U.S. Intelligence Reform A Bureaucratic Politics Approach

2010

Bonnie M. Schickler

University of Central Florida

Find similar works at: http://stars.library.ucf.edu/etd

University of Central Florida Libraries http://library.ucf.edu

Part of the Political Science Commons

STARS Citation


This Masters Thesis (Open Access) is brought to you for free and open access by STARS. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of STARS. For more information, please contact lee.dotson@ucf.edu.
U.S. INTELLIGENCE REFORM:  
A BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS APPROACH

by

BONNIE M. SCHICKLER
B.A. University of Central Florida, 2008

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Arts
in the Department of Political Science
in the College of Science
at the University of Central Florida
Orlando, Florida

Fall Term
2010
ABSTRACT

This study investigates the current bureaucratic struggles that exist within the U.S. intelligence community as a result of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004. The first part of this research examines the history of intelligence reform in the United States beginning with the National Security Act of 1947. The second part provides an in-depth discussion of the 2004 legislation as well as an examination of the main bureaucratic conflicts that have arisen between the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the rest of the U.S. intelligence community.

This study used the bureaucratic politics model to explain the development of the current disagreements, the reasons behind the DNI’s struggle for power, and the intelligence community’s inability to adapt to the reform. This research determined that the current conflicts have occurred as a result of the unclear authorities issued to the DNI by IRTPA and have been further exacerbated by interest-driven intelligence agencies and a well-developed culture that has proven difficult to abandon.

This research also provides insight into several alternative approaches that can be used to explain the current U.S. intelligence reform process. Additionally, recommendations were made for reducing the bureaucratic friction that currently exists within the intelligence community and to strengthen the overall authority of the Director of National Intelligence.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................ vii
LIST OF ACRONYMS/ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................ viii

## CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION ...................................................................... 1
Significance of Proposed Research: A New Approach .............................................. 1
Why Research This Topic Now? .............................................................................. 4
Methodology ........................................................................................................ 6
Looking Ahead ....................................................................................................... 8

## CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW ................................................................. 11
Main Actors ......................................................................................................... 12
Main Tenants ....................................................................................................... 12
Standard Operating Procedures .......................................................................... 17
Critiques of the Bureaucratic Politics Model ......................................................... 18

## CHAPTER 3: HISTORY OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE REFORM ......................... 20
The Bureaucratic Politics Model and U.S. Intelligence Reform .............................. 21
U.S. Intelligence: Post World War II ..................................................................... 22
U.S. Intelligence Reform in the 1950s and 60s ...................................................... 23
Intelligence Reform in the 1970s ........................................................................ 25
Intelligence Reform in the 1990s ........................................................................ 29
DCI v. D/CIA ...................................................................................................... 31
Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 32

## CHAPTER 4: INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004 ............................................................. 33
The Intelligence Community Prior to 9/11 .......................................................... 33
The White House Prior to 9/11 .......................................................................... 36
Passing Reform Legislation ................................................................................... 40
Director of National Intelligence ......................................................................... 45
New Agencies ..................................................................................................... 48
Intelligence Activities ......................................................................................... 49
HUMINT ............................................................................................................ 51
Open Source ....................................................................................................... 52
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Information Sharing</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Intelligence</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 5: BUREAUCRATIC CONFLICTS</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acceptance of Change</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Realistic Conflict Group Theory</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authority of the DNI</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The ODNI and Defense Department Relationship</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DNI and CIA Turf Battles</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture Wars</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assertion of Authorities</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 6: ALTERNATIVE VIEWS</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization Theory and Intelligence Reform</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Comparative Approach</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of Presidential Support</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groupthink</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centralization v. Coordination</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 7: SOLUTIONS FOR THE FUTURE</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposals Currently Under Consideration</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsibilities of the DNI</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenured DNI and Department of Intelligence</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for the DNI</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shift in Culture</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF REFERENCES</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Directors of National Intelligence ................................................................. 57
Table 2: Directors of the CIA since 2004 ................................................................. 57
Table 3: Secretaries of Defense since 2004 ............................................................... 57
Table 4: Conflicts between DNI and Secretary of Defense ........................................... 65
Table 5: Conflicts between DNI and Director of the CIA .............................................. 67
**LIST OF ACRONYMS/ABBREVIATIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADDNI/OS</td>
<td>Assistant Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Open Source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIO</td>
<td>Chief Information Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCI</td>
<td>Director of Central Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDI</td>
<td>Director of Defense Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DI</td>
<td>Directorate of Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIA</td>
<td>Defense Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DNI</td>
<td>Director of National Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXCOM</td>
<td>Executive Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUMINT</td>
<td>Human Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICS</td>
<td>Intelligence Community Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRAC</td>
<td>Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRTPA</td>
<td>Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISE</td>
<td>Information Sharing Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JICC</td>
<td>Joint Intelligence Community Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCPC</td>
<td>National Counterproliferation Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCTC</td>
<td>National Counterterrorism Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGA</td>
<td>National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRO</td>
<td>National Reconnaissance Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSA</td>
<td>National Security Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODNI</td>
<td>Office of the Director of National Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMB</td>
<td>Office of Management and Budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSC</td>
<td>Open Source Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSS</td>
<td>Office of Strategic Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBCFIA</td>
<td>President’s Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDB</td>
<td>President’s Daily Brief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDD</td>
<td>Presidential Decision Directive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USD(I)</td>
<td>Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USIB</td>
<td>United States Intelligence Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) was passed in late 2004, with the first Director of National Intelligence (DNI) being appointed in early 2005. Over the past six years, the U.S. intelligence community has undergone its most dramatic transformation in over half a century. New agencies have been established, new positions have been created, and the pre-9/11 mentality has slowly begun to fade away. Unfortunately, IRTPA has done little to subdue bureaucratic infighting and has ultimately failed to establish a clear command structure within the intelligence community. For this reason, the intelligence community remains flawed and still has many hurdles to overcome. This thesis will examine the conflicts that have arisen within the U.S. intelligence community as a result of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 and, through the bureaucratic politics model, will seek to explain the difficulties involved in the reform process.

Significance of Proposed Research: A New Approach

Six years have passed since the enactment of IRTPA, and although agencies and positions have been formed, they are still trying to find their way in the community. Further, rules, regulations, and authorities are still being assigned and clarified. The current state of these transformations and challenges make it an extremely important time to examine the structure and functioning of our intelligence community. This thesis will include a comprehensive report on the history of U.S. intelligence reform, a description of the main intentions of IRTPA, and a discussion of the bureaucratic struggles that have arisen since 2004. Ultimately, the research I have undertaken will broaden the scope of current literature and will enhance the overall quality of intelligence studies.
Since 2004, bureaucratic struggles have developed between the DNI and the rest of the intelligence community agencies. Some of these struggles have been small and quickly resolved. Others, however, have significantly challenged the authority of the DNI. In order to better understand these bureaucratic difficulties, it is important to examine the progress that has occurred within the intelligence community since IRTPA was enacted. This thesis will touch upon the current weaknesses of the intelligence community as well as expose the strengths of the legislation. It will offer a description of the effects of IRTPA, explain the changes that have taken place as a result of the legislation, and contribute to the overall knowledge of IRTPA. It is essential that these sections be included in my research in order to better understand the rules and regulations that have led to the current bureaucratic friction. In this regard, this study will compliment and expand existing research on U.S. intelligence reform.

The effective functioning of our intelligence community can greatly affect our national security. Therefore, it is crucial that academics, government officials, and the public understand how the intelligence community has expanded since the attacks of September 11th, 2001. It is my hope that this research will force others to think critically about the transformation that our intelligence community has undergone as well as allow them to raise critical questions, add meaningful criticisms, and develop new ideas within the field.

U.S. intelligence reform is a relatively new field of study. As a result, a great deal of scholarly work has not yet been completed on the topic. Both the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and Congress have undertaken their own investigations and have published reports on the issue. However, these documents only describe the changes that have taken place within the intelligence community. More specifically, their conclusions are not
deeply developed and the weaknesses of the intelligence community are only briefly discussed. Although these reports are important in order to understand where the intelligence community currently stands, they fail to adequately address and discuss the causes behind the successes and failures of IRTPA.

In an attempt to explain the current state of U.S. intelligence reform, several intelligence scholars have added a theoretical element to their research. For example, Richard Posner in Uncertain Shield: The U.S. Intelligence Community in the Throes of Reform focuses on intelligence reform as it relates to organization theory. Similarly, Glenn Hastedt and B. Douglas Skelley in their article “Intelligence in a Turbulent World: Insights from Organization Theory” also describe the creation and implementation of the DNI in terms of organization theory.

Despite these contributions, there has been no specialized research done on U.S. intelligence reform and the role bureaucratic politics plays in explaining the process. My research will argue that the bureaucratic politics model is an appropriate method to use in order to view, examine, and explore intelligence reform progress and the struggles that have arisen as a result of IRTPA. Importantly, my research will be informative, descriptive, and original. My research will bring to light the feuds that currently exist within the U.S. intelligence community and ultimately contribute to enhancing the efficacy of governance and national security within the United States. The bureaucratic politics model, which argues that government policy is the result of “pulling and hauling” between various actors throughout the government, may not be the only method available to adequately describe the current state of our intelligence community. However, in the field of intelligence studies, using the bureaucratic politics model is a unique approach that will hopefully shed light onto a controversial and difficult subject.
Why Research This Topic Now?

IRTPA and the DNI have not existed long enough for a great deal of research to be conducted on the topic. Further, those working directly within the intelligence community are still attempting to meet the demands of the 2004 legislation. The ODNI, its missions, values, and objectives are still being defined and challenged on a daily basis. The full effects of IRTPA remain to be seen and it will probably remain that way for some time. Conducting research on a topic so current is not an easy task. Policies are continually changing, the DNI is still trying to establish its authority, and it’s still too early to tell how well the reform process has actually worked. However, presenting this research today may be just as beneficial as if this project were carried out further down the road.

According to Russell Riley, Chair of the Presidential Oral History Program at the Miller Center of Public Affairs, the trail of documents traditionally used by scholars to uncover presidential actions and decisions is slowly disappearing. The majority of information regarding an administration is learned only after a president has left office and the confidential communications are released to the public by the presidential libraries. Such information, however, has recently become unavailable due to changes in the recordkeeping of senior officials within the executive branch. Today, senior officials are no longer writing down in-depth details of their thoughts and activities. Further, any records that do exist are not being released to the public due to concerns over national security (Riley 2009, 188).

Prior to 1978, presidents donated their papers to the National Archives after leaving office. This practice was dismissed following the legal fight over control of President Nixon’s records during Watergate. In response, Congress passed the Presidential Records Act of 1978.
This piece of legislation created public ownership of presidential papers and an official schedule for their release. As a result, a president can now withhold documents for up to five years after leaving office. A president can also delay the release of certain documents for up to twelve years. President Reagan altered the legislation with Executive Order 12667. This E.O. further complicated the process of moving presidential records from private to public status by arguing that the incumbent president had the authority to keep records of his choice secret. In 2001, President George W. Bush issued his own executive order (E.O.13233) that allowed for additional delays in the release of presidential papers (Riley 2009, 192-193).

To further complicate matters, in recent years, the release of White House records during a president’s term in office has only occurred because of investigations into alleged executive wrongdoings. For this reason, much of what we know about administrations from the last three decades is a result of congressional investigations and independent counsels. As a result, the materials that are available do not paint the clearest picture of presidential decision-making. In order to develop the broadest understanding of an administration’s time in office, researchers have been forced to develop the recent past from only the “odds and ends of history” (Riley 2009, 192).

Today, few presidential aides keep notes on key meetings or other decision-making events. Due to this habit, it is now becoming harder for researchers to separate fact from fiction and to establish an adequate account of an administration’s time in office. Put simply, scholars are being forced to conduct their research in the absence of new and original source materials. In relation to my research, if this trend continues, there may not be any additional information publicly released on the intelligence reform process than what exists now. Based on Riley’s
conclusions, it seems appropriate to go ahead with my projected research as there may not be a great deal more information available regarding IRTPA and its current state further down the road.

**Methodology**

Since IRTPA was enacted only six years ago, not enough time has passed for a wide range of literature to develop. In order to successfully conduct a thorough and well-developed research project, I needed to expand my studies beyond traditional sources of information such as books and scholarly journals. Throughout this project, I relied heavily on congressional reports, testimonies given by U.S. intelligence officials, panels, and research interviews. To supplement the information obtained from these sources, I focused on articles from various newspapers including the New York Times and the Washington Post. Although the methodologies used in this research are not new or innovative, they provided a sound and structured outline in which to conduct my research.

The methodologies I used to conduct this research provided me with the support I needed to effectively convey my argument. For example, I consulted the relevant literature on the bureaucratic politics model including Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow’s *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, Morton H. Halperin and Priscilla A. Clapp’s *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy*, and David C. Kozak and James M. Keagle’s *Bureaucratic Politics and National Security*. The bureaucratic politics model, as it relates to U.S. intelligence reform, has not yet been examined by scholars within the field. Thus, this literature allowed me to gain a deep understanding of the bureaucratic politics model so that I could effectively apply it to the current U.S. intelligence reform process.
For a significant portion of my thesis, I consulted the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. This legislation requires that the intelligence community become a more organized and unified structure and outlines the changes that need to be implemented in order for this to occur. It also describes the role that the DNI plays within the intelligence community including the DNI’s control over the intelligence budget and authority over personnel. Importantly, this legislation provided me with an in-depth understanding of the purpose, intentions, and potential of the reform process. It also allowed me to more adequately determine the overall effectiveness of the reform.

I conducted an interview with Patrick Gorman, former Assistant Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Strategy, Plans, and Policy. This interview focused heavily on his time at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and his dealings with former DNI Mike McConnell. I also conducted an interview with Dr. Stephen Sloan of the University of Central Florida’s Office of Global Perspectives. Both of these interviews shed light on the current situation within the ODNI, the key flaws of IRTPA, and the future state of the DNI. Put simply, the interviews I conducted significantly contributed to my work by expanding the relative information available and providing a new perspective to work with.

Interviews are an extremely important aspect of any research project. They provide in-depth information that would otherwise be unavailable as well as an opportunity to better understand the interviewee’s experiences. Interviews have and will continue to be conducted on the main players within the intelligence reform process. If the trend discussed above continues, it will become more and more difficult to find useful information from physical documents. Put simply, the less policy makers write down, the more important research interviews will become.
Although research interviews are useful for untangling complex issues, they do pose some disadvantages. The interviewer can affect the data if his or her remarks are not consistent. Research interviews can also be unreliable if the interviewer asks biased or closed questions. Further, research interviews are not conducted on a large number of people. For example, this research project only includes information collected from two interviews. Further interviews would have perhaps added additional perspectives on the current state of U.S. intelligence reform and broadened the scope of the research.

Oral history is also subject to personal bias. For this reason, now is the perfect time to conduct interviews with key intelligence officials involved in the reform process. Interviews with policymakers will perhaps be more significant today given that the reform events will be fresh in their minds. If these interviews are conducted at a much later date, there is a possibility that these key memories will be faded or distorted. To provide further support for conducting my research project today, even if this topic were pursued further in the future, there is a chance that reliable and well-documented information would not be available.

Looking Ahead

Following a brief literature review in Chapter two in which I detail the main tenants of the bureaucratic politics model, I will begin Chapter three of my thesis by discussing the history of intelligence reform in the United States prior to the attacks of September 11th, 2001. I will also discuss the role that bureaucratic politics played in the prevention of major reform prior to this date. Put simply, this section will discuss U.S. intelligence reform since the National Security Act of 1947. This historical background will help introduce long-standing bureaucratic struggles
within U.S. intelligence as well as help explain the power struggles that are hindering the current intelligence reform process.

In chapter four, I will discuss the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. This section will include a discussion of the reasons for the legislation’s implementation, the intentions of the legislation, and the changes that have occurred within the U.S. intelligence community since 2004. Discussion topics will include the responsibilities of the Director of National Intelligence, the creation of new national security agencies, and the reform of intelligence collection and analysis. This section will also focus on the shortcomings of the legislation including its failure to clearly define the chain of command within the U.S. intelligence system.

The main focus of my research, Chapter five, will be to examine the bureaucratic conflicts that have arisen within the intelligence community and the U.S. government as a result of the 2004 legislation. Through the bureaucratic politics model, I will discuss current feuds between the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the DNI, the power struggle between the DNI and the Department of Defense (DOD), as well as continuing turf wars within the intelligence community. From this research, I will determine if these current conflicts have prevented reform from being carried out effectively as well as the consequences they have had on the U.S. intelligence community.

Chapter six will explore several alternative methods that can be used to explain the current conflicts within the intelligence community. Firstly, this chapter will include an analysis of the conflicts through the lens of organization theory. It will also compare IRTPA to the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and explore the
possibility that the lack of presidential support for the DNI is a behind the conflicts. Finally, this chapter will investigate whether the current problems are due to a struggle between centralization and coordination within the intelligence community. The inclusion of alternative explanations will ensure that a well rounded analysis of the current state of intelligence reform is presented in this research.

Finally, in chapter seven, I will discuss potential solutions for the problems that currently plague the intelligence reform process. These solutions will attempt to reduce bureaucratic political conflicts within the intelligence community. To do this, this section will focus in on the problems left unsolved by IRTPA including the division of power that currently exists within intelligence leadership. The main goal of these solutions will be to enhance the overall quality of our intelligence system and to increase the effectiveness of U.S. national security policy.
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

The bureaucratic politics model emerged in 1954 and has been used to explain the 1956 Suez crisis, the Skybolt incident, U.S. policy in Vietnam, and the Cuban missile crisis. Bureaucratic politics argues that state behavior can be explained through the actions, attitudes, and interests of its decision-makers. As a result, policy is developed through “pulling and hauling” amongst different bureaucratic actors. In this regard, increasing the number of participants in the decision-making process allows for a more thorough analysis of information, fuller consideration of issues, and greater imagination in identifying options (Allison and Zelikow 1999, 271). However, throughout the decision-making process, each participant has his or her own responsibilities and interests and is committed to fulfilling these responsibilities as they see fit. The final decision, therefore, is a compromised solution that meets the conflicting demands, interests, and goals of the actors involved. Importantly, the model reveals that national interests and goals are not unified within a bureaucracy and that the policy-making process is far from ideal.

Authors Graham Allison, Philip Zelikow, David C. Kozak, James M. Keagle, Morton H. Halperin, and Priscilla A. Clapp have heavily researched and developed the main arguments of the bureaucratic politics model. Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow in their book Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis describe the bureaucratic politics approach as it relates to foreign and security decision-making. Morton H. Halperin and Priscilla A. Clapp in Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, analyze the ways in which bureaucratic infighting plays a role in the foreign and security policy-making of the United States. In their book, Bureaucratic Politics and National Security, David C. Kozak and James M. Keagle give further
support to the presence of bureaucratic politics within the U.S foreign policy decision-making process.

**Main Actors**

Government policy is not made by one decision-maker. Instead, it takes a number of large organizations and political actors who differ dramatically on issues and the stance that their government should take to resolve these issues (Halperin and Klapp 2006, 16). According to Allison and Zelikow (1999), there is no unitary actor within the bureaucratic politics approach. Instead, there are many actors who behave according to “various conceptions of national, organizational, and personal goals.” Top political leaders and officials of major government organizations become the central players in the bureaucratic politics approach. Beyond this central circle are lower level officials in the executive branch, the press, nongovernmental organizations, and the public. As a result, actors within the bureaucratic politics approach can include the president, cabinet officers, heads of relevant agencies, and members of the White House staff. Ultimately, struggles within the outer circle help to shape the decisions of those actors who can influence the government’s final decision (Allison and Zelikow 1999, 255-256).

**Main Tenants**

Authors Kozak and Keagle contend that “the bureaucratic politics approach emphasizes the political roles and relationships of bureaucracies, agencies and departments, and those who manage them” (Kozak 1988, 5). Through the works of George Appleby, Norton Long, Aaron Wildavsky, Francis Rourke, Graham Allison, Morton Halperin, and Guy Peters, Kozak pinpoints twelve major arguments of the bureaucratic politics model as summarized below.
1. Bureaucracy makes policy through the exercise of discretion. Due to the large amount of issues that a government handles, legislation alone cannot calculate the problems and issues ahead. For this reason, the President and Congress have been forced to delegate some of their tasks to bureaucrats.

2. Bureaucrats are influenced by political forces beyond those within the organization. These influences include lobbyists, citizen groups, elections, and nominating procedures. Put simply, decisions by bureaucrats can be heavily influenced by actors outside their organization.

3. Agency interests drive the bureaucracy. Participants who represent certain organizations are influenced by that organization’s mission, culture, and routines. Further, an individual’s organization determines their perspective of the issue, the stakes involved, and ultimately the stand that he or she will take during the decision-making process (Allison and Zelikow 1999, 276).

4. Agencies and bureaucracies compete for various stakes and prizes such as budget resources, additional personnel, morale, mission, autonomy, and essence. Further, organizations are constantly fighting for power, position, and prestige (Allison and Halperin 1972, 49). For this reason, organizations rarely introduce policy that will hurt their overall role or mission.

In dealing with reform legislation, the number of possible outcomes that organizations will find acceptable is severely limited. Organizations have their own interests and goals and will only lend support to new policies that help the organization meet its existing goals. On the other hand, policies that require the coordination of several organizations
are not likely to receive wide-spread support. For this reason, when a decision is not explicit in its language, the organizations responsible for implementing it, will seek to maximize its organizational interests (Allison and Halperin 1972, 49-55).

5. The continuous struggle for power between organizations creates a distinctive mindset within each agency. Those involved in national security decision-making often develop varying opinions of what the national security interest of a country is. According to Halperin and Clapp (2006), the manner in which individuals deal with the uncertainty involved in national security decision-making is determined by their “personal experiences, intellectual baggage, and psychological needs” as well as their position in the government bureaucracy. Participants of national security policy-making will view an issue differently depending on their particular concerns and where they sit within the bureaucracy. As a result, each participant will observe different dangers and opportunities.

Despite the differences that exist between organizations, there are a set of shared assumptions regarding values and facts in which they share. Perceptions of issues and arguments about national interest are accepted by most participants in bureaucratic politics. This set of shared attitudes and assumptions helps to shape participants’ national interests and acts as a basis for bureaucratic arguments. The majority of participants “interpret the actions of other nations to make them consistent with held images, rather than reexamining basic views.” Although not everyone within the bureaucracy will have these same beliefs, bureaucrats will have a tendency to act and argue as if they do believe
them. If they were to do otherwise, they would be discredited by other members of the bureaucracy (Allison and Halperin 1972, 56).

6. Within bureaucratic bargaining, there are various strategies that organizations use to successfully compete against one another. According to Francis Rourke, organizations will be more successful if they possess expertise, outside support, strong leadership, and organizational energy (Rourke 1984).

7. Decisions within bureaucracies are usually the result of considerable compromise or bargaining games. More specifically, governmental decisions are made by the pulling and hauling of many actors on the playing field. According to Allison and Halperin, within bureaucracies “compromise results from a need to gain adherence, a need to avoid harming strongly felt interests (including organizational interests), and the need to hedge against the dire predictions of other participants” (Allison and Halperin 1972, 53). Simply, policy involves “compromise, accommodation, and mutual adjustment” (Kozak 1988, 8).

8. Bureaucracies rely heavily on constituencies both in and outside the organization for political support and security. In return for this support, the clientele have a major say in the policies and decision-making process of the agency.

9. Bureaucrats interact with political institutions. Ad hoc committees, standing committees, and meetings offer important opportunities for bureaucrats to interact with political institutions and influence the decision-making process.

10. In the realm of bureaucratic politics, it is the responsibility of the president to coordinate, integrate, and synthesize bureaucratic politics. The president is responsible for reconciling conflicting interests and transforming them into harmonious government (Kozak 1988, 9).
Further, according to the bureaucratic politics approach, presidential decisions will be fully implemented when: a president has direct involvement in the policy-making process, he is explicit in his language, and the personnel that he placed in-charge have the authority to carry out the decision (Allison and Halperin 1972, 54).

11. Proposals for organizational change and reform are politically driven. Reorganizations occur because of political reasons and political motives. During times of reform, organizations are seen as political objectives and objects. In this regard, changes to an organizational structure are “attempts to provide greater influence to a different organization” (Hataley 2009, 4). Throughout the reform period, organizations develop their own positions on the issues involved and their own opinion of what would serve the agency’s best interests (Kozak 1988, 10). In order to ensure that their interests are served, opponents of a particular policy often make certain that it will be ruled out by predicting dire consequences if that option is passed (Halperin and Klapp 2006, 21).

A bureaucracy often reacts to a crisis by implementing major reform. Organizations understand this technique and will evaluate how the new policies will affect their future roles and missions. Throughout the reform process, organizations concerned with either expanding their mission, or preventing others from expanding theirs, are very alert to challenges and opportunities. As a result, organizations do not trust each other to not take advantage of the crisis (Halperin and Klapp 2006, 49).

12. The bureaucratic political process raises important questions regarding control, accountability, responsiveness, and responsibility in a democratic society. For example, as the number of actors with the ability to act independently on an issue increases, the
less likely the actions taken by the government are going to reflect the government’s decision on the issue (Allison and Halperin 1972, 54). If nothing else, the bureaucratic politics model describes a decision-making process that is less than ideal and almost contradictory to a system where policy-making is supposed to be in the hands of the elected official (Kozak 1988, 10).

**Standard Operating Procedures**

Standard operating procedures increase the “number, quality, and availability of products and the performance of both products and providers over any unorganized collection of individual amateurs” (Allison and Zelikow 1999, 148). Key documents within a government are gathered and created by a number of different agencies and organizations. In order for large amounts of information to be collected, analyzed, and disseminated to the appropriate officials in a timely manner, organizations must develop a set of standard operating procedures. Standard operating procedures allow organizations to successfully complete tasks in a way that is both reliable and easily understood. Further, standard operating procedures can be learned easily and completed by a large number of individuals. More importantly, standard operating procedures can influence the importance of each document that enters into the system (Halperin and Klapp 2006, 139-142).

Standard operating procedures, which define how tasks are to be performed, allow for little flexibility and creativity within an organization. Further, the existence of standard operating procedures has resulted in sluggish and sloppy work by bureaucrats. Standard operating procedures can be found within the attitude, culture, and operating style of an organization. Unfortunately, the deeper ingrained these procedures are in an organization; the more resistant to
change they will be (Allison and Zelikow 1999, 169-170). Ultimately, despite their usefulness, standard operating procedures may undo more innovative polices of higher level decision-makers (Hudson 2007, 19).

**Critiques of the Bureaucratic Politics Model**

According to Krasner, the bureaucratic politics model does not adequately represent the power of the president, removes high officials from responsibility, and allows leaders to excuse their failures. More specifically, Krasner argues that decision-makers “often do not stand where they sit.” For example, in 1966 and 1967, Secretary of State Dean Rusk argued for military action whereas Secretary of Defense McNamara strongly supported a diplomatic effort. Simply put, the perceptions and preferences of participants are not always due to their position within the government (Krasner 1972, 159-165). Richard Betts argues against the assumption of classifying all officials from one organization with the same mindset. For example, within the military there are differences between services, between branches, and between officers and those in the field. “Where officers stand often does depend on where they sit, but soldiers sit in different places” (Allison and Zelikow 1999, 277). Those within the military have different experiences, beliefs, and attitudes.

Krasner heavily criticizes the bureaucratic belief that departmental and presidential behaviors are independent and equally important. Instead, an organization can only further its interests by maintaining support for the president. A president chooses his advisors, controls their access to decision-making, and ultimately has the ability to strongly influence bureaucratic politics (Krasner 1972, 160-169). Put simply, the president exerts more authority and influence over foreign policy decisions than the bureaucratic politics model suggests. Similarly, critics of
the bureaucratic politics model argue that top political leaders within a government heavily influence bureaucrats. In this regard, bureaucrats develop their authority from the larger interests in society that they represent and their close relationships with members of congress (Guinier 2001, 96). Among critics, the bureaucratic politics model fails to examine how top government officials constrain the bureaucrats below them.

Art raises an important criticism regarding the pulling and hauling decision-making process within the bureaucratic politics model. More specifically, he argues that the model fails to specify how much all the bargaining and bureaucratic infighting below the President actually affects the President’s final decision. According to Art, even if a President plays just a small role in the decision-making process, the final decision cannot simply be the result of bureaucratic bargaining. The president has too much authority and influence for this to occur. Put simply, the bureaucratic politics model fails to acknowledge or contradict the idea that presidential perspectives can often override the preferences of bureaucrats’ (Art 1974, 474).
CHAPTER 3: HISTORY OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE REFORM

Throughout the 20th century, U.S. intelligence emerged as a bureaucratic activity with a difficult and complex management structure. Following World War II, as U.S. national security concerns increased and the complexity of intelligence missions grew, most intelligence activities were assigned to specific agencies or military branches. This arrangement eventually led to multiple, independent intelligence agencies and a recurring debate for a stronger, more centralized intelligence authority (Tidd 2008, 5). Despite minor changes in roles and functions, however, the national intelligence structure of the United States remained remarkably stable for fifty-seven years. It was not until 2004 with the passage of IRTPA that a major revision was made to the overall structure of the intelligence community (Lowenthal 2009, 19-20).

Proposals for intelligence reform have existed since the enactment of the National Security Act of 1947. Since then, at least 19 commissions, committees, and panels have made recommendations for structural reorganization. Many of these recommendations have called for a stronger centralized intelligence community and the establishment of a Director of National Intelligence (Cumming 2004, 1). Despite these calls for reorganization, very little real reform ever took place. Instead, U.S. intelligence reform throughout the second half of the 20th century was mired by bureaucratic resistance, turf battles, and an unwillingness to change. This chapter examines the history of U.S. intelligence reform prior to the attacks of September 11th, 2001, and through the bureaucratic politics model, attempts to explain the difficulties that prevented any major reform from taking place.
The Bureaucratic Politics Model and U.S. Intelligence Reform

The bureaucratic politics model attempts to explain the behavior of nations in international relations. The model argues that government decisions are not made by a single actor or a single decision. Instead, they are determined by the pulling and hauling of bureaucratic interests by a group of actors. According to Allison and Halperin, interests are divided into four categories: national security, organizational, domestic, and personal interests. In most cases, disagreements will arise on how a specific issue will affect national security interests. However, an organization can also greatly affect the perspective one develops regarding national security interests. For instance, members of an organization continually strive to maintain the health of their organization and consider its survival vital to national security. Therefore, an organization is careful to support only those policies that maintain its influence, ensure its mission, and secure necessary capabilities. Put simply, organizations are concerned with “maintaining autonomy and organizational morale, protecting the organization’s essence, maintaining or expanding roles and missions, and maintain increasing budgets” (Allison and Halperin 1972, 48).

Importantly, the bureaucratic politics model argues that organizations that fear change will refuse to acknowledge that new policies are needed. Since 1947, intelligence agencies have provided much support for this argument. In line with the bureaucratic politics model, the history of U.S. intelligence reform has been plagued with bureaucratic infighting, struggles for power, and competing interests. The sections below will describe the conflicts that have arisen since the passage of the National Security Act of 1947 and explain how interest driven intelligence agencies prevented any major reform from taking place.
Throughout World War II, the Army, Navy, and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) conducted collection, analysis, and counterintelligence activities. In addition, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) carried out these same services in support of the entire executive branch. Further, the expansion of U.S. intelligence activities led to covert activities that operated with little oversight or guidance. As a result, turf wars between the OSS, Army and Navy intelligence, FBI, State Department, and Army and Naval signals intelligence emerged throughout the war. Due to these conflicts, questions regarding the state of U.S. intelligence began to emerge at the end of World War II (Tidd 2008, 12-13).

According to the theory of bureaucratic politics, during negotiations between organizations, each agency will vie for an agreement that will allow it to pursue its own interests (Halperin and Clapp 2006, 52). Prior to the passage of the National Security Act of 1947, there were those that opposed strong intelligence management and oversight. For example, the Department’s of the Navy and Army did not want a central authority controlling their intelligence organizations. As a result, proposals for a strong central authority were discarded by the Joint Chiefs in 1944 and 1945. A Director of Central Intelligence responsible for the Central intelligence Group was developed by President Truman in 1946. This arrangement, however, was only meant to be a temporary solution (Tidd 2008, 12-13).

In 1947, the National Security Act established the legal framework for the United States intelligence community as well as established the CIA and the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). The Act’s main intention was to coordinate U.S. intelligence efforts in order to counter the threat posed by the Soviet Union. By 1947, the U.S. intelligence community consisted of the
intelligence components of the Armed Services, the Department of State and Treasury, the FBI, and the CIA. The Act tasked the CIA with “performing such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council (NSC) may from time to time direct” (Best 2004, 1). In response to resistance by those fearful of a centralized authority, the previous 1946 compromise remained intact within the National Security Act of 1947. In this case, the DCI would be responsible for coordinating the activities of the U.S. intelligence community, but would not have direct authority over any agency beyond the CIA (Tidd 2008, 12-13).

U.S. Intelligence Reform in the 1950s and 60s

Beginning in January 1948, proposals to reorganize the intelligence community started to emerge. These proposals included recommendations ranging from adjustments of the DCI’s budgetary responsibilities to the dissolution of the CIA and returning its functions to other agencies. Early attempts to restructure the intelligence community focused on the intelligence and operational missions of the CIA and the organizational loopholes in the National Security Act. By the 1950s, the increasing size and evolving missions of the intelligence community forced policymakers to expand their proposals to include the enhancement of the DCI’s community-wide authority and the establishment of executive and legislative branch intelligence oversight committees (Best 2004, 2). Despite these attempts, throughout the 1950s and 1960s, reform within the intelligence community was minimal and the DCI failed to gain the authority he needed to pursue his community-wide role.

According to the theory of bureaucratic politics, proposals for change are determined by political considerations. With this in mind, bureaucracies do not have a strong desire to change;
instead, they strive for self-preservation. The events described below will illustrate how the actors involved in intelligence reform adopted this bureaucratic state of mind and as a result successfully halted any chance of major reform from occurring.

The First Hoover Commission submitted its 121 page report to Congress on January 13th, 1949. The report concluded that the U.S. intelligence community was soundly constructed but was not yet working well. It determined that both the national security effort and the CIA were experiencing organizational shortcomings. The report also stated that the CIA must be the central organization of the U.S. intelligence community and recommended that a board, solely responsible for evaluating intelligence, be created (Best 2004, 4).

Three investigations into U.S. intelligence activities were conducted under President Eisenhower’s administration (1953-1961). These investigations, which attempted to strengthen coordination efforts throughout the intelligence community, resulted in a congressional oversight committee and a presidential advisory panel. The modern security clearance process was established, and the term “intelligence community” came into existence (Kellerhals 2004).

The Second Hoover Commission in 1953 became the first panel to suggest a more centralized intelligence community. The commission recommended that a position be established that would solely manage the CIA. The DCI, in this case, would focus all of his or her attention on the intelligence community. This recommendation, however, was either ignored or implemented differently by the various DCIs (Turner 2005, 149). In response to the Second Hoover Commission, President Eisenhower established the President’s Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities (PBCFIA). This group, made up of private citizens, was responsible for periodically reviewing intelligence activities. In one of its reviews, the board
noted the uneven attention that DCI Allen Dulles gave to his duties. As a result, the board attempted to strengthen the DCI’s intelligence community role by recommending that a new managerial body be created. This recommendation resulted in the establishment of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB). Unfortunately, the DCI gained very little authority as a result of the board (Lowenthal 1992, 27).

Two studies, conducted under President Kennedy’s administration, focused on the failed CIA-supported Bay of Pigs operation. Although both studies adequately pinpointed the failure of the operation, no real operational reform occurred (Kellerhals 2004). In 1961, John McCone became Director of Central Intelligence. McCone actively pursued his intelligence community responsibilities and was even able to gain some authority over overhead reconnaissance programs. This action ultimately increased the DCI’s collection requirements role through the USIB. McCone also created the National Intelligence Programs Evaluation office which was responsible for evaluating programs of intelligence agencies and for determining the effectiveness of the USIB. The program was limited in its authority but did allow the DCI to fulfill his community-wide responsibilities (Lowenthal 1992, 32).

**Intelligence Reform in the 1970s**

Following the failed invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs, the unsuccessful results of intervention in Vietnam, and the Watergate scandal, policymakers began to take a much more critical approach toward the national intelligence effort. In the mid-1970s, intelligence reform proposals included: the separation of the DCI and CIA director positions, the division of the CIA’s analytical and operational responsibilities, and the creation of congressional oversight committees. These investigations eventually led to the establishment of the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence as well as created a more rigorous legal framework for intelligence activities (Best 2004, 2). Unfortunately, little structural change occurred within the intelligence community and the DCI gained little authority during this period.

During the Nixon Administration, attempts were made to improve the community responsibilities of the DCI. The Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee (IRAC) was established in 1971 to advise the DCI on “the preparation of a consolidated budget for the community’s intelligence programs.” The committee, however, lacked the authority to give the DCI control of the intelligence budget. In 1972, the Intelligence Community Staff (ICS) was established under DCI Helms. The ICS was intended to help the DCI oversee the collection and production aspects of the intelligence community. Unfortunately, the ICS did not provide the DCI with the legal authority necessary to fulfill an expanded community-wide role (Best 2004, 17).

The Schlesinger Report of 1971 recommended reform options that ranged from mild to dramatic degrees of centralization. More specifically, the report recommended that an Intelligence Community leader be created in order to manage the entire intelligence community. The report determined that this position could be anything from a new coordinator in the White House to a director of national intelligence that maintained control over the intelligence budget and personnel. The report also made similar recommendations for the manager of the defense intelligence agencies. It determined that changes within the Department of Defense could make a significant impact on the allocation and management of resources and reduce the overall size of the intelligence budget (CIA, 2008).
The Schlesinger Report’s more dramatic proposals would have required new legislation and were, therefore, not highly regarded among those in the Nixon administration (CIA, 2008). As a result, President Nixon decided to increase the powers of the DCI rather than conform to the commission’s suggestions. A deputy to the DCI for Community Affairs was established as well as an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. Additionally, the military cryptologic organizations were combined into a Central Security Service under the National Security Agency and the Defense Mapping Agency was created (Murray 2007, 17).

The bureaucratic politics model states that an organization will only favor a new policy if this policy will increase the organization’s importance within the government (Halperin and Klapp 2006, 38). Schlesinger himself became DCI in early 1973 with the belief that the position should have more authority over the intelligence community. As a result, Schlesinger reduced the size of both the CIA’s Directorate of Operations and Directorate of Intelligence. He also actively participated in the drafting of National Intelligence Estimates. Unfortunately, Schlesinger’s time as DCI was cut short when President Nixon nominated him to be secretary of defense in the spring of 1973 (Lowenthal 1992, 36-37). Despite his short time in power, Schlesinger ensured that every subsequent DCI would oversee the preparation of the intelligence budget, establish intelligence requirements and priorities, and guarantee the quality of intelligence products (CIA, 2008).

The Church Commission, conducted during revelations about CIA assassination plots, made 183 recommendations on April 26, 1976. Following the committee’s recommendations, the Senate Intelligence Committee developed the “National Intelligence Reorganization and Reform Act of 1978.” This legislation called for a Director of National Intelligence that would serve as
the head of the intelligence community. In this case, the DNI would maintain control of the CIA but would have the option of delegating this responsibility to a Deputy or Assistant Director. (Johnson 2007, 228) The bureaucratic politics model argues that an organization will only accept functions “if it believes that to refuse to do so would be to jeopardize its position with senior officials.” Otherwise, organizations are mindful of new personnel with new skills and ideas that might seek to change the organization’s essence (Halperin and Klapp 2006, 39-40). In support of this argument, the Carter Administration eventually withdrew its support for intelligence reform legislation among growing concerns that intelligence would be too restricted with so much regulation (Johnson 2007).

Between 1974 and 1981, six public investigations were conducted by both the White House and Congress. These investigations focused on intelligence operations and the adequacy of intelligence organizations. In response to their findings, the investigations recommended several corrective measures including a DCI that operated separate from any single organization. In this regard, the DCI would oversee and coordinate the entire intelligence community, eliminate duplication, and evaluate performance and efficiency. In the years following these investigations, Presidents Ford, Carter, and Reagan all issued executive orders that established regulations for the organization and management of the intelligence community (Kellerhals 2004). For example, under President Ford, the DCI became the president’s primary intelligence advisor and gained responsibility for the development of the National Foreign Intelligence Program. Despite this increase in community-wide authority, the DCI still maintained the management responsibilities of the CIA. In 1978, President Carter issued Executive Order 12036 which slightly clarified the DCI’s community-wide authorities regarding budget, tasking,
intelligence review, coordination, intelligence dissemination, and foreign liaison. In 1981, President Reagan issued Executive Order 12333 which described the roles, responsibilities, missions, and activities of the intelligence community. Through this order, the DCI was granted more authority over the development, implementation, and evaluation of the National Foreign Intelligence Program (Best 2004, 17).

In 1985, Admiral Stansfield Turner argued that the DCI and CIA director positions should be separated. He recommended that a separate director of national intelligence be created who would be bureaucratically above the director of the CIA. Despite Admiral Turner’s attempts, his proposal failed to gain support from both congress and the White House (Kellerhals 2004).

**Intelligence Reform in the 1990s**

By the late 1990s, the intelligence community consisted of 13 different agencies. The largest of these agencies (CIA, NSA, National Reconnaissance Office, and National Imagery and Mapping Agency) developed the reputation of being “stovepipes” because they were vertically structured organizations that focused on specific function such as signals, imagery, and human intelligence. This structure led some to question whether the intelligence agencies were working cooperatively together (Tidd 2008, 16). At the end of the Cold War, studies were conducted by both the executive and legislative branches to determine the future roles, capabilities, management, and structure of the intelligence community. These studies included such issues as the competence of U.S. counterintelligence, the expanded use of open source intelligence, and the DCI’s roles and responsibilities. Although some changes did take place in the mid-1990s, these results were minimal (Best 2004, 2).
In 1992, the Senate Intelligence Committee and the House Intelligence Committee attempted to significantly overhaul the intelligence community. In 1992, Senator David Boren and Representative David McCurdy drafted legislation calling for the creation of a DNI with authority over the intelligence budget and personnel. The legislation failed to gain adequate support due to opposition from the Department of Defense and the congressional Armed Services Committees. Some of the recommendations, however, were included in the 1994 intelligence budget authorization legislation (Best 2004, 18).

Throughout 1995 and 1996, the Aspin/Brown Commission and the Intelligence Community in the 21st Century attempted to increase congressional oversight and expand the DCI’s authority. These two inquiries resulted in legislation that increased the number of deputy directors of central intelligence and established a deputy director to specifically manage the intelligence community. The DCI was also given the ability to develop the National Foreign Intelligence Program’s annual budget (Kellerhals 2004). Further, the DCI’s Community Management Staff was granted a larger staff and more funding. Ultimately, however, the Pentagon and the Senate and House Armed Services Committees were successfully able to thwart drastic measures that would have given the DCI real authority (Johnson 2007).

The Aspin/Brown Commission also discussed placing the entire intelligence budget under the control of the DCI. According to the bureaucratic politics model, changes to the organizational structure are considered to be attempts to provide a different organization with greater influence (Kozak 1998, 9-10). In line with this statement, both Brown and Aspin argued that the Secretary of Defense would not be willing to accept the DCI’s authority over the military intelligence spending. Thus, instead of increasing the DCI’s authority through legislation, Brown
insisted that the members of the commission urge the Secretary of Defense to make certain changes. Ultimately, the commission recommended the creation of special intelligence deputies that would assist the DCI. The commission also stated that the DCI should have more authority over who would run the other intelligence agencies within the community. In the end, however, the DCI would not have authority over the budgets of each intelligence agency (Johnson 2007).

**DCI v. D/CIA**

The initial architects of the U.S. intelligence structure expected that the CIA, under the DCI, would be a central organization that could coordinate the contrasting intelligence coming from the State Department and the military branches. Fairly soon though, as the CIA began to take on analytical and operational responsibilities, the demands of the two jobs, DCI and Director of CIA, became immensely burdensome. As a result, the DCI focused less on the community-wide role and focused more on the sensitive projects of the CIA (Lowenthal 2009, 300). In simple terms, the interests of the CIA became superior to the interests of the intelligence community at large. This development ultimately produced an inequality of resources, access, and performance (Tucker 2008, 50).

Despite the responsibilities assigned to the position, the DCI lacked the power and authority to effectively control the intelligence community (Malfatto 2007, 4). The Director had no authority over domestic intelligence and could only “facilitate the development” of the intelligence budget. More than 85 percent of the National Foreign Intelligence Program resources were appropriated to agencies other than the CIA, and therefore remained beyond the DCI’s direct control. As a result, the DCI only had exclusive budget authority over the CIA. The
DCI also lacked the ability to move funding and personnel within or across the intelligence community (Cumming 2004, 57-65).

On a day to day basis, the Secretary of Defense controlled more of the intelligence community than the DCI. The Secretary maintained control of the NSA, the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA), and other defense intelligence activities. The Secretary of Defense also had the authority to appoint principal agency heads for these organizations. Because of this structure, the DCI’s authority was continually challenged by others within the intelligence community as well as those throughout the larger U.S. government (Lowenthal 2009, 29).

Arguably, the merging of the DCI and the Director of the CIA was understandable as long as the intelligence community remained small. As the intelligence community grew in size though, the responsibilities became too great for one person to fulfill. For most of the position’s existence, the DCI acted as the President’s chief intelligence adviser, the coordinator of all the foreign-intelligence agencies, and the manager of the CIA. (Posner 2006, 58-59).

Conclusion

"Without intrusive oversight -- intrusive oversight -- or forces beyond the control of the bureaucracy, the bureaucracy will refuse to change" (McConnell 2010). For over fifty years, the intelligence community did little to implement the drastic reforms discussed above. Instead, the community decided to focus on some minor changes that did not affect the overall structure and functioning of the intelligence community. In the end, bureaucratic resistance from the White House, members of congress, intelligence agencies, and the Department of Defense ensured that little would change in the world of intelligence.
CHAPTER 4: INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004

Reactions to the attacks of September 11th, the failure to discover weapons of mass destruction in Iraq (despite intelligence estimates that indicated otherwise) and, in particular, the 2004 release of the 9/11 Commission report all led to the passage of IRTPA (Lowenthal 2009, 27). IRTPA established the position of the Director of National Intelligence, a separate director for the Central Intelligence Agency, and the number, duties, and qualifications of senior intelligence officials (Paulson 2008, 51). Since IRTPA was enacted, significant initiatives have been implemented and the intelligence community has undertaken its most extensive reorganization since the end of World War II. The reform process, however, is far from over.

Despite calls for intelligence reform, IRTPA’s debate within Congress was not a smooth and conflict-free process. Instead, it was driven by organizational interests and an intense struggle for power, position, and prestige. The result was a piece of legislation that is vague in its instructions and unclear in its objectives. This chapter will discuss the specific intentions of IRTPA as well as the changes that have occurred within the intelligence community since 2004. Further, through the bureaucratic politics model, this chapter will describe the difficulties that occurred prior to and during the passage of the legislation.

The Intelligence Community Prior to 9/11

The emergence of Usama Bin Ladin and Jihadist terrorism marked a change in the type of threat that confronted the intelligence community. Throughout the Cold War, most terrorist activities were carried out by state sponsored, radical left, and ethno-nationalist groups. It was not until after the first bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993, that the intelligence
community realized it was dealing with a new type of terrorism that did not conform to the Cold War model. Unfortunately, bureaucratic struggles, a reduction of funding, a shortage of language specialists, and a lack of information sharing all contributed to the intelligence community’s failure to successfully adapt to this changing security framework (United States 2002, 4).

Prior to September 11, 2001, the intelligence community was disorganized and ill-equipped to deal with global terrorists. Although significant relevant information was available to the intelligence community prior to the 9/11 attacks, the agencies “too often failed to focus on that information and consider and appreciate its collective significance.” This failure was a result of the major gaps that existed between the collection coverage provided by U.S. foreign and U.S. domestic intelligence capabilities. Foreign intelligence agencies did not pay sufficient attention to the possibility of a domestic attack. For example, the CIA failed to closely monitor suspected terrorists, and as a result, the agency did not place 9/11 hijackers Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi on the terrorist watchlist. Similarly, the counterterrorism effort in the United States lacked effective domestic intelligence capability. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was unable to correctly identify and monitor the extent of activity by al-Qa’ida and other international terrorist groups operating in the United States (United States 2002, XV).

Prior to 9/11, the intelligence community was structured in such a way that agencies acted more like individual units scattered throughout the government than an integrated community (Malfatto 2007, 2-3). Although multiple intelligence agencies produced reports on Usama Bin Ladin and al-Qa’ida more than three years before 9/11, “there were no complete authoritative portraits of his strategy and the extent of his organization’s involvement in past
terrorist attacks,” nor was there a comprehensive counterterrorist strategy for combating the organization (United States 2002, XVI).

Elements within the intelligence community did not adequately share relevant counterterrorism information. At the time, the information known about Bin Ladin and an imminent terrorist attack was not circulated well enough and sometimes not at all throughout the intelligence community. This lack of communication also existed between the different intelligence and law enforcement agencies and even within the agencies themselves (Malfatto 2007, 5). This failure to share information was the result of differences in the missions, legal authorities, and cultures of the individual intelligence agencies (United States 2002, XVII).

Between the end of the Cold War and September 11, 2001, the annual funding for the intelligence community either decreased or remained even. Because of an increase of intelligence priorities, a troublesome requirements process, the decline in funding, and reliance on supplemental appropriations, the U.S. intelligence community found it difficult to disperse community resources effectively against the growing terrorist threat. CIA officials state that, prior to 9/11, overall resources were limited and that any increased focus on counterterrorism would have meant that other issues would have had to receive less attention. Within the Counterterrorism Center, an intelligence community center, the staff and resources dedicated to counterterrorism could not even keep up with the incoming intelligence reporting (Strasser 2004, 494).

Before 9/11, the intelligence community also lacked the language specialists and language-qualified field officers needed to translate critical languages used by terrorists. For example, former Director for Gulf Affairs at the NSC and former CIA military analyst, Kenneth
Pollack, is considered to be an expert on the Persian Gulf. Yet, he is not competent in Farsi. In his book, *The Persian Puzzle*, Pollack confesses that it would have been helpful to know Farsi and that his lack of language capability most likely forced him to miss several nuances in thinking about Iran (Pollack 2004, 27). Additionally, prior to 9/11, the Language Readiness Index for NSA personnel working on counterterrorism was 30 percent. This index is based on the percentage of the mission that is being performed by qualified language analysts. The intelligence community also had difficulty recruiting clandestine officers with the language capabilities necessary to successfully recruit foreign agents in the Middle East and South Asia. The Director of the CIA language school stated that, following 9/11, the CIA Directorate of Operations was “not fully prepared to fight a worldwide war on terrorism and at the same time carry out its traditional agent recruitment and intelligence collection mission” (Strasser 2004, 498-499).

Lacking the appropriate language personnel, intelligence agencies often experienced backlogs in material waiting to be translated (United States 2002, XVI). Although the FBI employed a number of Arabic speakers, 35 percent of the Arabic language material collected was never reviewed or translated. By 2004, the FBI had failed to successfully translate more than one hundred and twenty thousand hours of recordings related to terrorist activities around the time of 9/11. Currently, up to 90 percent of the documents and communication transcripts collected by intelligence agencies remain untouched due to the lack of skilled translators (Johnson 2007, 68).

**The White House Prior to 9/11**

Essentially, U.S. policy towards al-Qa’ida developed following the 1998 embassy bombings in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi. Although these tragedies provided a unique opportunity
for the U.S. government to conduct a full examination of the security threat Bin Ladin and al-Qa’ida posed, the major policy agencies of the U.S. government failed to act on this opportunity (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 2004, 348-349). According to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, “despite sharpened focus in the years before 9/11, terrorism remained only one concern of many and counterterrorism efforts had to compete with other priorities.” The Joint Inquiry also found the process for establishing intelligence priorities vague and confusing and it determined that neither the Clinton nor the Bush Administration developed an integrated counterterrorism strategy prior to September 11, 2001 (Bolton 2008, 138).

In 1993, Mir Amal Kansi murdered two CIA employees just outside CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia. The murders, along with the World Trade Center bombing and Saddam Hussein’s plot to assassinate former President George H.W. Bush in 1993, made counterterrorism a top foreign policy priority for the first time. During 1995 and 1996, President Clinton devoted a significant amount of time seeking cooperation from other nations in denying sanctuary to terrorists, proposed significantly larger budgets for the FBI, and supported CIA requests for supplemental funds for counterterrorism (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 2004, 100-101).

In 1995, the NSC developed presidential decision directive (PDD) 35, which formally established terrorism as a top intelligence priority. Later that year, PDD 39 became the first NSC document on terrorism since the Reagan administration. The Directive stated that the United States should “deter, defeat, and respond vigorously to all terrorist attacks on our territory and
against our citizens.” It considered terrorism both a matter of national security and a crime, and the directive assigned specific responsibilities to certain agencies (Bolton 2008, 139).

Following the 1998 embassy bombings in Africa, al-Qa’ida and Bin Ladin came to dominate U.S. counterterrorism efforts. The NSC released two directives, PDD 62 and 63, establishing counterintelligence as a national security instrument and created procedures for responding to terrorist attacks on the United States. President Clinton gave the CIA permission “to disrupt and preempt terrorist operations planned abroad by al-Qa’ida” and authorized the killing of Bin Ladin (Richelson 2008, 415).

Throughout the Clinton administration, the NSC and other government agencies were aware of the serious threat posed by al-Qa’ida and they began to formulate national security objectives to disrupt nonstate transnational threats. President Clinton even launched cruise missiles on an al-Qa’ida training camp in an attempt to kill Bin Ladin in August 1999. By this time however, President Clinton’s second term in office was nearing its end and due to the arrival of the incoming administration, important counterterrorism decisions were deferred. Unfortunately, this occurred just as al-Qa’ida was preparing an attack on U.S. soil (Bolton 2008, 139).

According to the 9/11 Commission, “significant continuity in counterterrorism policy” existed between the Clinton and Bush administrations throughout the transition (Bolton 2008, 145). Yet prior to 9/11, the Bush administration did not focus on Usama Bin Ladin and al-Qa’ida as closely as did the previous administration. This weakened focus can be attributed to a series of bureaucratic complications as well as the administration’s preference for other foreign policy issues.
Although the Bush administration did not take a passive approach towards foreign policy prior to 9/11, it did not consider terrorism in South Asia to be a top priority. The 9/11 Commission indicated that “between the January inauguration of the new administration and early September, no NSC principals’ meeting was held on al-Qa’ida or to discuss al-Qa’ida”. In fact, the first NSC principals’ meeting on al-Qa’ida occurred just one week prior to the 9/11 attacks (Bolton 2008, 148). The administration focused more on issues regarding China, nuclear proliferation, and the peace process in the Middle East. In the first half of 2001, ballistic missile defense was considered to be the “keystone of the administration’s foreign policy” and consumed more of the Bush foreign policy team’s attention than any other issue (Naftali 2006, 290).

The Bush Administration eventually addressed Usama Bin Ladin and al-Qa’ida. When terrorism was finally discussed in April 2001, President Clinton’s chief counterterrorism advisor, Richard Clarke, encountered skepticism from Paul Wolfowitz, the then U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense. Wolfowitz argued that Bin Ladin was more inefficient than Clarke believed, and doubted Bin Ladin was an actual terrorist mastermind. The Pentagon’s reluctance to accept Usama Bin Ladin as a serious threat significantly hindered Clark’s effort to make Bin Ladin as important to the new administration as he had been to the old one (Naftali 2006, 293).

The Bush administration also faced numerous bureaucratic struggles that complicated attempts to successfully deal with al-Qa’ida. Prior to 9/11, the new NSC team was learning lessons the previous NSC team had already learned on its watch. For example, the NSC needed to examine the possible consequences of increasing aid to the Northern Alliance. If the U.S. increased aid, it risked upsetting Pakistan as well as Afghanistan’s Pashtun majority, both of
whose support the U.S. hoped to gain in the fight against Islamist terrorism. Unfortunately, the
Bush administration’s NSC was beginning to come to agreement on these important issues and
how they affected U.S. national security when it was already too late. Similarly, in May 2001,
the White House announced that Vice President Dick Cheney would head a task force to
examine worst-case scenarios regarding weapons of mass destruction and attacks on the United
States. Because of untimely actions, the events of 9/11 occurred before any examination could be
conducted (Bolton 2008, 147-149).

One can only speculate as to whether a timelier handling of the threats might have
prevented the attacks of September 11, 2001. The misuse of time, effort, and resources caused an
unnecessary rift in communication amid the Bush administration. Had this gap not existed,
perhaps a more collaborative effort could have emerged to prevent the results.

**Passing Reform Legislation**

Although the idea of a centralized intelligence director first surfaced in 1955, legislators
did not adopt the measure. Since that time, numerous proposals have received bureaucratic and
political resistance. The Bay of Pigs, congressional investigations into CIA abuses, the Iran-
Contra affair, and the Aldrich Ames spy case all generated major investigations and only minor
changes to the intelligence community. Intelligence reform, including Senate advocacy for a
DNI, reemerged once again after the fall of the Soviet Union, but major change did not follow
(Tucker 2008, 48).

Between the end of the Cold War and the 9/11 attacks, nearly a dozen reports by
Congress, special study groups, and think tanks urged as many as 340 reforms with repeated
emphasis on appointing a national intelligence director separate from the CIA. At no point did
the intelligence community fully rally behind this idea, likely because it threatened their budgets and autonomy. To make matters worse, both Congress and the White House appeared to be indifferent to the issue as a major initiative (Tucker 2008, 48). The long struggle to reform intelligence illustrates that the simple recognition of problems and inadequate performance levels do not guarantee that major change will occur. Instead, it demonstrates that the bureaucratic system is slow. Only when a bureaucracy is really pushed to change will any major action actually take place (Halperin and Klapp 2006, 99).

Unlike previous intelligence reform proposals, Congress widely accepted IRTPA and quickly passed it into legislation. This exception can be attributed to the political environment created by the attacks of September 11, 2001. According to the bureaucratic politics model, changes in the shared images of a society can cause a change in the overall domestic mood. Suddenly, al-Qa’ida and Usama bin Laden became household names, the public’s opinion of their safety and security shifted, and counterterrorism became the forefront of U.S. national security. 9/11 also produced record levels of public support for President Bush and increased bipartisan support in Congress. In addition, the public’s high expectations that the federal government would protect the United States provided a significant amount of support for reorganization that had previously been missing (Conley 2006, 308). Additional failures by the intelligence community on Iraq and the release of the 9/11 Commission Report caused further public outrage that made it impossible for the intelligence community to remain unchanged. Put simply, IRTPA and the current intelligence structure would not have emerged in the form or at the time that it did had 9/11 not occurred.
Those advocating change are most likely to increase awareness to a problem when an event occurs that creates an opportunity for change that did not exist prior to the event, or when the cost of continuing to operate without change becomes too great. More specifically, the type of political environment that 9/11 created was considered by pro-reform individuals to be an opportunity to advance reform policies and bring about major change. Further, once it is determined that the environment is right for change, those within the bureaucracy directly involved in the issue become aware of the move toward change (Halperin and Klapp 2006, 100-119).

In December 2001, Senators John McCain and Joseph Lieberman introduced legislation to establish a special commission to investigate the events surrounding 9/11. In November 2002, President George W. Bush created The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (known as the 9/11 Commission), to conduct a detailed fact-finding study and analysis (Lahneman 2007, 75). The President directed the Commission to “investigate and report to the President and Congress on its findings, conclusions, and recommendations for corrective measures that can be taken to prevent acts of terrorism” (Posner 2005, 6). Its final report appeared in July 2004 with numerous recommendations intended to restructure the intelligence community.

Following the release of the commission’s recommendations, both the Senate and the House intelligence committees began drafting their own reform legislation. The Senate’s bill called for the creation of a DNI and the National Counterterrorism Center. The bill also created the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board as well as a number of measures that promoted competitive analysis and analysts’ separation from politicization. Most importantly, the bill gave
the DNI unlimited authority to move personnel and funds in order to appropriately counter emerging threats. Differing from the Senate version, the House bill developed a DNI with limited authorities and an extremely small staff. It also covered a broad range of counterterrorism issues such as immigration and criminal penalties and called for the creation of a National Counterterrorism Center that would strictly deal with high-level strategy (Lederman 2005, 84).

Typically, large scale executive reorganizations are the results of crises and the related legislation tends to move hastily through the normally prolonged processes of Congress. Legislators are more likely to act swiftly in order to achieve the goals that the proposed legislation promises and also to be seen as responding to the crisis (Fenster 2008, 49). For example, the passage of the National Security Act of 1947 was hurried by the deregulation of the wartime economy following World War II, the emergence of the Cold War, and the development of new technologies (Conley 2006, 308). Similarly, the attacks of 9/11 combined with a fiercely contested presidential election, the absence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, and intense pressure from the public placed a great deal of stress on members of congress to quickly embrace and pass IRTPA.

By September there was a bill in Congress to enact the Commission’s principal recommendations. A brilliant public relations effort made by the 9/11 commission, its staff, and some families of the victims of the September 11th attacks enabled the bill to sweep through Congress and the Bush administration after brief debate and intense bargaining (Lowenthal 2009, 29). The proposition became law, under the name of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 when the President signed the bill on December 17, 2004 (Posner 2006, 2).
Despite the speed in which Congress passed IRTPA, the intense debate leading up to the final legislation was both interest and culture driven. Organizations rarely suggest options that could possibly lead to changes in their roles and missions. If these options are proposed by another organization, they may argue that the options are impossible to successfully implement (Halperin and Klapp 2006, 50). For example, during the 2004 debate regarding IRTPA legislation, the Department of Defense adamantly sought to preserve all of its authority, role, and mission. Its main concerns included preserving the authority of the Secretary of Defense and intelligence support for military operations (Lowenthal 2009, 300). More specifically, throughout the debate in Congress, many DOD supporters argued that a powerful DNI would “hurt the warfighters” (Lederman 2005, 98).

Bureaucrats rely on outside influences such as influential members of Congress, interest groups, and major groups within the president’s political party to gain support for their position. In particular, senior military officers have become quite influential due their relationship with leading members of Congress. Further, in defining the national interest of the United States, many within Congress have adopted the military stance on the issue. The military has also become very influential due to its ability to make its views known outside of the executive branch (Halperin and Klapp 2006, 238). As a result, the DOD was able to gain a fair amount of support from members of the Armed Services Committees. Ultimately, the opposition expressed by the Department of Defense and its allies in Congress guaranteed that the DNI’s ability to manage the military intelligence, combat support agencies, and the service intelligence centers would be limited. Further, Congress and the Bush administration did not support a proposal that
would have moved intelligence activities and the associated budget out of the Defense Department (Best 2008, 54).

Since 2004, the intelligence community has experienced a period of transformation, with major new offices and relationships developing. IRTPA seeks to improve information sharing, unity of effort, and accountability in the intelligence community by reorganizing the community’s management structure as well as reforming its collection, analysis, and dissemination functions.

**Director of National Intelligence**

The 9/11 Commission examined the issue of intelligence organization and recommended the creation of a Director of National Intelligence who would (1) oversee national intelligence centers on specific subjects of interest, (2) manage the national intelligence program, and (3) oversee the agencies that contribute to that program (Richelson 2008, 454). As a result, IRTPA established the position of Director of National Intelligence and a separate director for the CIA. Further, before 2004, U.S. law defined intelligence as being of two types: foreign and domestic. IRTPA redefined intelligence to mean “national intelligence” with three subsets: foreign, domestic, and homeland security. The DNI became responsible for coordinating domestic and foreign intelligence (Lowenthal 2009, 29).

Currently, the DNI revises intelligence institutions, rules, and relationships to meet current intelligence needs as well as ensures the integration of foreign and domestic intelligence collection and analysis (McConnell 2007, 49). The DNI maintains access to all intelligence and ensures the distribution of this intelligence across the intelligence community as appropriate. The DNI also maintains legal responsibility for the protection of intelligence sources and methods.
(Lowenthal 2009, 29). IRTPA authorized an additional 500 personnel and incorporated the National Intelligence Council into the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, giving the DNI a much larger staff than the DCI (Posner 2006, 58).

IRTPA reduced the community-wide responsibilities of the CIA director. The DNI replaced the Director of Central Intelligence as the senior intelligence official as well as head of the intelligence community, the NSC, and the Homeland Security Council. IRTPA further determined that the President’s Daily Brief, formerly prepared by the CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence and submitted to the President by the CIA Director, would now fall under the responsibilities of the DNI (Posner 2006, 73). The Director of the CIA would act as the National Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Manager and oversee the National Clandestine Service’s HUMINT collection (Best 2008, 68).

IRTPA provides the DNI with broad budgetary authority, but also gives the President the power to issue guidelines to ensure that the DNI acts in such a way that does not “abrogate the statutory responsibilities of the heads of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and Cabinet departments” (Best 2008, 59). Section 102A(c)(1)(B) gives the DNI the authority to “develop and determine” the budget of all the intelligence community agencies. It also delegates responsibility over how and when OMB disperses money to the Cabinet departments for their agencies. Even so, the money still flows to individual departments and not to the DNI. According to Senator Pat Roberts (R-KS), then-chairman of the Senate Committee on Intelligence, IRTPA gave the DNI “marginally improved budget authorities over our intelligence community agencies” (Warner 2006).
The DNI is responsible for consolidating a budget, overhauling personnel, security, and technology policies, ensuring that information is fully shared throughout the intelligence community, and eliminating waste and duplication. Despite these responsibilities, the DNI does not have authority over major Department of Defense programs (Posner 2006, 55-56). In fact, the Secretary of Defense still controls 75-80 percent of the intelligence agencies and their budgets.

Although IRTPA gave extensive budgetary and management authority of the NSA, NRO, and NGA to the DNI, the act did not reduce the Secretary of Defense’s general responsibilities to these organizations. The DNI’s principal deputy is outranked by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the service chiefs, and the senior civilian leadership of the Defense Department (Posner 2006, 76). This lack of authority could affect the DNI’s ability to maneuver against other principals in the intelligence community. Ultimately, IRTPA requires the DNI and the Secretary of Defense to work in close cooperation with each other. The legislation however, also provides opportunities for disagreements that could complicate the intelligence reform process and the conduct of intelligence activities (Best 2008, 54).

IRTPA also limited the DNI’s ability to transfer personnel between existing agencies or to new intelligence organizations. The DNI can only transfer 100 employees to a new intelligence center. The DNI can transfer employees to an agency, but for no more than two years and only if the transfer is to positions that are more crucial to national security than the transferees’ current positions. The transfer must also occur via an agreement with procedures that must be worked out between the DNI and the transferor agencies (Posner 2006, 173).
New Agencies

IRTPA created the Joint Intelligence Community Council (JICC) to help the DNI with developing and implementing a joint unified national intelligence effort. The JICC consists of the DNI, the Attorney General, and the secretaries of State, Treasury, Defense, Energy, and Homeland Security, along with any others that the president may designate (Richelson 2008, 456). Under DNI McConnell the JICC fell away in favor of the Executive Committee (EXCOM), which McConnell created. EXCOM consists of the DNI, the heads of all the intelligence agencies, and senior policy makers. The goal of EXCOM is to bring together policy customers and senior intelligence officials to ensure that the intelligence community is providing necessary support (Lowenthal 2009, 37).

Another major recommendation of the 9/11 Commission was the creation of a National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). The center, a home for joint intelligence and operational planning, would be staffed by personnel from the CIA, FBI, and other agencies. The Commission recommended that the NCTC’s operational planning duties should include assigning operational responsibilities to agencies such as the State Department, FBI, CIA, Defense Department, combatant commands, and the Department of Homeland Security. The Center would not control the actual execution of operations, but rather, it would track their implementation through the operational agencies (Richelson 2008, 464-465).

In August 2004, President Bush issued an executive order establishing the NCTC, under the supervision of the DCI. The NCTC is responsible for analyzing all intelligence acquired by the United States government related to terrorism or counterterrorism, with the exception of domestic counterterrorism information. The NCTC is also responsible for the mission of
strategic operational planning for counterterrorism activities (Best 2008, 58). Section 1021 of IRTPA shifted control of the NCTC to the DNI. The act also specified that the NCTC would report directly to the President regarding counterterrorist operations and to the DNI regarding budget, programs, and activities (Richelson 2008, 465).

IRTPA established the National Counterproliferation Center (NCPC) to act as “a central feature of counter proliferation activities.” The act suggested that the center include physical interdiction by air, sea, or land of weapons of mass destruction as well as enhanced law enforcement activities to identify and disrupt proliferation networks, activities, organizations, and persons (Bolton 2008, 308). In December, 2005, the DNI officially established the NCPC. The center currently coordinates strategic planning within the intelligence community regarding weapons of mass destruction and related delivery systems. The NCPC also identifies intelligence gaps in collection, analysis, and exploitation and develops solutions to fill these gaps (United States 2005).

**Intelligence Activities**

The 9/11 Commission concluded that the intelligence community needed to improve its coordination of collection activities, analysis, distribution, and production as well as revitalize its clandestine operations (Lahneman 2007, 76). Insufficient analytic focus and quality hindered the intelligence community’s understanding of al-Qa’ida. Some intelligence agencies considered analysis (and analysts) to be of less importance to counterterrorism missions than were operation personnel. As a result, analysts were not always used effectively. On the other hand, many analysts were inexperienced, unqualified, under-trained, and lacked access to critical information. This situation created both a shortage of creative, aggressive analysis focusing on
Bin Ladin and an inability to understand the overall significance of individual pieces of intelligence. As a result, U.S. policymakers did not understand the full nature of the threat and therefore could not make fully informed decisions (United States 2002, XVI).

IRTPA contains several provisions intended to improve analysis. These include an institutionalized mechanism for alternate analyses, the designation of an individual to ensure that intelligence products are timely, objective, and separate from political considerations, and an official within the ODNI to whom analysts can turn to for counsel regarding problems of analytical tradecraft or politicization and biased reporting (Best 2008, 63). As of May 2006, the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis had conducted an inventory of subject-matter expertise, appointed an analytic ombudsman to address concerns about the analytical process, and created an Analytic Integrity and Standards Unit to evaluate intelligence analysis procedures (United States 2006, 7).

Additionally, the Integrated Collection Architecture develops objectives and implementation goals that attempt to meet analysts’ needs, directs future collection investment decisions, and identifies shortfalls in collection capabilities. Since 2004, the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis has created the Analytic Resources Catalog as well as expanded the President’s Daily Brief (PDB) to include contributions beyond the traditional CIA input (United States 2007, 3). The Analytic Resources Catalog allows specialists to find one another among the 17,000 names listed and permits managers to find the right individuals to solve specific problems. Prior to this directory, no one person could specify how many analysts in the intelligence community worked on specific issues such as Iraq, Afghanistan, or terrorism.
Previously, the CIA had trouble enrolling participants when it launched the project; yet the DNI has managed to overcome such resistance (Tucker 2008, 50).

The DNI also launched the Library of National Intelligence, which acts as a searchable collection of all disseminated intelligence products. It is designed to collect all intelligence assessments from across the community with the goal of becoming a platform for information sharing. It officially came online in November 2007 and now contains more than 250,000 documents, with approximately 3,000 documents added daily. For the first time, analysts are able to search an intelligence repository that includes all disseminated products (Kerr 2008, 2).

HUMINT

The intelligence community did not adequately develop and use human sources to infiltrate al-Qa’ida. As a result, the community lacked reliable and knowledgeable human sources and was unable to acquire intelligence that may have been influential prior to the attacks (United States 2002, XVII). Policymakers deemed missions to infiltrate agents into al-Qa’ida to be too dangerous and therefore did not attempt the missions. To make matters worse, throughout the 1990s human intelligence receded behind technological systems in discussions of intelligence priorities. This technology was not capable of adequately fighting the new terrorist threat (Malfatto 2007, 2).

Before 9/11, CIA case officers operating in foreign countries had the responsibility to ensure that their operatives were not guilty of human rights violations and possessed numerous positive attributes. Decision-makers measured the value of the intelligence gathered against the source’s record of human rights abuses. This practice discouraged case officers from recruiting candidates that did not meet the requirements but may have made excellent sources. Case
officers believed that it was better to avoid persons of questionable ethics in order to protect their own CIA careers. As a result, the number of intelligence operatives decreased and the capabilities of U.S. human intelligence weakened (Lahneman 2007, 80).

IRTPA stated the need for an increased emphasis on and greater resources applied to enhancing human intelligence capabilities. In October 2005, the National Clandestine Service, established at the CIA, began undertaking the human intelligence operations of the CIA and coordinating the HUMINT efforts of other intelligence agencies (Best 2008, 62). In coordination with the National Clandestine Service, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the FBI, and the military branches are improving their training, tradecraft, and integration of their case officers and assignments (United States 2007, 2).

**Open Source**

Section 1052 of IRTPA expressed a need for an open source intelligence center where unclassified intelligence could be collected, analyzed, and disseminated to other intelligence agencies (Best 2008, 57). It stated that open source intelligence is a valuable source and it must be incorporated into the intelligence community to ensure that U.S. policymakers are fully informed (Best and Cumming 2008, 83). It required that

…the DNI shall ensure that the intelligence community makes efficient and effective use of open source information and analysis. It is the sense of Congress that the DNI should establish an intelligence center for the purpose of coordinating the collection, analysis, production, and dissemination of open source intelligence... (de Borchgrave, Sanderson, and MacGaffin 2006, 13)
The DNI created the new position of Assistant Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Open Source (ADDNI/OS) and established the Open Source Center (OSC) at the CIA. The OSC is responsible for meeting the open source needs of all the intelligence community members, as well as other government departments and agencies. The ADDNI/OS is responsible for developing strategic direction, establishing policy, and managing fiscal resources for open source development under the DNI (de Borchgrave, Sanderson, and MacGaffin 2006, IX).

Information Sharing

The 9/11 Commission asserted that the most significant problem in intelligence was the failure to share information and that this problem was primarily due to issues of technical compatibility. Section 1016 of IRTPA authorized the establishment of an Information Sharing Environment (ISE) to coordinate terrorism-related information (Best 2008, 57). It required the President to designate a Program Manager for the ISE and establish an Information Sharing Council to keep the President and the Program Manager informed. However, according to a congressional testimony made by the first Program Manager, John Russack, in July 2005, the ISE had only one full-time employee and two individuals working on a contract basis out of a projected 25 (Posner 2006, 168-169).

On November 16, 2006, DNI John Negroponte submitted the Implementation Plan Report for the Information Sharing Environment. Since this time, the DNI Chief Information Officer (CIO) and the ISE Program Manager have implemented a classified information sharing initiative with U.S. allies and launched the Electronic Directory Services. The Electronic Directory lists terrorism-related information as well as those who have counterterrorism responsibilities in the U.S. government. Information sharing within the Defense Department has
also been improved through the ISE. A joint office with the Department of Defense CIO was established for managing the development and planning of solutions that help national security systems shift information between networks operating at different classifications (United States 2007, 6-7).

**Domestic Intelligence**

IRTPA also addressed the FBI’s role in national intelligence. The Congressional Joint Inquiry Into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 determined that prior to 9/11, the FBI was incapable of generating significant intelligence products and was not adequately equipped to identify, report on, and defend against the foreign terrorist threat to the United States (Cumming and Masse 2007, 4).

For example, the U.S. Department of Justice procedures were different for criminal investigations and intelligence cases. Matters of intelligence required specific warrants from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. Therefore, FBI and intelligence agents could not always share information if their sources came from a specific warrant (Malfatto 2007, 5).

As a result of IRTPA, the FBI’s Office of Intelligence was renamed to the Directorate of Intelligence (DI). The Directorate manages the Bureau’s intelligence collection and analysis, analyzes intelligence gaps and ways to fill those gaps, develops uniform human source management and evaluation procedures, develops standard dissemination policies, and ensures appropriate focus on tactical intelligence. IRTPA also required that the FBI give its special agents intelligence training and require them during their career to serve time in both criminal-investigation and intelligence jobs (Posner 2006, 173). The FBI also established the National
Security Branch to encompass its counterterrorism, counterintelligence, weapons of mass
destruction, and intelligence programs (United States 2007, 2).

Conclusion

The intelligence failures of 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq indicate that intelligence reform
was long overdue. IRTPA intended to address the findings of the 9/11 Commission, and it did
just that. It was a historical reorganization of the intelligence community “aimed at thwarting
future surprise attacks against the United States and its allies” (Bolten 2008, 319). The legislation
successfully divided the responsibilities of the DCI and created the DNI to effectively manage
and transform U.S. intelligence. To do this, the DNI needs to “develop common security,
information technology, and personnel policies and procedures” (Lederman 2005, 100). Yet, the
DNI’s authority is still limited and this has, unfortunately, led to bureaucratic friction. For this
reason, implementing IRTPA has not been an easy task. Thus far, bureaucratic resistance,
culture, and a DNI with vague responsibilities have prevented IRTPA’s intentions from being
successfully implemented and carried out.
CHAPTER 5: BUREAUCRATIC CONFLICTS

Government reorganizations are a common response to governmental failures. Therefore, it is not surprising that following 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq, those within government deemed the intelligence community ready for drastic change. However, the majority of the improvements made to the intelligence community since 2004 are no different from reforms that have been proposed and enacted in the past. These include calls for “better leadership, better people, better pay, better information systems, better coordination, and better personnel systems.” Unfortunately, since “government leaders have competitive, not homogeneous interests; priorities and perceptions are shaped by positions; and problems are much more varied than straightforward, strategic issues” these calls for change have been difficult to implement (Halperin and Klapp 2006, 44). This chapter will argue that full integration of the intelligence community will not occur under the current IRTPA legislation because (1) the DNI lacks the necessary bureaucratic and legal authority, (2) the Department of Defense maintains a stronghold on important intelligence agencies, and (3) the existence of a culture that has proven difficult to change. In addition, this chapter will explore the conflicts that have arisen as a result of the changes made by IRTPA and, through the bureaucratic politics model, will seek to explain the reasons behind these conflicts.
Table 1: Directors of National Intelligence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DNI</th>
<th>Dates in Office</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>John Negroponte</td>
<td>April 21&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;, 2005 - February 13&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Michael McConnell</td>
<td>February 13&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; 2007-January 27&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dennis Blair</td>
<td>January 29&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; 2009-May 28&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Clapper</td>
<td>August 5&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; 2010- Present</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Directors of the CIA since 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CIA Director</th>
<th>Dates in Office</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Porter Goss</td>
<td>September 24&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; 2004 - May 26&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;, 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael Hayden</td>
<td>May 30&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; 2006- February 12&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leon Panetta</td>
<td>February 12&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; 2009- Present</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Secretaries of Defense since 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Secretary of Defense</th>
<th>Time in Office</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Donald Rumsfeld</td>
<td>January 20&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;, 2001 – December 18&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;, 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Gates</td>
<td>December 18&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;, 2006 – Present</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Acceptance of Change

The organizational climate is determined by the overall attitude toward change as well as by the reception that the particular proposal for change has received (Bacchus 1974, 241). Following 9/11 and the intelligence failures in Iraq, there was much agreement by those within the community as well as by the general public that a change in the intelligence structure needed to occur. Although this support continued throughout the debate of IRTPA, the final legislation was not widely received. More specifically, IRTPA was a compromise between DOD supporters and reform advocates and thus it did not fully satisfy one side or the other.

Almost immediately after being created, the DNI faced intense pushback from individual intelligence agencies. Many within the community viewed the DNI as a new and unwanted force and believed that he would interfere too deeply in the activities of individual agencies. This situation has ultimately created a struggle for power between the DNI and the heads of several intelligence agencies. As a result, the organizational climate that has developed since 2004 has been one of intense conflict and rivalry.

According to Bacchus, there are several factors that determine whether or not organizational change will be successful. They include organizational climate, the initial position of incumbents who fill new positions created by the change, the perceived effectiveness of their position, whether these new positions challenge the goals of others, the presence or absence of role inconsistencies and the amount of support the change has received (Bacchus 1974, 240). Unfortunately, the DNI has faced difficulties with every one of these factors. Since IRTPA was enacted, the DNI has dealt with intense resistance from intelligence agencies that are unwilling to forego their power. In addition, the authorities given to the DNI by IRTPA have forced the
DNI to continuously challenge the goals, missions, and essence of other agencies. To make matters worse, the DNI has received very little support from the White House and Congress. Although some of the intelligence agencies have been cooperative in regards to meeting the standards set by the ODNI, several major power struggles have arisen since the first DNI took office in 2005.

**Realistic Conflict Group Theory**

Muzafer Sherif, one of the founders of social psychology, defines a group as "a delineated social unit with properties which can be measured and which have consequences for the behavior of its members.” These properties include an organized power structure and a set of norms that help regulate group behavior. Further, intergroup behavior develops when individuals of one group interact with individuals or members from another group (Jackson 1993).

In the 1950s, Sherif conducted an experiment using twenty-two school aged boys, none of whom knew each other prior to the experiment. Upon arriving at a summer camp, the boys were divided into two groups and segregated from each other for about a week. The groups stayed in cabins a good distance from each other and, therefore, had very little social interaction. After a week, Sherif brought the boys back together again to compete in a variety of activities and games. Intense hostility quickly developed between both groups and it became so extreme that the boys could not even engage in noncompetitive activities without insulting one another. Prior to his experiment, Sherif ensured that his subjects were normal, well adjusted boys with no psychological abnormalities. This meant that just the simple act of dividing the boys into separate groups was enough to create hostility (Houghton 2009, 170).
When competition between groups occurs, the achievement of goals by one group creates a loss for the other. In this regard, the losing group becomes unfavorably stereotyped. These stereotypes become ingrained over time and ultimately allow for intergroup hostility to develop. In relation to the U.S. intelligence community, agency stereotypes and hostilities are quite strong. Poor information sharing and lack of agency cooperation over many years have allowed stereotypes to become deeply ingrained in the culture of each agency and have ultimately provided the basis for many of the current conflicts that exist within the intelligence community.

According to Realistic Conflict Group Theory, intergroup hostility is brought about by conflicting goals. Alternatively, positive intergroup interactions are the result of reciprocal interests and goals of the groups involved. Further, perceived threats to the safety of the group, economic interests, political advantage, and social status force groups to compete with one another over scarce resources (Sherif 1966, 15). Agencies within the U.S. intelligence community are forced to compete over scarce resources and are determined to exert their power and influence. For example, an intense rivalry has existed between the FBI and the CIA for many years. Prior to 2001, the FBI wanted to increase its role both within the United States and abroad. Therefore, in the mid-1990s, the FBI expanded the role of its legal attaches in U.S. embassies in order to create greater cooperation with local law enforcement agencies. Further, the FBI has allegedly conducted overseas activities without informing the CIA. A rivalry has also emerged over the recruitment of foreigners who live in the United State and are sent aboard to collect intelligence. Put simply, the FBI has reportedly sought to take over many activities traditionally associated with the CIA, arguing that they are domestic in nature. Thus far, the CIA has resisted the FBI efforts (Lowenthal 2009, 47).
Another example of turf protection involves the CIA and the DOD. Since the war on terrorism began in 2001, there has been a blurring of military and intelligence roles. More specifically, the CIA has played a covert role, whereas the military has participated in both covert and overt activities. Recently, the DOD has begun to show signs of a desire to gain greater control over all intelligence related to its missions. For instance, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was apparently upset with the speed at which DCI Tenet was able to insert officers into Afghanistan. The DOD under Secretary Rumsfeld needed much more time to plan and deliver combat units to Afghanistan. As a result, the 2005 Defense Authorization Bill included $25 million to “support foreign forces, irregular forces, groups or individuals.” Some within the field have questioned whether this provision gives the DOD the ability to conduct covert action without presidential or congressional oversight (Lowenthal 2009, 47-48).

Authority of the DNI

The position of Director of National Intelligence was established in 2004 to bring greater unity to the intelligence community. The position is supposed to ensure that all 16 intelligence agencies work together and share appropriate information. Shortly after John Negroponte’s appointment as the first DNI, he realized that creating new policies, procedures, and missions was not going to be an easy task. The CIA was reluctant to help the new DNI set up his office, the FBI complained about being underbudgeted, and the DOD intelligence agencies needed to learn to serve both military commanders and the entire intelligence community (Duffy 2006). Negroponte quickly discovered that his policies regarding personnel management, training, information sharing, and the improvement of analysis either already existed or contradicted policies already in place. He realized that similar to the DCI position, the DNI would have to rely
on the goodwill and cooperation of other intelligence agencies (Clapper 201, 632). Since Negroponte stepped down as the country’s first DNI in 2006, his successors have faced similar challenges, difficulties, and bureaucratic struggles. Taking into consideration that in the past five years there have been four DNIs, the position itself is not one that can be performed easily and with great success.

According to a 2008 report by the Inspector General of the ODNI, the most critical challenges facing the DNI are the following: strengthening leadership and governance, improving information sharing between intelligence agencies, removing obstacles that are preventing agency collaboration and integration, improving financial management and acquisition oversight, and resolving major legal issues (Maguire 2008, 1). Unfortunately, throughout the creation of the ODNI, strategy followed structure. IRTPA allowed the position of DNI to be created without first defining concrete lines of authority and responsibilities. As a result, the ODNI has had an unclear idea of what its exact responsibilities are supposed to be.

There are four levels of control that one must have in order to effectively run an organization:

1. One must have the ability and authority to draft policies and set direction.
2. One must have the ability to hire and fire people.
3. One must have the ability to control funds.
4. One must have the ability to control operations (Gorman, personal communication, July 2010).

According to the bureaucratic politics model, inconsistent norms and expectations regarding a position held by multiple actors or made internalized by an individual can disrupt the
effectiveness of a given position. Further, conflict regarding appropriate behavior of incumbents of new positions can lead to sanctions and uncooperative behavior (Bacchus 1974, 248). The vagueness of the DNI’s authority and responsibilities has caused a great deal of bureaucratic friction between the DNI and the heads of the intelligence agencies. More specifically, the DNI has very weak authorities regarding the control of operations and the hiring and firing of personnel. The DNI has the power to veto a nomination but he cannot nominate someone himself nor can he fire any intelligence community official. Because of this, there was a great deal of personnel turmoil in the senior intelligence positions in the first two years of the new legislation. For example, in February 2005, President Bush nominated Lt. Gen. Michael Hayden to be the Principal Deputy DNI. In May 2006, Director of the CIA Porter Goss stepped down and was quickly replaced by General Hayden. Hayden’s former position of Principal Deputy DNI went unfilled for more than a year. Some believe that these problems were evidence that the new structure was not working as smoothly as some proponents had hoped (Lowenthal 2009, 30).

Despite significantly lacking control over personnel and operation matters, the DNI actually has quite a bit of authority over the budget. Previous DNIs, however, have not fully exercised this authority due to the huge emotional backlash they receive from the individual intelligence agencies. As a result, whatever authority the DNI does have has been used in a very inconsistent manner.

The more participants accept a new role within the bureaucracy, the more likely the position will be seen as legitimate. Incumbents can also increase the status of their position by providing services that help other actors in performing their own functions (Bacchus 1974, 247). However, various intelligence agencies have complained that the ODNI issues duplicative
taskings and conflicting messages (Agence France-Presse, 2009). These redundancies unfortunately undermine the DNI’s credibility and further complicate the DNI’s assertion of authority. They have also caused independent agencies to go their own way and thus undermine the unified community envisioned by IRTPA. There are some agencies that believe that the DNI’s support for collaboration means that this occurs only with the consent of major intelligence agencies (Maguire 2008, 6). Further, the DNI does not have the authority to fully control an agency’s budget, further complicating the DNI’s ability to implement policies and ensure that these policies are effectively carried out. Ultimately, the most effective way to punish an agency is not an option for the DNI. There are few consequences for agencies who fail to cooperate and even fewer incentives for agencies that do. As can be seen above, the DNI as many struggles to overcome before he can be seen as a legitimate player in the intelligence community.

The ODNI and Defense Department Relationship

There are two major components of the intelligence community: the military intelligence program and the national intelligence program. In this regard, the DNI is responsible for setting national level intelligence priorities. The Secretary of Defense, on the other hand, maintains authority over the DOD intelligence agencies to ensure that both the warfighter and the policymaker receive the support that they need. As a result, the DNI’s authorities do not extend to the operational and tactical activities of the defense intelligence agencies. This situation has ultimately forced the Department of Defense to carefully balance its priorities against those set by the DNI.
Table 4: Conflicts between DNI and Secretary of Defense

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DNI</th>
<th>Secretary of Defense</th>
<th>Bureaucratic Conflict</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>John Negroponte</td>
<td>Donald Rumsfeld</td>
<td>Transferred far fewer analysts to the National Counterterrorism Center. Request for analysts came for DNI Negroponte.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Negroponte</td>
<td>Donald Rumsfeld</td>
<td>Defense Secretary introduced initiatives that significantly expanded DOD intelligence operations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Despite the intense fight put on by the DOD and its supporters in Congress during the passage of IRTPA, the Secretary of Defense and the DNI have managed to work closely and cooperatively on intelligence issues. According to Gorman, there were zero problems between DNI and DOD at all levels during his time at the ODNI. In fact, the DOD intelligence agencies cooperated quite well. For example, in the fall of 2005, an assessment was done to determine how the NSA shared its information with the other intelligence agencies. The report concluded that the new intelligence system was working well under DNI Negroponte and that the NSA had at least shared its information with other agencies. This finding indicates that the DNI was at least able to exert some influence over a DOD agency, especially one that had traditionally been very unwilling to share its intelligence. Further, General Hayden stated shortly after the New York Times article broke regarding NSA’s domestic eavesdropping program, that he and the DNI had authorized the same program under their own authority (Bolton 2008, 338-339). This action again signaled that the DNI was exerting influence over the NSA.

The original concept of the DNI was developed to create a position that would have the authority to manage, control, and oversee the entire intelligence community. The compromises
that were made to IRTPA, however, have created a DNI that does not have ability to do this. Despite the DNI’s limitations, throughout Mike McConnell’s time as DNI, President Bush, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, and Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) James Clapper all committed themselves to making intelligence reform work. To do this, USD(I) Clapper and Secretary of Defense Gates created the position of Director of Defense Intelligence (DDI) who would also serve as USD(I). As a result, USD(I) Clapper became the DNI’s point of contact within the DOD. The purpose of the position is to strengthen the relationship between the DNI and the DOD as well as to allow the DNI to enforce requirements and receive information when the need arises (Keane 2010). The DDI also provides oversight and policy guidance on intelligence matters of the DOD. The DDI is a member of the DNI staff and is therefore responsible for carrying out DNI responsibilities of overseeing defense intelligence agencies. Importantly, the responsibilities of the DDI are determined by the DNI in consultation with the Secretary of Defense (ODNI 2007). Put simply, the DDI works closely with the DNI to create a more unified and cooperative intelligence community by implementing policies that conform to the ODNI’s overall mission and goals (Clapper 2010, 633).

The current DNI position is entirely personality based. One reason the Defense Department and the ODNI have worked so well together is due to James Clapper’s appointment as USD(I). He was a proponent of intelligence reform and supported many collaborative community measures. Having the support of major players significantly made the working relationship much easier. As those in authority change over time, however, it may be more difficult to balance this delicate relationship.
DNI and CIA Turf Battles

Prior to IRTPA, the CIA saw itself as the nation’s primary organization for intelligence. Following 9/11 and the Iraq weapons of mass destruction (WMD) mishap, however, the CIA felt maligned. Many within the CIA viewed the policies put in place by IRTPA as a demotion and a punishment for their mistakes. As a result, since the creation of the ODNI, the CIA has been uncooperative, possessive of its turf, and unwilling to change. The majority of the recent struggles within the intelligence community have involved the CIA and its attempts to reassert its authority and primacy.

Table 5: Conflicts between DNI and Director of the CIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DNI</th>
<th>CIA Director</th>
<th>Bureaucratic Conflict</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>John Negroponte</td>
<td>Porter Goss</td>
<td>Negroponte becomes principal intelligence advisor to the president.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Negroponte</td>
<td>Porter Goss</td>
<td>Negroponte moves control of terrorism analysis to the ODNI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dennis Blair</td>
<td>Leon Panetta</td>
<td>DNI Blair decided that the ODNI would be responsible for assigning the head spy in each country overseas. The duty was heavily guarded by the CIA for many years.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Organizations will not support policies that take away any capabilities or functions that it views as necessary to its essence. If an organization realizes that another organization is after a particular mission, the first organization will take all means necessary to avoid giving the other organization any share of the mission. Conversely, organizations are indifferent to functions that they consider to be unessential to their overall essence (Halperin and Klapp 2006, 38-49). In
April 2006, Deputy DNI Hayden announced that the ODNI was taking control of terrorism analysis—a task jealously guarded by the CIA for many years. Further, DNI Negroponte spared with the CIA when he tried to increase the intelligence shared with the spy chiefs of other countries. The CIA opposed this measure for fear that the wider distribution of intelligence would compromise sources (Duffy 2006).

Organizations favor policies that will ensure their importance. More importantly, organizations will fight hardest for the capabilities they see as essential to their essence (Halperin and Klapp 2006, 38). For example, on May 19th, 2009, DNI Dennis Blair announced that the ODNI would select the top American spy in each country overseas. The following day, the Director of the CIA, Leon Panetta, directed agency employees to ignore DNI Blair’s statement and noted that the CIA was still in charge overseas. The CIA has controlled intelligence operations from American embassies since the 1940s. As a result, the selection of overseas personnel is closely guarded by CIA station chiefs. Many CIA officials believed that the authority exerted by DNI Blair would ultimately jeopardize the agency’s longstanding relationships with foreign intelligence services (Mazzetti 2009). After much confrontation, the dispute between DNI Blair and CIA Director Panetta finally came to an end when the White House sided with the CIA.

Organizations will only accept new functions if they believe that to do otherwise would jeopardize their relationship with senior officials or if it will lead to increased budgets or greater freedoms (Halperin and Klapp 2006, 40). Since the CIA has received no real threats from senior government officials, it has had little desire to accept changes to its functions. This disagreement
between the two spy chiefs shows the continuing struggles that intelligence agencies face as a result of the ambiguous language of IRTPA.

**Culture Wars**

Maccartney (1988) argues that the intelligence community is not a unified organizational actor. Instead, it is divided into several national level organizations including the Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency. These organizations are further subdivided and split between non-intelligence commanders including the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Energy. To further complicate matters, these officials are likely to have varying opinions on national security issues. Put simply, intelligence has multiple voices and these voices make intelligence policy and coordination extremely difficult (MacCartney 33).

The 16 agencies of the U.S. intelligence community maintain different missions, legal authorities, and cultures (U.S. Senate 2002, XVII). To expand further, there are three distinct cultures that help make up the community: military, civilian, and criminal investigation. The military focuses on discipline rank, physical fitness, and careful attention to detail. As a result, the military intelligence world views a civilian agency, such as the CIA which lacks all of the military attributes, with a certain degree of hostility and contempt. Further, the FBI varies from both the military and civilian intelligence cultures. The goal of national security intelligence is to prevent a crime from occurring by detecting the threat in advance. This is counterintuitive to the FBI’s standard operational techniques. For example, in contrast to a criminal investigation, there is no crime, no definite time and place to begin an investigation, no witnesses, and no physical evidence involved in intelligence collection and analysis (Posner 2006, 93-94). These three
distinct cultures make coordination between the intelligence agencies extremely difficult and ultimately limit the overall authority of the DNI.

Since IRTPA failed to fundamentally change the way the intelligence community functions, many of the old cultures and practices remain within the individual agencies. If the community is to truly integrate itself, these outdated processes need to be altered. For example, the policy of only allowing officials access to intelligence on a need to know basis has long been the norm for sharing intelligence. Although some improvements have been made since 9/11, many within the intelligence community consider this a difficult policy to abandon.

Organizations are reluctant to participate in missions, operations, and tasks that involve personnel from other organizations. Instead, they prefer total control over a situation and the personnel involved (Halperin and Klapp 2006, 51). Despite attempts made by IRTPA, intelligence agencies are still reluctant to cooperate with each other. Even within the newly established NCTC, the lack of information sharing is a significant problem. The NCTC brings together personnel from all of the intelligence agencies in an attempt to establish a more comprehensive understanding of terrorist threats. Since NCTC analysts hold varying levels of security clearances and come from different agencies, they see different pieces of information. As a result, officials remain reluctant to share information with colleagues from other agencies even when the rules allow it. To make matters worse, information is stored on nearly thirty separate incompatible information networks. In order to access all of them, NCTC analysts must use more than half a dozen different computers (Zegart 2007, 186).
Assertion of Authorities

According to the bureaucratic politics model, organizations will offer information, provide recommendations, and implement directives in ways that benefit their own self interests. Additionally, organizations understand that in the struggle for power, the winning side has the ability to expand their domain and their turf within the government. Shortly after Porter Goss announced his resignation as CIA director in 2006, General Michael Hayden was nominated by President George W. Bush to be his replacement. Since 2005, General Hayden had been second in command at the DNI under DNI Negroponte. Following his turbulent relationship with CIA Director Goss, DNI Negroponte realized that he needed someone to head the CIA who would remain loyal to the ODNI and respect the authority of the DNI. DNI Negroponte knew that General Hayden could provide that loyalty.

Similarly, former USD(I) James Clapper, recently confirmed as DNI, has a very close relationship with Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. Shortly following President Obama’s nomination of Clapper, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated “the president could not have found a better person, more experienced person or with a better temperament to do this job and actually make it work than Jim Clapper.” DNI Clapper has four decades of intelligence experience. Although they have all been Pentagon or military positions, DNI Clapper is widely respected throughout the intelligence community. With such support, however, some have wondered whether DNI Clapper will be able to stand up to the demands of the Pentagon (Gjelten 2010). Based on these two situations, the placement of close allies in positions of leadership may be a way for officials to ensure that their authority is protected and that bureaucratic conflicts will remain at bay within the intelligence community.
Conclusion

If disagreements between the DNI and the rest of the intelligence community continue, “it will be a triumph of strong personalities over bad legislation” (Cordesman 2007, 349). Because IRTPA granted the DNI authorities never possessed by his predecessor, it will take years to fully coordinate and clarify the DNI’s roles and responsibilities. The DNI’s authority, however, remains limited and may continue to lead to friction in the future. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates argued that centralizing intelligence would be pointless unless the DNI had authority over the 80 percent of the annual budget allocated to the Pentagon. If not, the new DNI would be an “intelligence eunuch” (Tucker 2008, 49). Until this occurs the ODNI runs the risk of becoming another layer of bureaucracy in the U.S. national security system.
CHAPTER 6: ALTERNATIVE VIEWS

Although this research focuses on the role that the bureaucratic politics model has played in the intelligence reform process, this model may not be the only method available to effectively explain the current disagreements within the intelligence community. For this reason, this section will provide alternative analyses of the reasons behind the current difficulties within the intelligence community. It will begin with a discussion of the role that organization theory can play in describing the current conflicts. It will then use the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 to conduct a comparative study of the reform of large bureaucracies. The next portion will argue that the lack of presidential support that the DNI has received has significantly contributed to the DNI’s struggle for power and authority within the intelligence community. This chapter will also briefly discuss groupthink and its applicability to the current difficulties. Finally, this chapter will explore the centralization versus coordination debate within the intelligence community. This chapter will work to expose the weaknesses of each of these alternative analyses in order to provide further support to the bureaucratic politics model. Ultimately, the inclusion of alternative explanations will ensure that a well rounded analysis of the current state of intelligence reform is presented in this research.

Organization Theory and Intelligence Reform

Organization theory is a way to understand how organizations form, grow, interact, gain and manage resources, and deal with both internal and external problems. The main principles of organization theory include: division of labor, authority, discipline, unity of command, and unity of direction. If these principles can be rationally applied within an organization, then organizational goals should be achieved efficiently (Hastedt and Skelley 2009). Since creating
the position of DNI was an organizational solution to the problem of intelligence failures, organization theory helps to explain the various turf battles that have arisen between the DNI and the rest of the intelligence community. Importantly, this section will examine the various ways in which organizational routines have helped to define the current struggles within the intelligence community.

Fayol (1949) argues that organizations with similar interests should have only one plan and one boss. This unity of command structure ensures that personnel answer to only one authority and prevents the development of conflicting leadership. Each organization of the intelligence community has the relatively same objective: the national security of the United States. As a result, the DNI should be the one supervisor that oversees these agencies. This centralization should improve the authority of the DNI and reduce conflict between high level officials.

In organization theory, organizational structure favors the general interests of the organization over the interests of individuals working within the organization. In this regard, the authority and communication structure within the organization should flow from top management down to the lowest ranks whenever possible (Hastedt and Skelly 2009). One major goal of IRTPA was to establish an integrated community in which individuals recognized the overall idea of intelligence rather than the mission of each individual agency. In this case, the DNI would be able to organize personnel, money, and tasks most effectively (Tucker 2008, 50).

According to the arguments of Foley (2009) and Arrow (1974), organizations are reluctant to change. Shortly after the idea of restructuring the intelligence community was introduced, personnel within the intelligence community, employees from other government
agencies, and the public expressed hesitation towards the legislation since it affected traditional lines of authority (Tucker 2008, 48). Further, as discussed in previous chapters, the DNI’s authority has continually been challenged by individual intelligence agencies that are unwilling to forego their pre-9/11 status.

According to organization theory, the previous successes of the current system will limit the organization’s ability to adapt to a new environment. For this reason, a situation facing an organization usually results in a response that has been enacted “at a previous time as an appropriate response for a stimulus of this class” (Foley 2009, 443). Although organizational routines which are defined as “recurrent interaction patterns, based on the formal rules and standard procedures” can change, they usually do so in a way that is dependent upon previous events within the organization’s history (Foley 2009, 443). Prior to 1986, the DOD faced problems regarding joint action, structural barriers, and poor personnel policies. Since the DOD and the intelligence community faced similar problems prior to their reform enactments, many considered the successful Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 to be a model for intelligence reform. Ultimately, since the organizational routines implemented by Goldwater-Nichols were successful, it became difficult for many to look beyond these policies and develop new measures appropriate for the intelligence community.

Further, historically-grounded routines help organizations form responses to contemporary challenges. For example, many of the policy changes introduced by IRTPA were not new to the intelligence reform debate. Since 1955, policymakers have pushed for a centralized intelligence director that would be separate from the CIA. Put simply, IRTPA was
based off of ideas and legislation that had been introduced in the past and as a result, does not consist of enough innovative policies to transform the intelligence community.

An organizational code is a “technical language that members of an organization learn in order to communicate among themselves and with members of other organizations” (Crémer, Garicano, and Prat 2005, 1). However, according to Arrow (1974), a system of information processing that works well in one situation is unlikely to work well when the environment changes. Further, organizations are unlikely to change the information processing system when the need arises. Once organizational codes and information channels are created, an investment has been made by the organization and therefore limits the organization’s reaction to the environmental change. Ultimately, changing an organization’s culture is difficult because “the culture is embedded in a network of complicated, informal personal interactions and expectations” (Posner and Garicano 2005, 6).

This argument helps to explain the current difficulties that the intelligence community faces in regards to information sharing and collaborative analysis in joint operations centers such as the NCTC. Still today, the 16 agencies of the U.S. intelligence community maintain different missions, legal authorities, and cultures (United States, U.S. Senate 2002, XVII). Since IRTPA failed to fundamentally change the way the intelligence community functions, many of the old cultures and practices remain within the individual agencies. These distinct cultures make coordination between the intelligence agencies extremely difficult and ultimately limit the overall authority of the DNI.

According to organization theory, government action is an organizational output that is partially coordinated by leaders. In most cases, however, organizations do not speak with one
voice and the majority of government leaders are not unitary decision makers. In the bureaucratic politics model, each individual within an organization is a player in a competitive game (Allison and Zelikow 2005, 199). As has been argued in previous chapters, the intelligence community has not spoken with one voice since the creation of the DNI. Additionally, the policies implemented within the intelligence community since 2005 have not come straight down from the DNI. Instead, these policies have been the result of ‘pulling and hauling’ between several government leaders trying to ensure their authority within the intelligence community. Put simply, organization theory focuses too heavily on the organization as a whole and as a result fails to acknowledge the various bureaucratic levels within the organization that have made the implementation of intelligence reform so difficult.

A Comparative Approach

Prior to the implementation of IRTPA, many policymakers considered the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 to be a model for intelligence reform. Goldwater-Nichols brought about a unity of effort within the military and many hoped that IRTPA would do the same for the intelligence community. Unfortunately, intelligence reform has not been as easy to implement as military reform. This section will determine the reasons for the DOD’s successful transformation into a unified command and examine why the intelligence community has been prevented from doing the same. Put simply, this section will use the Goldwater-Nichols Act and IRTPA as a comparative case study to illuminate the difficulties that have arisen within the intelligence community since 2004.

Similar to the intelligence community, prior to Goldwater-Nichols, the individual military branches did not trust one another to meet individual demands. For this reason, each branch
wanted to develop its own land, air, and sea capabilities (Bansemer 2005, 20). In order to bring about unity of effort within the military, Goldwater-Nichols assigned service chiefs with the role of recruiting and training troops and left operational activity up to the combatant commanders. This policy was successful because the DOD had a common organizational leader who allowed the unified commands to be led by a commander who had the ability to effectively plan and execute operations (Bansemer 2005, 100).

The DNI has the ability to plan, program, and budget major intelligence systems. He can also implement uniform policies and provide broad budget guidance. However, the only intelligence agency under the direct authority of the DNI is the CIA. As a result, the DNI is forced to coordinate with the other intelligence organizations dispersed throughout the government (Bansemer 2005, 71). IRTPA did not provide the DNI with the authority to go above agency heads to ensure that national intelligence priorities are being met (Spaulding 2007, 9-10). Although Goldwater-Nichols successfully brought together the branches of the military, IRTPA has not been able to do the same for the intelligence community due to the lack of authority given to the DNI.

Goldwater-Nichols forced the Army, Navy, and Air Force to focus on “jointness.” As a result, the individual military branches had to build their communication and weapon systems in the same manner in order to communicate with one another. Since the combatant commanders had the authority to control the operation capabilities of each branch, the military was able to place the need to cooperate over the needs of each individual branch. Today, many intelligence agencies establish their own procedures for protecting information despite policies set by the ODNI intended to standardize information sharing policies. Since the DNI was not given control
over operations by IRTPA, he has not been able to ensure that the same priorities are implemented throughout the intelligence community (Berkowitz 2004).

Goldwater-Nichols reformed a single organization. IRTPA, on the other hand, tried to reorganize fifteen very different organizations that are under various executive departments (Bansemer 2005, 101). IRTPA focused on the need to develop national intelligence centers in which analysts from around the community could come together and share information and analysis. These joint intelligence centers can be compared to the unified commands of the military in that they are both organizations that bring together several semi-independent organizations under one leader. The joint centers worked well under the military command structure. Although individual services have their own unique organizational culture, there is a much larger and broader culture that all military members subscribe to (Bansemer 2005, 66). Unfortunately, joint centers within the intelligence community are not as homogenous as similar military operations. As discussed in previous chapters, the intelligence community has multiple cultures that have different missions and different priorities. As a result, the intelligence community has faced far greater challenges in regards to joint intelligence centers than the DOD faced following the implementation of Goldwater-Nichols.

Many of the drafters of IRTPA tried to implement policies that closely resembled those of Goldwater-Nichols. Since the DOD and the intelligence community had similar motivations for change, it makes sense to model IRTPA after Goldwater-Nichols. Unfortunately, IRTPA did not as clearly define the roles and authorities of the DNI as Goldwater-Nichols did for the combatant commanders. Further, the intelligence community has a different organizational
structure, a different set of missions, and a different culture. For these reasons, the effects of IRTPA have been less profound than those of Goldwater-Nichols.

Unlike the bureaucratic politics model, this comparative approach does not delve into the power struggle within the intelligence community nor does it focus on the various personality challenges that have made reform implementation difficult. Further, the comparative approach too quickly compares the failures of IRTPA with the successes of Goldwater-Nichols. More specifically, the main argument of the comparative approach is that the combatant commanders within the military were given operational authority and were therefore successful in bringing unity of effort to the military. The DNI, on the other hand, currently lacks this authority and therefore has not been able to adequately bring the intelligence community together. It seems unlikely, however, that providing the DNI with more authority would bring about unity of effort within the intelligence community. Ultimately, the approach fails to look beyond the differences in legislation and consider other aspects of the reform difficulties. The comparative approach also fails to explain why intelligence heads have been hesitant to adhere to the reform legislation. Conversely, the bureaucratic politics model can adequately explain this reluctance since it takes into consideration the various levels of actors within the intelligence community that are locked in a continuous struggle for power over scarce resources, protected missions, and increased autonomy.

Lack of Presidential Support

The DNI significantly lacks the authority needed to fulfill the numerous responsibilities given to him by IRTPA. Additionally, since 2005, the DNI has not been able to fully exert the authority that he does have. One reason for the DNI’s struggle for power stems from the lack of
presidential support that the position has received. Neither President Bush nor President Obama ever made clear to the heads of the various intelligence agencies that the DNI was in charge of the community and that his authority should be respected. The numerous intelligence turf wars that have arisen since 2005, especially those between the CIA and the DNI, have brought to light the failure of the White House to appropriately acknowledge the authority legislatively given to the DNI.

IRTPA indicates that presidential leadership is required to bring about governmental change. As a result, much of the authority that the DNI has cannot be effective unless the DNI receives the full support of the president. According to IRTPA, conflicts between the NCTC and department heads can be resolved through an appeals process in which the president makes the final decision. Further, IRTPA gives the Secretary of Defense the ability to appeal to the President when a disagreement arises with the DNI. When the Secretary of Defense and the DNI “are unable to reach agreement on a milestone decision… the Director shall assume milestone decision authority subject to review by the President at the request of the Secretary” (Jones 2005, 52). Put simply, the resolution of conflicts within the intelligence community relies completely on the DNI’s relationship with the president.

In May 2009, DNI Blair issued Intelligence Community Directive 402 on the “designation by the DNI of DNI representatives to U.S. foreign partners and international organizations.” The directive stated that in almost all cases the CIA Chief of Station would serve as the DNI representative overseas. However, it also stated that in rare circumstances the DNI could designate a DNI representative other than a CIA Chief of Station. Since the DNI was exercising the authority granted to him under IRTPA, the Senate Intelligence Committee gave its
full support to the DNI’s decision and expected the CIA’s full cooperation (Feinstein 2009, 51-52). Unfortunately, the CIA considered the DNI’s directive to be a direct threat to its authority and mission and refused to cooperate. Even though the directive did actually recognize the importance of CIA station chiefs, CIA Director Panetta refused to see anyone other than a CIA official in the position.

According to IRTPA, the DNI is the head of the U.S. intelligence community and has “direct and immediate” authority over the CIA. Additionally, under the President’s direction, the DNI has the authority to oversee the relationship between the U.S. intelligence community and the intelligence services of foreign governments. More specifically, according to the Senate Intelligence Committee, the DNI has the ultimate authority over the assignment of top intelligence officials overseas. Any responsibility that the CIA does have in this area is to be exercised under the direction of the DNI (Feinstein 2009, 51). For this reason, President Obama’s decision to side with CIA Director Panetta over the assignment of top intelligence officers overseas was a huge blow to the DNI’s authority.

DNI Blair’s relationship with the White House was tumultuous from the very beginning. It was, therefore, not surprising that President Obama did not lend much support to the DNI when the need arose. According to Senators Lieberman and Collins, “the President now needs to nominate someone whom he fully trusts, and whom he will fully back in interagency disputes with other parts of the intelligence community” (U.S. Senate 2010). Yet even if President Obama decides to rally behind DNI Clapper, there is no guarantee that future presidents will do the same for their DNIs.
The DNI has the authority over the CIA, the DOD intelligence agencies, and the Cabinet agencies. Unfortunately, he has not had the support of the president to ensure that this authority is effectively implemented. Currently, Senator Lieberman is drafting legislation that would provide the DNI budget and personnel authority as well as a five year term. Though even if this legislation is passed, there is no way to tell how well it will be implemented without the support of the President. The President needs to remember that the DNI is the head of the intelligence community wherever it operates throughout the world and ensure that the heads of the individual agencies are aware of the DNI’s authority. The more the DNI’s authority is challenged, the more likely there will be break-downs in communication, additional inter-agency coordination issues, and duplication of authorities.

The lack of presidential support helps to explain some of the difficulties that the DNI has faced in regards to implementing his authority. Yet, unlike the bureaucratic politics model, this analysis does not acknowledge the interactions between individual actors and their struggle for authority within the bureaucracy. Each actor within the intelligence community has competing interests and the lack of presidential support does not adequately address the problems caused by these interests. Further, even if the President does provide strong support for the DNI, there are still likely to be interest-driven conflicts between intelligence agencies. The approach also does not explain the current difficulties within the intelligence community regarding cooperation and information sharing. The bureaucratic politics model, on the other hand, argues that organizations will not participate in tasks that involve personnel from other organizations. Instead, they prefer total control over a situation and the personnel involved (Halperin and Klapp 2006, 51). Although lack of presidential support may be one cause of the DNI’s difficulties, it
does not explain well enough the other dynamics within the intelligence community that are causing conflict.

**Groupthink**

Groupthink, developed by Irving Janis, is an important theory in the study of small group decisionmaking. Groupthink refers to “a deterioration of mental efficiency, reality testing, and moral judgment that results from in-group pressures” (Janis 1982, 9). Symptoms of groupthink include: over-optimism, a lack of critical examination, and negative stereotypes of outgroups (Janis 1972). In highly cohesive groups, there is a tendency to seek concurrence, especially when under high levels of stress. As members of a group become more reliant on each other, the more they will aspire for unanimity in their decisions. This desire for concurrence often becomes the goal of the group and as a result can impair the group’s decisionmaking ability. For this reason, victims of groupthink usually come to decisions that are neither well developed nor fully explored. Group cohesiveness can prevent critical questions from being raised and can block a group’s examination of potential consequences of their decision (Hensley and Griffin 1986, 499). Further, cohesive groups can too quickly finalize a decision without analyzing all available courses of action.

Both the Senate Iraq Report of 2004 and the Silberman-Robb WMD Report determined that groupthink played a role in the analysis of intelligence leading up to the Iraq war. More specifically, groupthink led analysts to interpret ambiguous data as conclusive evidence of the existence of WMDs in Iraq. According to the WMD Report, “intelligence analysts were too wedded to their assumptions about Saddam’s intentions” (2005, 3). Additionally, Richard Clark in his book, *Your Government Failed You*, argues that groupthink is normal part of the national
intelligence estimating process. Currently, however, there is no evidence that the difficulties experienced by the intelligence community since 2005 are the result of groupthink. Groupthink involves highly cohesive groups in which each member is seeking agreement and approval from the other members. Conversely, decisionmaking within the intelligence community has been fractured and full of divergence. More specifically, the heads of the individual agencies have disagreed with a number of policies implemented by the ODNI. For example, the overall authority of the CIA has been reduced as a result of the creation of the ODNI and every Director of the CIA has conflicted with the DNI over these changes. Additionally, every agency within the intelligence community has its own interests and authorities to protect. These differences have ultimately caused disagreements within the community, not cohesiveness. For these reasons, groupthink is not a viable option for explaining the current conflicts within the intelligence community.

Centralization v. Coordination

Following the Iraq WMD mishap and the intelligence failures surrounding the attacks of 9/11, many demanded that the intelligence community undergo major reform. Opinions on how to best go about the reform, however, have varied dramatically between scholars, intelligence officials, and policymakers. Some believe that the DNI should play a coordinating role in a decentralized intelligence system. Others argue for a centralized community with a powerful DNI at top. This section will further explore the debate between centralization and coordination and argue that this debate has significantly contributed to the complications surrounding the implementation of IRTPA.
The centralization versus coordination debate is not new to the field of intelligence reform. The passage of the National Security Act of 1947 was a major step towards a centralized intelligence system. Yet, in the years immediately following 1947, DCIs focused almost exclusively on their role as the CIA Director. As time passed, the intelligence community became more and more fragmented. As a result, by 1956, many within the executive branch began to recommend that the DCI increase the attention given to community-wide affairs (Bansemer 2005, 78). For the next fifty years, congressional investigations and executive branch reports would conclude that centralization within the intelligence community needed to be increased and that the DCI’s authorities should be enhanced.

Today, there is a struggle within the intelligence community to maintain control over all the agencies in order to reduce duplication and improve coordination and a desire to allow individual agencies to keep their unique missions and essence to ensure that policymakers receive the specific intelligence that they need. As a result, any reform of the community must involve “(1) balancing the need to share information with the need to protect information; (2) organizational adjustments that support “connecting the dots” while maintaining diversity of analytic opinion; and (3) determining the proper allocation of finite intelligence resources to meet the needs of both national policymakers and the departments” (Bansemer 2005, 76). By implementing policies that would improve information sharing, standardize personnel issues, and develop an intelligence culture, IRTPA attempted to centralize the intelligence community. However, since IRTPA did not give the DNI the ability to “abrogate the statutory responsibilities” of the other intelligence heads, the DNI cannot implement these policies in an effective manner.
The degree of centralization currently within the intelligence community is affecting the development and implementation of organizational standards (Bansemer 2005, 78). The DNI is trying to play a central role in the intelligence community but is continually prevented from doing so by those within the community who prefer a decentralized system. For instance, the DOD maintains control over eighty percent of the intelligence community and therefore poses the biggest threat to further centralizing the DNI’s authority. More specifically, the DOD will not accept having to rely on other agencies for performance of their core functions. Further, members of Congress will not overlook complaints by DOD officials that combat effectiveness is being put at risk. Put simply, the current structure within the intelligence community leaves the DNI completely dependent upon the DOD and, at times, this prevents the DNI from effectively implementing community-wide policies (Bansemer 2005, 49).

Supporters of decentralization argue that as organizations become more centralized, they run the risk of developing generic skill-sets among their personnel. Decentralization, on the other hand, often encourages greater specialization since various groups focus exclusively on their unique tasks. For instance, a more decentralized intelligence community, with the DNI as simply a coordinator, would allow analysts to communicate freely with their peers and policymakers instead of having to follow strict regulations on communication (Rovner and Long 2006, 199). Additionally, any attempt to further centralize the intelligence community will most likely complicate matters. Increased centralization would most likely involve placing the major intelligence agencies under the direct authority of the DNI. Since this shift would take a great deal of power and authority away from the DOD, it does not seem like a viable option to bring the intelligence community closer together.
Some argue that IRTPA may actually be weakening coordination between the individual intelligence agencies. For example, there is a DNI with a relatively small staff, a Director of the CIA with reduced authorities, and a Director of the NCTC with “a broad but unclear mandate” (Hutchings 2007, 1). It is possible, however, that the DNI can be both a centralized figure and a coordinator. The DNI can be a coordinator who is not superior to the other intelligence heads, but who will have the ability to bring the entire intelligence community together and implement policies that would allow intelligence community personnel to do their jobs more efficiently (Stein 2010). Simply, the DNI needs to be a position that can provide the leadership that the intelligence community needs so that it can successfully act in a cooperative yet decentralized manner.

IRTPA ensured that policymaking within the intelligence community would be decentralized. This decentralization has ultimately created an environment in which bargaining, bureaucratic interests, and struggles for authority can play an important role in the outcome of decisionmaking. Put simply, the decentralization within the intelligence community has allowed a situation to develop that supports the main tenets of the bureaucratic politics model. For example, the turf battle between DNI Blair and CIA Director Panetta over the assignment of top intelligence officials in countries overseas was partly caused by the decentralization within the intelligence community. CIA Director Panetta understood that DNI Blair did not have the authority necessary to override the head of any intelligence agency. As a result, Director Panetta and DNI Blair entered into an intense bureaucratic struggle over authority and bureaucratic interests. More specifically, CIA Director Panetta understood that the intelligence community was decentralized and therefore understood that an environment of compromise was possible. In
this regard, the centralization versus coordination debate within the intelligence community is not actually an alternative explanation for the current conflicts. In fact, the debate actually supports the bureaucratic politics model.
CHAPTER 7: SOLUTIONS FOR THE FUTURE

Given that there have been four DNIs in the past five years; it is not surprising that some have begun to question the possible future of the DNI position and the overall effectiveness of the ODNI. Thus far, it seems as if the DNI has been continually subjected to criticism for either interfering too much in the affairs of other agencies or failing to successfully use his ambiguous authorities. Although not everyone agrees on the role that the DNI should play, it is safe to say that the current system is not working.

Since 2005, the DNI has faced numerous bureaucratic struggles with several government agencies. Unfortunately, within the past five years, there have been very few initiatives to fix these problems. For this reason, this section will provide meaningful solutions to the current problems that plague our intelligence community. In particular, it will focus on the major difficulties discussed earlier in this research as well as further develop and explore some of the proposed solutions that many within the field have recommended. It will also explore new avenues for improvement.

Ultimately, whatever changes do occur will need to allow the DNI to resolve problems that plague the entire intelligence community and focus on issues that cannot be dealt with by any one particular agency. Additionally, the DNI needs to be able to revolutionize the intelligence community by rethinking collection techniques, forming teams that deal with multidiscipline problems, and managing the volume of information that is received on a daily basis (McGaughlin 2010).
Proposals Currently Under Consideration

Although efforts have been made by Congress since 2004 to increase the authority of the DNI, they have been repeatedly blocked by members protecting the interests of other agencies, especially those of the Department of Defense (Lowenthal 2009, 31). Since 2005, both the Senate and the House Intelligence Committees have introduced amendments to IRTPA. The majority of these amendments have focused on providing the DNI more authority to transfer personnel and money from one agency to the other. They have also zeroed in on the DNI’s need to conduct personnel assessments and accountability reviews. None of the proposed amendments, however, would change the current structure that exists between Cabinet heads and the intelligence components in their department (Best 2010, 4). Put simply, the DNI would still be forced to act in ways that do not “abrogate the statutory responsibilities” of other departments.

A 2010 report from the Presidential Intelligence Advisory Board rejected the idea of reducing the DNI’s role to one of coordinator or facilitator. The panel did suggest that the DNI’s staff be substantially downsized. The board also recommended that the ODNI do away with four components that are not considered essential to its overall strategic focus: an office for interagency information-sharing systems, the National Intelligence University, an office for protecting sources and methods at embassies and consulates, and an office which maintains an intranet site for current intelligence reports. Although removing these responsibilities from the ODNI might lessen the load placed on the organization, it does not address the main problems that limit the DNI’s effectiveness including issues related to the DNI’s budget and personnel authority. Further, White House spokesman Robert Gibbs said that he was unaware of any efforts within the Obama administration to develop legislation that would change the structure of the
position of the DNI or the intelligence community (Gerstein 2010, 1-2). Ultimately, the Presidential Intelligence Advisory Board failed to adequately confront and appropriately answer tough questions posed by many within the community.

**Responsibilities of the DNI**

IRTPA determined that the PDB, formerly prepared by the CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence and submitted to the President by the CIA Director, would now fall under the responsibilities of the DNI (Posner 2006, 73). As a result, the DNI meets daily with the President and spends a significant amount of time preparing for these meetings. According to those who have previously been tasked with the PDB, it can consume nearly 60 percent of one’s day. Ultimately, the intense preparation leaves little time for the DNI to focus on other coordination and management responsibilities (Hulnick 2008, 624).

With IRTPA’s enlargement of the DNI’s coordination role, the growing size of the intelligence community, and the escalating threat of international terrorism, the current DNI responsibilities could prove to be too burdensome for one person to fulfill (Posner, Uncertain Shield 58-59). As a result, it may be plausible to reassign the PDB to someone within the ODNI whose sole responsibility would be to prepare for and execute the PDB. This would remove a considerable burden from the DNI and would allow the DNI to focus more on his role as intelligence coordinator. On the other hand, taking the PDB away from the DNI could further reduce his overall effectiveness and authority. For instance, the DNI would not only lose face time with the president, he would also have a good portion of his “play-calling ability” taken away (Gerstein 2010, 3).
Tenured DNI and Department of Intelligence

Until the position of DNI becomes tenured, the DNI’s ability to hire and fire personnel and control operations will remain limited. A tenured DNI would serve a term similar to that of the FBI Director. The Director of the FBI serves for a period of ten years unless he or she is let go or resigns. As a result, a tenured DNI’s appointment would span across two administrations and, therefore, remove any political or institutional pressures. According to the Presidential Intelligence Advisory Board, the relatively short tenures of the three previous DNIs ultimately led to confusion over the Director’s authorities (Gerstein 2010, 2). A tenured DNI would provide the intelligence community with the consistency that it desperately needs.

Some within the field have proposed the creation of a Department of Intelligence. This department would place the big intelligence agencies (NGA, NSA, NRO, and CIA) under the same authority and would be similar to the Department of Homeland Security. The department would bring together the analytical, technological, and collection entities of the major intelligence agencies to streamline information sharing, improve capabilities, and develop a more unified intelligence community.

Similarly, others have proposed placing the DOD intelligence agencies (NSA, NRO, and NGA) under the authority of the DNI. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates argued that centralizing intelligence would be pointless unless the DNI had authority over the 80 percent of the annual budget allocated to the Pentagon. If not, the new DNI would be an “intelligence eunuch” (Tucker 2008, 49). Although Secretary of Defense Gates seems to be more cooperative with the DNI, it remains unlikely that there will be any major shifts of power or control of the NGA, NRO, and the NSA (Lowenthal 2009, 300).
Creating a Department of Intelligence or moving the NGA, NRO, and NSA under the DNI’s authority is unlikely to occur in the near future. Currently, there are no advocates on the hill for either of these measures. Further, implementing either of these options takes authority away from the Defense Department and ultimately moves a big chunk of the intelligence budget, power, and influence away from the Senate and the House Armed Services Committees. Additionally, there would be pushback from the individual agencies who like their quasi independent status and their ability to work between the ODNI and the DOD. Nowhere, except possibly within the ODNI itself, is there a great deal of support to change the current situation. Put simply, these options are unlikely to occur any time soon due to the current political environment.

Although none of these solutions have been given much consideration by Congress or the White House, they all tackle the major deficiencies within the ODNI and possess features that can cause a significant shift in the current intelligence environment. However, these solutions also lack feasibility. Until the underlined problems regarding the DNI’s authorities are dealt with, a tenured DNI will not be much more effective than the current DNI. More specifically, creating a tenured DNI position would not halt the high turnover rate that the position has experienced. A tenured DNI would still have the ability to be fired or leave on his own will. Perhaps years down the road, when the DNI’s major budgetary and personnel issues have been worked out, a tenured DNI can bring the intelligence community together in a concise and consistent manner.

Secondly, creating a Department of Intelligence would only further contribute to the bureaucratic mess of the intelligence community. Although it would bring all the intelligence
agencies together under one command and one mission as well as provide the DNI with more authority, it would create an additional and unnecessary bureaucratic layer. Currently, the Department of Homeland Security is seen by many to be too big to be effective. The Department of Intelligence, whose structure would be similar to Homeland Security, runs the risk of further developing bureaucratic feuds and driving the individual intelligence agencies farther apart.

One of the biggest challenges facing the intelligence community is the need to find a way to coordinate the efforts of every intelligence agency, including the DOD components, in order to meet the intelligence requirements and demands of the U.S. government. Originally, the NRO began as a joint undertaking with the CIA and the NGA’s analysis function was a joint CIA-military operation. These joint ventures allowed civilian intelligence analysts to act as a counterbalance against military analysts and ultimately created an environment for competitive analysis to thrive (Goodman 2008, 333-334). This cooperation is needed once again. Placing the NSA, NRO, and NGA under the authority of the DNI would have some benefits. For example, it would allow the DNI to push through important measures that would improve information sharing, increase cooperation, and develop a unified intelligence community. It would also clarify the responsibilities of the DNI as well as provide him more authority in regards to the day to day operations of the intelligence community. However, the main missions of these agencies would still be to support the Department of Defense and its military operations. It seems placing these agencies under the DNI would create further redundancies within the intelligence community and most likely cause further bureaucratic fighting within the intelligence community. The DOD is unlikely to give up these key agencies without an intense fight.
Support for the DNI

Importantly, the DNI needs to receive the full support of the president into order to effectively carry out his responsibilities. The DNI also needs to be able to develop strong relationships with congress and cabinet members. In addition, members of the intelligence community that are committed to making the DNI work need to continue to establish the effectiveness and legitimacy of the DNI position.

Since its creation, the DNI has not received much support from the President. For example, during DNI Blair’s tenure, President Obama continually sided with CIA Director Leon Panetta and gave counterterrorism policies and responsibilities to the Deputy National Security Advisor for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism John Brennan. The DNI is supposed to ensure that individual agency priorities do not take precedence over national priorities. In this regard, the President can ask the Director of the Office of Management and Budget to work with the DNI in cases regarding the President’s budget. The President also has control over personnel decisions and can therefore ensure that no senior level intelligence positions are filled without the permission of the DNI (Spaulding 2010). Most importantly, the President must also ensure that the heads of the various intelligence agencies are well aware of the DNI’s authority. Presidential support is one of the easiest and most achievable methods available to increase the DNI’s power and should be implemented immediately.

Shift in Culture

Cultures within the individual intelligence agencies are extremely developed and quite strong. IRTPA was intended “to improve information sharing, promote a strategic, unified direction, and ensure integration across the nation’s Intelligence Community” (Best 2010, 5).
Although IRTPA did not strive to do away with the unique cultures present in the individual agencies, it did try to supplement them with policies of coordination. For this reason, some advancement has been made in the creation of a new intelligence culture. For example, all agencies now must accept badges from other agencies. Further, in order to achieve senior management status, personnel are required to complete a rotation at another agency. These achievements may seem small but have made significant contributions to building a common intelligence culture (Best 2010, 433).

Although some improvements have been made since 9/11, many within the intelligence community still consider the need to protect information a difficult policy to abandon. Shifts in organizational cultures do not occur overnight, however. As new professionals are hired and exposed to policies that promote information sharing and coordination, the organizational culture of the intelligence community will shift. To further progress in this realm, the intelligence community needs to expand its consumer base to include state and local officials as well as members of the private sector (McConnell 2007). This will ultimately increase the flow of information between intelligence producers and consumers. In the mean time, there will be a period of transition within the intelligence community in which it must adopt measures that will successfully counter today’s and tomorrow’s threats.

Conclusion

Although the United States is improving the way its intelligence community functions and operates, the intelligence community must continue to establish priorities to deal with threats posed by terrorists throughout the world and inside the United States. To be more effective in its fight against terrorism, the intelligence community will need to focus beyond operations to attack
and disrupt terrorists; they will need to collaborate as a unified organization in order to preserve the national security of the United States. Ultimately, the agencies are going to need to accept some limitations in regards to their authority and independence.

The DNI needs to be able to make people feel as if they are a part of the intelligence community and also a part of something smaller so that competitive analysis will still be created. The DNI needs to possess strong leadership abilities and the authority to create clear priorities for the entire intelligence community. To do this, the DNI first needs the full support and approval of the President. This support combined with more authority over budget and personnel will significantly improve the situation faced by the DNI and will hopefully lead to a more unified and efficient intelligence community.

The full results of IRTPA “will only be seen one or two decades from now” (Lederman 2005, 102). It will take years to fully transform the collection and analysis of intelligence, improve information sharing, and institute personnel policy. Unfortunately, bureaucratic struggles over budget and authority will probably always exist within the intelligence community. With so much information flowing into the U.S. intelligence community, intelligence failures will be frequent and unpreventable. Yet, perhaps somewhere down the road, a more cohesive community that can quickly adapt to new threats, increase access to information, and work under the same mission will develop.
LIST OF REFERENCES


http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/8/0/1/7/p180171_index.html


107


