The Effects of Local Union Strength on Union Members' Attitudes, Perceptions and Job Satisfaction

Summer 1980

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THE EFFECTS OF LOCAL UNION STRENGTH ON UNION MEMBERS' ATTITUDES, PERCEPTIONS AND JOB SATISFACTION

BY

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B.A., Upsala College, 1976

THESIS

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science: Industrial Psychology in the Graduate Studies Program of the College of Social Sciences at the University of Central Florida; Orlando, Florida

Summer Quarter
1980
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In the past half of a century the American labor movement has emerged as one of the powerful forces dominating American life. From a position little more than peripheral in 1933, when its three million members were largely confined to skilled trades in relatively isolated or protected parts of the economy, the organized labor movement has expanded until collective bargaining has become a recognized and well established procedure in virtually every industry (Seidman, London, Karsh, & Tagliacazzo, 1958). Collective bargaining relates to outcomes which concern the worker's individual relationship to the organization, such as hours and conditions of work, rates of pay, seniority, promotions, etc. (Sayles & Strauss, 1967).

Scattered efforts to form trade unions were made early in the nineteenth century, and by the close of the century the American Federation of Labor was well established in a number of skilled crafts. Yet until the 1930's union-management relations outside these crafts were highly unstable. Though unskilled workers sometimes joined unions in times of prosperity, they abandoned them when hard times returned. This pattern began to change drastically during the Great Depression of the 1930's when relatively large permanent trade union membership emerged not only in the traditional crafts where workers had found it easier to organize, but also in mass production industry (Strauss & Sayles, 1972).

The fundamental change in our basic labor law, established by the passage of the National Labor Relations or Wagner Act in 1935, laid
the legal foundation for the organizations of millions of workers in the mass production and other less-skilled industries; and the organizing drives first of the CIO and then of the AFL, taking advantage of this opportunity provided the impetus for the mass movement into unionism (Seidman, London, Karsh, & Tagliacozzo, 1958). The full employment of the war and postwar periods, combined with the rising level of prices and the ample profits earned by employers, provided an economic environment favorable to the growth of unionism (Seidman, London, Karsh, & Tagliacozzo, 1958; Strauss & Sayles, 1972).

After World War II, union growth began to slow down. Membership reached its peak in the mid-1950's and then began to decline. The proportion of workers in easy-to-organize industries began to decline. From 1953 to the early 1960's the economy slowed down while technological change occurred at a rapid rate (Strauss & Sayles, 1972). Manufacturing employment as a whole fell off, and the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947 and Landrum Griffin Act in 1959 presented further barriers to union growth by restricting the use of the secondary boycott.

Since 1965, union membership has begun to increase again, at least in absolute numbers (Strauss & Sayles, 1972). Currently, of the entire U.S. working population, approximately one-fourth is unionized. Some members are attracted to or committed to their union and identify with it more than others, but there is no doubt that for a substantial part of the working population, union membership plays an important role in its working life (Chamberlain & Cullen, 1971; Rosen, 1975; Strauss, 1963). It most certainly affects the outcomes which accrue from work-
ing, and it may very well affect people's perceptions of and attitudes towards work and actual work behavior (Hammer, 1978).

In recent years there has been a renewed interest among researchers in employees' attitudes toward unions (Hammer, 1978; Hammer & Smith, 1978; Herman, 1973; Smith, 1977), their decisions to join unions (Getman, Goldberg & Herman, 1976; Strauss & Sayles, 1972), and their support of union militant activities (Alutto & Belasco, 1974; Rosen, 1975). The effects of union membership, however, have not received much attention since the "dual loyalty" research of the 1950's, which tested the hypothesis that positive attitudes toward the union would lead to negative attitudes toward the employer (Dean, 1954; Kerr, 1954; Purcell, 1954; Stagner, 1954). From both earlier research and recent work, we know of reasons why people join unions, but we have very little information on the impact of union membership on employee motivation, performance and attitudes (Hammer, 1978).

In the field of organizational behavior, theories and research on worker performance and attitudes have largely ignored the role of the union as a potential contributor to indices of organizational effectiveness (Hammer, 1978). Theories of worker motivation and attitude formation focus on the interaction between an individual's need structure and the employing organization's formal and informal reward systems, organizational structure and job designs (Friedlander, 1964; Hackman & Lawler, 1971; Herman, Dunhan & Hulin, 1975; Kahn, Wolfe, Quinn, Snoek, & Rosenthal, 1964; Lawler, 1973; Lawler & Hall, 1970; Porter and Lawler, 1965). Performance, tardiness, absenteeism and turnover are explained in terms of behavior-outcome contingencies set up by the employer through per-
personnel policies, supervision, technology and hierarchical structure, and by co-workers through their sanctioning of specific actions (Hammer, 1978). It is the purpose of this paper to argue for expanding research of the impact of unions on worker perceptions and attitudes and to describe the effects of union membership on worker's reactions to their conditions of employment.

For American labor, union membership has come to mean pay increases, better working conditions, job security and protection (Chamberlain & Cullen, 1971; Rees, 1962). Workers' intentions to join in collective action vis-a-vis an employer are based heavily on people's expectations that unions will improve their ability to obtain valued outcomes (Hammer, 1978). While there are universal expectations of greater outcome attainment within organized labor, the ability of unions to achieve worker goals through the collective bargaining process varies widely across industries (Kochan & Block, 1977) and over time (Rees, 1962). If Darwin's laws are applicable to unions as they are to biological organisms; one would expect that the stronger the union, the more it can obtain for its members (which is the reason for its existence) and the more members' attitudes and behaviors might be influenced by it (Hammer, 1978).

The present study proposes to examine relationships between local union characteristics and workers' perceptions of outcomes, attitudes about their job and job satisfaction. Members of local unions of retail store workers, working in the same industry will be the subjects involved. Until recently, little study has been attempted with regard to the local union, the basic structural unit in which the membership is
found (Sayles & Strauss, 1967). Yet, this is the only union world that the rank and file member knows. The local unions in the present study will vary in strength (bargaining power) and the hypotheses to be tested will use union strength as the independent variable. Before the arguments supporting union strength-employee reactions (perceptions, attitudes and job satisfaction) are presented the operational definitions of the union strength variable will be discussed.

**Union Strength**

Union strength has been defined as those activities and organizational attributes which allow the union to achieve its goals (Kochan & Wheeler, 1975). Sources of union strength are usually identified as the strike, the slowdown, the use of union labels to control product markets, control over the labor supply through limited access to membership status, and the use of closed shops (Rees, 1962). The traditional operational definition of this concept among labor economists has been the percentage of workers in an industry who are unionized or covered under collective bargaining agreements (Lewis, 1963). This union density index is not without its problems, because it assumes that there is a linear relationship between the percent of an industry's labor market contained in the local union and the ability of that union to attain valued outcomes for its members (Kochan & Wheeler, 1975). This relationship has not been found to be linear, as union density seems to be affected by the educational level of the work force and the geographical concentration of a given industry (Rosen, 1969). Block and Kuskin (1978) found that nonunion sector wages are generally more responsive to individual worker levels of education and experience and regional price and level
variation. Baskin (1977) found that relative wages of union and non-
union workers varies by race, sex, location and occupation. Furthermore, union power has been found to increase with greater organizational strength (Rosen, 1969). Within a given industry there are wide varia-
tions in the range of outcomes (such as wages, fringe benefits, senior-
ity clauses, working conditions) achieved by different local unions
(Hammer, 1978). Therefore, percent organized is a contaminated measure
of union strength.

It has been suggested, based on research data, that the relative
wage attained through collective bargaining is a more valid indicator
of the union characteristic than is percent organized (Kochan & Block,
1977; Levinson, 1966). The use of wage levels as an outcome assigns a
fixed numerical value to the union strength variable. According to
Chamberlain (1951), union strength should not be quantified in this man-
ner because it varies with the bargaining issue and the existing eco-
nomic, social and political conditions. Furthermore, unions appear to
increase wages more when first organized than later on (Rosen, 1969).
Thus a union may have more power over wage levels than other fringe
benefits or job security at a particular time, but this configuration
may change as the conditions surrounding the bargaining change (Hammer,
1978).

When the purpose of study is to ascertain determinants of worker
attitudes, bargaining outcomes can serve as a measure of the effec-
tiveness of the collective bargaining process in achieving favorable
terms and conditions of employment for workers (Kochan & Block, 1977).
Wages, fringe benefits and working conditions are outcomes of unioni-
zation, a result in many cases of the use of power sources as well as the collective bargaining process. Outcomes are experienced directly by union members, and it is the experience of the membership and not the percent of workers who are organized which should affect people's perceptions, attitudes and behaviors. It is, therefore, more appropriate theoretically to use outcomes of union membership as the operational definition of union strength (independent variable) when one examines the effects of unions on the individual worker because an outcome is closer to the dependent variables (attitudes, perceptions, job satisfaction) in a causal chain than is a factor like percent organized (Hammer, 1978).

In the present study, a Contract Scale Index will be employed in measuring union strength, which transforms bargaining outcomes to dollar values (Kochan & Wheeler, 1975). When examining the potential influence of the union on employee attitudes and behaviors, it becomes clear that one can not construct a network of hypotheses without knowing the union in question. Collective bargaining agreements differ from one international union to another, as well as from one local to another local within one international. The union contract is a primary source of information for examining the effects of union characteristics when the individual is the unit of analysis.

Union Strength-Employee Perceptions, Attitudes and Job Satisfaction Hypotheses

As mentioned earlier, the right to unionize has come to mean pay increases, better working conditions, job security and protection from management (Chamberlain & Cullen, 1972; Rees, 1962). The stronger the
union is the more able it should be to deliver these conditions to its members (Seidman et al., 1958). Cognitive dissonance theory suggests that outcomes which are acquired through the investment of personal effort and costs (as in the case of the history of collective bargaining) are highly valued (Aronson & Mills, 1959; Festinger, 1957). To union members, collective bargaining outcomes are the results of such investments, and the greater the union gains the more these gains should be valued or desired (Hammer, 1978). Local union strength, as measured by the relative hourly wage obtained through collective bargaining, has been found to be related to the desirability of job outcomes which are under total or partial control of the union, such as job security, pay and the wish for respectful treatment from superiors (Hammer, 1978). From this line of reasoning the following hypothesis was derived:

Hypothesis 1 - As union strength increases, outcomes under union control (such as pay and job security) will be perceived by union members as more desirable than factors not under union control (such as creativity).

Job satisfaction can be defined as an affective response of the worker to his job and can be viewed as a result of consequence of the worker's experience on the job in relation to his own values, that is, what he wants or expects from it (Smith, Hulin, & Kendall, 1969). Since job satisfaction is a partial result of the extent to which people receive valued outcomes and events from their job (Locke, 1976), it can be postulated that union strength will be related to an individual's satisfaction with those aspects of his job covered under the collective bargaining agreement. Kochan et al. (1975) found in their study of
local union leaders and stewards that collective bargaining is seen as most beneficial for the attainment of outcomes judged most important to workers, such as wages and fringe benefits, job security, working conditions and fair treatment through the grievance procedure. Hammer (1978) found a positive relationship between union strength (using relative wage) and pay satisfaction. It is therefore postulated that:

Hypothesis 2 - As union strength increases, union members will be more satisfied with those aspects of their job which are under partial control of the union (such as pay) than those job factors not under union control (such as creativity).

The next step in the present study was to examine members' perceptions of chances for outcome attainment. In a study of white collar workers, employees were asked about their desire for promotion, their perception of chances of promotion, and their satisfaction with the job (Stagner & Rosen,1969). All of the employees reported a strong desire for promotion, and those who thought their chances were good scored high in job satisfaction. Those who saw little chance of promotion, however, were dissatisfied - and in some cases, they expressed aggressive attitudes toward the employer (Stagner & Rosen, 1969). As was previously mentioned, collective bargaining is seen as beneficial for the attainment of outcomes judged most important to workers: wages and fringe benefits, job security, working conditions and fair treatment through the grievance procedure (Kochan & Wheeler, 1975). It is therefore postulated that:

Hypothesis 3 - As union strength increases, member's perceived opportunity of outcome attainment will be greater.
for those job factors under union control (such as pay) than for those job factors not under union control (such as creativity).

In sum, the present study focused on the possible impact which local union strength or power can have on members' wants and needs in their job, their beliefs in the probability of attaining what they want, and job satisfaction.
Subjects

The subjects in the study were 248 full-time members of the Retail Employees Union. All the members were employed in the supermarket industry located in the northeastern part of the country. The mean educational level for the groups was 12.1 years of academic schooling. Mean age per group was 32.3 years. The mean number of union membership years for the groups ranged from 6-10 years. The subjects were randomly selected within the three groups of union strength.

Procedure

Data were collected through the use of local union bargaining contracts, interviews with union officials and questionnaires distributed to the members.

All attitudinal and perceptual variables were assessed through questionnaires sent to the union members. These were completed and returned to the researcher in a self-addressed, pre-stamped envelope. The cover page of the questionnaire identified it as a thesis research project and the respondents were asked some background questions, such as: age, sex, educational level and local union membership years. The subjects were informed of the study through separate letters from the president of each local union. Information about confidential treatment of responses was provided to all participants.

The 248 members who returned data comprise 35 percent of the subjects scheduled for inclusion in the study. The response rate across the locals ranged from 29 percent to 38 percent.
Measures

Union strength was measured by the Contract Scale Index (Kochan & Wheeler, 1975). The contracts used were those which the local unions reached at the last collective bargaining settlement with the organization.

In the development of the Contract Scale Index, outcomes were scored according to the degree they approached attainment of union bargaining goals. As a result of the scaling of bargaining outcomes this way, it becomes possible to interpret this analysis as a study of the determinants of union bargaining effectiveness. The coding scheme that was devised for assigning scores to particular outcomes is shown in Appendix A.

A total score was calculated for each contract by simply adding the scores (assigned to each of the contract categories as listed in Appendix A) of those clauses contained in the particular contract. This total unweighted score forms the measure of bargaining outcomes which is the operational definition of union strength used in the present study. Kochan and Wheeler (1975) have found that weighted measures proved to be of no greater predictive value than simple unweighted measures. The two measures were correlated very highly (r=.936). This Contract Scale Index makes it possible to compare local unions which might differ in the kinds and amounts of bargaining outcomes attained along one dimension.

The members' feelings about work outcomes were assessed by asking each subject in the questionnaire to rate, on a five-point, verbally anchored scale, the desirability of a set of possible outcomes, some
under union control and others unrelated to union jurisdiction. Perceptions of chances for outcome attainment were measured by having the subjects rate their chances of getting each of these outcomes, again on a five-point scale where response alternatives will range from "no chance" to "very good chance". The questionnaire is shown in Appendix B.

Job satisfaction was measured by the Minnesota Satisfaction Questionnaire (MSQ) (Weiss, Dawis, England, & Lóquist, 1967). Twelve scales of the long form MSQ were chosen for the study, some of these job factors were under union control, others were unrelated to union jurisdiction. These scales included: Achievement, Advancement, Company Policies and Practices, Compensation, Creativity, Recognition, Supervision-Human Relations, Supervision-Technical, Working Conditions, Security, Responsibility and Authority. Each item in the MSQ refers to a reinforcer in the work environment. The respondent indicates how satisfied he/she is with the reinforcer on the present job. Five response alternatives are presented for each item: "Very Dissatisfied; Dissatisfied; Neither Dissatisfied nor Satisfied; Satisfied; Very Satisfied".
Results

Scores on the Contract Scale Index were calculated for each local union and these total score values were rank ordered to form the high, medium and low groups of union strength. For each subject within these three groups, scores on the MSQ and employee attitude survey were calculated. These data were analyzed by an Analysis of Variance with Repeated Measures (ANOV). This procedure performs an analysis of variance on the one between subjects factor of union strength and one within subjects factor (repeated measures) of members' reactions.

Table 1 gives the means and standard deviations for each of the three groups' desirability of job-related outcomes. Table 2 presents the results of the 3x6 ANOV testing hypothesis 1. The effect of union strength was not found to be significant, F (2,245) = .45, p > .05. The effect of job factors was found to be significant, F (5,1225) = 94.79, p < .01. Also, the interaction effect of union strength by job factors was found to be significant, F (10,1225) = 1.99, p < .05. No apparent difference between the means of the Low (3.62) Medium (3.60) and High (3.51) Union Strength groups were found. Although the union strength by job factors interaction was significant, post-hoc comparisons (Scheffe) showed no significant differences between levels of union strength and any particular job factor.

In order to further analyze the data pertaining to the differences between members' ratings of desirability of outcomes with those job factors under union control versus those job factors not under union jurisdiction it was necessary to carry out a post-hoc comparison. The Scheffe' Multiple Comparison Method was applied to compare the means of
Table 1

Means and Standard Deviations of Union Members Desirability of Job Related Outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Job Factors</th>
<th>Adv</th>
<th>Pay</th>
<th>Sec</th>
<th>Cre</th>
<th>Rec</th>
<th>Ach</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Low Union Strength | 3.02 | 4.07 | 3.98 | 3.56 | 3.22 | 3.89 | \( \bar{X} \) 
|                | 1.20 | .94 | .94 | 1.14 | 1.13 | 1.03 | S.D. |
| Medium Union Strength | 2.99 | 4.15 | 4.31 | 3.28 | 2.98 | 3.88 | \( \bar{X} \) 
|                | 1.30 | .84 | .74 | 1.28 | 1.24 | 1.03 | S.D. |
| High Union Strength | 3.03 | 4.29 | 3.96 | 3.24 | 2.79 | 3.73 | \( \bar{X} \) 
|                | 1.34 | .65 | 1.22 | 1.27 | 1.38 | 1.09 | S.D. |
| \( \bar{X} \) | 3.01 | 4.18 | 4.15 | 3.32 | 2.97 | 3.84 |
Table 2

Analysis of Variance with Repeated Measures of Union Members Desirability of Job Related Outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Union Strength</td>
<td>3.19</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.595</td>
<td>.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>865.06</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>3.53</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job Factors</td>
<td>375.34</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>75.07</td>
<td>94.79**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Strength x Job Factors</td>
<td>15.73</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>1.99*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>970.09</td>
<td>1225</td>
<td>.79</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* $p < .05$

** $p < .01$
the three job factors under union control (Advancement, Pay, Job Security) against those factors not under union jurisdiction (Creativity, Recognition, Achievement) for any differences. As predicted, the factors under union control were significantly greater, $p < .01$ than those factors not under union jurisdiction.

Tables 3 and 4 give the means and standard deviations for each of the three groups' job satisfaction measures. Table 5 presents the results of the 3x8 ANOVR for testing hypothesis 2. The effect of union strength was not found to be significant, $F(2, 245) = .99$, $p > .05$. The effect of job factors was found to be significant, $F(7, 1715) = 106.84$, $p < .01$. Also, the interaction effect of union strength by job factors was found to be significant, $F(14, 1715) = 3.99$, $p < .01$. No apparent differences between the means of the Low (16.86), Medium (16.91) and High (16.25) groups were found. Although the union strength by job factors interaction was significant, post-hoc comparisons resulted in no significant differences to be found between the levels of union strength (low, medium, high) and any particular job factor.

In order to further analyze the data pertaining to the differences between members' ratings of job satisfaction with those job factors under union control versus those job factors not under union jurisdiction, it was necessary to carry out a post-hoc comparison. The Scheffe Multiple Comparison Method was applied in the comparison of the means of the four job factors under union control (Job Security, Pay, Working Conditions, Advancement) against those factors not under union jurisdiction (Creativity, Responsibility, Recognition, Achievement). As predicted, the factors under union control were significantly greater, $p < .01$ than
Table 3

Means and Standard Deviations of Union Members Job Satisfaction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Job Factors</th>
<th>Sec</th>
<th>Pay</th>
<th>WC</th>
<th>Adv</th>
<th>Cre</th>
<th>Res</th>
<th>Rec</th>
<th>Ach</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Low</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union</td>
<td>17.33</td>
<td>19.51</td>
<td>16.58</td>
<td>13.87</td>
<td>16.16</td>
<td>17.13</td>
<td>15.67</td>
<td>18.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strength</td>
<td>4.08</td>
<td>3.47</td>
<td>4.42</td>
<td>5.19</td>
<td>5.37</td>
<td>4.47</td>
<td>5.88</td>
<td>4.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Medium</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union</td>
<td>19.18</td>
<td>19.55</td>
<td>16.21</td>
<td>13.39</td>
<td>15.66</td>
<td>17.76</td>
<td>14.00</td>
<td>19.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strength</td>
<td>4.08</td>
<td>4.15</td>
<td>4.93</td>
<td>5.12</td>
<td>4.98</td>
<td>3.72</td>
<td>5.49</td>
<td>3.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>High</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union</td>
<td>16.79</td>
<td>20.21</td>
<td>17.68</td>
<td>12.20</td>
<td>14.95</td>
<td>16.61</td>
<td>13.28</td>
<td>18.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strength</td>
<td>5.22</td>
<td>3.73</td>
<td>4.30</td>
<td>5.34</td>
<td>5.23</td>
<td>4.54</td>
<td>6.01</td>
<td>4.59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**X** 18.12 19.75 16.72 13.12 15.53 17.30 14.08 19.00
### Table 4

Means and Standard Deviations of Union Members Job Satisfaction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Job Factors</th>
<th>Sec</th>
<th>Pay</th>
<th>WC</th>
<th>Adv</th>
<th>Aut</th>
<th>CCP</th>
<th>SHR</th>
<th>St</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low Union Strength</td>
<td>17.33</td>
<td>19.51</td>
<td>16.58</td>
<td>13.87</td>
<td>18.07</td>
<td>13.27</td>
<td>15.40</td>
<td>15.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.08</td>
<td>3.47</td>
<td>4.42</td>
<td>5.19</td>
<td>3.89</td>
<td>5.03</td>
<td>5.26</td>
<td>5.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Union Strength</td>
<td>19.18</td>
<td>19.55</td>
<td>16.21</td>
<td>13.39</td>
<td>18.57</td>
<td>13.16</td>
<td>14.43</td>
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<td></td>
<td>4.08</td>
<td>4.15</td>
<td>4.93</td>
<td>5.12</td>
<td>3.61</td>
<td>4.93</td>
<td>5.10</td>
<td>4.54</td>
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<tr>
<td>High Union Strength</td>
<td>16.79</td>
<td>20.21</td>
<td>17.68</td>
<td>12.20</td>
<td>17.41</td>
<td>11.76</td>
<td>12.89</td>
<td>14.45</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.22</td>
<td>3.73</td>
<td>4.30</td>
<td>5.34</td>
<td>4.39</td>
<td>4.87</td>
<td>5.38</td>
<td>4.91</td>
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</table>
### Table 5

Analysis of Variance with Repeated Measures of Union Members Job Satisfaction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>DF</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Union Strength</td>
<td>176.39</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>88.19</td>
<td>.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>21774.69</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>88.88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job Factors</td>
<td>9416.29</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1345.19</td>
<td>106.84**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Strength x Job Factors</td>
<td>703.93</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>50.28</td>
<td>3.99**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>21593.65</td>
<td>1715</td>
<td>12.59</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p < .05  
** p < .01
those factors not under union jurisdiction. There was no significant difference found between those factors under union control and the non-union job factor of responsibility.

Table 6 presents the results of the 3x8 ANOVR for further testing hypothesis 2. The effect of union strength was again found not to be significant, $F(2,245) = 1.30, p > .05$. The effect of Job Factors was found to be significant, $F(7,1715) = 129.87, p < .01$. The interaction effect of union strength by job factors was found to be significant, $F(14,1715) = 4.04, p < .01$. Again, no apparent differences between the means of the Low (16.21), Medium (16.17) and High (15.46) groups was found. Post-hoc comparisons of the interaction revealed no significant differences between the levels of union strength (low, medium, high) and any particular job factor.

In order to further analyze the data pertaining to the differences between members' ratings of job satisfaction with those job factors under union control versus those job factors not under union jurisdiction, it was necessary to carry out a post-hoc comparison. The Scheffe's Multiple Comparison Method was applied comparing the means of the four job factors under union control (Job Security, Pay, Working Conditions, Advancement) against those factors not under union jurisdiction (Authority, Company Policies, Supervision-Human Relations, Supervision-Technical). As predicted, those factors under union control were significantly greater, $p < .01$ than those factors not under union control.

Table 7 gives the means and standard deviations for each of the three groups perceived probability of outcome attainment. Table 8 represents the results of the 3x6 ANOVR for testing hypothesis 3. The
Table 6

Analysis of Variance with Repeated Measures of Subjects Job Satisfaction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Union Strength</td>
<td>218.67</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>109.34</td>
<td>1.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>20597.44</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>84.07</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job Factors</td>
<td>11633.79</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1661.97</td>
<td>129.87**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Strength x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job Factors</td>
<td>723.13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>51.65</td>
<td>4.04**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>21947.59</td>
<td>1715</td>
<td>12.80</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p < .05
** p < .01
Table 7

Means and Standard Deviations of Union Members Perceived Probability of Job-Related Outcome Attainment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Job Factors</th>
<th>Adv</th>
<th>Pay</th>
<th>Sec</th>
<th>Cre</th>
<th>Rec</th>
<th>Ach</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low Union Strength</td>
<td>2.76</td>
<td>3.45</td>
<td>3.71</td>
<td>2.96</td>
<td>3.09</td>
<td>3.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>1.39</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>1.73</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>1.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Union Strength</td>
<td>2.65</td>
<td>3.66</td>
<td>4.17</td>
<td>2.92</td>
<td>2.80</td>
<td>3.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.96</td>
<td>1.87</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>1.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Union Strength</td>
<td>2.47</td>
<td>3.83</td>
<td>3.80</td>
<td>2.64</td>
<td>2.56</td>
<td>3.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.39</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>1.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\overline{x}$</td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td>3.67</td>
<td>3.98</td>
<td>2.84</td>
<td>2.78</td>
<td>3.66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

S.D.
Table 8

Analysis of Variance with Repeated Measures of Union Members Perceived Probability of Job-Related Outcome Attainment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Union Strength</td>
<td>14.55</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7.27</td>
<td>1.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>974.73</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>3.99</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job Factors</td>
<td>412.33</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>82.47</td>
<td>90.12**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Strength x Job Factors</td>
<td>24.89</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2.49</td>
<td>2.72**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>1120.95</td>
<td>1225</td>
<td>.92</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* $p < .05$
** $p < .01$
effect of union strength was not found to be significant, $F(2,245) = 1.83, p > .05$. The effect of job factors was found to be significant, $F(5,1225) = 90.12, p < .01$. Also, the interaction effect of union strength by job factors was found to be significant $F(10,1225) = 2.72, p < .01$. No apparent differences between the means of the Low (3.27), Medium (3.34) and High (3.11) groups were found. Post-hoc comparisons of the interaction revealed no significant differences between the levels of union strength (low, medium, high) and any particular job factor.

The Scheffe' Multiple Comparison Method was used to analyze the differences between members' ratings of perceived probability of outcome attainment with those factors under union control (Advancement, Pay, Job Security) versus those factors not under union jurisdiction (Creativity, Recognition, Achievement). As predicted, those factors under union control were significantly greater, $p < .01$, than those factors not under union jurisdiction.
Discussion and Conclusions

The present study examined the effects of a major union characteristic, union strength, and union members' ratings of desirability of job-related outcomes, outcome attainment and job satisfaction. In general, the following conclusions can be drawn from the results of this study:

1. The hypothesis of a positive and significant relationship between union strength and desirability of outcomes under union control was partially supported.

2. The hypothesis of a positive and significant relationship between union strength and job satisfaction with those aspects of member's job under union control was partially supported.

3. The hypothesis of a positive and significant relationship between union strength and outcome attainment of factors under union control was partially supported.

The results of a nonsignificant effect between levels of union strength in all three of the major hypotheses must be viewed in light of several limitations. First, the sample was composed of only three local unions, which forced a rank ordering (according to the Contract Scale Index scores) into the high, medium and low groups of union strength. Secondly, union strength was a factor of importance in this particular study because the employer could bargain separately with each local union. Where bargaining has industry wide guidelines, as was found with the retail store union workers, variations in outcome attainment from collective bargaining between the local unions were not great enough for this factor (union strength) to have much impact. Due to this situation, differences between local union strength groups were not found and the interaction between levels of union strength with any particular job
factor were not found.

The finding of a significant effect between the desirability of outcomes under union control (Pay, Job Security, Advancement) against those factors not under union control (Creativity, Recognition, Achievement) suggests that union members generally find job outcomes under union control more desirable than those outcomes not under union jurisdiction. This result is consistent with Hammer's (1978) study, which found pay and job security more desirable with members than outcomes not under union jurisdiction.

The finding of a significant effect between job satisfaction with those aspects of the job under union control, versus those aspects of the job not under union jurisdiction was generally supported. Satisfaction scores on the union controlled job factors of Pay, Advancement, Working Conditions, and Job Security were significantly greater than satisfaction scores on Creativity, Authority, Supervision-Technical, Supervision-Human Relations, Recognition, Achievement and Company Policies (non-union factors). Responsibility was the only non-union job factor where no significant differences were found with union controlled job factors. These findings were consistent with several other investigations: Kochan and Wheeler (1975) found a significant effect between collective bargaining and wages and fringe benefits, job security, working conditions and fair treatment through the grievance procedure; Hammer (1978) found a positive relationship between union strength and pay satisfaction.

The finding of a significant effect between perceived probability of outcome attainment with those job factors under union control against
those factors not under union jurisdiction suggests that union member's generally perceive a fairly good chance of obtaining outcomes under union control (Pay, Advancement, Job Security). These results were consistent with the findings of Hammer (1978) and Kochan and Wheeler (1975) who found collective bargaining beneficial to the attainment of factors under union jurisdiction (wages, benefits, job security, working conditions).

The results of this study suggested that characteristics of important work related organizations, such as unions, might have an impact on workers' reactions to events in their work world. This was borne out by the fact that the workers in this study rated job factors under union control more desirable than job factors not under union jurisdiction. Job factors under union control were perceived by members as more likely to be obtained on the job, and members expressed higher levels of job satisfaction with job factors under union control than with those job factors not under union jurisdiction. Because the results were in the expected direction, it seems worthwhile to conduct further investigations of these relationships in the future. Perhaps using a larger number of local unions varying in bargaining outcomes would lead to a more thorough investigation. The overall conclusion of this study is that the union is an important contributor to employees' perceptions and attitudes, and its effects on the individual worker deserve further attention.
Appendix A
CONTRACT SCALE INDEX

The coding scheme for the analysis of the contrasts is specified below. Each contract category was given a scale value according to the following schemata:

Cost of Living Allowance

0 = no reference
1 = some cost of living clause

Education Increments

0 = no reference
1 = some provision

Merit Increments

0 = some provision
1 = no provision

Overtime Pay

0 = no reference
1 = straight time pay or straight compensatory time off
2 = employee option for straight time cash or compensatory time off
3 = 1½ time pay (cash or compensatory time off)
4 = 1½ time pay (cash or compensatory time off at employee's option)
5 = double-time pay (cash or compensatory time off)
6 = double-time pay (cash or compensatory time off at employee's option)

Call Back Pay

0 = no reference
1 = some provision for minimum number of hours paid

Shift Differentials

0 = no reference
1 = some provision

Meal Allowance

0 = no reference
1 = meal allowance
2 = meals supplied by employer

Mileage Allowance

0 = no reference
1 = some reference
Length of Work Week

0 = no reference
1 = 72 hours or more
2 = 64-71 hours
3 = 56-63 hours
4 = 48-55 hours
5 = 40-47 hours

Starting Salary

0 = no reference
1 = 4,500-5,400
2 = 5,500-6,400
3 = 6,500-7,400
4 = 7,500-8,400
5 = 8,500-9,400
6 = 9,500-10,400
7 = 10,500-11,400
8 = 11,500-12,400
9 = 12,500+

Longevity Pay

0 = no provision
1 = some provision

Annual Increase in Wages
(first year of contract)

0 = no provision
1 = 1 to 3 percent
2 = 4 to 6 percent
3 = more than 6 percent

Sick Leave

0 = no reference
1 = some provision

Unused Sick Leave

0 = no provision
1 = some provision, e.g., accumulation allowed, cash or compensatory time allowed

Death in Family Leave

0 = no reference
1 = some provision, employee charged for sick leave
2 = some provision, no charge to sick leave

Severance Pay

0 = no reference
1 = some reference

Family Medical Plan

0 = no reference
1 = employee pays total premium
2 = part paid by employer
3 = total paid by employer

Education Costs Reimbursed

0 = no reference
1 = partial payment by employer
2 = total payment by employer

Life Insurance

0 = no reference
1 = part paid by employer
2 = total paid by employer

Pensions

0 = no reference
1 = employer makes some contributions to a pension fund; employee contributes (contributory plan)
2 = noncontributory plan

Vacations

0 = no reference
1 = number of days vacation increases with length of service
2 = number of days vacation decreases with length of service
Clothing Allowance
0 = no reference
1 = cash allowance
2 = furnished

Union Security
0 = no reference
1 = maintenance of membership
2 = agency shop
3 = modified union shop
4 = union shop

Payroll Deduction of Dues
0 = no reference
1 = employer deducts dues; union charged fee
2 = employer deducts dues; no charge to union

Time Off for Union Business
0 = no reference
1 = time off for grievances of negotiations
2 = time off for union seminars or conventions
3 = time off for all union business
4 = union has full-time paid staff representation

Bulletin Boards
0 = no provision
1 = employer may edit or must approve material
2 = employer supplies space for boards
3 = employer furnishes boards

Management Rights
0 = some management rights clause in the contract
1 = no management rights clause in the contract

Union Members Retain Prevailing Rights
0 = no provision
1 = some provision

Holidays
0 = no reference
1 = five days or less
2 = 5½-7 days
3 = 7½-9 days
4 = 9½-11 days
5 = 11½+ days

Compensation for on-the-job Injury
0 = no reference
1 = state workmen's compensation
2 = some provision in addition to workmen's compensation

Jury or Witness Pay
0 = no reference
1 = some provision

Leave of Absence
0 = no reference
1 = some provision

Vacancies-Promotions
0 = no reference
1 = decision of the store manager
2 = decision of the district manager
3 = by procedures in the contract

Safety and Health
0 = no reference
1 = some provision

Shift Exchange
0 = no reference
1 = permission of management required
2 = modification of management required
3 = reference - no requirement for notification or permission
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rules and Regulations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 = prior established rules prevail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 = no provision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 = contract prevails over rules</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 = contract prevails over prior rules and rules are subject to grievance procedure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 = rules must be mutually agreed to in bargaining</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grievance Procedure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 = no reference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 = final step rests in store manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 = final step rests in district manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 = final step is advisory arbitration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 = final step is binding arbitration</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No-Strike Provision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 = a no-strike clause is written in the contract</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 = a no-strike clause is not written in the contract</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Impasse Procedure (for impasses that arise in future contract negotiations)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 = no reference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 = mediation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 = factfinding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 = advisory arbitration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 = binding arbitration</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Working out of Classification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 = no reference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 = acting rank pay provided</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Clean Up Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 = no reference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 = some provision</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Savings Clause</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 = no reference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 = some reference</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# EMPLOYEE ATTITUDE SURVEY

## HOW TO ANSWER:
After reading each statement, circle the number that best describes how desirable the following job factors are to you.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>The chance for advancement on my job.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>The chance to try out some of my own ideas.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>The amount of pay I receive.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>The way my job provides for steady employment.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>The praise I get for doing a good job.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>The feeling of accomplishment I get from the job.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## HOW TO ANSWER:
After reading each statement, circle the number that best describes your perceived chance of obtaining the following job factors.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>NO CHANCE</th>
<th>LITTLE CHANCE</th>
<th>SOME CHANCE</th>
<th>FAIRLY GOOD CHANCE</th>
<th>VERY GOOD CHANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>The opportunity for advancement on my job.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>The opportunity to try my own methods of doing the job.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>The opportunity to earn adequate pay increases.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>My job provides for steady future employment.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>My job provides recognition for doing a good job.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>My work provides me with a sense of achievement.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
References


