios in regard to Bold Challenge reaffirms support of the hypothesis that ability rather than motivation is the key variable.

A Chi-square was calculated to determine the likelihood of the departure of the observed distribution from its expected frequency, the resulting probability is beyond the .01 confidence level ($X^2 = 13.80 \text{ df } = 2 \text{ p}<.01$). This power factor was responsible for clearly distributing the Machs into their predicted categories, not so much as a direct tool for point gain (though the better "manipulators" applied it strategically) but as a double-edged sword, separating its wielders, based on ability, into distinct categories.

Discussion

Durkin (1967) posited that high and low Machs acquire knowledge of the world in two significantly different modes - "analytic" and "analog." This presumes that some cognitive dichotomy exists such that internalization of "new material" is programmed into an individual's field of reference as a combination of gut or emotional cognitions (i.e. analog) and/or intellectual or symbolic cognitions (i.e. analytic). Durkin further suggested that while the "same" communication may be available to two individuals, the degree to which each individually perceives it, may be rather dependent upon his personal analytical or analogesque orientation. This
relationship, according to "encounter theory," is why during bargaining low Machs get "ego-distracted;" by "opening up" and relating to other persons, hence they actually get carried away by the other's influence. During bargaining high Machs send out their cognitions to communicate on a detached analytic level, never leaving the integrity of their cognitive framework.

Table 3
PILOT STUDY; MACH GROUP EFFICIENCY SUMMARY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mach Group</th>
<th>Completed Answers</th>
<th># Correct</th>
<th># Incorrect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>87% 69 of 79</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>95% 75 of 79</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>90% 71 of 79</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The encounter-theory may have some validity, but the pattern of responses in "The People Mover Game" shows a generally equal tendency for all subjects in this face-to-face communication situation to appear to one another as potential allies, while perpetrating approximately the same number of manipulative/persuasive attempts upon one another regardless of Mach level.

How then does one account for the disparity in scores?
1) Table 3 reveals there to be no major differences in actual percentage of "correct" responses.

2) Efficacy ratios for each Mach category differed less than 12% between extremes (high to middle).

3) Coalition frequency (Table 2) was only a minor factor slightly in favor of middle Machs - which, by the way, was slightly contrary to expectation, but again this study was conducted with only a very limited sample).

4) "Timing" was balanced by constructing the PMG in such a way as to virtually eliminate any contaminating effects carried along between or among players. Warm up runs were included to attempt to compensate for the possible novelty adjustment period before actual play. There is a slim possibility that some physiological differences in recall time or reflex-reaction time could exist between players, but the chance of that being a function of higher Machiavellianism Quotient seems rather unlikely.

5) Education or background, was generally equated within each triad. All players received their instructions and base material prior to playing the game, and all had to identify their grade point averages to assure relative group homogeneity.

6) Sex or some other demographic independent variable cannot account for all the point score differences; however, there was a consensus among females tested that the Mach tests used were dated, sexist, and "required" a woman to answer as if she were a man. This became an obvious problem early in the study, hence attempts to group triads with same-sexed individuals.

Typical PMG play reveals the "disadvantaged" lowest are not, as one might expect, helpless, but rather are taken unaware. The next higher Mach, often the most active and certainly one of the most powerful players, presses for advantage too impetuously, succumbing less to the inherent superiority of his opponents than to his own judgmental errors.
By this same token, the more successful and powerful high Mach players are aggressive but cautious, appealing to the 'sensibilities' of their opponents while constantly (almost relentlessly) seeking the advantage. Without intending to sound melodramatic, high Machs almost "mesmerize" others into committing some concentration shift where inadvertent blundering, the factor between winning and not winning, decides the outcome of the game in favor of the highest Mach.

The results of this pilot study clearly point to the importance of future research analysis to examine in greater detail exactly how well "Machness" and manipulation/persuasion game skills correlate over a broader population, in attempt to further refine those factors responsible for high or low success ratios. Findings in the present study are not completely consistent with interpretations of the results gleaned in past research. The effects that have heretofore been attributed to "manipulative" high Machs, or "humanistic" low Machs, may need reassessment.

Contrary to previous interpretations, based on observation of the interactions and interpersonal communication within the triads, it is reasonable to suggest that high Machs are aware of the personality and individuality of others. With a minimal amount of probing, the high Mach can accurately assess not only another's "weakness," but instigate impromptu interactions to facilitate attainment of his specific goals. Lower Machs
appear to be as aggressive, competitive and no more or less ingenuous, but while the high Mach strives in a goal oriented manner, the low Mach engages in the process of interaction, hence an apparent product vs. process dichotomy.
It can be argued that virtually all communication is persuasion, however, for the purposes of this thesis it is sufficient to recognize that a substantial percentage of communication is specifically intended to persuade. As defined by Bettinghaus (1968) communication devoted to persuasive intent is, "... a conscious attempt by one individual or group of individuals to change the behavior of another individual or group of individuals through the transmission of some message" (p.13). It was Tedeschi, Schlenker and Bonoma (1973) however, who pointed out the difference between persuasion and manipulation. Using their definition, manipulations are; "Influence attempts in which the source tries to disguise or hide from the target the influence nature of the relationship" (p.234). This implies shrewd use of influence for one's own purposes or profit at another's expense without the other's knowledge of that use, a subtle but distinct difference from Bettinghaus' definition.

Examining the bargaining process from a classical game theory perspective Nash (1950) defines bargaining as; "A non-zero-sum game that allows players to employ explicit communications and to make binding agreements ... over one or more issued in attempt to arrive at a jointly acceptable solution" (p. 129). Adding to this definition
an explanation of coalition behavior drawn from Tedeschi et al. (1973) which "... involves the formulation of groups whose intention is to use mutual resources to accomplish some common goal in a mixed-motive situation" (p. 155); one arrives at a working definition for bargaining-coalition.

While no distinct solution to mixed-motive bargaining is apparent, there are certainly a myriad of resolutions. Thus, while "outcome" is relative to solution, hence often specifiable prior to the bargaining; the actual outcome of a particular resolution may take many forms. These forms can be classed into several identifiable methods or strategies which typify the "style" of bargaining used by different individuals. If an individual wishes to reach an agreement in which he receives a larger portion of the outcomes than his opponents he must adopt a "competitive" strategy which increases his usable power, which in turn directly affects the opponents behavior resulting in a shift in outcome. A bargainer must implement his power cleverly or his opponent will mobilize counterpower, preventing the action from achieving its intended effect. How the fulcrum of this balance is shifted by virtue of one's Machiavellianism quotient, and more precisely, the limits of the effects of this variable relative to bargaining success is the purpose of this thesis.

**Coalition in Triads; The Bargaining Process**

Who enters into coalition and why? What determines who shall be excluded from the coalition? How will the outcomes be distributed among coalition members? What alternative coalition possibilities
are available to participants? Questions such as these have stimulated research on the processes, communication, decisions, and behavior involved in the formation and stability of groups whose intention is to use mutual resources, in a mixed motive situation, to achieve specific goals on outcomes.

The importance of bargaining for coalition can easily be discerned simply by examining historic texts and observing how often such unions motivated the political, social and economic forces which sealed the fate of nations. As an area of specific interest to researchers in the social services, formal analysis of coalition was begun as early as the turn of the century (Simmel, 1902) but not until recently has major investigation into variable which affect coalition formation been undertaken.

Caplow's (1959) research, mentioned previously in the pilot study revealed three distinctly different conditions under which the processes of coalition were affected: 1) Continuous, where the coalition controls the activities/rewards of the participants across several situations or trials; 2) Episodic, where coalitions are formed for the purpose of periodically controlling group outcomes over extended periods of time; and 3) Terminal, when the purpose of the coalition is to dissolve the group and redistribute power. These three conditions in turn are dependent on variables which roughly can be broken into two categories - A) those which impact on material resources or capabilities of the participants, and B) those which arise from interpersonal factors and interactions which affect the distribution of rewards of outcomes. Category A) type variables
are of major concern to researchers whose work focuses on the structural and/or material aspects of coalition. Category B) variables, on the other hand, are of import to researchers investigating status, norms of "fair play", persuasibility, and manipulation as personality factors which influence coalition formation.

Category A) research includes the work of: Shapley (1953) in value theory; Caplow (1956, 1959) initial distribution of power and logical allocation of rewards; Vinacke and Arkoff (1957) game theory interpretation of coalition frequency; Harsanyi (1963) who extended Shapley's model to determine the allocation of rewards within a single bargaining game; Gameson (1964) pivotal power, inversion effect of minimum power concept, and the minimal resource theory; Adams (1963) parity norms and equity principles; Chertkoff (1966, 1971) development of minimum resource theory; Vinacke, Crowell, Dien and Young (1966) information as a resource; Caldwell (1972) amount of individual resource vs. desire to join coalition; Komorita and Chertkoff (1973) alternative coalitions; and Lawler (1975) radical coalitions.

Category B) research includes: Vinacke and a multitude of associates (e.g. Amidjaja and Vinacke, 1965; Bond and Vinacke, 1961; Uesugi and Vinacke, 1963; Vinacke, 1959, 1962) investigation of exploitative and accommodative orientations to maximization of outcomes, male vs. female strategies during bargaining, and attraction effect; Kelly and Arrowood (1960) focus, confusion and affection relative to random coalition formation; Gamson (1964) confusion and distraction
theory; Anderson (1967) status differences and the impact of evaluation or esteem upon coalition formation; Ofshe and Ofshe (1969, 1970a, 1970b) reciprocation, choice and the stable state theory; Cherkoff (1971) information and manipulation; and Tedeschi, Schlenker and Bonoma (1973) subjective expected utility theory of coalition.

Most of the theories and experimental findings listed above have been drawn from situations wherein any coalition which forms automatically wins. This fact alone casts doubt on any broad generalization from experimental environment to real life situations because seldom is it certain that merely forming a coalition guarantees success in bargaining. Rather, a coalition only enhances the probability of greater success for its members viewed as a group. Since each individual participant in mixed-motive bargaining has his own outcome at stake, often what might be advantageous to the majority of the members in coalition may actually be less beneficial to a specific individual. Hence each participant examines the expected values of all coalitional possibilities available to him. He then balances this against his lone potential outcome and then determines what he can expect as the maximum outcome and attempt to implement it; herein lies the crux of bargaining strategy.

In demand-for-consensus situations such as the experimental environment in this study, to effectively negotiate a bargain means to pursue the dual, usually contradictory goals of maximizing one's own payoff and reaching some kind of group agreement in coalition.
Therefore, the situation itself must be viewed as a process through which various individual interests are gradually transformed into an acceptable coalition.

Lack of broad integrating theories and penchant to concentrate upon single processes (e.g. counter attitudinal advocacy, cognitive dissonance, etc.) deter communication researchers within the social sciences from developing universal (or for that matter, even shared) definitions. Reviewing the existing volume of methodological experimental research into the communication of cooperation and conflict, one notes that the number of studies examining personality variables are quite obviously in the minority. Though there are certainly many explanations for this fact, two of the most prominent stem from a) belief that personality effects are too ephemeral, affecting communication and behavior in some situations, but not others, and b) that testing hypotheses about particular personality types requires extensive personality pretest administration to large groups of subject, from whose ranks emerge a select few of those individuals possessing those qualities which exemplify the relevant personality variable. I submit that these, and all other rationale for avoiding further investigation into the study of personality effects are insufficient; and further, contend that if we are to adequately comprehend - much less, develop a comprehensive theory of - communication during bargaining relative to cooperation/conflict behavior, personality variables must be included. Communication research which generalizes from the experimental environment to
broader public domains always includes sufficient variance among individuals to infer that significant influence derived solely from differences in personality is expected upon the outcomes. Granted the outcomes or stakes in "real life" interactions are functions of the value systems and motives of the participants, and the complexity of the "games" being played vary with cognitive styles of the players.

A major characteristic of situations which attempt to resolve conflict that makes them especially vulnerable to the idiosyncracies of personality variables, is the fact that intentions underlying particular actions are seldom obvious. Hence, an ostensibly cooperative communication may either be genuine or rather an attempt to lure another person into a position more susceptible to manipulation. Conversely, the uncooperative communication may also be either aggressive or defensive in intent. Coupling these factors with the cognitive styles of the individuals it is possible, for example, to have three persons in conflict: one disposed toward cognitive simplicity who perceives the possible stakes only as victory or defeat and all other individuals as opponents to be beaten; the second person may be cognitively complex, seeing the other players not so much as opponents but as potential partners to be won over: finally the third participant, a cognitively multiplex individual perceives a range of outcomes in which through some compromise an optimal solution is possible. Given such ambiguities, interpretation of one individual's actions by another is, to some major extent, a function of the latter's predispositions and personality variables - among them Machiavellianism.
Yet, it is naive to assume that the utility functions reflected by point score are representative indices of the motivations in which are manifested the subject's personality. Hence, one individual (high Mach) may experience maximum utility and satisfaction by "out-witting" his opponents, while another (low Mach) may experience maximum utility and satisfaction when he perceives during interaction that his opponents are contented by achieving a slightly inequitable distribution of rewards, the cost of which is unimportant, as the "real" issue is the complexity of the interaction.

Variables

Once the conditions of the construct have been outlined, there arises the task of manipulating elements inherent within these parameters to test the limits of Machiavellian influence. Burgoon et al. (1974) suggests; "If in a group, you are attempting to minimize the influence of a high Mach, one of the few things you can do is de-emphasize the task ..." (p. 44). Hemphill (1961) investigating verbal reinforcement, concluded that experimenter positive reinforcement and emphasis on subject participation significantly increased the frequency of those subjects to attempt leadership in the group. The suggests that perhaps the "irrelevant affect" which emotionally distracts low Machs may be behaviorally modified by simple reinforcement of, and additional emphasis on, participatory leadership-information-concentration behavior.

From a bargaining perspective Tedeschi et al. (1973) suggests promotion of the power inversion effect, where, predicated on the
knowledge that bargaining strengths may differ between players, weaker group members form coalitions against stronger group members. This is similar to Lawler's *1975* study of factors affecting the mobilization of 'revolutionary' coalitions. This promotes coalitions against the "stronger" high Mach, by the less strong low Machs - causing the stronger player to lose more and the weaker players to win more control; hence, weakness is strength.

Machiavellianism generally correlates with successful manipulation during mixed-motive conflict of interest bargaining coalitions within a triad, reflected in outcome ratios. By inference, supported by past research, successful bargaining is predicated upon manipulative and persuasive communication abilities, formation of coalitions, control of power, judgment and/or leadership, awareness of exploitative or propagandistic techniques and concentration on the conflict resolution or goal without becoming distracted by the processes which lead to that resolution. In this thesis, two additional variables are to be introduced: 1) emphasis on the need for all players to concentrate on the task at hand, and partial disclosure of the nature of Machiavellianism; as well as 2) full disclosure of the general characteristics of the Machiavellian personality including the actual Machiavellianism Quotient of each subject in the bargaining triad, to all triad members.

**Statement of Hypothesis**

Main: High Machs are more successful than low Machs in mixed-motive bargaining coalition situations. Much of this success will
be attributed to their superior manipulative abilities, lack of emphasis on conventional ethical standards, and a detached approach to interpersonal functioning. Until such time as Machiavellianism Quotient disclosure reveals his true nature, a participant will control the balance of bargaining power, both in leadership and judgment, to his advantage in proportion to his Machiavellianism Quotient. Disclosure of the Nature of Machiavellianism's emphasis on task orientation, and particularly the impact of revealing each individual's Machiavellianism Quotient to all members of the bargaining triad will negate any innate or acquired superior manipulative skill possessed by a member Machiavellian.

This thesis posits that the effects of Machiavellianism on bargaining success in mixed-motive coalition triads will be limited by 1) personally labeling Machiavellian individuals as manipulators to the other triad members, and to a lesser extent 2) by stressing the need for all participants to concentrate on the bargaining task without consideration for the outcomes of any other player.

Testable Research Predictions

#1) In the base condition (i.e. condition 1) high Machs will successfully out bargain lower Machs and receive a significant and disproportionately large share of the outcomes, which will result in high Machs winning more games.

#2) When all subjects are specifically instructed to concentrate on optimizing the bargaining task to overcome the influence of a skilled Machiavellian manipulator in their midst; high Machs
will win somewhat more points than low Machs, but the margin of
difference will not be as profound as in research prediction #1.

#3) Full disclosure of the nature of Machiavellianism, coupled with revelation of the Machiavellianism Quotient of each participant, should effectively equalize and limit any effects on bargaining due to Machiavellianism. Hence, no statistically significant score disparity among participants will occur.

#4) The balance of power strategies (i.e. bold challenge and coalition for majority) will be more ably controlled to optimum advantage of a player in proportion to the strength of his Machiavellianism Quotient only so long as that Mach Quotient is not known to his opponents.

**Operationalization**

Condition 1. Eight triads (n=24)

Establishment of basic homogeneous bargaining-coalition triads consisting of one each high, middle and low Mach males; where each individual's purpose is to accrue the maximal point score per reading, with the goal being a "win" of 20 total points. The gains are accomplished by establishing the identity (by type #) of various manipulative-persuasive techniques of propaganda. Subjects score either by majority consensus or via an individual direct challenge of the "correctness" of a majority's decision. Subjects will be provided with a common base of specific information regarding point score and classification of propagandistic techniques. All subjects will be
informed prior to the actual participation that the rules of the game are designed to promote and encourage individual development of strategic tactics.

Condition 2. Eight triads (n=24)
Bargaining groups are as identical as possible to those composed in Condition 1; with additional emphasis placed on the necessity for each individual to apply himself to the bargaining task, accumulating as many points as possible for himself without regard for any other player's outcomes. Plus a pregame explanation about manipulation, Machiavellianism, and revelation of the fact that one such Machiavel is a member of each bargaining triad.

Condition 3. Eight triads (n=24)
Identical in composition to Conditions 1. and 2. with the inclusion of additional pregame information promoting possible inversion effects. This explanation will emphasize the importance of each individual's concentration on the task, the nature of Machiavellianism, and the group identification of each participant's Machiavellianism Quotient.
CHAPTER III

STRUCTURE, PURPOSE AND IMPLEMENTATION

Game Theory and Communication.

In any bargaining in coalition game situation, one participant or group seeks to gain compliance from another participant or group. In such situations lines of communication and behavior are established in an attempt to get another to comply in a manner advantageous to the manipulator, even though the target individual is apt to respond unpredictably. The perpetrator of manipulation, if he is to accomplish his ends, must then counteract the moves of those from whom he seeks compliance by a variety of direct or subtle deflecting maneuvers. It is precisely these maneuvers which, when observed in continuum, reveal a manipulator's strategic and exploitative skills.

The problems of communication, trust, suspicion and temptation which accompany mixed-motive bargaining provide a wealth of opportunity for the imaginative manipulator to exercise various aspects of his strategy. It follows that winning strategies are successful attempts to implement an agreement which convinces the other participant(s) that the best manipulator should receive a greater portion of the total outcomes than they. To do this, a bargainer must implement any power he possesses, or he can attempt to distort his partner's and opponent's perception of the actual nature of the power relationship.

38
Generally, the mixed-motive bargaining situation utilized as the experimental environment of this study begins conflict with one participant attempting to establish a controlling structure within the triad from which compliance to his intentions is a "normal" or "legitimate" consequence. His control may be countermanded by several contradictory course of action introduced by either one or both of his potential controllee, or the latter may accept the overall structure as suggested by the controller and erstwhile manipulator, but redefine some specific elements of the bargain prior to coalition, this modifying the outcomes in his behalf; in essence perpetrating a countermanipulation upon the individual in control. In response to this counteroffer the controller must either insist on his original course of action, attempt to direct the impetus of his bargaining to only one of the two potential manipulatees establishing a dyadic union which also elicits maximum payoffs for himself, utilize elements of his opponent's presentation for his own exploitative value, challenge via threat of punishment any other coalition or course of action suggested by his opponents which would reduce his own outcomes below his minimum acceptable limit, or succumb to the will of a superior manipulator and accept any form of counter proposal lest he be excluded from the coalition entirely, thus receiving no outcome at all. Usually the structure of communication during bargaining is constructed in phases. The first offer is introduced and immediately is accepted or thwarted; the offer is either re-introduced, modified or withdrawn; any new offer introduced is either accepted or thwarted
and so on. Each game consists of numerous rounds and each round in turn may be composed of several offers and counter offers. The round ends when: the controller succeeds in keeping his power; when the intended manipulatee has avoided or evaded the controller's frame of compliance, opting for some other course of coalition action; when there is a standoff; when any participant demands a bold challenge breaking off any further bargaining; or when all members of the triad accept unanimous plea bargain accepting the minimum positive outcome over none or negative outcomes. The game ends when the most skilled manipulator(s) has triumphed over his adversaries successfully achieving the required point score terminating additional rounds.

Speaking in broad terms, participants identify the "purpose" of the game in play, although not usually in terms of specific strategies by establishing communication among one another in order to become cognizant of the individual goals each has chosen. This is, presumably, what is meant by game theory rationale. Awareness that the other participants have individual goals, as evidenced by their respective lines of action and the varied but finite means available through which to realize them, defines the preliminary parameters necessary for bargaining interaction. In a sense the mandatory nature of this understanding is a meta-communication in and of itself by virtue of fact that absence of same constitutes the principal condition under which bargaining cannot proceed. Hence, once participants have defined the structure of the bargaining situation, they begin to interpret the symmetrical or complementary understandings which tacitly
establish the motivation for coalition, negotiation and strategic manipulation – all of which are based upon the crucial aspect of mutual agreement.

One area in which the present study differs from the more mathematical models of game behavior is the shift of emphasis from perfect (zero sum) information to a condition of intentionally ambiguous and imperfect information (mixed-motive) wherein the players have in general, partially-common/partially-opposed interests. It is exactly this imperfect information feature which should enhance generalizability from the findings of this study to the imperfect information conditions which characterize bargaining in real life social situation. Rather than constraining ingenuity, independent action, or novel communication strategies, this game design provides the participants with a stressful environment which elicits anxious concern over numerous face-to-face strategic decisions and adds incentive for individuals so inclined to directly control the situations – so long as some form of coalition exists between or among the players controlled. Exercising this game framework within conditions which differ in regard to task orientation and personality variable disclosure should provide a rough "yardstick" to measure the limits of the effects of the Machiavellian personality upon bargaining success in triads.

There are those critics of bargaining and associated game frameworks who object to manipulation/persuasion studies of this type because Machiavellianism Quotient, achievement orientation, dominance, etc., pre-suppose participants to be to some greater or
lesser degree, basically immoral and essentially opportunistic. In response, I contend, that it is not that bargaining pre-supposes any particular morality; rather, in the mode of game framework, bargaining indicates that personality variable both affect and effect bargaining outcomes and such enhanced skill has advantageous rewards. Amoral and adept manipulators are simply one of a variety of traits manifested within several personality types, which for some are seen as ne'er-do-wells, for others, role models. This study proposes to assist humanistic communication researchers in their understanding of those elements which might assist moral man in immoral society, and for those opportunists less concerned with the fate of mankind, vice versa.

Methodology

Subject selection was accomplished by administration of the Mach IV test (7 point Likert-type scale; cumulative +20, Christie and Geis 1970, p. 17; see Appendix B) to five hundred and sixty two (562) male subjects. All tests were scored and compared to discern if any significant homogeneity differences were obvious relative to Mach type concentrations among the different subject population pools tested. Analysis yielded no significant differences in the distribution of high, or low Machs across the four major populations tested (i.e. TU and USF college students at random, Naval Training Center recruits, Kappa Alpha Fraternity members, and sworn personnel of the Orange County Sheriff's Department.) Low Machs, those individuals scoring between 40 and 80, numbered 11%, thus accounting for 28.67% of the total population. Mach V tests (forced choice,
20 question most/least, weighted score +20 (Christie and Geis, 1970, p. 22-32, see Appendix B) were then administered to a randomly selected total of sixty-three (63) of those subjects living in Orange County who had completed the Mach IV test. Low Machs were considered to be those individuals whose scores fell below 80, while a high Mach was indicated by any score equal to or greater than 110. Each subject's score on Mach V was compared to his score on Mach IV; if a subject's score did not correlate sufficiently between tests such that when both scores were averaged the total no longer fell within the range for his Mach classification that subject was withdrawn from the population pool. Forty-six (46) of the sixty-three (63) subjects tested were selected for the additional testing on the basis of their high or low score on the Mach IV test. Of these forty-six subjects, four (4) were discarded due to lack of score correlation, yielding two Mach pools of twenty-one (21) each high and low Machs. The remaining seventeen (17) subjects were chosen at random from a population pool consisting of midrange Mach IV scorers who were available for further testing and interested in participating in one or more of the experimental conditions. One of these individuals was not considered for study due to lack of correlation between Mach test scores.

From the fifty-eight (58) males in the final population pool, thirty-six (36) subjects were actually used. Six (6) triads consisting of one each high, middle and low Mach were drawn randomly from the pool and then two (2) triads were placed into one of each of the three experimental conditions. This proved to be an extremely
time-consuming unconservative means of instituting the experimental manipulations. Therefore a more economical and efficient method of triad construction was devised. Utilizing rotation, this method placed each subject in all three experimental conditions while assuring that no subject was ever placed in a triad which contained another subject with whom he had interacted in any previous experimental condition. This method of rotation not only conserved subjects, lessened the load of coordinating times and personal schedules, but also reduced confusion as to how the game was played, thus eliminating the need for rule reading, warm-up rounds, etc. after the initial experimental condition. (For a diagram of the rotation system used see Appendix A.). This allowed the formation of eighteen (18) triads, made up of eighteen (18) subjects in two nine (9) subject units, supplying six (6) triads per experimental condition. These eighteen (18) triads when combined with the six (6) early triads, yielded eight (8) triads in each experimental condition. (Twenty-two (22) of the subjects fully tested were not selected to participate in any experimental condition.)

Procedure

As in the pilot study all subjects were given a printed instructional handout (see Appendix A) and allotted individual study time prior to engaging in a verbal recap of the game and bargaining procedures. The importance of coalition formations was explained and the open ended nature of coalition for majority and plea bar-
gaining was discussed. Each participant was briefed on the score tabulation process and an effort was made to familiarize all participants with the request for reread and bold challenge procedures.

The scoreboard was either a chalk board or newsprint pad, upon which was lined a vertical simple linear scale, from -5 to +20 inclusive. (This aspect differs slightly from the procedure in the pilot study in that the scale is one space shorter, hence winning occurs at 20 as opposed to 21.) The scale is divided into equal thirds vertically with each subject's name written in at the zero space, in alphabetical order from left to right. The subjects sat within arm's length of the designated control block (either a standard chalk board eraser, or a 2" x 2" x 6" piece of white pine) centered among them.

After all subjects in a triad said they understood what was to be expected during play, the experimenter ran a trial reading (this step was deleted if all subjects within a triad had played the game before) after which any final questions a subject had were answered. In Condition 1. the experimenter closed the pregame discussion by emphasizing to all participants that each reading constituted a new condition subject to no restrictions from any previous coalitions, and that each participant was to accrue as many points as possible per reading, maximizing scoring to his fullest potential.

Condition 2. The experimenter restated all the information given
in the first condition, additionally stressing the need for each player to focus his attentions on winning and applying himself to efficiently complete the bargaining task. The experimenter emphasized that all players should accumulate as many points as possible without regard for the outcomes of any other player. At this point the experimenter then said, "Obviously the tests which each of you took recently have some bearing upon this experimental game. Perhaps I should shed some more light on the issue to clear up a little of the confusion. First, the study of communication overlaps into most other areas of the social sciences, like psychology. One area of parallel interdisciplinary research concerns itself with how different personality variables relate to communication and behavior of persuasive or manipulative intent. Each of you in this group, based solely on these tests, has been classed as either a high, middle or low Mach. "Mach-ness" as derived from the writings of Niccolo Machiavelli, an Italian statesman, is the extent to which one advocates manipulating situations and people to one's own ends. Now without going into a long or moralistic diatribe on how the Machiavellian personality manifests itself, suffice to say that one of you in this group is a high Mach and should exhibit some very Machiavellian tendencies while the one who is a low Mach probably will not. Now that's all I'm allowed to say at this point in time, if you are interested in additional information, call me at work in May or June. Now let's begin".
The experimenter's pregame discussion in Condition 3. included all of the material contained in Condition 2, but excluded any additional emphasis placed on task orientation. In addition to the dialogue disclosure concerning the Machiavellian personality, the experimenter included "... suffice to say that in bargaining situations such as this higher Machs do significantly better jobs of achieving their goals at the expense of lower Machs. In this group, (subject's name) is the highest Mach, and (subject's name) is the lowest Mach. If you are interested in additional information, call me at work in May or June. Now let us begin, and may the best Mach win."

From the main choice bank of 60 technique cards of ten types, twenty cards, two of each type were drawn at random for Condition 1, of those cards remaining every other one went into a stack designated for Condition 2, the remainder being reserved for Condition 3. There was also a secondary choice of 20 additional technique cards from which readings were drawn whenever any game played exceeded twenty readings. In each condition the experimenter read technique cards selected at random from the card bank for that condition. If any subject requested a re-reading, the request was granted. Readings continued and participants bargained, challenged, and entered into coalition accumulating points until one individual or coalition advanced across the +20 line to win, at which point the experimenter officially declared the game over and all subjects were then released or rescheduled for additional bargaining situations.
Of the thirty-six (36) subjects who arranged to participate in the experiment only one was unable to attend a scheduled session, fortunately one of the middle Machs from one of the "single play" triads was available to fill in. Hence six High Mach subjects played one game each and six played three games each; five middle Mach subjects played one game each, five played three games each, and two played two games each; six low Machs played one game each and six played three games each. The average number of readings necessary to establish a winning participant in Condition .1, was eighteen (18); in Condition .2, sixteen (16) readings, and in Condition .3, twenty-two (22) readings were necessary. (Much of the increase in average number of readings in Condition .3 can be attributed to the one triad in which thirty-eight (38) readings were required to complete the game.).
CHAPTER IV

RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

Results

Individual total point scores in each Mach grouping for all three experimental conditions are listed in Table 4.

Table 4

RAW TOTAL POINTS SCORED BY EACH SUBJECT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition .1:</th>
<th>High Mach</th>
<th>Middle Mach</th>
<th>Low Mach</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>152</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>98</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

49
The raw score data from Table 4 were submitted to a One-Way Analysis of Variance, the results of which are displayed in Table 5.
Table 5

ONE-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF BARGAINING SUCCESS
AS A FUNCTION OF MACHIAVELLIANISM.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experimental Condition</th>
<th>Source of Variation</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Between Samples</td>
<td>182.58</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>91.30</td>
<td>4.72</td>
<td>&lt;.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Within Samples</td>
<td>406.37</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>19.35</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total Variation</td>
<td>588.96</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Between Samples</td>
<td>90.34</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>45.17</td>
<td>3.73</td>
<td>&lt;.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Within Samples</td>
<td>254.62</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>12.12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total Variation</td>
<td>344.96</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Between Samples</td>
<td>2.34</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>.083</td>
<td>&gt;.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Within Samples</td>
<td>294.62</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>14.03</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total Variation</td>
<td>296.96</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The overall treatment effect was significant in support of the main hypothesis (F 2, 69 = 7.57 p < .001). The data in Table 5 reveals that the influence of Machiavellianism was a significant factor in Condition 1. (F 2, 21 = 4.72 p < .02) and, to a somewhat
lesser extent also significant in Condition .2 (F 2,21 = 3.73 significant beyond the .05>p confidence level). The results from Condition .1, fall into line with those gleaned from the pilot study, hence supporting research prediction #1. The results from Condition .2 appear to conflict somewhat with the anticipated direction of research prediction #2. However, as shall be demonstrated in Table 6, rejection of the hypothesis in this case need not signify acceptance of the null hypothesis.

Examination of Table 5 data for Condition .3 yields (F 2,21 = .083 NSD) a strong indication that the influence of Machiavellianism has indeed been constrained. Thus, lending support to research prediction #3 by accepting the hypothesis as stated.

It must be realized that some variations do not adequately reflect the full extent of the restraints of the finite bargaining universe within each experimental condition where the point score of 20 is an absolute. Placing this into its proper perspective both the dependent nature of score acquisition and the significance of even a two point spread between the top scorers are factors which are not well represented in raw point score analysis. Though game score is calculated on a linear ordinal scale, the increments are weighted by the participants in the bargaining situation with increasing significance in ascending order. With this in mind, the importance of scores which differ, let us say four points between highest and lowest players bears more relative impact between 15 and 19 (where the player with the lower score must take increased risks, prevent any successful plea bargaining, and cope with the additional
Table 6
CHI-SQUARE COMPARISON OF BARGAINING SUCCESS
AS A FUNCTION OF MACHIAVELLIANISM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experimental Condition</th>
<th>Mach Group</th>
<th>Frequency Observed</th>
<th>Frequency&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Percent of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>152/377</td>
<td>125.67/377</td>
<td>40.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>127/377</td>
<td>125.67/377</td>
<td>33.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>98/377</td>
<td>125.67/377</td>
<td>25.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&lt;span style=&quot;font-size:1.2em&quot;&gt;χ² = 11.62 df2&lt;/span&gt;</td>
<td>&lt;span style=&quot;font-size:1.2em&quot;&gt;p&lt;.01&lt;/span&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>155/407</td>
<td>135.67/407</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>135/407</td>
<td>135.67/407</td>
<td>33.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>135/407</td>
<td>135.67/407</td>
<td>28.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&lt;span style=&quot;font-size:1.2em&quot;&gt;χ² = 5.33 df2&lt;/span&gt;</td>
<td>&lt;span style=&quot;font-size:1.2em&quot;&gt;p&lt;.07&lt;/span&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>135/415</td>
<td>138.34/415</td>
<td>32.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>141/415</td>
<td>138.34/415</td>
<td>33.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>139/415</td>
<td>138.34/415</td>
<td>33.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>Each Mach group should receive one third of the total points therefore, the expected frequency equals 33.33% of the total points scored for each experimental condition.
stress factor of his opponent's "game point" status, etc.) than the same point deviation when players are in mid game between 9 and 13. This significance is not realized by raw point score F tests, hence the possibility of dubious reliability of ANOVA indication of significance. Therefore non-parametric measures of the data in Table 4 were also taken.

As shown in Table 6, using the cumulative total technique developed in the pilot study, a score is derived which may be calculated, via the Chi-Square statistical procedure, against 33.33% of the total expected value (i.e. each group should receive an equal third of the total points). As one might expect in Condition .1, Chi-Square indicated strong support of research prediction #1 ($X^2 = 11.62$ df2 $p < .01$) attesting to a definite influence on bargaining success as a function of Machiavellianism Quotient. In Condition .2 however, contrary to what was supported by ANOVA, the Chi-Square only "suggested" a trend ($X^2 = 5.33$ df2 $p < .07$) toward the influence of Machiavellianism. However, convention ordains the .05 level of confidence sacrosanct thus we may accept the hypothesis posited in research prediction #2. Significance levels of the data in Condition 12, as determined by $X^2$ and ANOVA, reveals a slight lack of statistical congruence suggesting that partial disclosure coupled with increased emphasis on the bargaining task may not have as profound an influence on the effects of Machiavellianism as it was thought to have. Condition .3, as anticipated yielded no significant difference via Chi-Square ($X^2 = .14$ df2 $p > .93$) supporting the disruption of Machiavellianism's influence in
conditions of total disclosure, supporting research prediction #3.

To further validate the impact of each condition on limiting the effects of Machiavellianism on bargaining success, a Pearson 'r' (correlation coefficient) was calculated to establish significant correlations between Mach score and point score. In Condition .1, \( r = 0.59 \) significant beyond the .01 confidence level; in Condition .2, \( r = 0.39 \) significant beyond the .05 confidence level; and in Condition 13, \( r = -0.20 \) an insignificant slightly negative correlation. Again one should note that the results support significance in the direction of the research predictions. Having established confirmation of the Main Hypothesis and the first three research predictions; analysis of changes or modifications of Machiavellian implementation of power strategies among conditions which account for the disruption of Machiavellian influence is now in order.

**Power Strategy Analysis**

The rationale for implementing various power plays has been covered in the Power Strategy section of the Pilot Study, for a review of same please check Chapter I. Table 7 contains the raw data scores of all subjects separated into Mach groups and divided into the respective experimental conditions.

The overall pattern of bargaining activity for all three Mach groups in each experimental condition was vigorous and in line with that observed in the Pilot Study. Directional consistency of results between Condition .1 and the Pilot Study was expected, but the fact that these consistencies carried almost completely into
Table 7

RAW SCORE COMPARISON OF BARGAINING STRATEGIES

BY MACH GROUP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Controller</th>
<th>Plea Bargain Made Accepted</th>
<th>Coalition</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Condition .1:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Mach</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Mach</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Mach</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bold Challenge</th>
<th>Correct</th>
<th>Incorrect</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High Mach</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Mach</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Mach</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Controller</th>
<th>Plea Bargain Made Accepted</th>
<th>Coalition</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Condition .2:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Mach</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Mach</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Mach</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Condition .3:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mach Condition</th>
<th>Controller</th>
<th>Plea Bargain Made Accepted</th>
<th>Coalition</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High Mach</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Mach</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Mach</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Mach</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Mach</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Mach</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mach Condition</th>
<th>Bold Challenge</th>
<th>Correct</th>
<th>Incorrect</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High Mach</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Mach</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>55.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Mach</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>33.33%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Condition .2 was quite unanticipated. Generally speaking, high Machs in the first two conditions, while no more active than middle or low Machs, consistently succeeded in maintaining a slight but statistically non-significant advantage over their triad mates in the Controller and Plea Bargain modes. As suggested in the Pilot Study this constant "edge" may have some cumulative effect on bargaining success but such speculation has, at this time, no statistical support. On the other hand, both the Bold Challenge mode and Coalition for Majority formation proved to be significant factors in determining bargaining outcomes. As shown in Table 8 a Chi-Square reveals high Mach superiority in both Conditions .1 and .2 to be significantly enhanced by effective manipulation of the Bold Challenge power strategy.

As displayed in Table 8, Condition .3's disclosure factor inhibits effective application of the Bold Challenge power strategy. It is also quite apparent that full disclosure, rather than task orientation, limits the ability of high Machs to control the bargaining structure by dominating Coalition for Majority formation. Whether high Machs initiated the majority of the coalitions that they participated in or whether they were selected (prior to Condition .3) on the basis of "preferred partner" status is a moot point. The fact remains that high Machs tend to be in the majority of winning coalitions so long as their high Mach-ness is not specifically revealed. If the high Mach's personality type is disclosed he enters significantly fewer coalitions.
### BOLD CHALLENGE MODE:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition .1:</th>
<th>Condition .2:</th>
<th>Condition .3:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$x^2 = 9.07$</td>
<td>$x^2 = 10.37$</td>
<td>$x^2 = .2892$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>df2</td>
<td>df2</td>
<td>df2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p &lt; .02</td>
<td>p &lt; .01</td>
<td>p &gt; .86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### COALITION for MAJORITY:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conditions .1-X-.2</th>
<th>Conditions .1-X-.3</th>
<th>Conditions .2-X-.3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$x^2 = .0063$</td>
<td>$x^2 = 6.553$</td>
<td>$x^2 = 6.625$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>df2</td>
<td>df2</td>
<td>df2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p &gt; .99</td>
<td>p &lt; .05</td>
<td>p &lt; .05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Significant change in the utilization of important bargaining strategies by high Machs between Conditions .1 and .3, with a corresponding drop in outcomes, reconfirms the major hypothesis and supports research prediction #4. Hence, it seems reasonable to interpret this as evidence that situational threat via personality type disclosure, minimizes individual differences in bargaining abilities and manipulative skills due to Machiavellianism Quotient.

Analysis of Other Factors Influencing Outcomes

It is insufficient merely to "discover" that Machiavellianism ceases to have a significant effect on bargaining success in conditions where full disclosure prevail; without attempting to understand why this is so. What exactly is it about Machiavellian bargaining tactics which was forced to change or become inoperative between Condition .1 and Condition .3? Several factors not classified as power strategies per se appear to have a definite influence on the communication patterns, hence upon the bargaining outcomes, which typify Machiavellian behavior. These factors include: adapting well to artificially accelerated game play by exhibiting the ability to make speedy decisions; apparent cooperation coupled with tenacious intent to achieve the optimum outcomes; the ability to define "fairness" to the satisfaction of other members in the triad which in turn determines the structure of bargaining; and single minded attention to the immediate bargaining outcome in
terms of superior position, in essence "toughness" of bargaining stance. These four factors seem almost to contradict one another, yet they account for much of the high Mach's success in the base condition (Condition .1) and lack of same in the fully disclosed condition (Condition .3).

Speed Factor

A priori assumptions in the past confined most of the game theory analysis solely to the mathematics of absolute conflict of interest, forced rationality of outcomes amongst participants, mutual knowledge of outcomes, and agreement as to the rank order of strategic preferences; this type of abstracted formalism has often elicited severe criticism as to general applicability. One such criticism levied against the present study attacks a possible elemental flaw in operationalization; that the sine qua non, forced quick decisions, are not truly representative of communication and behavior which produce the same outcomes as would occur naturally. Can the compression-of-time factor actually be equated with situations where decisions are made in a slow and deliberate manner?

In line with Durkin's (1967) analysis of the cognitive dichotomy existing between high and low Machs, is the observation in this thesis that high Machs more so than lows enjoy a high tension "snap decision" bargaining environment. The reason for this may be quite simple; the pressure of forcing speedy
decisions increases stress upon the bargainers which in turn enhances irrelevant affect - a main criterion for optimum expression of Machiavellianism. In Condition .1 the high Machs were able to keep the bargaining pace accelerated perhaps because all participants thought this was part of the game's purpose, that speedy decision in some way pleased the experimenter or was encouraged by him, or simply because the sooner the game was over the sooner someone would be declared a winner and everyone could then go about his daily business. However, in Condition .3, high Mach attempts to pick up the bargaining pace were met with both passive and active resistance. Passive resistance took the form of asking the experimenter for technique card rereadings totalling 24% more than asked for in Condition .1. Active resistance manifested itself in substantially more intra group communication directed toward individuals who pressured for accelerated decision making, in the form of retorts demanding time to think.

Several subjects commented on the fact that they felt the game made them rush into a decision which normally they would have pondered longer or not made at all if they weren't more positive of the results. The applicability of this research then may be more directly significant for crisis type bargaining decision making than for lengthy negotiation. Taking this notion one step further; mightn't the Machiavellian personality variable as established in Condition .1 and Condition .2,
be a factor which helps secure early advantages in bargaining - an immediate phenomenon - the impact of which may very well be reduced as the relationships among the participants develop, mature, and stabilize as a function of extended interaction - a longitudinal phenomenon - effecting disclosure similar to that which affected results in Condition .3?

Cooperation

Bargaining is likely to be more active when at least one of the participants profoundly exhibits those tendencies indicated by high Machiavellianism Quotient pretests, and at least one of the other individuals in the triad exhibits an attitude of passive cooperation. Any exploitative and manipulative behavior is then revealed in bold relief when contrasted with the docile and dependent actions of very cooperative lower Machs. Successful bargaining fluctuates between these two extremes with the largest continual gains made by those individuals who "appear" to espouse egalitarian attitudes while taking advantage of the other participants. In most situations the best policy, in terms of maximizing gains, seems to be one tending toward cooperation but actively goal directed, such than flexibility does not interfere with success orientation.

Expressed throughout this thesis are many statements of theoretical possibility which maintain that personality is important to the communication process which determines the
outcomes during a bargaining situation, contending that each participant brings to the situation propensities to communicate in certain general ways, and within the situation their personality variables interact with environmental characteristics to determine specific behaviors and outcomes. This idea conceived in the framework of the above stated bargaining conditions suggests that the differences observed between Condition .1 and Condition .3 can be explained as personality variable -X- experimental situation interaction.

Fairness

As odd as it may sound, effective manipulation often depends upon one's wielding the pressure of "fairness;" for without this concept bargainers find it difficult to quickly make and accept the concessions necessary to reach an agreement. Fairness and "honesty" should not in this case be misconstrued to mean the same thing. An adept player can misrepresent his interests either by hyperbole or understatement and secure an agreement which is factually to his distinct advantage, although it would appear quite fair to his opponents.

High Machs tended to control the "definition of fairness" discussions in Condition .1 and .2 by virtue of their self cast leadership role. In Condition .3 however, any discussion initiated or directed by the high Mach was apt to elicit responses from the other triad members insinuating or boldly maintaining that some greater ulterior motive was behind such
discussions. Not unexpectedly middle Machs in this condition often "Mached-out" higher Machs by forcing them into a secondary control position or distracting them from the immediate task at hand via irrelevant innuendo concerning evil and manipulative Machiavellian people.

**Toughness**

Since bargaining is basically a process whereby positions that are divergent become "identical" allowing par es who disagree initially to reach a mutual agreement; bargaining for coalition can therefore be viewed as either a series of decreasing demands or an all-or-nothing situation. The outcome of every reading in which bargaining took place was analyzed by comparing the number of times a subject made a demand and was allotted a concession with the frequency that he rejected a lesser counter-proposal, thus deriving a general measure of "toughness." A "tough" bargainer was one who started with high demands and made concessions infrequently; whereas "softness" in bargaining was indicated by low initial demands and a subject's willingness to accept any counter-proposal. In each reading then, the final outcome of bargaining as reflected in point score accrued by each subject yielded a rough index of bargaining success as a function of toughness or softness.

Irrespective of Mach grouping, as a subject participated in
successive experiments, his bargaining neither grew "tougher" nor "softer." Thus passage of time in the bargaining situations per se does not appear to alter an individual's style of bargaining for coalition. Unfortunately this research design had no definitive means for measuring the actual degrees to which the toughness/softness variable influenced specific bargaining outcomes. Generally speaking, high and middle Machs were tougher and successfully controlled their situations, tending to continue being tough throughout the experiments. Conversely, low Mach subjects tended to drive soft bargains as a result of the toughness displayed by one or both of his opponents, rather than a function of any conciliatory attitude displayed by an opponent. There was virtually no difference between the proportion of higher Machs who responded to concession by making a concession and those who responded by not making one.

Examination of exhibitions of toughness/softness across all conditions suggests that it is not so much that toughness was a good strategy, but rather, that softness was a poor one. Except in the Plea Bargain mode, an extremely soft bargaining strategy tended to place the individual on the outside of any coalition formed. Low Mach players were three times as likely as high Machs to exhibit "extremely" soft bargaining strategies. Softness in the Bold Challenge mode actually hindered progress toward any coalition or non-punitive form of resolution. Comparison of the Plea Bargain and the Bold
Challenge mode reveals that toughness plays a dual role, oftentimes with contradictory consequences. While toughness decreases the likelihood of a Plea Bargain Coalition; it increases the payoff for those who survive the possibility of failure in the Bold Challenge mode.

In the Coalition for Majority mode, where bargaining is relatively flexible, toughness proved to be a bad strategy in the majority of the cases. High Machs were the most able "tough" bargainers, however, middle Machs employed the technique as frequently but gained an average of 23% fewer points across all conditions. It should be noted that the total information, fully disclosed condition, yielded the fewest successful attempts as "toughness," suggesting that the more accurate a bargainer's information is about their opponents, the more likely toughness is to prevent coalition.
CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION

Restatement of Major Findings

High Machs were more successful as predicted than low Machs in mixed-motive bargaining coalition situations. Much of this success is attributed to their superior manipulative abilities, lack of emphasis on conventional ethical standards, and a detached approach to interpersonal functioning. Until such time as Machiavellian Quotients were disclosed, participants controlled the balance of bargaining power, both in leadership and judgment, to their advantage in proportion to their respective Machiavellianism Quotients. Disclosure of the Nature of Machiavellianism, emphasis on task orientation, and particularly the impact of revealing each individual's Machiavellianism Quotient to all members of the bargaining triad were shown to negate any innate or acquired superior manipulative skill possessed by a member Machiavellian. In short, the effects of Machiavellianism on bargaining success were limited 1) personally labeling Machiavellian individuals as manipulators, and to a lesser extent 2) stressing the need for all participants to concentrate on the task at hand.
Quoting from page 23 in Chapter I, typical game play ".. reveals the 'disadvantaged' lowest are not, as one might expect, helpless, but rather are taken unaware. The next higher Mach, often the most active and certainly one of the most powerful players, presses for advantage too impetuously, succumbing less to the inherent superiority of his opponents than to his own judgmental errors. By this same token, the more successful and powerful high Mach players are aggressive but cautious, appealing to the sensibilities of their opponents while constantly (almost relentlessly) seeking the advantage. Without intending to sound melodramatic, high Machs almost 'mesmerize' others into committing some concentration shift where inadvertent blundering, the factor between winning and not winning, decides the outcome in favor of the highest Mach."

Restatement of research prediction #1: in Condition .1, high Machs will successfully out bargain lower Machs and receive a significant and disproportionately large share of the outcomes which will result in high Machs winning more games.

Briefly reviewing the chronology of events in Condition .1 bargaining one notes that there is some indication that for the first third of the game all players interact more or less as equals. During this time much "table talk". probing, examination of other player's attitudes, and reality/knowledge testing transpires among participants. It becomes increasingly obvious that internal struggles are taking place; with one (or more) of the players, usually a higher Mach, making an effort to impose their value system, enhance personal
believability, and dominate the attention of the other players between readings. The initial all-for-one alliance attitude quickly transforms into a conditional situation where positive and negative interpersonal rewards are being used as the fulcrum for coalition formation. Hence, either promoting future mutually beneficial interactions (e.g. "Keep up the good work dude."), soothing injured egos (e.g. "damn game is trickier than I thought.... but we'll get it together next time.") or a silent battle of wills between at least two players in which a substantial effort is made either to "psych-out" the competition or appear to be totally aloof.

The turning point of the game usually takes place about 3/5 ths into the readings (8 to 10 techniques read), at which time one player has begun to "fall by the wayside" and the conflict is being carried on between two approximately equal opponents. At this point the critical errors are most likely to occur (e.g. too little concentration before attaining the control position, emotionally motivate Bold Challenges, hasty forming of unstable coalitions, etc.) as well as the "tough" but subtle power plays (e.g. Controller made Bold Challenges, Coalition for Majority with no acceptance of Plea Bargainers, etc.)

The final 20% of the game is usually either 1) a struggle against the most likely coalition by the odd-person out (at this point the lowest score player usually poses no threat and is sought for partnership by the other players), or 2) cautious bargaining by one player (or perhaps two) attempting to slow or halt the advances of another. Ultimately there is a winner or winning coalition, usually being or
containing the highest Mach.

There are seven generally prominent bargaining features observable in almost every triad in Condition .1:

1) High and middle Machs initiate cooperation the most; low Machs do so least.

2) High Machs wield Bold Challenge power most effectively whereas middle and low Machs were less adept at same.

3) High Machs, as anticipated, exhibit the most successful efforts to manipulate others. Consistent with their performance in the Pilot Study, low Machs had far the fewest successful attempts at manipulation.

4) High Machs tend to respond quickly to the changes in their partner's behavior, and attempt to "punish" another's shift from cooperation to antagonism.

5) Low Machs discriminated between the other Mach groups within the triad preferring high Machs during bargaining, middle Machs preferred high slightly more than low Machs, while high Machs exhibited no signs of preference. (It is interesting to note that this tendency was expressed in both the Coalition for Majority and the Plea Bargain modes.)

6) High Machs tend to control conversations which discuss proportionment of outcomes.

7) Low Machs frequently exhibit "softness" in their bargaining styles as a function of the "toughness" exhibited by higher Machs.
Such differences, as stated above, between high and low Mach behavior may be accounted for through "encounter-theory" (Durkin 1967) "The Cool Syndrome vs the Soft Touch" philosophy (Christie and Geis 1970) "rationality vs vulnerability" (Burgoon et. al. 1974), or by this author's concept of personality and environmental bargaining situation interaction in which all bargainers are conflict assertive or conflict interactive.

In this concept high Machs in Condition .1; exhibit conflict assertive/resolution directive communication and behavior, while low Machs opt for the path of least resistance; that being conflict submissive/resolution interactive. Needless to say middle Machs fluctuate somewhere between these extremes. The Machiavellian personality pretest measures only indicate an individual's predisposition to accepting dominant or less dominant roles in mixed-motive bargaining coalition situations. Whereas during the actual bargaining interactions a multitude of factors either facilitate or inhibit implementation of tactics or strategies which directly influence the final outcomes and dependent upon these factors, Machiavellianism is either advantageous or not.

Condition .2, A Closer Look

Restating research prediction #2; when all subjects are specifically instructed to concentrate on optimizing the bargaining task to overcome the influence of a skilled Machiavellian manipulator in their midst; high Machs will win somewhat more points than low Machs,
but the margin of difference will not be as profound as in research prediction #1.

Emphasizing task orientation and establishing that the triad consisted of one each high, middle, and low Mach; with an accompanying dialogue on what Machiavellianism is and how it effects bargaining situations, had only one discernible effect, all Mach groups did slightly better than they had in Condition 1. This would lead one to conclude that while it is true that such information does indeed help non-Machiavellians compete in the bargaining situation, it also provides such incentive for Machiavellians. Hence, it is incorrect to assume, as Burgoon et. al (1974, p.44) suggests that such information will minimize the influence of a high Mach. In actuality this strategy simply heightens the focus of all participants without regard for Machiavellianism Quotient. Low Machs continue to lose in spite of partial disclosure, appear to be unconcerned or unable to discern that their most frequently "chosen" partner was indeed the high Mach, and by several low Mach subject's own admission proceeded with the bargaining irrespective of any titles or personality types included in pregame discussion. High Machs, on the other hand, kept their attentions on the goal uninvolved with their interest in the implicit information regarding Mach grouping.

High Machs tended to use the information that each triad was constructed according to Mach quotient as a strategic barricade
from which to launch a smoke screen of "distrust'" and "accusation". This provided sufficient irrelevant affect to more than compensate for any increase in outcome realized by low Machs perhaps contaminating any resultant increase brought about through heightened concentration on the bargaining task.

Condition .2, produced three times as many verbal contracts between players as did Condition .1. Six of these agreements to establish continuing but information coalitions were formed; including a high Mach and a low Mach in three instances, a high and a middle Mach in two, and a high, middle, and low in one instance. Humorously enough, it was often the actual high Mach of the group who pointed out to one of the other members of the triad that the third player's actions could only be construed to be the manipulations of a "Machiavellian type" and in this manner turned the focus of attentions from himself by establishing a "common enemy".

The contrast effect of this common enemy tended to diminish mutual differences between allies, providing an outgroup participant for negative reference. Thus, in effect, minimizing perceived differences within a dyadic group by increasing conflict between that group and the remaining person in the triad. The very suggestion of this type accusation stimulated the competitive conflict situation, increasing distrust and in two instances severely reduced group communication either to or from the excluded party. Seemingly, the more the ousted bargainer attempts to persuade the
others to his side, the more the others reject his information as being merely attempts at manipulation; this fact was even more clearly displayed in Condition 3.

Obviously it is possible for any participant to attempt a direct influence attempt surreptitiously; with the identifying characteristics of such an attempt that the perpetrator of the intended manipulation behaves and initiates communication as if the target individual(s) can not or do not perceive the perpetrator's own interests in accomplishing said manipulation. Naturally some perpetrators are rather inept, clumsy, and obvious in their manipulative attempts apparently only marginally aware that their target is not deceived by the tactics being used. One manifestation of conflict assertive/resolution directive high Mach strategy is that they rarely appear to succumb to obvious or blatant manipulations, when such tactics if discovered would be disadvantageous. Generally, the high Mach successfully perpetrates manipulative attempts upon his target in a manner which, quite frequently in Condition .2, results in the target expressing great satisfaction at the "victory" which, to a major extent, was had at his conflict submissive/resolution interactive expense!

Drawn from the comments made during and after bargaining sessions by low Machs in Condition .2, there is a possibility that a significant factor between low and high Mach performance is that low Machs assume that their partners are "just like them", 
thereby attributing low Mach motives to Machiavellian behavior. Though equally motivated to participate, low Machs neglect to manipulate the situation to their own best advantage, erroneously assuming that the egalitarianism and fair play espoused by their opponents will triumph. This is not only an ineffective but a losing strategy. Unfortunately no formal posttest was administered to confirm this contention, hence it must be considered speculation.

Condition .3, Affecting the Effect

Restatement of research prediction #3; full disclosure of the nature of Machiavellianism, coupled with revelation of the Machiavellianism Quotient of each participant, should effectively equalize and limit any effects on bargaining due to Machiavellianism. Hence, no statistically significant score disparity among participants will occur.

Comparison of the three experimental conditions reveals; that the Machiavellian uses many strategies to resolve conflicts of interest, his adeptness at same leads to concessions by naive opponents resulting in successfully shifting the bargaining outcome in his favor (Condition .1), where competent implementation of strategies results in superior manipulation of available power. Power deficiencies may even be overcome by intelligent employment of various subversive or misrepresentative strategies (Condition .2). However, especially over repeated interactions, strategies
and bargaining styles associated with deception, unfairness, and manipulative intent are learned by the opposition, resulting in the development of reactive counter-strategies, (Condition .3) which in turn produces a level of "bargaining awareness" involving correspondingly negative or aversive conditions which will not necessarily be surmounted via implementation of a strategy - in fact, the reverse is true, once the deceptive nature of Machiavellian strategy is disclosed, the merest exhibition of competitive bargaining by the person so accused results in the escalation of conflict and a resultant decline in his outcomes.

The base of a Machiavellian's influence on bargaining is successfully implementing power to affect another's responses; hence, the crux of much of the intricate and subtle behavior which constitutes "bargaining" in a mixed-motive situation in the fully revealed condition. A high Mach's use of power to affect the other bargainer's outcomes adversely often adversely affected his own outcome, hence he was less likely to resort to manipulative behavior.

In one instance a twice successful top scorer high Mach reacted so negatively to the disclosure in Condition .3 that he refused to make or acknowledge any bargaining offers. He limited his participation to Bold Challenges and consistently chose the previous reading's correct response as his answer. This strategy resulted in the lengthiest time of play (38 readings), and had virtually the same effect as refusing to respond at all; thereby reducing the
immediate outcomes for all players.

What in essence occurs is a bargainer's natural predisposition to accept his usual conflict assertive/resolution directive role is thwarted; which simply means that someone else must, to a greater or lesser extent, fulfill that function. The thwarted or deposed individual has several alternatives: a) He may accept a more secondary role (e.g. conflict assertive/resolution submissive) and hope for the best outcome possible; b) He can "go it" alone and attempt to maintain his comfortable role; c) He can refuse to participate, inhibit communication, and generally attempt to disrupt the bargaining; and d) He can discredit the source which forced his deposition, change bargaining situations, or if he allows sufficient time to pass, win by default. The ideas espoused herein, though "original", are not new. Surprisingly enough, every one of these suggestions and several more can be gleaned from the works of a Florentine secretary, one Niccolo Machiavelli; strange how little the nature of man, bargains, conflict and communication change in over six centuries.

Conclusions

The major disadvantage of using Mach tests, or any paper and pencil measure designed to test for a specific personality variable, is that their value is limited by not revealing more of the total personality. Therefore, problem areas regarding validity and
reliability manifest themselves immediately upon generalization from the simplest controlled conditions to conditions which are either more complex or less controlled. Comparison of the three conditions indicates that the communication process during bargaining is affected by factors of both personality and situation suggesting an interaction effect. If indeed this is so, future researchers might do well to manipulate other situational variables to discover those situations in which personality differences account for greater and lesser impacts on communication. At present, the chasm between the controlled laboratory environment and "real-life" situations is observed as a formidable obstacle in the task of creating a scientific approach to conflict resolution via communication research. This gap may be crossed if the same "laws" govern events in both conditions - as no such universal laws are readily discernible in human interactions, the bridge must therefore develop from the study of mini-conflicts with clearly defined and controlled issues, progressing to larger conflicts with more poorly defined goals observed by convoluted issues. Additional conflict research investigating interpersonal communication variables must be undertaken using this laboratory gestation period to give birth to a viable theory of bargaining applicable not only to rational conflict, but, more importantly, to the resolution of that conflict.

While broad generalization is impossible, the importance of a
study such as this should not be downplayed because it investi-

gates atypical personality effects. It would appear likely that

in "real-life" situations it is the atypical personality which often

plays the major role. Consequently, future communication research-
ers would do well to further investigate atypical personalities,
especially if those personalities tend to typify individuals

responsible for developing situations which are of specific interest
to the researcher.

In conclusion, there are undoubtedly a multitude of areas of

improvement for future researchers investigating personality effects

on communication during bargaining. Six such areas of concern are

readily apparent: improved personality measurement; more complex

experimental situations; increased attention to the interaction of

personality variables and environmental situations; more attention

to motivations and incentives behind manipulative or non-manipula-
tive behaviors; utilization of more specific indices to log, by
type and impact, communication which enhances bargaining efficacy;

and conceiving of personality variables as roughly equivalent to

valences in chemistry such that a bargaining situation and its

limits may be considered in elemental terms as equations capable

of determining outcomes prior to conflict.

The interaction of all input factors effects the predisposition
to communication within small groups. Irrespective of content,
the communication patterns which evolve within the group establish
three basic classifications of variables: task orientation, interpersonal characteristics, and procedural development; all interact affecting the resultant communication. Adequate assessment of the determinants which control the ratio between quality and quantity of effective communication to reach an agreement is impossible unless those factors which influence the process of persuasion can be isolated and understood. To desire knowledge concerning communication inherent in small group bargaining interactions, but to disregard investigation of the elements which may be the key variables of the persuasive process undermines any value of communication research. The implications gleaned by studying personality variable interactions and limitations related to effective propagandizing, not only provides additional answers about communication, but also fosters inductive insight into the validity of applying these (and other similar) principles to business management, motivational seminars; and a variety of seemingly mundane competitive bargaining situations where "persuasion" is not merely a matter of semantics, but the intended purpose of the interaction.
APPENDIX A
Rotation Procedure

SUBJECTS:

High Mach; #1 #2 #3
Middle Mach; #4 #5 #6
Low Mach; #7 #8 #9

GROUPS IN TRIAD:

Condition .1          Condition .2          Condition .3
I:  #1, #4, #7        IV:  #1, #5, #9        VII:  #1, #6, #8
II:  #2, #5, #8      V:  #2, #6, #7        VIII:  #2, #4, #9
III:  #3, #6, #9     VI:  #3, #4, #8       IX:  #3, #5, #7
Rules of the Game

1. Prejudice/Ridicule:

   Prejudices example: A young man wishing to make a good impression on his girlfriend's father, learns that he is a rabid Democrat. So one evening, while waiting for the daughter to finish dressing, he engages the "old man" in conversation, turning it in such a way as to rip the Republicans to pieces. The father later informs the girl that the young man has "good stuff in him and should go far." Meaning: The one who makes the appeal to persuade you to act or feel in a certain way by associating his person, product, or proposal with a certain one of your prejudices, positive or negative--a prejudice being a prejudgment wrapped in emotion and having a history. Not only does he rekindle your prejudice, he also arouses in you feelings of kinship for one who shares your prejudice (i.e. himself)--and so exploits you through your weakness.

   Ridicule example: The professor, on the first day of class, having made a certain statement, is asked an embarrassing question by a class member. Preferring a cheap victory to an honest discussion, the professor replies sarcastically, "I'm afraid Mr. Jones, that I cannot understand what you mean. You are too deep for me." He then goes on to the next questioner. Meaning: An attempt is made to influence us to accept a certain proposition by poking fun at those who oppose it, or to discredit their counter proposal by subjecting them to verbal abuses.

2. Abstraction-Ambiguity-Diversion:

   Abstraction example: A speaker defines "Neurosis" as a "psychological term for a state of mind involving the nerves," but when he is asked to identify or point to--among a large number of people--a case of neurosis, he is unable to do so, showing that he is unable to use the term to make any concrete distinctions. Meaning: An abstracted term is a word or symbol which stands for the qualities possessed in common by a number of particular things, facts, or events. The technique of abstract terms occurs when an arguer employs a word for which he may have the meaning in the form of other words, but the arguer is unable to identify the concrete facts to which the word supposedly refers.

   Ambiguity example: Joe says, "Henry likes pudding better than his wife." Does Henry like pudding better than he likes his wife or does Henry like pudding more than his wife likes pudding? Meaning: A word or phrase is ambiguous if in the
mind of a hearer or reader it has two or more quite different meanings and the interpreter is uncertain as to which was really meant.

**Diversion example:** Teacher: "Johnny, what were you doing outside during study hall?" Johnny: "Oh, I dunno. Say did you know that the School Nurse and Mr. Higgins the janitor, go down into the basement together?" Teacher: "No! Really! I wonder what they would go there for?" Meaning: To divert is to get off the subject. With the original issue left unresolved, perhaps to join in a discussion or argument over some other unrelated subject.

3. **Rationalization/Pity:**

**Rationalization example:** The student, having failed the test, blames his failure on the classroom's being too hot. So hot in fact that he just could not think. Whereas in reality he knows that not enough time was spent in study, hence his failure. Meaning: You cite reasons or causes that will justify action that really has less creditable grounds.

**Pity Example:** Student to professor: "I know that my test grades have been poor, and that I deserve an 'F', but my dad is in the hospital and it would just kill him for me to get an 'F' in this course." Meaning: An attempt is being made to secure a commitment by presenting the object of commitment as an object of sympathy, thereby arousing our sympathetic feelings to the point where these feelings determine favorable action.

4. **Wishful Thinking/Oversimplification:**

**Wishful Thinking example:** "My daughter will be chosen Home-Coming-Queen, because she ought to win after all her long hard preparation." Meaning: You believe a proposition to be true because you want it to be true.

**Oversimplification example:** "If it were not for the ammunition makers, we would never have wars." Meaning: A complex event is explained by references to only one or two probable causes whereas many are responsible.

5. **Flattery-Status-Manner:**

**Flattery example:** Salesman to young matron answering the door: "This is my lucky day... to be greeted at the door by not only the most youthful and attractive woman on this street, but obviously, by the look of your house, also the most
conscientious." Meaning: An attempt is made to secure our commitment by pointing out in a very favorable light, some manifestation of our personal appearance, intellect or some other category where we wish to excel.

Status example: "Sudo was developed in the laboratory of a great and famous University. It's got to be good!" Meaning: Persons, places, or objects for which we have a strong sentiment of respect and esteem - or which at least possess some degree of fame or prestige - are introduced into the argument as endorsing that which we are asked to buy or believe.

Manner example: "I'm sure he's the president of this university. Notice the way he carries himself and the condescending way in which he speaks to those students." Meaning: A person's manner of behaving is made the basis of our acceptance or rejection of then without any thought that this manner may be a deceptive indicator of value.

6. Acceptable to the Dubious/Draw the Line, Moderatism-Radicalism:

Acceptable to the Dubious example: Advertisement: "The boys in the service abroad want letters more than gifts. Write frequently because some letters get lost. Write only good news because there is enough unpleasantry going on over there. Buy and write on Barton's Victory-Bond Stationary and we'll win this damned war." Meaning: The arguer states a series of propositions. The earlier ones are readily acceptable to the audience or reader, but the later ones are dubious. The listener is expected to blindly accept the latter ones because of what preceded them.

Draw the Line example: "Either you tell the truth or you lie." Meaning: Sharp distinctions are drawn where it is inappropriate to draw sharp distinctions.

Moderatism-Radicalism example: "What we need is new ideas, completely new ways of thinking; the old is not worthy of our acceptance." . . . vs . . . "Vote for me. My Radical-Middle party is neither conservative nor radical, we refuse to take a stand on any specific issue, but we sure can compromise . . . just think FM as the party which sits on the fence with both ears to the ground." Meaning: These quasi-political habits of the mind are similar to prejudice in form, but prejudice has history whereas Moderatism-Radicalism (or the reverse as depicted above) has neither history nor rational construction. The dichotomy between new for newness sake/old for oldness sake vs total avoidance of any extremes to the point or refusing to make a stand on any issue; there is no inherent virtue in either.
7. Practical Consequences/Attacking a Straw-Man:

Practical Consequences example: To paraphrase the movie "The Godfather": Make em an offer that they can't refuse." Meaning: An effort is made to persuade us to comply based on concern for our individual welfare due to harmful influences.

Attacking a Straw-Man example: Forbes: "A good portion of the best high school students never get to college. They just don't have the money." Busby: "Forbes, what you want is to pay kids to go to college ... how absurd!" Meaning: Your opponent either 1) restates your position falsely or 2) exaggerates its consequences.

8. Bandwagon/Bargain:

Bandwagon example: "Join the winners, vote for Senator Simpkins." Meaning: An effort is made to influence you to act in a certain way by asserting or implying that that is popular or what the majority is doing.

Bargain example: Display in a store: "SPECIAL 45¢ each new Ruskin tomatoes." Upon examination of the shelf, the regular price is found to be two for 90¢. Meaning: An attempt is made to get you to buy by appealing to your desire to save money ... hoping that you will not investigate the situation by price comparison, quality etc.

9. Begging or Leading the Question:

Begging the Question example: "Man is a social animal because he is gregarious." Meaning: This technique involves assuming as true what has yet to be proved. Frequently a similar (or the same) proposition is used both as argumental premise and as conclusion. This may be done either by 1) the use of synonymous terms or 2) by circular argument, which involves the use of A to prove B and B to prove A.

Leading the Question example: "Tell me Jones, have you stopped beating your children yet?" Meaning: A leading question is one which 1) dictates or suggests an answer or 2) one which incriminates the answer no matter how he answers.

10. No Technique:

No Technique example: "I believe in Federal Aid to Education. First, let me define education. Education is the act or process of providing someone with knowledge, skill, or
competence." Meaning: No manipulation is used to propagandize you into accepting what is being discussed.

Rules

The 'Reader' selects an example at random from the bank and reads the card aloud, should the contestants request a repeat, one re-reading of the example is admissable. As soon as any player recognizes (or feel that they know) which technique is being represented, they identify the technique on the pad affixed to the "technique card" (using the technique identifying number) and immediately grabs the control block from the center of the table. If by chance two players simultaneously grab the block they have an opportunity to enter into a coalition, if no secure coalition can be arrived at between them, they may attempt to secure a "coalition for majority" with the other player, if no coalition can be reached all players regress (-1) one space. When only one player has the control block that player is then known as the Controller and all other players have 10 seconds to also arrive at a conclusion and identify it on their pads. All players reveal their answers at the direction of the 'Reader.'

If a unanimous majority occurs the Controller advances 3, each junior partner advances 1. If a Controller and one-other-player majority exists and no 'Bold Challenge' is made, the Controller advances 3, the other-player (partner) advances 1, and the odd person out remains stationary. If a majority occurs against the Controller and no 'Bold Challenge' is made, each majority partner advances 2, the ousted Controller regresses -1. In the case of any two player majority, the odd person out may attempt to Plea Bargain - by threatening the majority with a 'Bold Challenge' - if they will not allow him to join their coalition . . . if his plea is accepted all players advance 1; if rejected the threat of 'Bold Challenge' is carried to the 'Reader.' (the penalty for an incorrect 'Bold Challenge' in the Plea Bargain condition is -1, the reward is 1. If both choices are in error all players regress -1.) Rewards for a correct 'Bold Challenge' (not preceded by a Plea Bargain) are 3 spaces advance, while the Controller suffers a penalty of -2 and his partner suffers -1. If it is the Controller who makes the 'Bold Challenge,' he advances (if correct) a total of 6, no penalty to the other side. Penalties for an incorrect 'Bold Challenge,' for a non-Controller suffer -2, for a Controller -3. If a 'Bold Challenge' is made and neither side is correct (by decision of the
'Reader') the challengee suffers -1, and the incorrect challenger suffers the standard penalty according to condition as stated above.

After the 'Reader' calls for answer revelation and there is no initial majority, any two players may enter into a 'coalition for majority' (exactly the same as simultaneous grabbing of the control block). In this situation several alternative courses of action are available, but in any case no points are made if no majority emerges . . . and if no majority can be made all players suffer -1. Any coalition for majority is open to odd-person out Plea Bargaining should the odd-person-out decide to attempt it. If a 'coalition for majority' is established and no 'Bold Challenge' or Plea Bargain is made, the partners in the coalition both advance 2. (Please note any changes in prediction brought about by a 'coalition for majority' on the score pad of the player making the prediction shift.)

Examples of Play

A. Player 1, the Controller, identifies the example as #8. Players 2 and 3 also identify the example as #8. The Controller advances 3 the other partners advance 1 each.

B. The same situation as above except player 2 chose #6; if no 'Bold Challenge' is made the advances are the same as above except that player 2 remains stationary, if however, a 'Bold Challenge' is made and it is incorrect player 2 suffers -2 . . . the 'Bold Challenge' was correct player 2 advances 3, and the Controller suffers -2 and his partner suffers -1.

C. Player 1, the Controller, identifies the example as #3. Players 2 and 3 identify the example as #8. If no 'Bold Challenge' is made by the Controller both 2 and 3 advance 2, the Controller (even though in the odd-player-out position, having been impetuous grabbing the control block, can not be challenged as he alone does not constitute a majority) however suffers -1 for impetuosity.

D. Same situation as above except that the Controller chooses to make a 'Bold Challenge.' If the 'Bold Challenge' is incorrect the Controller suffers -3 and the other players advance 2. If the Controller's 'Bold Challenge' is correct he scores 3 for the 'Bold Challenge' and 3 for the control block for a total point score of 6. If instead of a direct 'Bold Challenge', the Controller chooses to offer a Plea Bargain and is accepted, all players advance 1, if on the
other hand he is rejected he suffers -1 for the Plea Bargain consequence of error and -1 for impetuousity for a total suffering of -2. If after the Plea Bargain attempt both sides were wrong all players suffer -1 (no additional penalty of impetuousity is levied on the Controller in this case). If the Controller's 'Bold Challenge' was incorrect for all sides and players, a penalty of -2 is suffered by all players.

E. All players have a different choice for the example, then every player has the opportunity to enter into a 'coalition for majority.' In these cases if the Controller chooses to either accept a partner or is accepted as a partner (determined by whomsoever switches from his initial choice to that of his partner) then neither the advantages nor the disadvantages of being the Controller apply to the scoring, hence the option for 'coalition for majority' is not a function of Controller asset or deficit. If however, the Controller is not in the 'coalition for majority' the same penalties and liabilities exist as in any other condition.

ANY QUESTIONS BEFORE WE BEGIN?
### Scoring Key for Mach V (1968)
Points per Item by Response Pattern

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item No.</th>
<th>1.</th>
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\( ^{a}\text{Sum for all 20 items and add constant of 20. Range: 40 - 160} \)

Forced choice Mach V. (Christie and Geis 1970, p. 31-32)
In each of the 2 categories please mark over the prefix letter with an X if it is most like yourself (compared to the other two choices), and mark over the prefix letter with an O the item least like yourself, leave the one remaining prefix letter blank.

Age ______ Male Birth rank in family ______ of ______

Grade Point Average _______ Social Security Number ______ __________

Date of this administration __________________________

Location of administration ______________________________

1. A. It takes more imagination to be a successful criminal than a successful business man.  
   B. The phrase, "the road to hell is paved with good intentions" contains a lot of truth.  
   C. Most men forget more easily the death of their father than the loss of their property.

2. A. Men are more concerned with the car they drive than with the clothes their wives wear.  
   B. It is very important that imagination and creativity in children be cultivated.  
   C. People suffering from incurable diseases should have the choice of being put painlessly to death.

3. A. Never tell anyone the real reason you did something unless it is useful to do so.  
   B. The well-being of the individual is the goal that should be worked for before anything else.  
   C. Since most people don't know what they want, it is only reasonable for ambitious people to talk them into doing things.

4. A. People are getting so lazy and self-indulgent that it is bad for our country.  
   B. The best way to handle people is to tell them what they want to hear.  
   C. It would be a good thing if people were kinder to others less fortunate than themselves.
5. A. Most people are basically good and kind.
   B. The best criteria for a wife or husband is compatibility —
      other characteristics are nice but not essential.
   C. Only after a man has gotten what he wants from life should
      he concern himself with the injustices in the world.

6. A. Most people who get ahead in the world lead clean, moral
      lives.
   B. Any man worth his salt shouldn't be blamed for putting
      his career above his family.
   C. People would be better off if they were concerned less
      with how to do things and more with what to do.

7. A. A good teacher is one who points out unanswered questions
      rather than gives explicit answers.
   B. When you ask someone to do something, it is best to give
      the real reason for wanting it rather than giving reasons
      which might carry more weight.
   C. A person's job is the best single guide as to the sort of
      person he is.

8. A. The construction of such monumental works as the Egyptian
      pyramids was worth the enslavement of the workers who built
      them.
   B. Once a way of handling problems has been worked out it is
      best to stick to it.
   C. One should take action only when sure it is morally right.

9. A. The world would be a much better place to live in if people
      would let the future take care of itself and concern them-
      selves only with enjoying the present.
   B. It is wise to flatter important people.
   C. Once a decision has been made, it is best to keep changing
      it as new circumstances arise.

10. A. It is a good policy to act as if you are doing the things
      you do because you have no other choice.
    B. The biggest difference between most criminals and other
       people is that criminals are stupid enough to get caught.
    C. Even the most hardened and vicious criminal has a spark
       of decency somewhere within him.

11. A. All in all, it is better to be humble and honest than to
      be important and dishonest.
    B. A man who is able and willing to work hard has a good chance
       of succeeding in whatever he wants to do.
    C. If a thing does not help us in our daily lives, it isn't
       very important.
12. A. A person shouldn't be punished for breaking a law that he thinks is unreasonable.
B. Too many criminals are not punished for their crimes.
C. There is no excuse for lying to someone else.

13. A. Generally speaking, men don't work hard unless they are forced to do so.
B. Every person is entitled to a second chance, even after he commits a serious mistake.
C. People who can't make up their minds are not worth bothering about.

14. A. A man's first responsibility is to his wife, not his mother.
B. Most men are brave.
C. It's best to pick friends that are intellectually stimulating rather than ones it is comfortable to be around.

15. A. There are very few people in the world worth concerning oneself about.
B. It is hard to get ahead without cutting corners here and there.
C. A capable person motivated for his own gain is more useful to society than a well-meaning but ineffective one.

16. A. It is best to give others the impression that you can change your mind easily.
B. It is a good working policy to keep on good terms with everyone.
C. Honesty is the best policy in all cases.

17. A. It is possible to be good in all respects.
B. To help oneself is good; to help others even better.
C. War and threats of war are unchangeable facts of human life.

18. A. Barnum was probably right when he said that there's at least one sucker born every minute.
B. Life is pretty dull unless one deliberately stirs up some excitement.
C. Most people would be better off if they control their emotions.

19. A. Sensitivity to the feelings of others is worth more than poise in social situations.
B. The ideal society is one where everybody knows his place and accepts it.
C. It is safest to assume that all people have a vicious streak and it will come out when they are given a chance.
20. A. People who talk about abstract problems usually don't know what they are talking about.
B. Anyone who completely trusts anyone else is asking for trouble.
C. It is essential for the functioning of a democracy that everyone vote.
APPENDIX B

For each of the 20 items please mark in the space provided, the extent (VSD SD D N A SA VSA as explained below) to which you agree with the statement. Very Strongly Disagree (VSD), Strongly Disagree (SD), Disagree (D), Neutral (N), Agree (A), Strongly Agree (SA), Very strongly Agree (VSA).

Age _____ Male Female Birth rank in family _____ of _____

Grade Point Average _____ Social Security Number _____

Date of administration ______________________

Location of administration ______________________

SCORED: 1. The best way to handle people is to tell them what they want to hear. VSD SD D N A SA VSA

- 2. When you ask someone to do something for you, it is best to give the real reasons for wanting it rather than giving reasons which might carry more weight. VSD SD D N A SA VSA

- 3. Anyone who completely trust anyone else is asking for trouble. VSD SD D N A SA VSA

+ 4. It is hard to get ahead without cutting corners here and there. VSD SD D N A SA VSA

- 5. Honesty is the best policy in all cases. VSA SD D N A SA VSA

- 6. It is safest to assume that all people have a vicious streak and it will come out when they are given a chance. VSA SD D N A SA VSA

+ 7. Never tell anyone the real reason you did something unless it is useful to do so. VSD SD D N A SA VSA

- 8. One should take action only when sure it is morally right. VSD SD D N A SA VSA
9. It is wise to flatter important people.

10. All in all, it is better to be humble and honest than important and dishonest.

11. Barnum was very wrong when he said "There's a sucker born every minute."

12. People suffering from incurable diseases should have the choice of being put painlessly to death.

13. It is possible to be good in all respects.

14. Most people are basically good and kind.

15. There is no excuse for lying to someone

16. Most men forget the death of their father more easily than the loss of their property.

17. Generally speaking, men won't work hard unless they are forced to do so.

18. Most people who get ahead in the world lead clean, moral lives.

19. The biggest difference between most criminals and other people is that criminals are stupid enough to get caught.

20. Most men are brave.
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