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INTERPRETING THE RELATION BETWEEN IMMIGRANT HOSTILITY AND EXTREME RIGHT WING PARTY SUCCESS IN ENGLAND

by

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Honors in the Major Program in Political Science in the College of Sciences and in The Burnett Honors College at the University of Central Florida Orlando, Florida

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ABSTRACT

The study of race relations in England developed in the modern era amongst conflict between races, political parties and local communities. England, consisting of a predominantly white population, is an interesting case of race relations in that immigrants of color seem to be in the center of many of the most controversial conflicts of the past century. Existing research on race relations in England suggests that the region is largely racist due to the conflicts of the past and the current political success of the anti-immigrant extreme right-wing parties (ERPs). But the times at which these parties have been successful compared with high levels of animosity towards non-white immigrant groups have not been thoroughly studied in the past decade. This research will attempt to answer questions regarding racial hostility and ERP success.

Do ERPs receive support from purely racist groups during times of high levels of immigration? Or is their racist rhetoric cloaked by logical justification for anti-immigrant policies? ERPs such as the British National Party and The National Front have risen, fallen, evolved and dissolved since the 1960s. They have, in some cases, worked together to gain votes, but eventually break apart to form small, non-political factions that concentrate on social protests. Most recently, England has seen the decline of these particular ERPs, although anti-immigrant social groups still remain strong. Those that were associated with recently dissolved ERPs may turn their attention United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), a party that has a message similar to the BNP, but has a more consistent and attractive political platform. UKIP is an anti-immigrant party and its current success is an interesting case study in this thesis.
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INTRODUCTION

In 1968, the infamous “Rivers of Blood” speech made by Conservative MP Enoch Powell, predicted that the increasing numbers of non-white immigrants to Britain would cause unavoidable racial riots in the streets (The Telegraph, 2007). Though the population of England’s ethnic minority reached over nine percent in 2001, it has not led to the “rivers of blood” Powell envisioned. However, the 21st century has brought with it numerous cultural and societal concerns for the non-white immigrant population (Bowyer, 2005 p.1). Far right-wing parties, known for their anti-immigrant policies and xenophobic tendencies, have experienced periods of success at the polls, sometimes following arrivals of non-white immigrants to England.

The study of extreme right-wing party (ERP) successes in Europe have been previously analyzed in waves (Arzheimer K., 2009; Arzheimer & Carter, 2006). Taking place in the both the 1940s and 1960s, these waves have occurred socially and politically each time; the social demonstrations turning into electoral success but without any real stability for the long-term. Arzheimer and Carter (2006) point out that during the wave of extreme right party activity from the 1980s to the present, there has not been a consistent level of electoral support for those parties (Arzheimer and Carter, 2006 p.3) which leads one to question: do ERPs receive support from purely racist groups during times of high levels of immigration? Or is their racist rhetoric cloaked by logical justification for anti-immigrant policies? ERPs such as the British National Party, English Defense League, British Freedom Party, The National Front and The National Democrats have risen, fallen, evolved and, in some cases, dissolved since the 1960s. They have, in some instances, worked together to gain votes, but eventually break apart to form small
factions that concentrate on social protests (BBC News, 2011; Brown, 2012; Hope Not Hate, 2013; Hope Not Hate, 2013b). Most recently, these particular ERPs have declined in importance.

Although the entire United Kingdom has experienced immigration issues, I focus on England since the current problems associated with immigration are concentrated in metropolitan areas, especially in London and the surrounding cities. Also, it is more appropriate to focus on England’s particular experience with non-white immigrants as opposed to the whole of the United Kingdom, which experiences various immigration issues unrelated to race.

I define racism as the conviction that members of a specific race are superior to another’s. Racial hostility, therefore, is the condition in which an individual or group opposes or resists another due to difference in race. Racial hostility can be seen in certain political rhetoric and extreme right-wing party policies. Extreme right-wing parties (ERPs) are normally classified based on their extreme conservative views, which can be established on issues such as tighter immigration control, nationalist ideologies and better policing. I study the extreme right social groups and political parties in the context of their racist tendencies and anti-immigrant policies since these are the issues that have been most associated with their times of success.

ERP support has classically consisted of middle class British citizens. The recent success of UKIP is of utmost importance since the party attracts both the classic ERP voter and the mainstream voter (Ashcroft, 2012). UKIP is a Eurosceptic party that focuses primarily on UK withdrawal from the European Union. In a recent opinion poll, UKIP received almost double the support of the Liberal Democrats, the UK’s most supported third party. UKIP received a surprising fifteen percent of the poll, a definite new high for the anti-EU party (Bentley, 2012). Joan Collins, English-American soap opera actress, placed her support behind UKIP in 2004 and
at the same time claimed to have never voted in the UK. Another celebrity supporter of UKIP, Robert Kilroy-Silk, was probably the most well-known UKIP member. In 2004, Kilroy-Silk was a candidate for the party in the European election and labeled all Arabs as “suicide bombers, limb-amputators and women repressors.” But shortly after winning his seat as a member of European Parliament, he left the party, saying he was embarrassed and ashamed to be a member. Kilroy-Silk claimed the party did not do any work in their newly appointed positions as MEPs and that the party had “no policies, no energy, no vision and no spokepeople” (BBC News, 2005). Other celebrity supporters for UKIP have included the famous adventurer Sir Ranulph Fiennes, actor Edward Fox, astronomer Sir Patrick Moore and racecar-driver Stirling Moss. The party’s campaign organizer was Bill Clinton’s campaign strategist. The party has become surrounded by high-profile publicity stunts to help gain more celebrity and youth support, while its base continues on strong (Woolf, 2004). The party does not have a problem attracting a wide range of celebrity supporters. These individuals would probably not support classic ERPs such as the BNP and the National Front. Most curious about UKIP is their ability to appeal to the average voter that would otherwise support a mainstream party. Along with this support, UKIP can appeal to those that have voted for ERPs in the past, but are disappointed and frustrated by those parties’ recent failures.

UKIP leaders claim that their number one policy is EU devolution. In UKIP’s national manifesto, the party outlines how the EU has failed the United Kingdom on immigration policy and that the EU policy has been a “deliberate attempt to water down the British identity” (United Kingdom Independence Party, 2010). Although UKIP supporters are fearful of increasing immigration as a threat to the economy, some have argued that their racist message is merely
veiled by logical and common British concerns. David Cameron labeled the party as “fruitcakes, loonies and closet racists” back in 2006 (Lyons, 2006). The founder of UKIP, Alan Sked, came out recently to say that the party is very different from what he founded in 1993. In 2012, Sked told the HuffPost UK that the party had become “extraordinarily right-wing” and devoted to “creating a fuss” over Muslim immigrants. Sked also called the party “morally dodgy” when discussing their views on immigrants and banning the burqa (Hasan, 2012). A recent study revealed that UKIP support is “concentrated among middle aged, financially insecure men with a Conservative background” and even more so “among the skilled working classes who have been most exposed to competition from the European Common Market.” Hostility towards immigration is also associated with UKIP support. The hostility exists at a greater volume in BNP support than in support for UKIP (Ford, Goodwin, & Cutts, 2011, p. 206). It is common knowledge that the BNP has anti-immigrant policies and mainstream voters are essentially repelled by its racist rhetoric. But UKIP has appealed to those who stand for controlled immigration and attracts those that would otherwise support BNP if it was less taboo to do so (Ashcroft, 2012).

Based on existing academic sources provided by Arzheimer and Carter (2006), the voter profile for the far right-wing party tend to be young men with lower level education and working class, self-employed or in routine non-manual forms of employment (Arzheimer and Carter, 2006 p.5). It can be noted that the voter profile for UKIP support relates to the voter profile of right-wing party support. The studies that have zoned-in on this voter profile have done so using local context in regards to racial and immigrant hostility. Local support, as opposed to national, seems to be where ERPs receive most of their following (Bowyer, 2005, p. 6). Therefore, if
local, social dynamics influence racial hostility, then which factors are the most important in determining whether or not a community or area will vote for far right-wing parties? Do rates of immigration in specific English communities create racial hostilities toward non-white immigrants, and thus lead to ERPs winning seats? Does the current success of UKIP in the European elections indicate a shift in the far-right towards mainstream, non-violent forms of expressing xenophobia?

To address these questions, I examine the effects of immigration on racial hostility in theory and in history. Theories on how ERPs are successful in the British model will be observed and analyzed with current data. I will then compare racial hostility with ERP support, either from classical far-right groups such as the BNP or with the “new” far-right that is UKIP. Throughout this thesis, I also present the party logos which are used on voting ballots, in campaigns and on party websites. These logos differ greatly between mainstream parties, which tend to favor simple symbols, and extreme right-wing parties, which tend to don British or English colors and flags within their logos. In voting, these logos are featured next to the names of each candidate and those same candidates often wear pins or ribbons with the party logo and colors. Although the logo does not necessarily sway a voter in one way or another, it could indeed show a voter how the party wishes to be viewed by the public. The logo of the Conservative party is green tree with a blue base and is in a scribbles-style. The Labour party chose a red rose as their political emblem. The Liberal Democrats have a yellow and black emblem featuring a stylized bird.
The analysis of the party logos is interesting to this study because the United States does not have political party logos. The Democratic donkey and the Republican elephant are mere symbols of the parties and have never changed. In the United Kingdom, however, the party logos in a way represent the party and some have been “revamped” over time as the parties evolve. Not only do these logos show the way in which the far right parties represent themselves on the ballots, but they also illustrate the differences in the messages of far-right parties that have become successful, such as UKIP, and those that have not, such as the English Democrats.

Background and Literature Review

To better understand why the social values in specific English communities are hostile towards immigrants and non-white minorities, the historical context of racial hostility in the region should be taken into consideration. Though immigration to and from England was common and crucial to the growth of the country, England did not begin to see a non-white immigrant population until after the Second World War. The volume of migration increased
significantly after 1945 (Panayi, 2010, p. 6). Before this increase occurred, a study conducted by Richard T. Lapiere (1928) found that there were much stronger levels of racial hostility in England than in France. Because both countries were experiencing the same unfamiliar levels of non-white immigration at the same time, Bowyer (2005) suggests that the prejudice of English whites originated from the national culture as opposed to personal experience (p.24). The 1950s through the 1970s saw racial riots as mass immigration continued on from the end of WWII and from changes in UK policy towards the Commonwealth countries. During this time, Powell made his speech on his fears about immigration which in turn created violence in parts of the country (BBC News, 2002; The Telegraph, 2007). The 1980s were met with a stronger immigration policy in the Conservative government that quelled violent xenophobia but furthered the ERP justification for tighter controls (Bowyer, 2005, p. 188). The 1990s saw the same continued controls on immigration but ERPs during this time were relatively inactive (Brown, 2012).

At the turn of the 21st century, the riots in northern England shed light on the local roots of racial hostility. The riots in the summer of 2001 took place in areas that were ethnically highly segregated, particularly in Pakistani and Bangladeshi neighborhoods. Dancygier (2010) and Arzheimer and Carter (2006) concluded that the perception that existed among the whites in these neighborhoods was that ethnic minorities are “unduly advantaged” by government programs. At the same time, the ethnic minority groups believe that “whites are privileged by a political system that is directly or indirectly racist” (Arzheimer and Carter, 2006 p.29).

Britain, according to Panikos Panayi (2011), is an extreme case of consistent migratory movement in and out of one country which in many cases has led to racial hostility. Dancygier
(2010) expounds upon these conflicts and further assesses the patterns of hostility in the country’s history. He evaluates the validity of certain theories of conflict and in some cases focuses on specific areas in England in which conflict is prevalent in the past and the present. These conflicts can be used to evaluate social perception of immigration in the present day. Using the British Social Attitudes Survey (BSAS) can contribute to this evaluation. The BSAS has collected individual level data annually since 1983. Most recently, the Survey has included questions regarding immigration and social views on immigrants. Numerous polls and surveys from other sources will also be studied.

Bowyer (2005 and 2008), Arzheimer & Carter (2006), and Dancygier (2010) interpret ERP success as a non-violent manifestation of racial hostility. Bowyer (2005 and 2008) assesses the success of right-wing parties by using a number of resources, including BSAS data from the early 2000s. He interprets election data and describes numerous theories in both of his works that explain why or why not an ERP is successful in England. Bowyer claims that immigration plays a large role in the social views of the extreme right and uses mostly data from England since there are higher concentrations of immigrants and, subsequently, ERP movements in that region.

Arzheimer and Carter (2006) use political opportunity structures to explain how far-right parties gain votes. Political opportunity structures were developed specifically in the context of social movements in order to evaluate the possibility of a new political party to gain access into the current political system. These studies take into account how economic, political and historical factors influence modern social movements and how those movements can affect party success. Dancygier (2010) develops a theory on the relationship between immigration and far-
right electoral success that analyzes how immigration affects the economy and how the economic factors affect immigrant hostility.

How racial hostility can manifest into votes for the extreme right must be analyzed in social context. The British Social Attitudes Survey (BSA) sheds some light on the values of those who live in Britain. Although the survey has been around since 1983, it has just recently included questions on immigration and minority groups. The annual survey, conducted by the National Center for Social Research, asks over 3,000 random individuals questions on social, moral and political attitudes. Immigration issues were listed as one of the top concerns of British citizens in the BSA’s 2011 findings. According to the survey, three out of four respondents support an overall reduction in immigration, while over half of the respondents support a large reduction. Negative judgments on immigrants have increased significantly between 2002 and 2011, from 43% to 52% who believe that migrants negatively affect the economy, and from 33% to 48% who believe that migrants have a negative cultural impact on their country (Ford, Morrell, & Heath, 2012, p. 26).

The anti-Fascist group Searchlight Educational Trust (2011) conducted a poll to measure attitudes toward immigration. The survey was concerned with how individuals dealt with a multiculturalist society and contained questions involving race, immigration and general views on British culture. The poll surveyed 5,054 citizens in England and identified six social groups. One group was classified as “hostile persons” and within that group thirteen percent were “active enmity,” and had a deep and continuous hatred for immigrants (Searchlight Educational Trust, 2011). This poll shows that over 20% of the population in Britain, considered hostile or actively
hostile towards immigrants, share the ERP’s overwhelming fear of immigrants whether for economic or cultural reasons.

Racial attitudes vary between countries, counties, cities and neighborhoods (Bowyer, 2005 and 2008). Bowyer (2005) focuses exclusively on characteristics of individuals within a specific local area when determining levels of hostility towards other races. He argues that previous studies involving immigrant hostility in England take too large of a sample size to come to any accurate conclusion. The smaller sample size makes for a better study in determining racial or immigrant hostility (Bowyer, 2005, p. 3). The theory takes into account the socialization experiences of individuals in a geographic region and how their position in society influences their racial views. Though Dacygier (2010) views racial hostility as directly connected to scarce material resources, Bowyer (2005) argues that character values and societal makeup in a community is more important. The scarce resources theories contend that an ethnic minority group may cause individuals to feel threatened in their economic security. Therefore these individuals could display higher levels of racial hostility. Bowyer (2005) believes that “the character of a contextual unit is more than an aggregation of the attributes individuals contained within its boundaries.” In other words, an individual’s views are shaped not only by their internal beliefs, but also by their community’s social composition (Bowyer, 2005 p.4). Contact theory proposes that if there is increased contact amongst the immigrant and native groups (i.e. the integration of immigrants), hostility is less likely to occur. The theory also explains how neighborhoods with much more diverse populations tend to have less conflict. But is a white individual that lives in a predominantly non-white immigrant neighborhood expected to feel no hostility towards the non-white immigrant population? In the English case, it is rare that contact
between natives and non-natives of color make a community less hostile (Bowyer, 2005, p. 4). Bowyer (2005) points out that increased contact does not necessarily create sympathy and, in most English cases, actually produces hostility. Realistic group conflict theory asserts that “as the size of the outgroup increases, competition between groups over scarce resources results in heightened group animosity” (Bowyer, 2005 p.5). This suggests that competition for resources are a driver of hostility, but Bowyer (2005) suggests that there is a lot more going on here, that previous studies did not take into consideration how large or small their sample size was. Some studies found that the geographical unit of analysis showed mixed results in supporting the contact hypothesis. For example, neighborhoods are more likely to show significantly higher or lower percentages of racial hostility as compared to the country they are in. The measure of intergroup contact at the smallest geographic unit possible (i.e. neighborhoods instead of countries) gives a better measure of an individual’s reasoning for racial hostility compared with contact. Bowyer (2005) claims that groups experience all types of (p.6).

Though there are many theories surrounding the support and non-support of the radical right parties, most academics are similar in their explanations of social composition in relation to racial hostility and voter profiles. The reasons for the success of the extreme right-wing parties could also be the reasons for their downfall depending on the political, economic or social climate. This thesis will therefore look at how racial hostility manifests in local areas, how those areas develop ERPs, and how the ERPs win votes. A case study of UKIP reveals how a new form of ERP can successfully challenge mainstream parties in electoral politics.
RACIAL HOSTILITY

In seeking to address racial inequality in the late 1960s, due to increased non-white immigration from the previous British colonies, British policy-makers began using concepts of race, racial differences and racial equality in their political rhetoric (Bowyer, 2005, p. 17). In the 1970s, sociological discourse on racism began to appear in Britain and this gained the attention of black historians who identified with everyday discrimination. Discussion and research on inter-ethnic relations turned towards racism due to the increased marginalization of ethnic minorities (Bowyer, 2005 p.18). The study of "race relations" was adopted by many social scientists. So rather than studying individual discrimination against blacks, which was most common in the 1960s, researchers began to study discrimination toward race, or racism, on a much larger scale (Panayi, 2010, p. 201). It was apparent that British immigration law was affected by these stark realities, becoming more controversial towards race (Bowyer, 2005, p. 18). Bowyer (2005) states that the approach to racial relations in Britain has been both color-blind and color-conscious at the same time as common policy was accepting and rejecting immigration from former colonies (p.18). Police racism was recognized in the 1980s, conceivably confirming the intolerant nature of British society (Panayi, 2010, p. 202). Due to the characteristics of Nazi Germany which still haunted Europe at this time, researchers of racism did not use the terms “racism” and “xenophobia” so lightly. Those who wrote on Britain’s hostility towards color did not suggest that these minority groups were faced with violent, unremitting hostility, possibly afraid to parallel race relations in Britain with the anti-Semitism of Nazi Germany (Panayi, 2010, p. 203). There were also the cases unrelated to race of the Irish and the Jews, each that faced discrimination during this time by individuals and the state and were
written about frequently in regards to xenophobia (Panayi, 2010, p. 204). In discussing the
distinction between racism and xenophobia, it would be more accurate to describe Britain as
predominantly xenophobic throughout the 20th century as opposed to racist. Immigrants of color,
however, are more attractive to the media, and therefore, according to Panayi (2010) receive
longer periods of obsessive controversial coverage. This has led to an excessive amount of study
and research provided on racism as opposed to xenophobia in English history (Panayi, 2010, p.
205). This chapter will focus on immigrants of color and the hostility towards them and their
communities.

Immigrant History of England

Following the Second World War, Britain began to see much larger waves of
immigration. Migrants such as the Ugandan Asians have mostly been dispersed throughout
Britain, as opposed to being concentrated in urban areas. Pre-World War II, the East End acted
as a magnet for migrants. This part of London attracted Eastern Europeans, Jews, the Irish and
Germans. The few non-white minorities who settled in the East End were predominantly Somalis
and Maltese (Panayi, 2010 p.89). The increase in population at this time was apparent, but the
native British population itself would have had limited interaction with any non-white minorities
due to the concentration of colored immigrants in small London boroughs. At the outbreak of the
Second World War, the non-white population was still widely dispersed throughout Britain, even
if concentrated in local areas throughout, and consisted of about 370,000 migrants (Panayi, 2010
p.90). Also, by this time the migrant population was moving out of central London and into the
suburban areas and social housing, European or not (Panayi, 2010 p.91).
When the country began seeing large waves of immigration in the 1950s, and thus implemented the Commonwealth Acts throughout the next few decades, London became a magnet once more. The economy of Britain was growing rapidly, but the native workers were not attracted to the more menial jobs that needed to be filled. The migrants became the labor supply in these low-end jobs in both the manufacturing and service sectors (Bowyer, 2005 p.35). Within west and south London, communities of West Indians settled. In the 1960s, South Asian communities began to grow and migrants from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and East Africa arrived in much larger numbers (Panayi, 2010 p. 91). In London, each group concentrated in different boroughs; Pakistani communities are mostly concentrated around the city center, while others are settled in the city's suburbs (Panayi, 2010 p.92).

In 1960, the Conservative British government appointed a parliamentary committee to write the Commonwealth Immigration Act of 1962 to control immigration of the citizens of the Commonwealth Nations, which were all former British colonies including India, Australia, Kenya, South Africa, Pakistan, and many others. Those wanting to immigrate to Britain needed to obtain a work voucher which was based on the person’s employment prospects (The National Archives).

The Labour party opposed Commonwealth controls, but continued the policy once in office. Due to the popularity of the controls, the Labour government even tightened the administrative controls on immigration and lowered the quantity of vouchers in 1965 (The National Archives). When the Conservative MP Enoch Powell gained popularity in 1968, he and his associates campaigned for even tighter controls as a reaction to the 200,000 Kenyan Asians fleeing ethnic conflict. The Labour government responded with the Commonwealth Immigration
Act of 1968 which took away the right of Commonwealth citizens to immigrate to the U.K. unless at least one parent or grandparent was born in or a citizen of the U.K. The act was replaced by the Immigration Act 1971 which further cut back on immigration by replacing vouchers with temporary work permits. In 1972 the Ugandan president gave 90 days to the country’s 80,000 Asians to leave or be detained in military camps. Around 27,000 Asians from Uganda were passport holders to Britain and in 1972, the British government constituted the Uganda Resettlement Board. Due to the controversy of the previous expulsion of Commonwealth citizens, the Board accepted the immigrants into Britain (The National Archives).

In cases of close proximity, ghettoization has always occurred in the English case. Despite the state's attempts to disperse immigrants that concentrate in cities, migrants have ended up in smaller groups in parts of the cities. Public housing initiatives have had similar effects in that they continue to keep ethnic groups together due to the cheaper expense attractive to recent migrants from similar areas. Other factors that push migrants into these communities are that migrants tend to settle near their place of work and that the absence of affordable housing will push migrants into poorer neighborhoods, where they will often find other migrants in similar situations and similar ethnic backgrounds (Panayi, 2010 p.94).

Racial Conflict

Meanwhile, areas that experience this type of ethnic cohesion may encounter conflict at some point. This may be due to a spark of violence or the initiation of violence by a public figure (Panayi, 2010, p. 95). When Enoch Powell gave his “Rivers of Blood” (The Telegraph,
2007) speech on a Saturday, 20 April 1968, he was fearful of the growing immigrant population and, possibly due to the assassination of Martin Luther King Jr. just eighteen days before, troubled by the racial violence the U.S. was experiencing. But his speech, filled with racial slurs and grim prophecy, was marked as “evil” and cast Powell into political exile. Though the actual phrase “rivers of blood” was not used by Powell during the speech, it has become known as such. The actual phrase, though not as catchy, is much more foreboding and surrounded by imagery of the violence of the Civil Rights Movement in the United States:

“As I look ahead, I am filled with foreboding; like the Roman, I seem to see ‘the River Tiber foaming with much blood.’ That tragic and intractable phenomenon which we watch with horror on the other side of the Atlantic but which there is interwoven with the history and existence of the States itself, is coming upon us here by our own volition and our own neglect. Indeed, it has all but come. In numerical terms, it will be of American proportions long before the end of the century.” (The Telegraph, 2007)

After Powell was sacked from his position as Shadow Defense Secretary in the Conservative Government because of his controversial remarks, his supporters took to the streets. In Wolverhampton and London there were public demonstrations protesting Powell’s dismissal. By the following Tuesday, 23,000 letters had arrived at Powell’s home and within ten days he was sent 700 telegrams and 100,000 letters. Remarkably, only 800 of these opposed the speech (Manzoor, 2008).

The 1970s saw relatively low points in racial conflict but the early 1980s saw some of the worst instances of large-scale violence ever in Britain. In 1981 in Brixton, the minorities called it an “uprising” (Newburn, Lewis, & Metcalf, 2011). The investigation by the government
following the riots revealed that it was caused by a “spontaneous crowd reaction to police action.” The riots themselves were not planned, however, they did take place shortly after aggravation by the police in which over one thousand black youths were stopped and searched (John, 2006). The report found that the spark that set off the violence took place when a couple of police officers were helping a black youth who was bleeding from a suspected stab wound. Rumors spread quickly that the police meant to harm the boy and a large crowd confronted the officers. An arrest made later that night essentially made the riots worse. Many involved in the riots, which lasted for three days, were second generation; born in Britain, but of parents who had immigrated to the country from the Caribbean in the 1940s and 1950s. Second generation, South Asian youths joined these riots which ignited again in 1985 due to similar tensions and spread to the London areas of Handsworth, Brixton and Tottenham (Kundnani, 2001),

Whereas the riots in the 1980s were organized demonstrations protesting anti-immigrant groups and the police’s failure to provide safety, the 2001 riots quickly intensified, literally overnight. The communities had already experienced much racial tension, making the violence spread like wildfire. From April to July in 2001, the cities of Oldham, Burnley and Bradford experienced racial violence and riots between Asian communities, racist gangs and police. There are many theories as to why these conflicts escalated into violence; one report concluded that the failure of the police to provide protection to the immigrant communities from the racist gangs was a core issue (Kundnani, 2001). Pakistanis and Bangladeshis of the second and third generations collided with anti-immigrants groups, including a faction of the National Front, in the summer of 2001. The South Asian communities had experienced over a decade of a declining local economy, high unemployment, and high risk of violence. Non-white immigrants living in
Oldham, Burnley, Blackburn, Bradford and Leeds were among the country’s most impoverished one percent. The continuing failure of the police to control racist gangs led to more violent confrontations between the gangs and the youths (Kundnani, 2001). When the police did arrive in the midst of the violence, the Asians were the ones facing the consequences of the violence. Inevitably, this led to a general hatred of the police force by Asian communities and thus the targeting of these communities by the forces (Kundnani, 2001). In Bradford, this escalated in July of 2001 when the National Front held a protest march, bringing in people from all over the country and, subsequently, a counter-demonstration by the Anti-Nazi League. The League met in a city square, consisting of over five-hundred people, many of which were young Asian men. Nearby, the National Front supporters had gathered and moved towards the Asian group. At some point, the NF supporters began shouting racial slurs at the group and in an instance the situation erupted into violence. The riot police quickly lost control of the situation which they were anticipating would result in large-scale violence. While many people were arrested throughout the hours of public order offences, it was soon clear that the offenders were mostly made up of out-of-towners. Local Asians, whites, blacks and others were shocked that such an event, which resulted in the burning of several cars and five people seriously injured, could occur in their neighborhood. This particular instance of racial violence is peculiar in that it does not involve locals. While the problems of race relations were apparent in Bradford, those who sparked the violence were from other areas that possibly experienced the same general problems (The Observer, 2001). Possibly resulting in a mob-like mentality, these people shared similar tensions that met similar boiling points.
Bowyer (2005) theorizes that, based on contact and group conflict theories, studying race relations based in local context will give a direct indication of racial hostility. Local context in England can possibly shed light on whether the hostility can be reduced through contact with the “outgroup” or the decrease of economic competition.

Two distinct groups of thought exist in race relations. One assumes that as socialization increases between the ingroup and the outgroup, prejudice towards the outgroup declines. The other contends that as the size of the outgroup increases, economic competition between both groups increases, resulting in heightened animosity. Bowyer (2005) notes that social contact between the native and immigrant population does not directly contribute to sympathy towards immigrants. Bowyer (2005) also notes that neighborhoods are more likely to show higher percentages of racial hostility as compared to the country as a whole. The smallest geographical unit possible studied can more accurately measure racial hostility, and the reasons for hostility, compared with simply assessing contact (Bowyer, 2005 p.5). For example: England is the largest sample, Bedfordshire is a ceremonial county consisting of three districts, and Luton is a unitary authority within Bedfordshire and therefore the smallest sample.
Figure 2: Compares possible migrant populations in different localities as of 2010.

The chart above shows that England’s immigrant population is actually more than the county of Bedfordshire’s but much less than the borough of Luton. This makes the county’s sample size unreliable in determining how many people are affected by immigration in a geographical area. The studies that measure contact by employing a larger geographic variable produce mixed results to contribute positively to the hypothesis. Since there are not many surveys that break down a neighborhood’s social attitudes towards immigrants or race, the analyzing of social attitudes as a result of contact is difficult to assess. It is possible, however, to ascertain violence and crimes in some neighborhoods in England. Only in some cases are instances of racial violence or racist crimes calculated and released to the public.

If contact theory is correct, are those who live in enclaves, or highly congested areas consisting of immigrants, more or less likely to be victims of crime? The effects of living in
enclaves are described in a report for the Migration Advisory Committee of the UK Border Agency. Social disorganization theorizes that ethnic and immigrant consistency in neighborhoods suggests that the area is prone to high levels of crime. However, the area may reach a point at which the community becomes most important and crime decreases due to social norms against criminal activity. Another theory is that enclaves do not commit as much crime against one another and therefore experience less crime than mixed communities. The adverse effect of this is that a homogeneous community may attract outsiders on the edge of the community that would carry out violent crimes against that community (Bell and Machin, 2011 p.66). Contact theory does not take into account enclaves that exist near more intolerant neighborhoods and therefore turns a blind eye to the violence that would ensue in these particular areas. Breaking down the numbers to an even smaller sample sheds light on the violence taking place in enclaves in the wards of Luton. Biscot is a highly concentrated neighborhood near the city center in Luton. The charts below demonstrate the relationship between the percentage of the total population that is not white and the amount of crime that takes place in the area.
Figure 3: The non-white population compared by locality (2010).

Figure 4: Crime rates compiled from Bedfordshire Police (2011), Office for National Statistics (2011) and CREOTEC (2012) for different areas.
Here we can see that Bedfordshire does experience a higher crime rate per 1000. Bedford, Luton and Central Bedfordshire all exist within Bedfordshire. It should be noted that the borough of Bedford, which is north of Luton, also has a high concentration of immigrants in its city centers and experiences high crime as well, thus the higher crime rate than the neighborhood of Biscot (Office for National Statistics, 2011). With this in mind and the data presented on the graphs, using the neighborhood sample is clearly the most accurate measure of a community’s hostility towards non-white immigrant populations. As seen above, if the crime rate is an accurate measure of immigrant hostility, native contact with the immigrant population does not necessarily foster positive relations between the two.

Another measuring tool for immigrant hostility is the existence of large-scale or continuous social conflict in these areas. Dancygier (2010) categorizes immigrant conflict into events of violence, disorder, unrest, uprising or riot. He also makes the distinction between immigrant conflict in response to the state and that which is in response to natives. For this study, instances of immigrant-native conflict are most important in determining the local feelings towards immigrants. Dancygier (2010) analyzes the conflicts that have taken place between 1958 and 2008. He determines that most events occur following significant economic downturns. The riots of 2001 occurred during times of economic stability; however, they occurred in areas that experienced significantly worse economic conditions compared to the rest of the country (Dancygier, 2010, pp. 64-65).

In England, there have been over twenty instances classified as “race riots” by various news articles since 1960. In the 21st century alone, there have been at least six reported occurrences that included wide-scale violence opposing race or immigration. The first, which has
been previously discussed, was in 2001 and those riots were concentrated in Northern England towns, particularly in neighborhoods that experience high poverty rates (Sultoon & Jones, 201).

Correspondingly, Dancygier found that as local areas become more prosperous economically, the number of racist attacks directed against the South Asian group declines. The black community in Britain, however, does not see this effect as significantly in England as compared to the South Asian communities. Dancygier finds that a significant relationship between the population increase of South Asians in local areas to the number of violent crimes that occur against South Asians. This effect again is non-existent in black neighborhoods. One reason for this could be that South Asian communities are more defensive of their neighborhoods than blacks (Dancygier, 2010, pp. 124-128). This supports the theory that an immigrant community will develop to defend itself against crime in its own area, possibly with the consequence of being met by outside conflict, as presented by Bell and Machin (2011).

**British Attitudes**

Until recently, the British Social Attitudes Survey did not ask many questions about immigration. Every year the issues change and the survey does not necessarily ask citizens the same questions annually. In 1994, the first question on immigration was presented in the survey, which has been around since 1983. This question was only included in the survey for three nonconsecutive years. In 2008, the question in the survey presented a statement to participants who had to state whether or not they agreed or disagreed. The statement and results are provided in the following chart.
The overwhelming majority of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that immigration was a threat to British national identity. This question was only on BSAS once and was asked during a relatively low conflict period between immigrants and natives. Another question on immigrants in the same year revealed that over fifty percent of respondents wished for immigration to be reduced a lot (NatCen Social Research, 2013). The same question was asked in 2011.
The evidence shows a slight but insignificant decrease in the hopes for a reduction in immigration. The concerns seem to shift, however, when respondents were asked about the impact of immigration on economy and culture (NatCen Social Research, 2013).
Figure 7: British Social Attitudes Survey question in 2008 and 2011 on the cultural and economic impacts of immigration.

The concerns about the negative impact of immigration have risen since 2008. The respondents have turned their attention more to the economy and the negative impact that immigrants may bring to the system. The characteristics of immigrants, for example, determine views on immigration. Today, the numbers for the 2012 British Social Attitudes Survey are still being analyzed before raw data is released. A report was publicized in September 2012 which showed some statistics on immigration coming out of the surveys already collected. Over fifty percent of respondents of the 2012 survey said they consider professional migration as good, whereas less than twenty percent regarded unskilled labor migration as positive for the country (Ford, Morrell, & Heath, 2012). It seems that as immigration stays relatively steady, far-right groups gain their appeal by focusing on the negative impact immigrant have on the economy.
Britons may becoming less concerned about the cultural aspects of immigration, and more so concerned about losing their jobs to immigrants.
EXTREME FAR-RIGHT POLITICAL PARTIES

While hostility towards immigrants expressed in widespread violence and racist dialogue has decreased in England, it has certainly not disappeared. This chapter focuses on the behavioral manifestation of immigrant hostility, specifically as reflected in voting for extreme right-wing parties. Most recently, the political discourse on immigration has become altogether less about race and more about the effects of immigration on the economy (Bowyer, 2005, p. 185). The face of xenophobia has, perhaps, changed altogether. In the political realm, immigration policy has been targeting economic issues as opposed to cultural clashes similarly expressed by MP Powell in the 1960s. Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrats support Labour’s points-based immigration system which requires those migrating to the UK to qualify under a certain amount of points in specific categories based on type of migration, age, skills and education (SIA Work Permit, 2008). In fact, the three major parties do not have many differences in their immigration policies. Generally, each party wants heightened border control, skilled immigrants who speak or learn English and more controls on immigrants while they are in the country temporarily (BBC News, 2010a).

Over the last four decades, the smaller parties have seen an increase in votes in the general elections. Though the parties have not gained many seats, it is apparent that they are growing more popular amongst voters. All smaller parties, including the Green Party and far-left groups as well as far-right parties have steadily gained votes since 2001. This trend can be due to a general opposition to the mainstream parties by those who have voted for those parties in the past and are looking to use their vote as a “protest” against Conservatives, Labour or Liberal Democrats.
In the 2010 general election, the UK Independence Party and the British National Party received significant increases in vote share. UKIP experienced a .9% increase with 866,633 votes, while the BNP showed a 1.3% increase with 532,333 votes in England alone. This rise went unheard in the media, however, when the major media outlets made it seem that the BNP experienced a “humiliating defeat” and that their “worst fears were realized” (Taylor & Muir, General election 2010: the defeat of the BNP, 2010; Whitehead, 2010). And although leader Nick Griffin’s project to gain seats failed and they subsequently lost six council seats to Labour in 2012, their general support across the country actually increased (Press Association, 2012). The success of these smaller, radical parties may well indicate where the social and political
rhetoric is focused and whether local communities have substantial influence on election outcomes.

One of the first extreme radical right parties to experience significant success, the National Front was formed in 1967 and began as an alliance of the conservative right, imperialists and those following Nazi ideologies. By the mid-seventies, the NF became the fourth largest party in Britain and was able to front more than 300 candidates in the 1979 general election of which it saw nearly 200,000 votes. The fall of the party came as quickly as its rise when the party was faced with a new Conservative government and split into separate social factions no longer with consistent ideologies. Margaret Thatcher’s government came into office with strict regulations on immigration which appeared to steal away votes from the NF (Bowyer, 2005, p. 188). In the 1980s and 1990s, it was thought that the Front only contained a few dozen active members (Brown, 2012). In the past few years, however, there has been a slight swell in membership. Not as powerful as it once was, the Front has a mere 400 paying members who are encouraged to “agitate in local communities by the use of protests, localized leaflets and sales of the bi-monthly newspaper Britain First” (Hope Not Hate, 2013b). The National Front’s logo has remained unchanged for the most part since its inception into the political realm and is the British flag shaped into “NF.”
The British National Party, formed somewhat out of the ashes of the Front’s failures. John Tyndall, once a leader in the National Front, founded a splinter group in 1979 called the New National Front. By 1982, Tyndall had merged with enough of the other splinter groups to form the British National Party. The BNP saw success in the 1990s when it gained popularity in London’s East End. In the 1993 special election for a seat on the Tower Hamlets council, the BNP candidate won the plurality with 1,480 votes or 34% of the vote. Bowyer (2005) gives a few reasons as to why this win sheds light on the xenophobic conditions in the Millwall ward and the East End. First, the East End has traditionally supported xenophobic candidates since the 1960s, and possibly further back to the 17th century in opposition to the Huguenots. Second, the local whites of the Millwall ward dislike Bangladeshis who they claim receive priority on the limited housing in the area (p. 190). Third, the Liberal Democrats in that local area had “regularly appealed to white voters on racial grounds, fostering a political climate in which racist appeals were no longer taboo.” Bowyer also points out that the BNP were campaigning in the area for “Rights for Whites,” making the xenophobic culture even more acceptable (p. 191). But
the success was short-lived in that the London boroughs which were keener to vote for the radical right fell to the mainstream parties. They filtered more candidates through the East End and had stronger campaigns throughout London in the 1990s than the BNP could produce (Bowyer, 2005, p. 191). In 2010 the British National Party revamped their logo into an attractive heart that resembles a British flag. The marker-type drawing is similar to the Conservative party’s scribbled tree. This could illustrate the BNP’s ambition to be seen as a mainstream party or at least a better alternative because they chose a nationalist symbol as opposed to a tree.

Figure 10: The British National Party’s new logo (The Electoral Commission, 2013).

In 2002 and 2003, the English local elections showed substantial support for the British National Party. While fascism had been a popular third-party movement in other European countries for many years, Britain had not seen such a trend (Bowyer, 2008, p. 185). When the movements of the National Front and the BNP came about in the 1970s, the issue at hand in the country was immigration. Both parties gained much popularity on the local levels. In recent times, the BNP has gained the ongoing attention of the national press and even received enough acknowledgements from some mainstream politicians to be considered a legitimate force. The party targets deprived, urban communities in England who feel the Labour Party has failed them (Bowyer, 2008, p. 185). The party focuses its attacks on British Muslims and claims white
Britons do not have as many rights as colored immigrants. Keeping all of this in mind, in the way Bowyer (2005) puts it, “…voting for the BNP is unmistakably a manifestation of animosity toward ethnic minorities (p. 186).”

British National Party success has been typically concentrated in areas of high unemployment, specifically the North of England. Bowyer finds that in the 2002 and 2003 elections, the BNP showed most support in districts with non-white immigrant communities, particularly Pakistanis and Bangladeshis. The BNP leadership set out before the elections to tone-down its racist rhetoric. They no longer preached white supremacy and the forced deportation of immigrants. Instead, their message became more professional and thus attracted voters with local grievances against an influx of refugees to Britain which was, Bowyer (2008) believed, an illegitimate fear fueled by the mass media (p. 192). Throughout the ups and downs that the BNP has experienced, it has indeed maintained its base support.

The National Front and the British National Party both began with whites-only membership. While the BNP had to change this rule before the 2010 election in order to run according to the Equality and Human Rights Commission, the National Front maintains its whites-only membership policy (Hawkins, 2010). Today, all staff in the Prison Service of the United Kingdom are not allowed to be members or take part in any activity of the NF or the BNP because they are considered groups that incite racism (HM Prison Service, 2001). Nevertheless, those that have fought against the rise of the BNP have barely put a dent in their base support. Dominic Carmen, a Liberal Democrat who ran for MEP in Barking, East London, against Nick Griffin of the BNP in 2010, ran almost entirely to take votes away from Griffin. Carmen had written books and articles on Griffin’s violent and racist behavior before the election and made
sure to advertise on that during his campaign. Carmen revealed shortly after the election that he once joined the National Front at age sixteen to spite his political father and he understands firsthand the allure of the extreme right to young people (Carmen, 2010). In the 2010 election, Labour showed 54% of the vote, but Griffin only lost one percent since 2005 with 14.6% of the vote (BBC News, 2010b). In Romford, Northeast London, the BNP candidate and London organizer Robert Bailey was campaigning when three Asian men went to confront him. Bailey continued to spout remarks at the men as they closed in around him. When one of them spat at Bailey the candidate began throwing punches at the men and a fight broke out between the Asians and the BNP supporters (BBC News, 2010c). Contrary to this supposed “bad press”, the BNP actually came in fourth with 5.2% in Romford, gaining 2.7% more of the vote share since 2005 (BBC News, 2010b). Another instance of violence that broke out during the 2010 election happened when anti-fascists demonstrators and BNP supporters clashed outside the UK Border Agency building in Croydon, South London. There, the BNP introduced its candidates and drew attention to immigration concerns before it encountered its tragic loss at the elections (The Telegraph, 2010).

The English Defence League has often been associated with the BNP and has a very loose organization across England. While it is not technically a political party, it is a social movement that tries to influence politics and occasionally funnels party members through the BNP candidates in elections (Hope Not Hate, 2013a). Their unofficial symbol is a red cross over a black and white background, similar to the English flag, and usually with the Latin phrase “In this sign, you will conquer” (English Defence League, 2013). The EDL currently boasts 28,188 members on their website (a number which increased to 28,205 just the next day) and frequently
attends protests and demonstrations across England (English Defence League, 2013). In 2011, the BBC reported that the EDL had around 70,000 followers on Facebook (BBC News, 2011). When it began in Luton in June 2009, the EDL quickly became the most noteworthy far-right movement in the UK since the rise of the National Front in the 1970s. The leadership of the group claimed that the EDL felt England was being threatened by the number of Islamic extremists in the country, but the protestors themselves displayed violence and hatred against minorities and immigrants of many backgrounds. It attracted the likes of football hooligans and violent street gangs which took to the streets in protests in the summer of 2010. Matthew Taylor (2010) of the Guardian UK went undercover in the group to see what the demonstrators were really all about from January to April of 2010. At one of the first gatherings of hundreds of EDL supporters, an open bar can be seen in the footage where men drink and chant “We all hate Muslims” and “Muslim bombers off our streets!” After four hours of heavy drinking, tensions rose and a group began pushing at the police, leaving seventeen supporters to be arrested. The EDL have consistently attacked individuals, communities and counter-demonstrations since their formation in 2009. Once the BNP and the NF caught wind of the effects of the street demonstrations and the rising numbers of members in the EDL, they began to use the EDL for political reasons (Taylor, 2010). The face of the group, Stephen Yaxley-Lennon, who is known by the EDL as “Tommy Robinson,” has been in and out of jail for various crimes and is currently barred from attending any EDL demonstrations by the UK government (Luton News Herald & Post, 2013).

One of the other key figures in the movement is Guramit Singh, an anti-Islamic British Sikh who asserts that he and the EDL are vehemently opposed to Islam as a whole saying, “It’s
disgusting… It’s Islam (BBC News, 2011).” Some people see Singh’s dark skin and believe him to be Muslim or an Asian immigrant of some sort. Contrary to what people normally associate with the Sikhs, Islam is not their religion. It is common for Sikhs to be targeted by extreme far-right groups in Western countries, especially in England where there are numerous Sikh communities in many urban areas (Saner, 2012). Sikhs are dark-skinned peoples from India and Sikhism itself is a religion, not a race (Almasy, 2012). In fact, the Sikhs have always had conflicts involving Islamic groups dating back to the 1600s in India. The Islamic Mughal emperor forced the people to convert to Islam and the religious leader of the Sikhs responded by militarizing Sikhism (Hundal, 2012). During the partition of India in 1947, violence escalated when on both sides of the conflict as many as 75,000 women were abducted as a sort of “retribution” for their troubles. Only ten percent were ever found and it is believed that the women were raped, committed suicide, and/or changed their identities in other countries (Butalia, 2000). The tension resurfaced in the 1990s when an anonymous leaflet circulated in the UK which persuaded Muslim men to try to seduce Sikh girls in order to convert them to Islam. Though no one ever found out who produced it, and many local mosques thought the leaflet was appalling, it managed to cause enough panic in the UK that younger girls were taken out of afterschool activities for months (Hundal, 2012).

When the rumors of forced conversions by Muslim men began again in the 2000s, the far-right used it to their advantage. In 2004, the BNP used a Sikh candidate who, as stated by Hundall (2012), was used to “demonize Muslims.” When this candidate did not succeed, they appointed a Sikh spokesman who was later arrested for religious aggravation and excommunicated by Sikh and Hindu groups. In 2007, the Hindu Forum Britain alleged that
Hindu and Sikh girls were being targeted by Muslims but never backed their findings with any real evidence (Hundal, 2012).

Sikh communities have stated the past that they do not wish to align themselves in any way with the EDL, but at the start of summer in 2012, they could have done just that. From May to August of 2012, the EDL became very active in many protests and demonstrations, primarily in Luton and London. On May 29th, twelve EDL members, including Tommy Robinson, joined 300 Sikh men in Luton. They even covered their heads out of respect for the turban-wearing Sikhs. According to the story in the Mail on Sunday (2012), Sikhs had gathered in front of a police station to protest the lack of police work done on the recent allegation that a Sikh woman had been sexually assaulted by a Muslim man. While the EDL is outspoken about their disdain for the Muslim faith, they claim to have no quarrels with other religions or races. The EDL has used the conflict between Sikhs and Muslims to create more allies against the Islamic community and possibly to gain votes. This alliance is still in effect and when asked about a secret meeting between the Sikhs and the EDL just days later, Tommy Robinson replied by saying, “We can’t comment on exactly what we will do with the Sikhs but we will do whatever we can to work together, raise awareness and combat the problem” (Gallagher & Slater, 2012). This newly formed relationship creates greater tension between the Sikh and Islamic communities. Certain Sikh leaders believe the relationship will not last very long and that the majority of Sikhs oppose Islamophobia and the far-right (Hundal, 2012).
In 1998, Scotland and Wales voted for devolution, allowing them to receive partial independent power; Wales has an Assembly and Scotland a Parliament although both are still under Westminster authority. England, which is home to the Westminster national parliament, does not have independent power and is solely governed by the federal government (Parliament UK, 2013). Those that believed in a devolved English Parliament created the “English National Party.” With very little support, the group eventually came together with other far-right groups and English nationalists to create a manifesto in 2002. Shortly after, the party registered itself as the “English Democrats Party” (The English Democrats, 2013). The party has never won a Westminster parliamentary seat, but elected one mayor, Peter Davies, in Doncaster in 2009 as well as approximately ten district, county and parish councilors throughout England. In the 2012 local elections, the EDP filtered 87 candidates and averaged 10.3% of the vote.

Like all other far-right parties, the EDP has connections with the BNP. In 2009, Mayor Davies declared at an EDP conference, “We should have no association with any extreme far right group. I would not accept membership from anyone who has been a member of the BNP.” The party has no official stance on members joining from the BNP and has allowed many to join
since 2010. Strategically, it is thought that the party can become more electorally credible with the previous BNP members joining their ranks. Some have even become leaders in the party upon joining (Hope Not Hate, 2013). On the BNP’s website, the difference between the two parties is explained:

Like the British National Party, the English Democrats have a number of 'ethnic' members. But there is a crucial difference in how we regard them. The British National Party, by contrast, recognises pro-British members of assimilated minorities as British in a civic sense, and welcomes their contribution to our fight for fair play for, and the future survival of, the indigenous peoples of these islands. But we absolutely reject the poisonous, Politically Correct, anti-indigenous fiction that they are English, or Scottish, or Welsh, or Irish. They may well be very decent people, but if any of us went to Nigeria or Afghanistan, no-one would dream of pretending that we were Nigerians or Afghans. (British National Party, 2013)

The language of the explanation is casual at best, and the tension between the parties is clear, even though the BNP have done significantly better at the polls than the EDP. In fact, the BNP contains a multitude of articles on the English Democrats on their website, perhaps to dissuade those in the BNP from joining the EDP which seems to be a trend. In this same section, the BNP uses excerpts from the EDP manifesto which claims that anyone on the electoral roll of England or anyone who identifies with being English is welcomed into their party. The BNP responds by saying:

…to the English Democrats, every featherless biped that manages to get to England is English! When they say that anyone can be English, they are all in fact agreeing that
being English means nothing. All of them share this racist obsession with the BBC, which is why the BBC – like the rest of the Political Class – treats the EngDems with a fairness that they never accord to the British National Party. That's because, just like UKIP, the English Democrats are a part of the liberal-left attack on our nation. They are just another safety valve, designed to lead good people up a blind alley, and to divide the true nationalist cause. (British National Party, 2013)

In contrast to other far-right political parties, the EDP has taken its message of nationalism and promoted it on a basis of anti-racism and “pro-English,” which is not favored by the other parties. While the English Democrats wish to attract members to its simple message that many would potentially support, it has pulled in those who are more extreme. Earlier discussed, Mayor Davies quit the EDL in February 2013 because of the major influx of ex-BNP members, possibly following the BNP loss at the 2012 elections (BBC News, 2013). This raises the question of whether far-right parties are presently gaining their support from those hostile towards immigrants, or those who are more focused on nationalism.

**Political Party Success Theory**

The recent victories of parties such as UKIP and the British National Party do not necessarily threaten the larger parties. Arheimer and Carter (2006) describe political opportunity structures in which long-term, medium-term, and short-term variables affect right-wing party success. Long-term variables are predominantly institutional variables that are constant. If an electoral system is more proportional, a small party has a better chance at entering the electoral race and gaining representation. If the electoral system is less proportional, the opposite is true.
The other long-term variable is less precise. In one argument, given by Arzheimer and Carter (2006), the more centralized a government is, the more likely voters are to be in favor of right-wing extremists because of “second order” elections, or the local elections that occur after national elections at which there is less turnout. In the other argument, second order elections can serve as a “security valve for the political system” because it gives voters a way to “express their political frustration with the mainstream parties without overly disturbing the political process on the national level” (Arzheimer and Carter, 2006 p.6). This indeed could be the case with England and the far right BNP and UKIP. In the 2010 general elections, the Conservatives and Labour received the highest number of votes (BBC News, 2010b). England was predominantly Tory blue. In the 2012 second order council elections, however, Labour came out on top and the smaller parties took seats. While there existed a definite swing in Labour’s favor against the 2010 win by the Conservatives, the smaller parties did indeed experience more representation in 2012 than they had in the first order elections (BBC, 2012). In this case, the voters let out their frustration with the party in power at the second-order elections by voting for either Labour or, if also in contempt with Labour, for the smaller parties.

The three medium-term variables are non-institutional factors and are not as constant as the long-term variables. The first variable is the ideological position of the one party as compared to other parties in the system. The impact of this variable also has competing arguments. It can be said that the more extreme the right-wing mainstream party, in this case, the Conservative party, the less likely the mobilization and influence of a smaller radical right-wing party. But it can also be argued that the same instance may cause the smaller radical right party to be more legitimate in voters’ eyes (Arzheimer and Carter, 2006 p.7). The downfall of the
National Front is an example of the mainstream right-wing party (Conservatives) taking away influence of the radical right. When Mrs. Thatcher’s government came to power in 1979, she boasted a hardline immigration policy that possibly crippled the influence of the National Front, when just a few years before the NF was experiencing a rise in support and filtered its highest amount of candidates yet (Bowyer, 2005, p. 188).

The second variable is the degree of convergence between the parties of the mainstream right and those of the mainstream left. One theory which states that if the parties are more ideologically distinct from one another, it is more difficult for the right-wing parties to propose an alternative ideology, whereas another theory contends that the distinctiveness of the mainstream parties may lack elite consensus which could end up boding well for the far right-wing parties in order to secure the popular vote. The third variable considers a coalition of the two mainstream parties. Arzheimer and Carter (2006) state here that the extreme right will benefit for two reasons. One reason is that “voters will feel that there is a lack of other political alternatives” and the second reason is that supporters of the mainstream right “may become alienated if they do not see their preferred policies being enacted” and therefore may see their supposed right-wing party playing a role of “principled opposition” rather than true opposition.

The short-term variables are largely social factors that are in some cases inconsistent. Since immigration is a clear issue in radical right-wing parties, levels of immigration and unemployment seem to affect votes. It is expected that the right-wing extremist vote would be positively correlated to both the levels of immigration and levels of unemployment (Arzheimer and Carter, 2006 p.7).
A rather “perfect storm” of medium and short-term variables can be measured by looking into the 1970s, when the National Front reached its peak shortly after the arrival of thousands of Ugandans who were forced from their country. Protests and pickets were held in England by NF supporters to keep the immigrants out of certain cities that were not approved by the Uganda Resettlement Board (Mulhall, 2012). The tension gave the NF a clear opening to influence the British population. In 1973, the party polled 16% of the vote and their influence extended to 20% in strongholds that protested against Ugandan passport-holders until tensions changed focus in 1976 (Brown, 2012). At that time the mainstream political climate towards immigrants was apprehensive. It was only a few years following Conservative MP Powell’s removal from the party after his racist remarks and the Tories were trying to fall away from racist rhetoric and policy altogether. Labour was adopting similar strategies and policies at this time as well, possibly causing individuals with anti-immigrant views to give their vote to the National Front. The combination of the convergence of mainstream parties, high levels of immigration and the lack of strong-handed immigration policy could have made for the brief success of the National Front.
THE EMERGENCE OF UKIP

Figure 12: The United Kingdom Independence Party uses the symbol of the British monetary pound in their yellow and purple logo, very different from classical far-right parties (The Electoral Commission, 2013).

Newly formed Center for Fascist, Anti-Fascist and Post-Fascist Studies at Teesside University in Northeast England has been focusing research around the failure of the BNP and other classical far-right parties. It claims that although the BNP and the EDL are both in serious decline, the possibility of a “violent anti-Islamic sentiment” and “a lone, Anders Behring Breivik style attack,” is conceivable. A historian in the program, Dr. Matthew Feldman, suggests that organizations such as the EDL only last for a couple of years. The people involved, he says, can only take time to shout slogans on the streets for a couple of years until the group gets too small and the chance of getting arrested too large. Of course, the shift towards cultural nationalism against Islam from race-based far-right activism is also notable. Feldman believes that the far-right is moving into the mainstream with significant, albeit small, success. He also adds that the internet has changed the way far-right groups meet. Once, classic extreme far-right groups had to meet in pubs or rented government rooms in order to spread their message, organize and mobilize their members. Now, because of the rapid sharing of ideologies, the internet allows for
all of this to happen fairly quickly and could lead to more lone-wolf attacks that resemble Breivik’s massacre of 77 people in Norway (Walker, 2013).

These fears, coupled with the far-right tendencies of the recently successful United Kingdom Independence Party lead to much concern over where the extreme right-wing supporters will cast their votes. Although the party focuses on UK withdrawal from the European Union, UKIP offers a variety of policies covering many issues (Hayton, 2010, p. 27). Many smaller parties advocate Euroskepticism, but UKIP is the forerunner of this belief currently in politics. Traditionally, Euroskepticism has always been present in British politics and has attracted interests of anti-federalists, nationalists, and other far-right advocates for many years. Formed by members of the Anti-Federalist League who opposed the Maastricht Treaty which later led to the establishment of the European Union, UKIP has focused its political efforts in the European Parliament (EP) elections. UKIP has consistently polled far better in the second-order elections to the EP than in the first-order elections to Westminster. In analyzing the research on the social and attitudinal profiles of extreme far-right voters, Robert Ford, Matthew J. Goodwin, & David Cutts (2011) provide evidence of “high correlations” between voters for UKIP and those for the BNP (p.205). This suggests that UKIP has more than Euroskepticism to offer to those from the radical right. The main factors analyzed in voters in the study were populism and anti-immigrant hostility.

**UKIP Support**

As stated before, Arzheimer & Carter’s (2006) profile for extreme far-right party support is made up of young men with lower level education and working class, self-employed or in
routine non-manual forms of employment. Ford, Goodwin, & Cutts (2011) give a different profile for supporters of UKIP being “concentrated among middle aged, financially insecure men with a Conservative background and is significantly higher among the skilled working classes who have been most exposed to competition from the European Common Market” (p.206). While these profiles are different in that one expresses younger men and the other middle-aged men, both explicitly express working class vulnerability. Perhaps UKIP is simply a grown-up version of the BNP, and its voters more mature and strategic. In the outcomes of the European Parliament elections and the British Parliament elections between 1994 and 2010, it is possible to see the strategic voting that occurs amongst UKIP supporters.

![Figure 13: Actual votes received by UKIP supporters in first and second-order elections.](image)

Ford, Goodwin & Cutts (2011) also found that UKIP supporters generally tend to come from two distinct groups. One group is made up of strategic voters who normally vote
Conservative at the Westminster elections but vote UKIP at the EP elections. These supporters seem to be negatively targeting the EU itself as opposed to standing for the party’s general policies. The other group of UKIP supporters tend to be poorer, working class and more concerned with the principles and policies of the party. These voters seem to resemble supporters of the BNP and classical radical-right parties and vote for UKIP on most all occasions. It was even suggested that UKIP could be offered to voters as a “polite alternative” to those who are angry about immigration levels and mainstream party corruption but are not comfortable in voting for extreme parties such as the BNP (Ford, Goodwin, & Cutts, 2011, p. 206).

The actual number of votes shows that the largest amount of support for UKIP came out to vote in the 2004 election. UKIP has been classified by recent academic studies as an “Anti-Political Establishment” party that opposes the status-quo, believes it is outside the mainstream party ideologies, and vies that there is a fundamental divide between the people and the government. These sort of political parties do not last very long and rely on a phenomena of increased grassroots activity that leads to short-term electoral success (Abedi & Lundberg, 2009, p. 73). Hayton (2010) argues that the party deserves more academic attention and needs not be labeled an Anti-Political Establishment party any longer.
The 2009 win was particularly surprising since some of the party’s members of European Parliament (MEPs) elected in 2004 were caught up in scandals involving benefit fraud and financial irregularities. UKIP was also faced with the recent rise of other smaller parties like the Green Party and the BNP both of which had the potential to take away a significant amount of support from UKIP. Furthermore, the global financial crisis in the same year gave many parties a new platform whereas UKIP did not have a solid take on the issue. Almost everything should have been working against UKIP’s favor (Hayton, 2010, p. 28).

Lord Ashcroft (2012) wrote a piece on his polling website about the implications of UKIP success. In a recent poll, he has found that twelve percent of those who voted for the Conservative party in 2010 now say they would vote for UKIP in an election tomorrow. Furthermore, half of those who would consider voting for UKIP supported Conservatives in the
last election. This evidence supports the claim that voters within the mainstream Conservative party can be compelled to vote for the far-right. Ashcroft (2012) says that the misconception about UKIP support is that voters are unsatisfied with the mainstream party’s policies and look to smaller parties with single, predominant issues. They would believe that if the mainstream took the policy stance they wanted, then the voter would return to that party. According to Ashcroft (2012), policies are secondary to voters. Voters instead draw from their personal beliefs and outlook, especially in their everyday lives. In referring to UKIP voters’ concerns that were mentioned in a focus group, Ashcroft (2012) gives a snapshot of why they are dissatisfied with Britain as a whole:

Schools, they say, can’t hold nativity plays or harvest festivals any more; you can’t fly a flag of St George any more; you can’t call Christmas Christmas any more; you won’t be promoted in the police force unless you’re from a minority; you can’t wear an England shirt on the bus; you won’t get social housing unless you’re an immigrant; you can’t speak up about these things because you’ll be called a racist; you can’t even smack your children.

All of these things, “real or imagined,” are important issues to those willing to toss their support behind UKIP. Ashcroft also found in his poll that people who voted for UKIP often explained why by saying it was “on the side of people like me.” The most significant findings of the research by Ashcroft (2012) came with the poll on the policies voters found most important.
As presented above, discussion was focused on general concerns voters have and barely any discussion mentioned the European Union. It is also analyzed by Ford, Goodwin & Cutts (2011) that UKIP’s core support is female and since extreme right-wing parties such as the BNP and the National Front are dominated by men, women have been more attracted to UKIP (p. 207). Another poll conducted in 2009 found that the most important issues amongst UKIP supporters were, from most important to least important, were immigration, the economy, crime and Europe. To BNP supporters it was the same. To Conservative supporters the most important issue was the economy, followed by immigration, crime and Europe. All voters aligned most with the Conservative party supporters. While UKIP supporters are most similar to BNP followers, they are not far-off from aligning with Conservatives (Hayton, 2010).
UKIP Dissent

Even in Ashcroft’s (2012) research it is clear that there exists a general difference between average voters and those who would vote for UKIP. These differences center on immigration and nationalism but have very little to do with the economy, jobs and debt. Much of the policies of UKIP are, similar to other smaller parties, ambitious and expansive. On immigration, the UKIP manifesto claims 2.5 million immigrants have arrived in the UK since 1997, but does not mention emigration out of the UK. They also determine that approximately one million immigrants currently live in the country illegally. They wish to implement a freeze on immigration for five years, heighten border control (by leaving the EU), making overstaying a visa a criminal offence, triple the amount of staff that oversees immigration controls, deport illegals immediately, implement a strict British Asylum Act, and end the promotion of multiculturalism by the government and publicly funded bodies (United Kingdom Independence Party, 2010, pp. 5-6). Policies also include setting up boot camps to rehabilitate young criminals, increase defense spending, and others associated with an older generation (United Kingdom Independence Party, 2010, pp. 6-7). Nigel Farage (2012), currently the most popular leader of UKIP, opposes anyone claiming that supporters of the party are racist and states that, until recently, those who “dared raise the issue of mass migration” were “denigrated as a racist.” It is not racist, he claims, to question policy. In his own words:

The political traditions of Britain are largely about the growth of liberty, freedom, equality before the law and tolerance. We believe in fair play and muddling through. We don’t like grand plans and irrational manoeuvring for political gain, as seen in
Rotherham. We are decent people, who are fed up with the nannying, pettifogging overlordship of the grey bureaucracies. (Farage, 2012)

David Randall and Brian Brady of The Independent UK news (2013) write that UKIP has become the “wild card of British politics” very suddenly. They claim the party should be called the UK Immigrationphobe Party and assert that UKIP has not been met with enough scrutiny in the past. But this was not the first time UKIP supporters have been labeled “closet racists.” As early as 2006, shortly after UKIP’s significant win in the EP, David Cameron named the party “fruit cakes and “closet racists.” Conservative MP Cameron, who is now the British Prime Minister, admitted that the Conservative party needed to do more to incorporate other races in its representation. Nigel Farage replied to Cameron’s comments by saying that “…he should apologize, not just to us, but to the 2.7 million voters who supported us in 2004” (Lyons, 2006). The point should not be taken lightly either. In 2011, the Fear and Hope campaign put on by the anti-fascist group Searchlight Educational Trust believed that almost half of Britain would vote for far-right parties if they halted violent acts and protests and gave up fascist ideologies. According to Searchlight’s annual surveys, it was clear to the campaigners that the mainstream parties in Britain were “losing touch” with voters on issues involving race and immigration. At least sixty percent of those polled in England said they believed immigration to be a “bad thing for England” compared to the forty percent who said it was “good” for the country. This opposition was significant in minorities, not just white Britons. The report also found that fifty-two percent of those polled agreed that “Muslims create problems in the UK” (Daily Mail Reporter, 2011).
Recent UKIP Gains

Just days before the 2013 by-election in the Southwest English local authority of Eastleigh, Lord Ashcroft released a poll that determined the Liberal Democrats would keep the seat with 33%, Conservatives would come in second with 28%, UKIP would take third with 21%, and Labour would bring up the rear with 12% (The Telegraph, 2013). Chris Huhne, the Liberal Democrat who had vacated the seat in February after pleading guilty to perverting the court of justice, had held the seat since 2005 and took 46.5% of the vote in the 2010 general election (BBC News, 2010b). The actual election results were very different from the polls.

![Eastleigh by-election results](image)

**Figure 16: Eastleigh by-election results (BBC News, 2013).**

The results left UKIP coming in a close second behind the Liberal Democrats. In general, the Liberal Democrats vote decreased by 14.48%, the Conservative vote by 13.96%, while the UKIP vote increased by 24.2%; a massive win in numbers for the party. The results also indicated a
16.62% decrease in turnout from the 2010 election showing that in a by-election, strategic voters of UKIP can find success if they mobilize enough supporters. This election has been seen as one of the most important examples of UKIP success and its threat to mainstream parties, especially Conservatives (Rogers, 2013). In 2012, however, UKIP experienced similar success at the by-elections for Rotherham, Croydon North and Middlesbrough, all of which held Labour wins but followed with significant UKIP numbers. Rotherham and Middlesbrough, both located in Northern England, experienced low turnouts and UKIP came in second each time. In the North Croydon election, UKIP won 1,400 votes, coming in third, which is unusual in the Greater London area (Chorley, 2012).
CONCLUSION

Hayton (2010) points out that all across Europe there has been a general swing to the right. Center-left parties have suffered while the right and center-right parties have stabilized or experienced significant gains. While the BNP has proposed a voluntary resettlement scheme for immigrants, UKIP has attracted supporters of the far-right to its five-year freeze on immigration policy and speeding up the deportation system. Both parties propose that the red tape of the mainstream government takes away the rights of British citizens (Hayton, 2010, p. 30). Searchlight Educational Trust (2011) found a range of attitudes revolving around race and immigration that they measure based on polls considering optimism, security, economic identity, national identity, minority attitudes, social identity, negativity towards Islam and Muslims, political interests, and absence of conservative values in politics. In the Fear and Hope campaign, Populus polling broke down the new groups of multiculturalism into their corresponding political parties. The “new tribes of British identity politics” were identified as confident multiculturalists, mainstream liberals, identity ambivalents, cultural integrationists, latent hostiles and active enmity.
These findings reveal the “identity ambivalents” as the swing vote which seem to occur in each group. Further polling showed that the “identity ambivalents” were of similar background to latent hostiles. Both represented over fifty percent of those who owned a house, close to thirty percent each in social housing, and less than eighteen percent were in private rentals. In total, it was found that young people are more likely to be positive towards immigration and multiculturalism than older people and sixty percent would support combating extremism in a positive manner. The two main groups within the sixty percent were identity ambivalents and cultural integrationists, making them very important to those from either side of politics since they are considered the swing vote (Searchlight Educational Trust, 2011).
In answering the previous puzzle, the rapid increase in rates of immigration in local communities does have the potential to heighten hostility towards immigrants of color or those of color in general. This can be seen in the arrival of Ugandan immigrants in England in the 1960s and the native response in the form of local protests and riots in various English towns (Brown, 2012; Mulhall, 2012). Even in neighborhoods that have not historically experienced racial or immigrant hostility but do have high concentrations of immigrants, hostility can catalyst in times of economic downturn (Dancygier, 2010). This particular instance happened in 2001 when the areas of high immigrant concentration collided with anti-immigrant groups over various crimes, failures of the police to handle the crimes, and belief that the minority group was unduly advantaged as compared to the native whites (Kundnani, 2001). This hostility may manifest in electoral success for ERPs if mainstream parties have seemed to “fail” that neighborhood previously as seen in the 2002 and 2003 elections for the BNP and the 2012 and 2013 by-elections for UKIP (Bowyer, 2005; Hayton, 2010).

The British Attitudes Survey shows opinions on immigration and race in Britain and is an indicator of potential immigrant hostility, violent or non-violent (NatCen Social Research, 2013). The economic fear is clear for native Britons living in a world that recently experienced an international recession. Immigrants are seen by natives as those that are going to take their scarce resources, explicitly their jobs.
Because there is always a base support for anti-immigrant groups and ERPs, even in times of economic stability and low immigration, it seems those with a true disdain for immigrants of color or immigrants in general do continually exist in England. The extended support and times of “true success” for these groups and parties may be impacted by times of high immigration or economic instability. When people fear their jobs are at stake, it is apparent that much discourse on immigration will occur and turn more to voting for ERPs if they feel the current government is not meeting their needs. Racism and xenophobia are elements that occur in England in an organized manner, otherwise these parties would have no support in times of a good economy and low immigration.

The apparent swing to the right pointed out by many scholars addresses the growing frustration with the current mainstream parties in England. Citizens are looking to smaller parties
that are “pro-England” to bring back the issues in the political realm they believe are most important. The extreme left does not offer these attitudes and those who would not vote for the far-right very well may vote for a party such as UKIP if they indeed share a Euroskeptic view. The international system that the country has been a part of has “failed” the regular, working-class citizens and those citizens are mobilizing against it. This begins with the European Union and UKIP is the party boasting these beliefs and policies.

Classical ERPs such as the National Front, the British National Party and the English Democrats may split on issues even more in the future with the emergence of UKIP. The BNP has already shown that it wants to be taken seriously as a political party and changed its white-only policy. The National Front kept the policy regardless of the consequences, displaying its disregard for the BNP’s evolution. And while the change did not bring instant success to the BNP, it did not manage to lose many members and even gained some from the National Front. The English Democrats has become more and more liberal in its party make-up and may continue to be a single-issue party but develop into a moderate party as opposed to an ERP.

Racism and xenophobia are not declining, as would be the explanation for the 2012 losses of the BNP. In fact, it has come a long way since Powell gave his speech in 1968, becoming more aware of polite rhetoric and strategic voting. The successes of UKIP, which may no longer be able to deny its far-right leanings, are proof of this evolution. The shift is one that challenges the mainstream in non-violent forms, but still expresses racist undertones in order to attract the base that is still there, but is repelled by the BNP.
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