African Regional Organizations And Democracy

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AFRICAN REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND DEMOCRACY

by

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ABSTRACT

Instability and political repression are two reasons why many states in Africa are unable to develop. African regional organizations have the potential to encourage democracy, stability and development within their regions if they have the right tools. Using case studies of two major interventions by African regional organizations this thesis will determine what those tools may be. Both the intervention of ECOWAS into Liberia and the SADC into the DRC were rife with problems but they were able to bring some stability and even democracy to states in crisis. This thesis finds that African regional organizations can promote democracy and stability, but the focus is always on stability for the region. With strong institutions and mandates, policy agreement and strong leadership, African regional organizations can bring stability, development and even democracy to their regions.
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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ADFL – Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo

AFL – Armed Forces of Liberia

AU – African Unity

COMESA – Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa

DRC – Democratic Republic of Congo

EAC – East African Community

EBID – ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development

ECOWAS – Economic Community of West African States

ECOMOG – Monitoring Observer Group of ECOWAS

INPFL – Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia

LDE – Lofa Defense Force

LPC – Liberian Peace Council

NPFL – National Patriotic Front of Liberia

OAU – Organization of African Unity

RCD – Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie

SADC – Southern African Development Community
SADCC – Southern African Development Coordination Conference

SMC – Standing Mediation Committee

SWAPO – South West Africa People’s Organization

ULIMO (J/K) – United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (Johnson/ Kromah)

UMA – Arab Maghreb Union

UNOMIL – United National Observer Mission in Liberia
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Liberia was meant to be a new start and a brighter future for former slaves in the United States. Yet, instead of being a haven of peace and freedom, Liberia became known for a violent civil war that erupted from years of autocracy and repression. The international community turned their back on the civil war, leaving one African regional organization with little option but to intervene. With no preparation for peacekeeping missions and nothing beyond an economic focus, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) embarked on a military intervention to return peace and stability to Liberia. In an effort to bring lasting stability, a democratic government was created and supported by ECOWAS. This intervention was the first time that any economic regional organization intervened militarily in a member state, and it raises numerous questions about the potential of African regional organizations to promote democracy and stability in their regions.

Since gaining their independence, numerous African countries have struggled to build stable and economically developed regimes. There have been dozens of theories levied by both the international community and within African states on how to solve the problem of stalled African development. Many African nations do not have the stable democracies that many western nations believe is necessary for sustained development. Autocratic and unstable regimes are rife throughout the continent and finding a solution to bring about greater stability to these states, has led to a focus on African regional organizations.

Several regional organizations have been created since African states gained independence to promote economic development and regional stability. However, there are
questions as to whether regional organizations have the ability to promote stability and change within their regions. This thesis will begin to answer the question of whether or not African regional organizations have the ability to work together to influence change within member states and the region as a whole.

African regional organizations are defined as organizations of states brought together with economic and developmental goals, and with a regional component. Both ECOWAS and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) are regional in their design and have the goals to promote economic growth, stability and development within their regions.

This study will examine whether or not African regional organizations have the ability to promote democracy, stability and economic development within member states. Leaders of unstable regimes and powerful autocracies are members of these organizations, but the belief within African regional organizations is that democracy is the key to development and stability.\(^1\) Cases of intervention by the SADC and ECOWAS will be examined to better understand whether African regional organizations have the ability to promote stability and democracy within their region. The two organizations were started on the principles of good governance and economic development. Both of these organizations focused primarily on economic development and international trade, but they also promoted democracy, human rights and the rule of law as integral to their missions.

\(^1\) (Nathan, 2012)
**Research Questions**

The primary research question is whether African regional organizations have the ability to promote stability and democracy. This includes whether regional organizations have the ability to directly influence member states and what structures are necessary for this influence to be successful. One of the prominent theories regarding regional organizations and their ability to promote democracy suggests that only regional organizations with a majority membership of democracies will be able to effectively promote democracy. However, African regional organizations have intervened in member states to promote stability and democracy even when they have a majority membership of autocracies. Determining whether or not these interventions were successful will be part of the focus of the case studies.

If African regional organizations can promote democracy and stability within their regions, what resources and structures need to be in place? Does the regional organization have to have a certain democratic functioning or do the majority of the states need to have similar interests in any situation? In the case of ECOWAS in Liberia in 1990, many states within ECOWAS saw intervention as necessary to their own security. With the SADC intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), there was little consensus on the need to intervene or the best methods of bringing about stability. Understanding the successes and failures of these interventions is pivotal to understanding other interventions by African regional organizations and their potential for creating stability and change in the future.

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2 (Pevehouse, 2002a)
3 Both of the cases studied in this thesis consisted of regional organizations with majority membership of autocracies.
**Conceptual Framework**

The main hypothesis within this paper is that there are three components of regional organizations that will increase the chances that a military intervention will lead to democracy and stability. The stronger and more prevalent the policy agreement of member states, the presence of a single regional hegemon and clearly defined institutions, the more likely that interventions and initiatives by the regional organization will be successful. An intervention may be successful without all three of these components, but the help of a stronger international organization is often necessary.

Several assumptions lie within this work and the first is that African states and regional organizations prefer stability within the region and within their own state. Often states will make decisions based upon their own impressions of what will benefit them. Many ECOWAS members feared that during the Liberian civil war the fighting would spread to neighboring countries creating greater instability within the region. Both Mali and Niger decided to send troops to help the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia, on the belief that it would help move potential dissident soldiers out of the country.

The second assumption is that members of a regional organization support the principles of the regional organization that they belong to, at least in regard to the other members. In both ECOWAS and the SADC, democracy is one of the underlying principles and goals of the organization\(^4\), and yet we see very few member states run as democracies throughout much of these organizations’ histories. However, while states may not be willing to move toward democracy within their own regimes, they are willing to promote that within other members,\(^4\) (ECOWAS, 1993; SADC Secretariat, 1993)
especially among those neighbors that are unstable. ECOWAS in Liberia supported a democratic government in Liberia because they felt it was the most likely way to prevent further violence.\footnote{Alao, Mackinlay, & Olonisakin, 1999, p. 104}

**Methodology**

In order to understand how the structures and states within African regional organizations work together, both ECOWAS and the SADC will be examined in depth. The creation and the protocols of the organizations will be studied to see how the goals of the organization were achieved prior to intervention. A closer look at how the member states work together to achieve previously agreed upon goals and initiatives will provide insight into how those states can also work together to intervene in states suffering from instability and violence.

The interventions of ECOWAS into Liberia will be examined to see not only whether or not the organization was successful in intervening, but also the reasons for the intervention. The ECOWAS intervention in Liberia was chosen for this study because it was the first intervention by ECOWAS and the first military intervention by any economic regional organization. Understanding what caused the organization to decide to finally intervene in the severe instability of a member state is crucial to understanding the circumstances under which an African regional organization will intervene not only politically but militarily in the affairs of another state. The crisis in Liberia also pitted the two sides of ECOWAS against each other, as the Anglophone and Francophone states fought for power and status within ECOWAS and the international community.
The SADC intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo was chosen not only because it was one of the first military interventions by the SADC, but also it was one of the few interventions by the SADC that involved in some way, all of the member states. Other interventions by the SADC were spearheaded or enacted solely by a few states, but the conflict in the DRC prompted a response from all members of the SADC. The split on how to handle the situation in the Congo was so severe that it threatened to destroy the entire regional organization.

An extensive review of previous literature will examine regional organizations and their ability to function and create democracy within member states. An examination of the current theories on African regional organizations will determine if they have the power or the influence to enact lasting change within the region. Following the literature review will be a discussion on the methodology used to conduct the case studies. This will include discussions of conceptual definitions and databases used in the research.

In four sections this thesis will analyze what aspects of African regional organizations are necessary for successful functioning and what aspects can be detrimental both to the regional organization and the member states. The first section will outline the history and the structures of both ECOWAS and the SADC.

The next section will detail the ECOWAS intervention into the Liberian civil war. ECOWAS was a major player in the civil war until the democratic election of Charles Taylor in 1997. When instability returned to the region both ECOWAS and the UN returned to Liberia, which led to another free and fair election in 2006. The decision to intervene in Liberia was not unanimous but ECOWAS was still able to eventually bring stability to the state, with more states joining the cause as time progressed.
The third section details the SADC intervention into the Democratic Republic of Congo. The intervention severely split the SADC when President Mugabe of Zimbabwe authorized a military intervention into the DRC by the SADC without even consulting the majority of members or the SADC chairman. Three states intervened militarily in the DRC; Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia, while the other members of the organization sought a diplomatic solution to the crisis.

The final section will analyze what structures and aspects of each regional organization were successful in the interventions and what aspects were detrimental to the mediations. Both organizations had successes and failures because of their interventions but only one paved the way for lasting stability. The section will also examine to what extent did the stability and the regimes of the member states themselves, affect the ability of the regional organization to function. The extent to which the regional organizations have moved toward stability will also be examined to see whether or not membership in the regional organization may have a positive influence on promoting stability and democracy within member states, without direct intervention.
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

Despite the preponderance of studies on international organizations, studies on regional organizations are less common, and research into African regional organizations even less so. Discussions on what areas of policy international organizations have influence on include democratic transitions, human rights, resolution of conflict, stability and economic growth. The potential connection between membership in international organizations and transitions to democracy is the focus of this work, so a thorough understanding of not only the influence of regional organizations on member states but also of democratization is essential.

International Organizations

The suggestion that regional organizations can prompt transitions to democracy means that international organizations may have the ability to influence member states. While there is no debate that alliances between states or treaties between states can be created and adhered to, as long as all states have something to gain, the idea that international organizations themselves can create change is under debate. One of the staunchest critics to the potential influence of international organizations on their member states has been Mearscheimer. In a realist view on international organizations, Mearscheimer argued that international organizations are nothing more than mirrors of the international system.\(^6\) They are a different manifestation of the balance of power and that anything done by an international organization could have just as easily been done with an alliance between several states with similar national interests.

\(^6\) (Mearschimer, 1994, p. 7)
If the realist view presented by Mearscheimer is true then what reason do states have to work through international organizations at all? For the past several decades, most interactions between states have involved some form of international organization. Abbott and Snidal argue that international organizations do offer more than simple alliances or the balance of power. States can use international organizations to provide a stable negotiating forum for interactions between states, to manage joint operations, provide a sense of norms for the community, and perhaps most importantly, to provide neutrality. In several interventions led by the ECOWAS and the SADC, regional hegemons chose to work through the regional organization in order to give their operations neutrality. Nigeria used ECOWAS to gain allies for the Liberia intervention, and for the intervention to appear neutral, rather than as a military invasion by Nigeria.

Abbott and Snidal argue that there are significant benefits to states working through international organizations to achieve their goals. For organizations such as ECOWAS and the SADC there is also an economic benefit, through trade relationships, to being a member. These benefits may give international organizations the ability to influence policy within member states. This occurs when the member state has something to lose if they are rejected from the organization. If the benefit of staying in the organization is greater than the cost of conforming to the policy mandate of the organization; the member state is likely to conform. It is this logic that might explain why Russett and Oneal found that states that have economic trade relationships are less likely to fight each other and states that are members of international organizations are less likely to fight each other. The benefits of remaining a member of good standing within the organization are higher than the cost of not engaging in conflict with another member state.

7 (Abbott & Snidal, 1998, pp. 10-23)
8 (Oneal & Russett, 2001)
Conversely, if an organization pushes an autocracy toward democracy, the costs of remaining in the organization become too high, as the autocratic leader would sacrifice too much to become democratic.9

Boehmer, Gartzke and Nordstrom found that intergovernmental organizations have the ability to reduce the likelihood of conflict among member states, exacerbate the likelihood of conflict, or have no effect on conflict, depending on the strength and prevalence of certain components. The likelihood that member states within a regional organization decreases with higher the levels of institutionalism and member cohesiveness and if the organizational mandate addresses security concerns.10 Hansen, Mitchell and Nemeth also found that the more institutionalized the organization, the more likely it was to settle disputes and the less likely it was to have conflict between member states.11

**Intervention**

While international organizations can decide to suspend a member state from the organization if they do not conform to organization mandate, the international organization may also choose to intervene. Intervention and peacekeeping operations are another way that international organizations may prompt transitions to democracy within member states. Fortuna found that intervention into conflict ridden states by the international community is more likely to lead to peace and that peace is more likely to last.12 Despite the likelihood of promoting peace, Bueno de Mesquita and Downs found that military intervention was unlikely to lead to

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9 (Schimmelfennig, 2007, p. 137)  
10 (Boehmer, Gartzke, & Nordstrom, 2004, p. 29)  
11 (Hansen, Mitchell, & Nemeth, 2008, p. 29)  
12 (Fortna, 2004, p. 285)
democracy, especially if the intervention was led by an autocracy. They even go as far as to argue that autocratic states would not support democratic transitions following a military intervention in another state. Research by Van de Leuten and Hoffman on what causes international organizations to intervene found that democratic organizations were more likely to intervene in states where democratic principles were violated. However, in cases where the organization did not intervene, the organization lost standing and influence in the international community.

African regional organizations are in areas where development and civil liberties are often limited or even nonexistent. Therefore, the potential of regional organizations to not only bring economic development to the region, but democracy is intriguing. Do African regional organizations have the institutions in place to be able to influence policy within member states or can they perform interventions that not only bring peace but democracy as well?

**Democratization**

Studying democratization has become more and more sophisticated throughout the years. Through these studies one common trend has surfaced, the correlation between democracy and economic development. What is under debate is whether or not development is causation or correlation to democracy. Prezeworski et al. found that there was no link between levels of economic development and transitions to democracy. Their findings were disputed by Boix and

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13 (Bueno de Mesquita & Downs, 2006, p. 647)  
14 (Bueno de Mesquita & Downs, 2006, p. 643)  
15 It is important to note that the focus of Bueno de Mesquita and Downs' research is on an individual intervener or intervention by the UN Security Council, and not on interventions by a regional or international organization.  
16 (Van Der Vlueten & Hoffmann, 2010, p. 754)  
17 (Geddes, 2007, p. 318)  
18 (Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, & Limongi, 2000, p. 106; Przeworski & Limongi, 1997, p. 167)
Stokes, who found that economic development does contribute to democratic transitions, with the level of development being extremely significant for predicting democratic transitions prior to 1950, and only slightly significant post-1950.\textsuperscript{19} Epstein et al. present a middle ground, where development can be linked to democratic transitions in states that are partial democracies (Polity IV score of +1 to +7), but development has less effect on transitioning full autocracies (Polity IV score of 0 to -10) to full democracies (Polity IV score of +8 to +10).\textsuperscript{20}

The link between development and democratic transitions can help explain why African states turned toward democracy after periods of instability. As Epstein et al. suggest it was as the power of the autocracy declined and the level of development rose, that democratic transitions were most likely. For ECOWAS states there was a period of instability in the late 1990s, where many authoritarian regimes were struggling to maintain power and were steadily going through periods of development. In every state that experienced this weakening of the state and building of development, instability followed and that was in turn followed by democracy. This was true regardless of whether or not ECOWAS intervened.

Another prospect toward democratization especially in Africa is the connection with the gap between rich and the poor and democratic transition. This gap is more striking in African states than perhaps anywhere else in the world, where elites in Zaire in the 1990s, were among the richest men in the world at the same time that the majority of the country lived in dire poverty. Under this theory the rulers present aspects of democracy in order to coerce the population into agreeing to higher tax rates in return for liberalization. Since it is easier for an authoritarian regime to collect taxes on a consenting public, they are likely to offer representative

\textsuperscript{19} (Boix & Stokes, 2003, p. 531)
\textsuperscript{20} (Epstein, Bates, Goldstone, Kristensen, & O'Halloran, 2006, p. 566)
institutions in order to increase tax revenue.\textsuperscript{21} The same is true in cases where the population can easily move away; an authoritarian leader may offer aspects of democracy in order to convince people to stay.\textsuperscript{22}

The problem with these models is that they require mobility of capital in order for the elite rulers to move toward democratization on their own and that democratization must always be elite-led. Within Africa, transitions to democracy often follow periods of political instability in which rebel groups rise up against the elite-run government. Rarely have authoritarian leaders willingly given up control of the government. Burton, Gunther and Higley address this concern by identifying the leaders of the opposing groups within the state as elites themselves. Once they rise to the head of an opposition group, they are among the elite and it is therefore a negotiation between the old and new elite that leads to democracy.\textsuperscript{23} Rustow makes a similar argument stating that democratization occurs when there is conflict between opposition groups and an authoritarian regime, notably those which include conflict between old and new elites.\textsuperscript{24}

Other studies of democratization include models which search for simple links between elements of democratization, but there is as of yet no universal explanation of what leads to democratization. Acemoglu and Robinson present a model in which nondemocratic countries are ruled by a rich elite and that the poor can rise up at times when opportunity cost is low, such as during a recession. The uprising can force the elite to move toward democracy to prevent revolution while still consolidating power.\textsuperscript{25} Zak and Feng present a model in which the determinants of democratic transitions were per capita income, distribution of wealth,

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{21} (Bates & Lien, 1985, pp. 64-65)
  \item \textsuperscript{22} (Geddes, 2007, p. 326)
  \item \textsuperscript{23} (Burton, Gunther, & Higley, 1992, p. 4)
  \item \textsuperscript{24} (Rustow, 1970, pp. 352-357)
  \item \textsuperscript{25} (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2001, pp. 938-939)
\end{itemize}
educational levels and strength for political preferences and civil liberties. Their model predicts the chances of a democratic transition at any point in time. This model is useful for studying African transitions because it not only takes into account aspects of development but the political preferences and desire for civil liberties of the people within the state. In 1999, the Zak and Feng model predicted that the democratic prospects were not high for Zaire, Malawi, Angola, Guinea, Togo, or Niger.\textsuperscript{26} Their predictions proved to be true as only Zaire (now the DRC), Malawi and Niger are currently moving in the direction of stable democracy and Niger’s regime has changed frequently over the years.\textsuperscript{27}

The democratization process is a multi-faceted process but most importantly for the case studies and the organizations that follow, is the perceived link between development and democracy. As these economic organizations were formed with a desire to promote development, there was an understanding that this would likely lead to democratic transitions. The link between opposition elites and democratic transitions will also be useful in explaining how the instability within Africa led to a wave of democratization, especially within ECOWAS.

Yet, there is a final facet of the democratization process. Pevehouse argues that democratization can come from membership within democratic regional organizations. His model shows that states who are members of an organization in which a majority of the states have a Polity IV score of +6 or higher, are likely to transition to democracy.\textsuperscript{28} This outside-in approach, if true, can provide a way for poor, underdeveloped countries to transition to more democratic regimes without the struggle of increased development or violent transition. Putting

\textsuperscript{26} (Zak & Feng, 2003)
\textsuperscript{27} (Marshall & Jaggers, 2011)
\textsuperscript{28} (Pevehouse, 2002a, p. 529)
Pevehouse’s theory into the context of African regional organizations is the inspiration for this research.

African Regional Organizations and Democracy

The existing research into African regional organizations is limited to analysis of different aspects of attempts at intervention. The focus of these studies rests on the success or failure and what led to the end result. Few studies have been presented on the strength of the organization itself to promote democracy, either through its institutions or intervention. There has also been limited discussion on what institutions and structures within African regional organizations are needed to promote democracy both through peaceful means and through intervention. The purpose of this thesis is to help fill some of the gaps in African regional organization research.

While the research by Pevehouse did not directly address African regional organizations, the research by Olonisakin and Levitt did. They found that it was democratic transitions within member states that prompted the creation of stronger and more democratic institutions within ECOWAS and the SADC.\(^{29}\) Therefore, the institutions would only be strong enough to influence transitions to democracy after states had already transitioned to democracy. The more democratic the member states became, the more changes occurred to the institutions within the regional organizations. This suggests that democratic transition in African states may be a bottom-up approach through development and elite confrontation as other research into democratization

\(^{29}\) (Olonisakin & Levitt, 1999, p. 76)
processes has presented. Tsie had similar findings in that the institutions within the SADC were not strong enough to promote democratic transitions within the region.\(^{30}\)

Zartman found that regional hegemons, working through regional organizations, were more likely to be the method of conflict resolution in Africa over the Organization of African Unity/ African Union (OAU/AU). Regional hegemons in Africa, while stronger than other states in the region are still relatively weak and therefore need the support of other states within the regional organization. Also working through the regional organization lends legitimacy to the actions taken by the hegemon while still allowing the hegemon to have most of the control over the intervention.\(^{31}\) This was seen in the intervention into Liberia by ECOWAS and the intervention into the DRC by the SADC.

Aning found that the security mechanisms within ECOWAS are weak and largely flawed. While the focus on good governance, democracy and stability are essential for West Africa’s future, the organization currently lacks the capacity to deal with the current problems facing the region. Aning proposes a four tier system with complete oversight over policy and objectives, operations and tactics only under the purview of key personnel, and with the inclusion of civil society organizations to act as additional oversight and counteract the suspicion between “political and security elites.”\(^{32}\) Aning’s analysis of the structures needed to create a stronger collective security system within ECOWAS is a start to understanding the key structures needed for both the SADC and ECOWAS to effectively promote democracy and stability within their regions.

\(^{30}\) (Tsie, 1996, pp. 85-86)  
\(^{31}\) (Zartman, 2003, p. 100)  
\(^{32}\) (Aning, 2004, pp. 541-542)
As these organizations are still new it will take more research to understand what impact they have had on the development and democratic transitions of their regions. Continuing research will be able to determine the role that these organizations will have with recent changes to structure and regarding new intervention efforts. This thesis intends to add to the dialogue of the potential effect of regional organizations in Africa so that their future influence can be better understood.
CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY

With limited research on African regional organizations and a substantial need for progress within African states, extended research into what role African regional organizations play is necessary for understanding the best way forward. If African regional organizations have been successful in moving states in conflict toward stability and democracy, then current operations by these organizations may also have the potential for success. Research by Pevehouse and his colleagues has shown that regional organizations in other areas around the world have been able to promote transitions to democracy, provided that the membership of the organization is mostly democracies.\(^{33}\) Yet, when ECOWAS and the SADC were formed they existed with a large majority of autocracies, and still intervened in states and promoted transitions to democracy. Today both these organizations have a majority membership of democracies, understanding the role that ECOWAS and the SADC played in these transitions to democracy can provide new insight into top-down approaches to democratic transitions.

Due to the fact that there has only been limited research into the link between African regional organizations and democracy and stability within member states, case studies were chosen. Using case studies will allow for a deeper understanding of the potential causes of these interventions and transitions to democracy and the role that African regional organizations played. It also gives an opportunity to understand other factors that may have influenced the actions of the regional organizations. Using comparative analysis between the two major case studies will allow for a greater understanding of how changes in structure, member cohesion and dominant players affect the ability of the regional organization to be successful in their goals.

\(^{33}\) (Pevehouse, 2002a, 2002b; Pevehouse & Russett, 2006)
The purpose of this research is to understand the conditions under which African regional organizations are successful at promoting democracy and stability through intervention. Therefore, it is hypothesized that intervention by African regional organizations into states in conflict will be successful if the intervention is led by an organization with majority agreement on policy concerns, includes the support of a regional hegemon and that the organization has strong, clearly defined institutions. While it is not necessary for an intervention to have all three components to move a state toward stability and democracy, the more present and prevalent these conditions the more likely the intervention will be successful and that stability will last.

Mill’s Methods of Agreement and Difference allow for situations to be examined in a way that determines the conditions that are sufficient for a certain effect. Using case studies that contain some aspect of each method of the hypothesis and case studies that do not have some aspect of the hypothesis, the causal factors that are sufficient for a successful intervention are determined. By studying the causal factors that are present or missing from each intervention the importance and the necessity of each causal factor can be determined. Case studies were found in which each causal factor in the hypothesis were present or missing, with the exception of the presence of strong, clearly defined institutions. This missing factor will be discussed later.

Using Mill’s Methods of Agreement and Difference several cases of intervention by African regional organizations were studied to understand the causal factors to success in intervention. The cases allow for study of policy agreement and the presence of a hegemon. However, there have not yet been any cases of intervention by ECOWAS or the SADC in which strong, clearly defined institutions were present. Currently both organizations have strengthened and defined their institutions, so future research into the current interventions by the SADC and ECOWAS will help strengthen this point.
To understand the link between policy agreement and the success of intervention, the common goals and national interests of the majority of ECOWAS states in Liberia is studied. The SADC intervention into the DRC provides an opposite example in which a majority of states within the organization did not agree on the type of intervention, nor were the goals of intervention similar. Conversely, there is a brief look into the SADC intervention in Lesotho, in which a majority of SADC states were united in values and national interests toward the intervention.

To understand the importance of a regional hegemon, the intervention of ECOWAS of Liberia shows the effect of one dominant hegemon on an intervention. Conversely, the intervention of ECOWAS into Guinea-Bissau is briefly examined as that intervention did not have a dominant hegemon. In terms of the SADC, the intervention into the DRC had two competing hegemons, while the intervention into Lesotho had two hegemons working together. These case studies provide a strong foundation for understanding the importance of a regional hegemon throughout the intervention process.

For the importance of strong and clearly defined institutions both the SADC and ECOWAS did not have the strong institutions needed in any of their past interventions. While they were able to achieve some level of success without this component, the interventions were rife with problems that could have been remedied with better institutions. For the ECOWAS interventions, there was no security structure or protocol in place prior to the intervention in Liberia. For the SADC, there was a security structure in place but it was not under the control of the main body of the SADC, nor were there protocols for its management. Both situations created very different problems for the organizations that were only overcome by the control of a regional hegemon or help from other international organizations.
The case studies control for membership as neither organization was controlled by a majority membership of democracies at the time of Liberia and the DRC. ECOWAS was dominated by autocracies. However, the SADC was mixed with 5 states as established democracies, 4 as anocracies and 2 autocracies. Zimbabwe was an autocracy and a regional hegemon and fought for dominance with the other regional hegemon, South Africa, a democracy. Economic development is controlled as both countries had economies that were collapsing at the time of intervention. In 1988, the GDP growth rate of Liberia was -2, and the GDP growth rate of the DRC in 1997 was -5. Both countries experienced drastic declines in growth rates in the following year when conflict broke out. The GDP per capita in current US dollars of Liberia in 1988 was $474 while the DRC had a GDP per capita of $131. While there is a disparity in the GDP per capita and the GDP growth rates in the year prior to the outbreak of war, both countries had low levels of development and economies that collapsed when war broke out.

The economy, regime and stability of Liberia and the DRC are examined in the case studies to determine if the conditions within the state were the cause of the success or failure of the interventions. The strength and number of rebel groups is also explored as a potential reason for the success or failure of intervention, as well as the handling of the military and diplomatic aspects of the interventions. International support from other states and organizations is also examined as a potential cause of the success or failure of the interventions.

The success of intervention will be measured in terms of democracy and stability. For the purposes of simplicity and clarity, democracy will be defined by a +6 to +10 Polity IV score. Autocracy is defined as -6 to -10. These benchmarks were chosen to exclude anocracies which

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34 (World Bank, 2011)
35 (World Bank, 2011)
fall between these scores and focus on states at one extreme end of the spectrum or the other. Polity IV takes into account both democratic and autocratic aspects of government to define a scale of -10 to +10 with -10 being the most autocratic and +10 being the most democratic. Polity IV categorizes democracies on the basis of three elements: presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences, the existence of institutionalized constraints on executive power, and the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in participation in political activities.\textsuperscript{36} Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index and Mo Ibrahim rankings will also be used to determine the quality of democracy for each state following intervention. The Corruption Perceptions Index ranks states based on public perceptions on corruption using polls and drawing on corruption related data.\textsuperscript{37} The Mo Ibrahim index is an annual assessment of African governments; it consists of 88 indicators drawn from 23 independent international data providers.\textsuperscript{38}

Stability will be defined as a state that does not pose a threat to the region, either through conflict spillover, economic collapse or refugees. This will include a state that is threatened by an internal or external violent force or a state that is suffering from a severe economic crisis. It can also include a state that drastically violates the protocols and mandates of a regional organization, which threatens the stability and the reputation of the regional organization. If a state is in severe violation of the principles of a regional organization and the regional organization does not act, its reputation and influence within the international community is at risk.

\textsuperscript{36} (Marshall & Jaggers, 2011)  
\textsuperscript{37} (Transparency International, 2012)  
\textsuperscript{38} (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2012)
An intervention will be considered successful if there is democracy and stability in the state following the intervention. It is important to note that length of the intervention is not discussed as a contributing factor to the success or failure of the intervention. As some interventions may take more time than others and some may be more difficult than others, it is hard to measure failure in terms of a long intervention process. However, reasons for a lengthy intervention will be discussed to see if they are contributing factors to the decisions made by the regional organization on how to proceed.

A brief look into other interventions by the SADC and ECOWAS, as well as one case of non-intervention by the SADC, will offer a more complete picture of African regional organizations and interventions. Looking at the other interventions will clarify the two cases studied in depth, by examining the effect of changes in regime, hegemon influence and policy agreement on intervention success.

Following the case studies there will be comparisons between the ECOWAS and SADC interventions and conclusions drawn to determine the main goals of the member states of the regional organization and whether or not these goals were accomplished. The link between democracy and autocracy and the link between democracy and economy will be discussed to see how they interact with the goals of the members within a regional organization. Finally the case studies will be compared to see what aspects of ECOWAS and SADC institutions and values were necessary for a successful intervention and what institutions and values were missing in interventions that were not as successful.
ECOWAS Background

The Economic Community of West African States was formed in 1975 following an initiative by General Gowon of Nigeria and General Eyadema of Togo. General Gowon and General Eyadema began traveling to West African states in 1972 to present the idea of a regional trade agreement. When the final draft of the Treaty of ECOWAS was signed, there were 15 signatories. The fifteen original ECOWAS states were Benin, Burkina Faso (then known as Upper Volta), Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. Two years later in 1977, Cape Verde joined ECOWAS. The organization remained at 16 members until 2000, when Mauritania left in order to focus on their membership in Arab Maghreb Union (UMA), believing that their interests would be better protected in the UMA.

ECOWAS was formed with the intention of promoting cooperation and integration with member states, as well as the eventual creation of an economic and monetary union. The overall goal was to create collective economic self-sufficiency among member nations through the creation of an economic and trading union. The optimism that created ECOWAS did not last as the organization found it hard to work together and presented few successes within its first few
decades of existence. The lack of progress and initiative can be linked to economic, cultural and political factors that affected both individual states and their ability to work together.\(^{39}\)

In 1975, Nigeria was the powerhouse within the region and continues to be so today. Nigeria maintained a population and Gross National Product that far exceeded that of any other ECOWAS state, a fact which continued to be true throughout the Liberian crisis.\(^{40}\) The strength of Nigeria played a major role in the working of ECOWAS, as several West African states continue to suffer from extreme poverty and low rankings in human development. The vast differences in wealth and development, made it hard for some ECOWAS states to trust the initiatives of Nigeria.\(^{41}\)

The division between English speaking and French speaking states also created a problem for ECOWAS. The nine Francophone and five Anglophone nations continued to harbor tensions toward each other, as outgrowths of their colonial experience.\(^{42}\) In order to promote unity within the organization, French, English and Portuguese were all adopted as official languages. The chairmanship of ECOWAS also alternated between the Francophone and Anglophone states. This cultural division played a major role not only in the decision to intervene in Liberia but also how the intervention was managed. The divisions made it hard for some states to trust the dominance of Nigeria within ECOWAS and they feared that Nigeria would take over full control of the organization and the intervention.

The final obstacle for ECOWAS was the political instability within many of the member states, few states maintained stable regimes and were often occupied with problems within their

\(^{39}\) (Brown, 1999, pp. 5-6)  
\(^{40}\) (Howe, 1997, p. 407)  
\(^{41}\) (Brown, 1999, pp. 15-20)  
\(^{42}\) (Brown, 1999, p. 6)
own states. Throughout the first decades of its existence, few ECOWAS countries had stable democracies or even stable autocracies. This prevented the states from being able to focus on ECOWAS or creating a true regional trading bloc.

Structure of ECOWAS

ECOWAS has a very specific structure that has changed slightly over the years as the organization has adjusted to the growing needs of the region. The ultimate authority is the Authority of Heads of State and Government of Member States. Comprised of the heads of state of all the member states, the Authority controls the general guidelines and goals of ECOWAS and gives directives. The Authority meets once a year in order to oversee the functioning of ECOWAS institutions and the implementation of ECOWAS objectives. It also decides whether a matter should be handed over to the Community Court of Justice, appoints the Executive Secretariat (changed to a Commission with a President in 2006), and adheres to all other powers granted to it by the Treaty. The ECOWAS Treaty (also known as the Treaty of Lagos) was signed on May, 28, 1975, and established guidelines for cooperation and integration in order to create an economic and monetary union. The ultimate goal of the treaty was to create economic growth and development in the region.

The Executive Secretariat used to be named to four year terms and could only be re-elected once. The Secretariat was the head of ECOWAS and was responsible for ensuring that the organization remained true to the Treaty under which it was formed. The Commission now consists of President, Vice President and seven commissioners. This allows for greater control of the variety of sectors and institutions within ECOWAS. According to the ECOWAS website “the
Commission adopts Rules for the implementation of Acts enacted by the Council. These Rules have the same legal force as Acts enacted by the Council. The Commission makes recommendations and gives advice. Recommendations and advice are not enforceable.\textsuperscript{43}

The Council of Ministers is another institution within ECOWAS that is comprised of a minister in charge of ECOWAS affairs and a Minister appointed from each member state. Previously the Council decided on recommendations for the Authority that would help meet the obligations and goals of ECOWAS, and then these recommendations would be decided on by the Authority.

In 1999, ECOWAS also created a Community Court of Justice. This court will hear complaints from member states and ECOWAS institutions, and concerns of member states relating to defaulting states. The Court consists of a president, chief registrar and seven judges. ECOWAS also has a Community Tribunal which interprets the Treaty and handles any disputes by member states which are referred to it.

The ECOWAS parliament is the largest body of ECOWAS and consists of 115 seats divided up between all the member states according to population. The parliament acts as an advisory board with regional executives making referrals of issues to the parliament. The parliament consists of the plenary, the bureau, the conference of bureau and parliamentary standing committees.

The ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (EBID), also known as The Fund, supports projects geared toward improving the infrastructure and economic development of West African states. The Fund also works to increase investment to the region and hopes to become

\textsuperscript{43} (ECOWAS, 2007)
the premier finance bank in the region for investment and financing of special projects to alleviate poverty and generate wealth and development.\footnote{EBID, 2011}

There are also a number of commissions and specialized agencies geared toward addressing specific problems and initiatives within the region.

![ECOWAS Over Time](image)

**Figure 1 ECOWAS Regimes over Time**

Democracy defined as +6 or higher in Polity IV data. Autocracy defined as -6 or lower in Polity IV data. Transition defined as -66, -77, or -88 in Polity IV data.

Source: (Marshall & Jaggers, 2011)

At its inception in 1975, ECOWAS was an organization of autocracies, with 13 out of 16 states ranking as established autocracies (-6 or lower on Polity IV).\footnote{EBID, 2011} This is surprising
considering the ideals of good governance and democracy under which the organization was founded. The status of autocracy dominance did not change until a period of instability which began in 1989, the same time as the Liberian civil war. The entire region was on the crux of instability which was one of the reasons why the organization felt it necessary to intervene in Liberia to prevent the entire region from falling into chaos.

However, several states would follow Liberia into civil war and ECOWAS later intervened in Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau following the Liberian intervention. While the period of instability severely threatened the region, it also spurred a massive transition to democracy. In only 12 years ECOWAS went from an organization run by a majority of autocracies to being an organization run by a majority of democracies. The transitions to democracy continued and in 2011, nine out of 15 states are established democracies, with several more headed toward democracy. The dominance of democratic governments has allowed the organization to grow and restructure to try and reach a position of greater power and influence within the region.

The above chart shows the progression of ECOWAS from an organization dominated by autocracies to one with a majority membership of democracies. The chart also shows that at the time of the three major interventions by ECOWAS the organization was dominated by autocracies. Even the regional hegemon, Nigeria, which was the driving force behind the Liberian and Sierra Leone interventions, was a firmly established autocracy. 1991 was the pivotal year for ECOWAS. The number of states in transition spiked as several autocratic states experienced strong challenges to their authority. Following 1991, the number of autocratic states continues to decline while democratic states continue to rise. The instability in the region created

\[\text{(Marshall & Jaggers, 2011)}\]
a wave of democracy throughout the region in a desire to bring stability between old
governments and rebel uprisings.

ECOWAS has become one of the most powerful and influential regional organizations in
Africa because of the relative stability of its member states. The SADC is moving toward greater
influence and strength within the region like ECOWAS, but they continue to be held back by
slow economic growth and development.

SADC

SADC Background

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) began in 1980 with several
newly independent southern African states wanting to create their own sub continental regional
entity. They formed the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) in
order to promote regional integration and decrease the dependence on apartheid South Africa.
The original members were Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland
Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. A decade later, the organization realized that no progress had
been made. It was not an effective instrument for economic integration due to several
shortcomings within the structure of the organization and the inability to mobilize resources
within the region for development.⁴⁶ The SADCC accomplished the creation of a regional
identity, which brought the states together to reorganize the SADCC in 1992.

The Treaty of the Southern African Development Community was different from the
SADCC in four ways: the first was that the mandate now included political and security

⁴⁶ (Nathan, 2012, p. 18)
concerns, South Africa was allowed to join, and that it was created to be an international body with a legal persona, and the Treaty and all protocols were meant to be binding on all member states. The region would have to strengthen itself both economically and politically if it was ever to become a real influence in the international community.47

The new SADC placed a great weight upon the necessity of rule of law, democracy, peace and security, solidarity, human rights and balance and mutual benefit. The new membership, which now included Namibia and South Africa, were brought together during an era of change. Several of the region’s countries had moved toward democracy, prompting the belief that other member states would soon follow. However, the growing instability within the region and the organization itself would come to a head in the mid-1990s. All the hopes with which the SADC had been founded were quickly threatened by disagreements over how to handle the growing number of conflicts within the region.

Following the struggles and division of the 90s, the SADC revised their 1992 treaty in 2001. The most important change to this treaty was the Organ on Politics, Defense and Security was placed under the control of the Summit, the highest governing body in the SADC. Previously the Organ on Politics, Defense and Security had been its own entity and deployed military action and made decisions on behalf of the SADC without consulting the Summit or all of the SADC members.48 That same year the SADC worked to create a free trade area, combining efforts with the East African Community (EAC) and the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) in 2008. The SADC now consists of Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia,

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47 (Landsberg & Baregu, 2003, p. 2)
48 (Nathan, 2012, p. 37)
Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, South Africa and Seychelles. Madagascar is currently suspended following the 2009 coup d’état.

SADC Structure

The highest governing body of the SADC is the Summit. The Summit consists of the heads of state for each member. There is a chairperson and vice chairperson which are rotated annually among member states. Directly under the Summit is the Council of Ministers. The Council plays an advisory role to the Summit, oversees the implementation of SADC policies, and the execution of its programs and the functioning and development of its organization. The three other main SADC institutions are the Standing Committee of Officials, which offers technical advice to the Council, the Tribunal, which handles disputes, and the Secretariat. All SADC institutions are required to make decisions by consensus and quorum for meetings of the institutions is 2/3 of the member states.

The SADC has protocols on several objectives including peace and security, infrastructure and services, science and technology and politics, diplomacy and international relations. The SADC decided to use sectorial co-ordination to achieve its objectives, with individual states being responsible for the co-ordination of the various sectors. The result proved to be very inefficient and ineffectual. As of 2001 there were 21 sectorial coordinating unites and commission in 12 countries.

The only sector that was not placed into the hands of a single state was the sector on politics, diplomacy, international relations, peace and security. This was turned into a central coordinating body which would be chaired by member states on a rotating basis. There were few

49 (Nathan, 2012, p. 24)
instructions given for how this would be run or what authority was granted to the chair of the sector. This would eventually become the Organ on Politics, Defense and Security Co-Operation.

The lack of true policy agreement within the SADC have prevented it from being effective in addressing the number of violations by member states in regards to democracy, human rights and the rule of law. The different national interests, levels of development and regimes, caused for significant differences in beliefs over how the SADC and regional security should be controlled. There are enough consensuses to work together on functional areas but it is unable to act in a unified or effective manner in terms of regional security.  

Figure 2 SADC Regimes over Time

50 (Nathan, 2012, pp. 24-27)
Democracy rated at +6 or higher Polity IV score. Autocracy rated as -6 or below Polity IV score. Transition rated at -66,-77, or -88 Polity IV score. Madagascar included for 2005-2009. Seychelles is excluded for lack of Polity IV data, but the country is understood to be relatively democratic.

Source:(Marshall & Jaggers, 2011)

The Southern African Development Community was formed during a period where many of the states were moving toward democracy and autocracy was on the decline. However, the SADC still struggles to have a majority democratic membership even in 2011. Many states remain in transition, and Swaziland remains a strongly autocratic regime despite the values of the organization.

However, the focus of the SADC has not been as much on the political and peacekeeping needs of the region. Instead, the modern focus of the SADC has been on the economic needs and development of the region, believing that development will bring forth the democracy and stability that the organization supports. New partnerships to create free trade zones and build a strong economic and investment sector within the region have been the main objectives.

The SADC has taken steps against Madagascar following the 2009 coup d’état. They have not only suspended the state from the SADC, but they have attempted to intervene with peacekeeping forces. The SADC has been the most successful in the past in terms of peacekeeping. There were struggles in both Lesotho and the DRC, with the different states within the SADC not able to work together or agree on appropriate actions in these two interventions.
CHAPTER FIVE: ECOWAS AND THE LIBERIAN CRISIS

Background to the Liberian Crisis

The Liberian crisis stemmed from the very beginning of Liberia’s history. Liberia was founded as a place for freed slaves from the United States to start a new life on their own in Africa. There were several freed slaves who decided to start over in Liberia and they created a new government that placed them in control. The Americo-Liberians allowed themselves to have complete control over the wealth and power in Liberia, even though they made up only 5% of the population. The rest of the population consisted of the people that were indigenous to the area.51

There are 16 major groups of indigenous Liberians and 31 different languages spoken within the country. By 1971 4% of the population controlled 60% of the country’s income, and

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51 (Sesay, 1992, p. 30)
that 4% were all Americo-Liberians. On April 12th 1980, the repression of the indigenous Liberians came to a head when Samuel Doe led a successful military coup against the Americo-Liberian government. As a member of the Krahn ethnic group, the people of Liberia hoped that he was their answer to years of repression.

However, Samuel Doe found that at 26 years of age, it was hard to maintain the respect and authority needed to govern a country and make the necessary changes for a more egalitarian society and government. It was not long before it was clear that Doe’s government simply placed a new ethnic group in power. Government repression and corruption were common and Doe made sure to give government and military positions to members of his Krahn ethnic group. By 1985, there was no free speech and no political parties allowed. All political opponents to Doe and his government faced death or imprisonment.

In 1989, a rebellion led by Charles Taylor moved against Doe’s government. Calling themselves the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) they spurred the first Liberian war. They started their campaign in Nimba and Doe responded by attacking Nimba and killing civilians. Doe’s response caused many to side with Taylor and his forces quickly grew. Within months, Taylor’s forces controlled large portions of Liberia and were ready to move on the capital. President Doe appealed to neighboring countries for help against the insurrection and received support from Nigeria. Taylor on the other hand, received support from Cote d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso.

Both sides used ethnic rivalries to increase the tensions. President Doe killed Gio and Mano groups and Taylor killed Krahns and Mandingos. Both sides attacked and killed civilians.

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52 (Guanno, 1982, p. 99)  
53 (Alao et al., 1999, p. 18)  
54 (Alao et al., 1999, p. 18)
with little mercy, causing the war to receive international attention. However, the United States was occupied with the Gulf War and the rest of the international community felt that there should be an African initiative to stop the bloodshed.\textsuperscript{55} With a lack of response from the international community, ECOWAS members decided that it was time to step in.

\textbf{Reasons for ECOWAS Intervention}

The intervention of ECOWAS into the Liberian crisis was unique and unexpected on a number of fronts. This intervention was the first time that an economic regional organization intervened militarily in an internal crisis. Another surprising factor was that many ECOWAS governments were unstable and feared their own coups and insurrections. Within the years of the Liberian crisis, six out of sixteen ECOWAS governments would experience periods of transition or interregnum (scores of -88 and -77 on Polity IV) and only 3 were considered stable democracies.\textsuperscript{56} When the organization decided to intervene there were more autocracies than democracies and yet there was still an initiative to promote democracy within Liberia.

Despite the lack of a democratic majority within ECOWAS, the organization still took the initiative to promote democracy. Pevehouse suggests that democracies want to promote other democracies because it lends legitimacy to their own regime, but there is no suggestion of the reasons why an autocracy would want to push another state toward democracy. In the case of ECOWAS, there is significant evidence that the reasons for intervention in Liberia were due to individual state interests, rather than an organizational initiative to promote democracy. While

\textsuperscript{55} (Adebajo, 2002, pp. 43-44, 49)
\textsuperscript{56} (Marshall & Jaggers, 2011)
democracy in Liberia eventually became the goal of many states within ECOWAS and of ECOWAS itself, a transition to democracy was never a main initiative in intervention.

The major force behind the intervention in Liberia was Nigeria which was expected for a number of reasons. Nigeria was the richest country in ECOWAS and it had previous experience working with UN peacekeeping missions. Nigeria also had the most advanced military and the resources to spare in order to intervene in Liberia.\footnote{Alao et al., 1999, p. 34} When it came time to send troops and money, Nigeria sent more than all the other ECOWAS countries combined. Despite the expected reasons for why Nigeria would be the lead on any intervention performed by ECOWAS, Nigerian leaders had their own reasons for intervening.

The Nigerian government wanted to prove itself as the regional hegemon both to ECOWAS and to the rest of the international community. Promoting stability and ending the bloodshed were the reasons that Nigerian leaders used when convincing ECOWAS to intervene in Liberia in order to end the war and restore stability. The focus was always on stability and never on the necessity of promoting democracy. It later became the opinion of many states, including Nigeria, that democracy in Liberia was the most likely way to create stability between the government and the rebel groups.

There was also a need for retaliation in response to the murder of hundreds of civilians as they hid in the Nigerian embassy. At the outbreak of the war there were more than 70,000 Nigerians living and working in Liberia.\footnote{Mays, 1998, p. 108} When the Nigerian president Ibrahim Babangida answered President Doe’s request for assistance, the Nigerians living in Liberia became targets
of Taylor’s National Patriotic Front for the Liberia (NPFL). On August 8, 1990, the NPFL attacked the Nigerian embassy, solidifying Nigeria’s need to intervene.

President Ibrahim Babangida also saw an opportunity to gain allies because of the threat of regional instability. The countries of Gambia, Sierra Leone and Guinea were close to Liberia and were not only receiving refugees but also had members of their populations join Taylor’s forces. There was a growing fear that the civil war in Liberia would spread to these neighboring countries. President Babangida needed their support to help against the growing criticisms of the international community on the human rights abuses and political repression in Nigeria. Nigeria was under fire for the problems within its own state, so they hoped that making a good show in Liberia and having the support of neighboring states would allow the international community to continue supporting Nigeria.

Ghana also supported intervention in Liberia for two reasons, like Nigeria there was concern for the 10,000 Ghanaians living in Liberia at the time of the war. There was also the growing concern over the number of Liberians that were seeking refuge within Ghana. The Foreign Minister of Ghana maintained that the ECOWAS intervention should only be performed if it was for the good of the membership of ECOWAS. He maintained that the thousands of Ghanaians, Nigerians and other nationals that were suffering in Liberia due to the war, were the sole reason why ECOWAS needed to intervene. Ghana proved to be the only country that contributed troops that had no direct political benefits to gain from the outcome of the war.

59 (Mays, 1998, p. 114)  
60 (Brown, 1999, p. 13)  
61 (Brown, 1999, p. 19)  
62 (Adibe, 1997, p. 474)
Guinea and Sierra Leone were the first countries to band together with Nigeria in support of intervention. Both countries had been the recipients of thousands of refugees and worried about their internal stability. Guinea and Sierra Leone maintained that intervention was necessary to ensure not only stability within Liberia but stability within their own states. 63

Mali and Togo were not directly affected by the crisis in Liberia and were therefore wary of providing troops toward a peacekeeping mission. 64 Neither Togo nor Mali opposed intervention outright but were not willing to send troops. In 1991, a change of government in Mali caused a change of heart as the new President Alpha Omar Konare was an advocate for regional peace and stability. He also hoped to maintain stability within his own country by sending away the troops that were supporters of the previous regime to Liberia. 65

There was also strong opposition to invention in Liberia but in some cases the opposition was overpowered by the voice of Nigeria, and in others the leaders of the opposing states changed their minds. Both Burkina Faso and Cote d’Ivoire believed that intervention by ECOWAS would be an over extension of its mandate, citing the Organization of Africa Unity (OAU) charter and the ECOWAS Treaty on state sovereignty. However, privately it was known that Burkina Faso and Cote d’Ivoire supported the Taylor regime. 66 President Compaore of Burkina Faso eventually changed his position when he prepared to be chairman of the OAU. He knew that as leader of an organization that promoted peace, he could not support the violent rebellion in Liberia.
Niger and Senegal were also wary of intervention in Liberia and turned their attention elsewhere at the onset of the intervention. Niger was experiencing internal unrest and therefore could not spare any troops for Liberia. That would change when, like Mali, the new President Ibrahim Bare used the Liberian crisis as a way to move potentially threatening troops out of the country.\textsuperscript{67} Senegal would change its position under pressure from both the United States and Taylor. The United States could not spare the resources to intervene during the Gulf War, but offered to provide financial support for any peacekeeping mission by Senegal in Liberia.\textsuperscript{68} Taylor believed that Senegal would help make the intervention more neutral, as he did not trust the Nigerian dominated force.\textsuperscript{69} The first troops from Senegal arrived in October 1991 and Niger’s troops arrived in 1997.

Zaire and Ethiopia supported the intervention on the hopes that this would keep the United Nations from intervening in the situation. Zaire and Ethiopia were under pressure from Nigeria to support the mission. Both countries also feared that UN involvement in Liberia would set a dangerous precedent if their own unstable regimes should come under attack.\textsuperscript{70} Thus, the majority of countries that supported the intervention in Liberia did so because of instability within their own states and instability within the region. The importance of domestic stability and regional stability differed for each member state. For the states that chose to send troops to Liberia as a method of removing potential dissidents from the country, domestic stability was the main concern. For states like Nigeria with a strong autocracy, the greater concern was stability for the region. There was very little true humanitarian focus, but rather a focus upon what Liberia would mean for the tenuous control the other leaders had over their states.

\textsuperscript{67} (Brown, 1999, pp. 14-15)
\textsuperscript{68} (Mortimer, 1998, p. 127)
\textsuperscript{69} (Mortimer, 1998, p. 126)
\textsuperscript{70} (Ofuatey-Kodjoe, 1994, p. 290)
The process of ECOWAS intervention began in 1990 when pressure from Sierra Leone and Guinea to intervene led to the creation of a Standing Mediation Committee. The committee consisted of representatives from Guinea, the Gambia, Mali, Nigeria and Togo who were tasked with finding a peaceful solution to the crisis. The Standing Mediation Committee attempted to arrange a peace agreement but was daunted by the refusal of Doe to step down and Taylor’s factions were not interested in negotiating for peace. The SMC also imposed travel restrictions, froze assets, and restricted the use of sovereign territories by the rebel forces, but these methods failed to bring about a peace agreement. In July 1990, despite some opposition, the ECOWAS Defense committee created a plan for military intervention in Liberia.

The intervention was justified based upon the Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defense which was adopted by ECOWAS in 1981. This protocol allows ECOWAS to intervene in any internal armed conflict within a member state if the conflict is likely to endanger the peace and security of the region. The protocol allowed for a community army of troops to be formed from national units in order to militarily intervene in an internal situation. General Erskine of ECOWAS stated that “with the crisis in Liberia creating unbearable refugee problems for Sierra Leone, Ghana, the Gambia, Guinea, Nigeria and Cote d’Ivoire, it is obvious that the situation in Liberia has gone beyond the boundaries of the country and ceases to be an exclusive Liberian question.”

The Monitoring Observer Group of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOMOG) was deployed in Liberia in August of 1990. Their mission was to include the imposition of a ceasefire, the disarmament of the warring parties, end the violence, impose an embargo on the acquisition and import of guns, establish an interim government and prepare for

71 (Ofuatey-Kodjoe, 1994, p. 282)
elections and the evacuation of all foreign nationals.\textsuperscript{72} The entrance of ECOMOG into the country escalated the violence and the conflict.

**ECOMOG in Liberia**

The ECOMOG forces were composed of 3,500 troops from Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea, Sierra Leone and the Gambia. The forces were led by Lt. General A. Quainoo of Ghana in an attempt by Nigeria to show that they were not trying to dominate the ECOMOG force.\textsuperscript{73} Upon landing in Liberia, ECOMOG forces quickly took control of the capital of Monrovia. At this point the NPFL had splintered and a new rebel group, the INPFL (Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia), formed causing Charles Taylor to have a war on two fronts. Along with the INPFL, Taylor also had to contend with the leftover forces from the dissolved Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). The government’s standing army continued to fight on behalf of Doe and the government, even after Doe was no longer in power. However, that did not stop Taylor from not only increasing the violence upon the arrival of ECOMOG but attacking the observer group as well. ECOMOG was forced to go on the offensive to protect themselves and Monrovia. The use of force by ECOMOG against the NPFL changed the purpose of ECOMOG from a peacekeeping force to a peace enforcement force.\textsuperscript{74}

The first major problem for ECOMOG came in November 1990 when INPFL forces broke through the ECOMOG containment and kidnapped President Doe. The leader of the INPFL, Prince Johnson, filmed the torture and murder of the Liberian president. This embarrassment caused Lt. General Quainoo to be replaced by a more experienced Nigerian

\textsuperscript{72} (Ek, 1996)
\textsuperscript{73} (Ero, 1995, p. 6)
\textsuperscript{74} (Adisa, 1992, p. 218)
leader, and it would be Nigerian leaders that would control ECOMOG for the rest of the intervention. The event also spurred ECOMOG into action and an interim government was quickly set up in Monrovia. The government was disputed by Taylor who argued that it would not be legitimate since NPFL forces controlled the majority of the country, and the NPFL was not a part of the new government.

ECOMOG was eventually backed into a corner of increasing their military capacity and going on the offensive against the INPFL and the NPFL in order to protect the capital and the new government. The problems that ECOMOG faced were compounded as the rebel groups continued to splinter and new ones entered the country. In June of 1991, the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO) entered the country and began attacking NPFL forces. This group was formed from former Doe supporters and members of the Liberian army who had fled the country. This group would eventually split like the NPFL into two separate factions the ULIMO-K (led by Kromah) and the ULIMO-J (Led by Roosevelt Johnson). The AFL was also known to fight along with ULIMO forces as they often had the same objectives.

With several active fronts within the country and each rebel group unclear about what it was they wanted in a new government, few of the peace agreements forged by ECOMOG were successful.

ECOMOG itself struggled to maintain control in Liberia and follow through on the mandate it was given. However, there was no direct link between the ECOMOG forces and there were few political directives given to the forces from ECOWAS. There was not even a mechanism in place to hold ECOMOG accountable to ECOWAS, so the force commanders controlled the military and the political aspects of the operation.\(^{75}\) There was not even an ambassadorial group to help forge the peace agreements. The forces were also too small to

\(^{75}\) (Kihunah, 2005, p. 127)
maintain firm control over the region and move beyond Monrovia. They suffered from a lack of funds and a lack of direction that prevented them from being successful in Liberia from the start. However, ECOMOG did provide a sense of stability within the capital and opened the doors to peace agreements.

In 1992 the NPFL was losing territory to the ULIMO forces and decided to stage an attack on ECOWAS. Taylor’s goal was to either defeat ECOMOG or cause enough damage for them to leave Liberia. Operation Octopus was a full scale attack by the NPFL on Monrovia and it caught ECOMOG completely off guard. It was nearly a week before ECOMOG responded by bombing NPFL targets, ULIMO forces and former members of the Liberian army came to the aid of ECOMOG.\textsuperscript{76} By the time a ceasefire was called, about 3,000 lives had been lost in the attack and ECOMOG’s neutrality was called into question.

Not only did the NPFL continue to doubt the neutrality of ECOMOG but the international community did as well. Former President Jimmy Carter of the United States questioned the size of ECOMOG, its neutrality and the number of arms under its control.\textsuperscript{77} Within ECOWAS, Burkina Faso spoke out against the continued attacks of ECOMOG against the NPFL. ECOWAS formed a Committee of Nine, consisting of Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, Senegal and Togo to monitor the implementation of the peace agreements. The Committee decided that ECOMOG had the right to defend itself against continued attacks from the NPFL but that there would be a ceasefire on the 10\textsuperscript{th} of November 1992. The Committee also invited a representative from the United Nations to aid the peace

\textsuperscript{76} (Adebajo, 2002, p. 55)  
\textsuperscript{77} (Ero, 1995, p. 7)
process. The decision by the committee was a compromise between the Francophone countries that wanted to mediate the crisis and the Anglophone countries that wanted a military response.\textsuperscript{78}

In 1993, the Contonu Peace Agreement was forged in Monrovia, setting up a coalition government between the interim government set up by ECOMOG, the NPFL and Doe’s remaining supporters. In order to enforce the agreement, ECOWAS called upon the help of the United Nations to enforce and monitor the conditions of the peace agreement. The United Nations deployed the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL), a group of over 300 observers who would be under the protection of ECOMOG.

The enforcement of the Contonu Peace Agreement was slow as the rebel factions were not fully committed to the agreement. The matter was further complicated by the influx of two new groups, the Liberian Peace Council (LPC) led by George Boley and the Lofa Defense Force (LDF). Neither of these groups had signed the Contonu Peace Agreement and they moved on NPFL forces, causing Taylor to be reluctant to comply with the peace agreement. ECOMOG and UNOMIL attempted to forge new peace agreements but the situation had deteriorated into one of warlords simply looking to add territory to their own claims of power.

After renewed struggle, the ECOWAS chairman Ghanaian President Jerry Rawlings called the leaders of the three main rebel groups in Liberia to Akosombo. The negotiations included Taylor of the NPFL, Kromah of the ULIMO-K, and General Bowen of the AFL. The peace agreement set up a new power sharing government between the warlords, which appeased those in attendance. However, several factions were not represented and continued fighting, including taking over the territories of the factions who did attend the peace talks.

\textsuperscript{78} (Provisional Verbatim Record of the 3138th Meeting, Held at Headquarters, New York, on Thursday, 19 November 1992: Security Council, 1992)
Peace talks were restarted once again in Abuja and this time all the factions were represented. The war weary factions were losing ground and their forces were ready to end the fighting. The new peace agreement set up another power sharing arrangement between the warring factions with the intent to set up elections in August of 1996. However, this plan failed when fighting once again broke out between factions of the UNLIMO-J. ECOMOG troops and the interim government subdued the fighting and the elections were scheduled for May 1997.

During this time ECOWAS sought out the help of the international community with the rebuilding and the restructuring of the Liberian government and infrastructure. The United States decided that it would help with the process despite its displeasure at the state of domestic politics within the military regime of Nigeria. The European Union also pledged its support to the Abuja peace agreement and offered support to ECOMOG. The support and the additional funding and troops for ECOMOG allowed the disarmament to begin and for there to be enough forces to create real stability within the state.

Charles Taylor pushed a strong campaign for the 1997 elections and he was the most well-known candidate in Liberia. He gained large support, to the surprise of many. One political saying was “He killed my ma, he killed my pa, still I will vote for him.” ECOWAS supported Charles Taylor for President of Liberia because they felt that was the only way to ensure that there would be no more fighting and the ECOMOG troops could pull out. The international community however feared that with Taylor in power, there would not be a liberal democracy.

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79 (Moran, 2006, p. 106)  
80 (Alao et al., 1999, p. 104)
The elections were held in May 1997 as planned, and both ECOWAS and UN observers found the elections to be free, fair and transparent.81

The international community called upon ECOWAS to continue to work toward rebuilding and restructuring Liberia. The organization was tired of the war and was eager to bring their troops home, but the success of the elections led them to commit to leaving troops for another six months. While publically ECOWAS promised that the rebuilding of Liberia was the goal of the new government, privately ECOWAS believed that it would be up to other members of the international community to help Liberia move forward.82

Democracy Before and After ECOWAS Intervention

Figure 3 Liberia Polity IV

81 (Alao et al., 1999, p. 107)
82 (Alao et al., 1999, p. 113)
Polity IV (2) changes values of -66, -77, and -88 to common Polity IV values. -77 is marked as 0, -88 is prorated across the span of the transition. 
Source: (Marshall & Jaggers, 2011)

Liberia faced a rocky beginning following the election of President Taylor. For several years, Taylor ruled with an iron fist that was similar to that of President Doe. He was known for human rights abuses and filling the government with only his key supporters. In 1998, he ejected ECOMOG from the country and refused their involvement in Liberia. This changed when more rebel factions entered Liberia in 1999 and 2002. These factions quickly took control of the country and put Taylor on the defensive. Once again ECOWAS troops with the help of the UN intervened and a new peace agreement was in place in 2003. In October of 2003, the UN took over the peacekeeping operations from ECOWAS, but continued to use ECOWAS troops. By 2005 another round of free and fair elections took place. President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf was elected and has since tried to lead Liberia down a path of peace and stability.

Prior to the intervention of ECOWAS, Liberia had a Polity rating of -6. Even though President Doe took over the government with the promise of creating an equal and democratic Liberia, what really happened was far from it. In 1983, copies of the new draft constitution were everywhere as Liberians were asked to read it and relay any concerns. Posters were found in every town asking the citizens to do their duty as Liberians and improved the new Liberian constitution. There was hope within Liberia and the international community that a true move toward democracy was on the horizon.

83 (Adebajo, 2002, pp. 45-46)  
84 (Marshall & Jaggers, 2011)  
85 (Moran, 2006, p. 108)
But as Doe moved to consolidate power he killed many of his rivals and sent several others fleeing into exile, including Prince Johnson and Charles Taylor, future leaders of the NPFL. The United States and other allies convinced Doe that moving to civilian rule would be the best way for him to stay in power, by doing the same that other military dictators in Africa had done.\textsuperscript{86} To this end, Doe formed his own political party and used all the government resources at his disposal to recruit supporters to stand against any who opposed him. His support was limited to the few he had put into power, his tough and brutal tactics had lost him the support he had gained at the start of his military rule.\textsuperscript{87}

The 1985 presidential election was blatantly rigged and there was little dispute by any observers of that fact.\textsuperscript{88} His unpopularity within Liberia forced Doe to claim that he had won only 50.9 percent of the vote, a low number for an election that was so obviously rigged. However, the United States chose to recognize the election as legitimate and that Doe was now the rightful President of Liberia. This move by the United States was strategic as the Cold War continued; Liberia was a strong foothold for the United States and the Central Intelligence Agency. It was necessary to keep ties strong, which meant that no matter what offenses Doe committed or promises he broke, he continued to have the support and aid of the United States.\textsuperscript{89}

A month after the elections, Quiwonkpa, a former supporter and friend of Doe who helped with the 1980 coup, returned to Liberia after being scared into exile. He entered through Nimba County with the hope of pulling off another successful coup attempt.\textsuperscript{90} There was widespread jubilation at Quiwonkpa’s entrance into Monrovia, but Doe was prepared. The

\textsuperscript{86} (Ellis, 2006, p. 58)
\textsuperscript{87} (Ellis, 2006, p. 58)
\textsuperscript{88} (Ellis, 2006, pp. 58-59)
\textsuperscript{89} (Ellis, 2006, p. 63)
\textsuperscript{90} (Adebajo, 2002, p. 46)
United States had already informed him of the pending coup, allowing Doe to summon enough troops to defeat Quiwonkpa and his soldiers.\textsuperscript{91} The coup attempt caused Doe to go on a brutal rampage against any who were thought to be supporters of Quiwonkpa; including residents of Nimba County, those that cheered at Quiwonkpa’s arrival and anyone with any suspected tie to the rebel force. An estimated 1,500 people lost their lives in the aftermath.\textsuperscript{92}

There was no restraint on Doe’s power. Even as the United States realized that Doe was squandering the aid that was being sent to Liberia, there was little that could be done to stop him. The United States even sent a team of accountants to try and keep track of the money, but Doe was able to easily outsmart them. By 1986, the country was spiraling downward. A report by the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights found that brutality, executions, political detentions and abuse of free speech were the cornerstones of the Doe regime.\textsuperscript{93} Teachers went on strike and members of the army grew largely unhappy as their salaries were withheld for months and up to 80\% of their income was taken as taxes to the government. Political detentions without due process became common as students, journalists, teachers and any opposition figures were jailed with no word on the chance of release.\textsuperscript{94}

The lack of restraint on the executive and the lack of civil liberties placed the Doe regime as a firm autocracy. When Charles Taylor was elected president in 1997 in elections that were widely considered free and fair by a number of international observers, ironically it brought a new era of repression for Liberia rather than democracy. By 1998, there was widespread fear throughout Liberia as Taylor went on a rampage against anyone associated with his old rival Roosevelt Johnson. Government road blocks were set up to capture anyone of the same ethnic

\textsuperscript{91} (Huband, 1998, p. 39)  
\textsuperscript{92} (Ellis, 2006, p. 60)  
\textsuperscript{93} (Reuter, 1986)  
\textsuperscript{94} (Reuter, 1986)
group as Johnson. Counselor Tiawan Gongloe was a human rights lawyer in Liberia in 2002 when he spoke out against Taylor’s government. Taylor responded by having him brutally tortured. Taylor also gained international condemnation when he jailed four journalists working for Britain’s Channel 4 news. The journalists were working on a widely known story of Taylor trading diamonds from rebels in Sierra Leone for weapons. In 2012, Charles Taylor was convicted of war crimes for supporting the brutality of the rebel troops in Sierra Leone; he was given a sentence of 50 years.

UN and ECOWAS peacekeepers returned to Liberia in 2005 to bring stability to the region after insurgents entered the country once again causing Taylor to flee to Nigeria. By 2006, the country went through another round of free and fair elections. Liberia elected the first female African president Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, Taylor’s major competitor in the 1997 elections. President Sirleaf has been re-elected in subsequent free and fair elections and Liberia is now considered to be an established democracy.

Under Sirleaf foreign debt has nearly been eliminated and the country reports annual growth rates of 6.5%. However, there have been some concerns over nepotism and corruption as Sirleaf appointed three of her sons to top positions in the government. While Sirleaf admitted that corruption was rife within her country, the appointments she made were on the basis of merit. There were also concerns of land deals made to outside investors, where land was taken from the community and granted to foreign companies. Some reports say that Sirleaf’s government turned over more than a third of Liberia’s land. The Sirleaf government has

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95 (Moran, 2006, p. 123)  
96 (MacDougall, 2012)  
97 (Simons & Goodman, 2012)  
98 (Simons & Goodman, 2012)  
99 (Tran, 2012)  
100 (Tran, 2012)
promised to stop all public land sales and look into the issue, promising that any unfair deals would have the land returned to the community.\textsuperscript{101}

While there have been a number of problems within the Sirleaf government, they have been minor compared to the brutality and repression of the past. A 2009 human rights report found that there was still violence in Liberia, poor prison conditions, reports of detention without due process, and government restriction of the press. There have been no reports of politically motivated killings and any incidences where the military or army has participated in an unjust killing have led to arrests. There have been no politically motivated disappearances, and torture by the government has been outlawed by the constitution. There have been some reports of military and police using torture, and trial by ordeal continues to exist in rural areas.\textsuperscript{102}

Liberia has a long way to go to be truly peaceful and stable, but in just a few years Sirleaf has done a great deal of work in healing the wounds created by decades of conflict.

**Other ECOWAS Interventions**

The fear that Liberia would cause instability within the region was not unfounded as in the following years ECOWAS would intervene in both Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau. The intervention in Sierra Leone was much like the intervention into Liberia with Nigeria taking the lead and ECOMOG being rife with logistical and financial problems. When Nigeria moved from an autocracy to a civilian democratic government it could no longer play a major military role in ECOWAS peacekeeping efforts. It pulled out of Sierra Leone, leaving the rest of the process to the UN, and did not provide troops for the intervention into Guinea-Bissau. These two

\textsuperscript{101} (Tran, 2012)
\textsuperscript{102} (Bureau of Democracy, 2010)
interventions had very different results, largely due to the decreased presence of Nigeria following its own regime change.

Sierra Leone

The Sierra Leone war occurred partly as an outgrowth of the Liberian crisis. Disaffected youths in Sierra Leone formed the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and were joined by rebels from Charles Taylor’s NPFL in March of 1991. The reason for the support of the NPFL was that Taylor warned that Sierra Leone would experience their own “taste of war” for their support of ECOMOG in Liberia.\(^{103}\) Nigeria, Ghana and Guinea all sent troops to help the government fend off the rebels in fulfillment of a mutual defense pacts that had been signed.

The poorly trained and poorly equipped Sierra Leone army could not defend against the rebels and a military coup occurred in April 1992, under the leadership of a former ECOMOG soldier.\(^{104}\) The formation of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) put the country under relatively stable if corrupt governance. The NPRC drastically increased the army, even hiring soldiers from South Africa to fight and push out most of the RUF in 1995.\(^{105}\)

In January of 1996 another coup, led by Julius Maada Bio ousted the NPRC. Bio staged the coup after speaking with Nigerian officials and learning that Nigerian troops would not stand

\(^{103}\) (Adebajo, 2002, p. 82)
\(^{104}\) (Adebajo, 2002, p. 84)
\(^{105}\) (Adebajo, 2002, p. 84)
in the way of the coup. International pressure caused Bio to hold democratic elections in Sierra Leone, and in March Ahmed Tejan Kabbah was elected.\textsuperscript{106}

In 1997 elements of the Sierra Leone Army, led by Johnny Paul Kromah, rose up against Kabbah. Following the coup against a democratically elected government, the Nigerian chairman of ECOWAS, sought diplomatic measures to force the military junta to step down and for the democratic government to be returned to power. The international community refused to recognize the military junta and continued to view Kabbah as the rightful leader of Sierra Leone.

Kromah refused to work with ECOWAS in July 1997, stating that he would not be forced back into a civilian government. In August 1997, ECOWAS ministers recommended that the troops from ECOWAS countries within Sierra Leone be referred to as ECOMOG II. The talks between ECOWAS and Kromah were criticized for being unilateral, with Nigeria not consulting other members of ECOWAS about the negotiations.

The conflict came to a head when Nigerian troops in the capital attacked the military junta in February 1998. While the initiative led to Kabbah being returned to power in March 1998, the unilateral action by Nigeria was frowned upon by some members of ECOWAS and the UN. However, Nigeria supplied about 90 percent of the troops in Sierra Leone with small numbers of troops coming from Ghana, Guinea and Mali. Benin, Gambia, Cote d’Ivoire, and Niger all promised troops to the mission but they never arrived. Therefore, even though Nigeria continued to be seen as a bully hegemon with the Sierra Leone intervention, as they did in Liberia there were few others willing to put forces and finances toward the mission.

\textsuperscript{106} (Adebajo, 2002, p. 85)
Many of the same problems that plagued ECOMOG in Liberia continued in Sierra Leone. There were few operational and logistical mechanisms for the peacekeeping forces; there were not even enough bilingual officers to effectively run the entire force. There were ill feelings toward Nigerian dominance that caused divisions within ECOWAS which prevented the peacekeeping force from having the full support of the organization. Nigeria would often push aside the attempts of other states to take leadership roles within the intervention or the diplomatic proceedings, causing anger and distrust for the hegemon.

Nigeria had several reasons for wanting to be a major force in Sierra Leone. The intervention allowed Nigeria to put off substantial sanctions against its own regime. The international community had been threatening severe sanctions against Nigeria for human rights abuses and for the repressive regime. One of the reasons why Nigeria did not stop the coup attempt by Bio was because the leader of the NPRC had voted to censure Nigeria at the Commonwealth summing in Auckland. The censure vote was in response to the hanging of nine environmental activists by the Nigerian regime. The continued international efforts of Nigeria acted as a sleight of hand trick, where the international community would look toward the intervention efforts of Nigeria and ignore the actions of the repressive regime.

In turn, Nigeria also wanted to restore democracy to Sierra Leone as a way to bolster the image of Nigeria and to gain with the international community. The intervention into Sierra Leone was also another step in Nigeria’s quest to be seen as a regional hegemon. There were also personal reasons for the intervention, as corrupt generals and even Abacha himself was able to redirect millions of dollars into private funds while billing them as ECOMOG expenses.

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107 (Tavares, 2011, p. 155)
108 (Adebajo, 2002, p. 92)
Another invasion by RUF occurred in January 1999, and Nigerian troops were once again forced to fight back to bring stability to Sierra Leone. However, the Nigerian forces received strong criticism for using their own brutal methods against the rebels. A ceasefire was signed in May 1999, and called for disarmament and for the RUF to become a political party. The agreement allowed for the new government to be split being the warring factions and would be overseen by the UN, the OAU, the Commonwealth and Togo. The agreement was far from ideal but it was becoming clear that Nigeria was no longer willing to commit troops.

In August 1999, Nigerian President Obasanjo (elected in May 1999 in democratic elections) wrote to the UN, stating that Nigeria would be pulling troops out of Sierra Leone. The new democratic, civilian government had too many internal problems to continue the estimated U.S. $1 million a day mission in Sierra Leone. The UN reluctantly took over the ceasefire and found the task daunting as several of the UN’s own managerial problems prevented a proper response. In 2000, ECOWAS agreed to send 3,000 troops to help the UN forces. Disarmament was completed in 2002, and parliamentary and presidential elections occurred that same year, with Kabbah being re-elected president. Another round of elections occurred in 2007, and Sierra Leone currently has a Polity IV score of 7.109

Guinea Bissau

The intervention into Guinea-Bissau was unique for ECOWAS in that it was the first intervention that did not include Nigeria in a leadership role. The hegemon was still struggling to overcome internal issues with its fledging civilian government. Nigeria also refused to be a

109 (Marshall & Jaggers, 2011)
major financial or military backer for the intervention, which left the entire operation to other
ECOWAS states for the first time.\footnote{Hutchful, 1999, p. 111}

The conflict in Guinea-Bissau began in 1998 when President Joao Bernardo Vieira
accused his army chief of staff, General Ansuniane Mane of providing arms to secessionists in
Senegal. Mane denied the charges and was not only replaced but Vieira attempted to have him
arrested.\footnote{Ero, 1999, p. 67} A report was released in April 1999 that not only exonerated Mane, but implicated
Vieira as the one trafficking arms.\footnote{“Guinea-Bissau,” 1999, p. 30}

Mane’s treatment led to a coup attempt and the establishment of a military junta. Mane
was very popular among the army as he always fought for better conditions for his men and for
Vieira to pay their delayed salaries.\footnote{Adebajo, 2002, p. 115} Mane’s popularity meant that most of the army defected
and joined Mane’s rebellion, forcing Vieira to hire young men to fight on his side, sometimes
even underage boys. Both Senegal and Guinea intervened militarily on the side of Vieira, and
Vieira was urged to seek ECOWAS support.\footnote{Adebajo, 2002, p. 116}

ECOWAS support came immediately with Vieira’s request. This was due largely to the
lack of a Nigerian dominance in the intervention, but also because there was strong camaraderie
between Senegal, Guinea and Guinea-Bissau and other ECOWAS heads of state. This is in
contrast to the Liberian intervention where Samuel Doe was not well liked by the other
ECOWAS heads of state. By October 1998, a Committee of Nine was established to address the

situation in Guinea-Bissau. Nigeria refused to contribute troops despite Vieira personally requesting Nigerian assistance because Nigeria’s resources were already overstretched.\(^{115}\)

Nigeria did play host to a peace accord and the Abuja agreement was brokered in November 1998. Despite the peace agreement and preparations to deploy peacekeeping observers to Guinea-Bissau, fighting once again broke out in January 1999.\(^{116}\) Problems with communication, logistics and finances once again created delays and problems for the ECOMOG forces. Once ECOMOG arrived in Guinea-Bissau they were shackled with poor equipment. Vehicles were constantly breaking down and there was a lack of radios which meant that troops could not patrol very far from headquarters.\(^{117}\)

Problems continued as Vieira refused to abide by the terms of the ceasefire, causing Mane to rally his troops to fight against Vieira again in May 1999. ECOMOG troops did nothing to stop this round of fighting, allowing Mane to take control and force Vieira out of the country. Soon after ECOWAS condemned the coup but stated that ECOMOG would withdraw from Guinea-Bissau in early June 1999. This was due to the deteriorating situation in Guinea-Bissau and the financial and logistical problems that ECOMOG was experiencing.\(^{118}\)

Elections were held in November of 1999, electing President Kumba Yala. September 2003 saw another military coup and a round of legislative elections occurred in 2004.\(^{119}\) This was followed by military mutiny and another round of presidential elections in 2005.\(^{120}\) This time

\(^{115}\) (Adebajo, 2002, p. 118)
\(^{116}\) (Adebajo, 2002, p. 120)
\(^{117}\) (Adebajo, 2002, p. 123)
\(^{118}\) (Adebajo, 2002, p. 124)
\(^{119}\) ("Army Ousts Leader of Guinea-Bissau," 2003)
\(^{120}\) ("Army man wins G. Bissau election," 2005)
President Vieira was re-elected and served until his assassination in March 2009.\textsuperscript{121} In June of 2009 the military allowed for another election to be held this time with Malam Bacai Sanhá winning the presidency. April 2012 saw another military coup and continued instability.\textsuperscript{122}

**Conclusion**

The Liberian intervention showed that Nigeria was necessary as a major player in ECOWAS affairs, despite the anger of Nigerian dominance in other member states. Nigeria’s wealth and troops were needed to have any chance of bringing stability to Liberia, as well as Sierra Leone. When it was clear that Nigeria would no longer be a financial and military backer for Sierra Leone, the ECOWAS mission backed down in favor of UN involvement. The ECOWAS mission in Guinea-Bissau was rife with problems from lack of adequate troops to the inability to properly finance the mission and give ECOMOG the tools it needed. Comparing the outcomes of the interventions with and without the presence of the regional hegemon of Nigeria it is certain that a regional hegemon or help from an outside power (either a state or international organization) is necessary to provide the necessary resources for the interventions to be successful.

Another interesting development was that only as an autocracy was Nigeria willing to expand significant numbers of troops and substantial financial support for the ECOWAS interventions. Once they moved to a democracy it was clear that Nigerian troops and funds were needed to help stabilize Nigeria and solve the problems at home. What was clear about the Sierra Leone mission and in part the Liberian mission was that the Nigerian initiative to create stable

\textsuperscript{121} (McGreal, 2009)  
\textsuperscript{122} (Nossiter, 2012)
democracies was based on a desire to improve the international standing of Nigeria. As an autocracy, Nigeria was guilty of several human rights abuses and repression of her own people, by turning the attention of the international community toward the successful democratic and peacekeeping efforts of Nigeria; it delayed the inevitable sanctions and pressures for reform.

The ECOWAS interventions also had strong member cohesiveness with all members of ECOWAS aware of the interventions before they occurred. There was discussion and debate for the best course of action in all of the interventions and there was majority support for the interventions. This policy agreement whether through national interests or a common goal for the region and the organization, helped to provide a strong and unified front for the ECOWAS interventions. It also paved the way for the interventions to get support from organizations like the UN when it was needed.

It is also of note that democracy was never the main initiative in any of the interventions. They were driven by national interest and the desire to maintain stability in the region. Democracy only came as an outcropping of the desire for stability, with power sharing and democratic regimes being the only chance at bringing peace to states torn by conflict. In Liberia, few thought that Charles Taylor would be an effective leader, but the belief among Liberians and ECOWAS was that Taylor winning the election was the best chance at stability. It was a commonly held belief that if Charles Taylor did not win, the NPFL would continue fighting in Liberia. Therefore, the focus was not on the rule of law, on the electoral process or even human rights to an extent, the focus was on bringing stability to Liberia and to the region. Democracy was just seen as the best pathway to that desired stability.

The problems with the ECOWAS efforts to bring stability and democracy to states in crisis was not that the interventions were driven by individual national interests, but that there
were no mechanisms in place for such initiatives. The strong and clearly defined institutions did not exist in any of the case studies and this deficit caused problems throughout all three interventions. In all three ECOMOG operations there was no clear line of authority for the troops and no strategic or logistic efforts in place by ECOWAS. All military decisions were made by whichever state was leading the intervention, and it was clear that Nigeria was one of the few states that had the experience and the means to run the large intervention forces. However, Nigerian forces were also very corrupt and were not easy to trust, as was evidenced by Nigerian generals stealing from ECOWAS funds and billing the missing money as ECOMOG expenses. While this lack of strong and clearly defined institutions did not prevent the intervention from bringing eventual stability and democracy to Liberia, eventually the help of the UN was needed to solve the problems that were left by the lack of structure within ECOWAS.

There are three very important lessons to be taken from the interventions by ECOWAS. The first was that they were poorly planned and poorly implemented. The second was that while they were messy and may have been the cause of conflict rather than the solution, they were able to bring a sense of stability to conflict ridden areas when the rest of the international community was unwilling to intervene. The final lesson is that with many ECOWAS states still struggling to build their economies and their military, it is necessary for a strong hegemon like Nigeria to be involved in peacekeeping missions. Therefore, a regional hegemon proved to be essential to the success of ECOWAS interventions and a strong hegemon helped to fill the gap that was left by the lack of strong institutions.

Today ECOWAS has revamped their institutions and created a new structure for many of their operations. Several states are also on the road to becoming stronger states with the ability to have a larger role in peacekeeping interventions, but a strong hegemon will still be necessary for
interventions to really be able to bring stability. The difference in ECOMOG force size with and without the aid of Nigeria was thousands, and the equipment supplied to the Nigerian backed interventions was essential to providing stability to capitals and states in crisis.
CHAPTER SIX: SADC INTERVENTION IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

Background to the DRC Conflict

The crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was the culmination of years of conflict and strife leading all the way back to its brutal colonial roots. The DRC was colonized originally as the personal property of King Leopold and he exploited the people and resources of the DRC with extreme brutality. When independence was granted to the Congo, its people had had no real access to education or the ability to run their own government; there was no preparation for independence at all. 123

This led to a power struggle within the country. The elected Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba had to seek help from the UN to secure his borders and bring stability to the country that had been re-named Zaire in 1971. The UN was slow to respond, causing Lumumba to turn to the Soviet Union. This turned Zaire into a Cold War battleground with the Western states placing Mobutu Sese Seko in power. Mobutu ruled the country with deep pockets, surrounding himself with his followers and preventing any political opposition from forming against him. 124

By 1980 the people were starving and there was little that could be done. Eighty percent of the country’s resources went toward the presidency, causing Mobutu to be one of the richest men of the world and president of one of the poorest countries in the world. 125 By 1990, the Cold War was drawing to a close and Western states could no longer ignore the way Mobutu was ruling the country. Mobutu was forced to make concessions such as allowing political parties to

123 (McCalpin, 2002, p. 38)
124 (Naniuzeyi, 1999, pp. 679-680)
125 (McCalpin, 2002, p. 43)
form and reducing the repression of his citizenry. However, the changes were not enough and soon Western countries began refusing aid to Zaire.

In 1992, troops were threatening mutiny and Mobutu was forced to buy currency from Germany in order to pay them. These practices led to hyperinflation and the Zairian dollar at the time was valued at $110 million to $1 US dollar.\textsuperscript{126} The loyalty of the army declined drastically as unpaid troops refused to remain under Mobutu. The situation in Zaire worsened further as hundreds of thousands of refugees from the 1994 Rwanda genocide flooded into the country.\textsuperscript{127} These issues were compounded by the fact that Mobutu was diagnosed with prostate cancer and was forced to neglect the state even further to seek treatment. The weak state and dismal situation finally allowed a rebel movement to form after 30 years of Mobutu’s kleptocracy.

In 1996, the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (ADFL) was formed and led by Joseph Kabila. The group declared war on the nearly defunct Mobutu regime as Mobutu sought cancer treatment in Europe. Kabila’s main goal was to seize power for himself and rather than pursue an altruistic goal of saving Zaire.\textsuperscript{128} The ADFL received financial and military help from neighboring Rwanda, Uganda and Angola and gained significant ground in Zaire by the time Mobutu returned in December of 1996.

While Mobutu was able to rally his forces and delay an offensive it was clear by May 1997 that the country was lost to the ADFL. Mobutu fled to Morocco and Kabila renamed the country the Democratic Republic of Congo and declared himself president. Kabila remained a strong ally to Rwanda and Uganda. Rwanda intervened because the new government following the genocide was unhappy with Mobutu’s support of the Hutu troops who were responsible for

\textsuperscript{126} (Reno, 1998, p. 159)
\textsuperscript{127} (McCalpin, 2002, pp. 45-46)
\textsuperscript{128} (McCalpin, 2002, p. 47)
the killing. The troops were not only allowed to remain in eastern Zaire but they were being supplied with weapons by Mobutu and his government. Soon these forces began launching attacks against Rwanda from their camps within Zaire.\(^{129}\) This caused the new Rwandan government to do whatever it took to remove Mobutu from power.\(^{130}\)

Kabila proved to be little better than Mobutu, not only in his leadership of the Democratic Republic of Congo but in his treatment of Rwanda. The troops who had helped Kabila win the country refused to leave once Kabila was in power. Having Rwandan troops in the capital caused many Congolese to believe that Kabila was nothing more than a pawn of foreign powers, so Kabila knew they had to leave.\(^{131}\) In July of 1998, he accused his Rwandan ally of plotting against him and forced all Rwandan troops out of the country.

This led to a new rebel group: the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie (RCD) which formed with the support of Rwanda and Uganda. By August of 1998, the rebel forces were seizing several areas in eastern DRC and moved quickly through the country, making use of captured aircraft. Kabila knew that his chances for survival rested on foreign assistance, but this time he could not call on Rwanda or Uganda for help. Instead he turned to the SADC and gained the help of Zimbabwe and Angola.\(^{132}\)

### Reasons for SADC Intervention

When the conflict in the DRC broke out, the SADC was structurally divided. The SADC was chaired by President Mandela from South Africa and the Organ on Politics, Defense and

\(^{129}\) (Dunn, 2002, p. 55)
\(^{130}\) (Nathan, 2012, pp. 85-86)
\(^{131}\) (Dunn, 2002, p. 61; Stearns, 2011, pp. 181-184)
\(^{132}\) (Dunn, 2002, p. 63)
Security Co-Operation was headed by President Mugabe from Zimbabwe. The Organ was allowed to act autonomously from the SADC and did not have to get permission from the SADC chair or even a majority of states in order to make decisions. This caused a great deal of tension between Mandela and Mugabe who both struggled to have more control in the SADC. The chair of the Organ on Politics, Defense and Security Co-Operation was meant to rotate annually, a process which stopped when Mugabe took the chair. Once he was in control, Mugabe would often make decisions on behalf of the SADC without consulting the other states, or even all of the members of the Organ.\(^{133}\) This was due to the power granted to the Organ to function independently at the Summit level, which was the highest level of authority within the SADC.

On August 7, 1998, a month after the rebellion began Mugabe held a meeting in Victoria Falls with the heads of state for Angola, the DRC, Namibia, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. Mandela, despite being President of South Africa and chair of the SADC was not invited due to the friction between Mandela and Mugabe over the power of the Organ.\(^{134}\) On August 18\(^{th}\), Mugabe declared that the SADC had unanimously decided to answer Kabilia’s appeal for help, despite that fact that only seven of the SADC’s states attended the meeting. Mandela’s spokesperson stated that the meeting held by Mugabe could not have been done under the auspices of the SADC.\(^{135}\)

South Africa, Botswana, Mozambique, and Tanzania all sought a peaceful and diplomatic solution to the crisis in the DRC. On the 23\(^{rd}\) of August, Mandela convened an emergency summit meeting to discuss the authority of the SADC over the actions of the Organ. Mugabe did not attend the meeting, suggesting instead that the OAU must now be enlisted to solve the

\(^{133}\) (Nathan, 2012, p. 86)
\(^{134}\) (Nathan, 2012, p. 86)
\(^{135}\) ("The last days of Laurent Kabila?," 1998)
problem because the SADC was too divided.\textsuperscript{136} Angola and the DRC also refused to attend the summit meeting and Mozambique stated that they would not send troops to the DRC without the support of the SADC and the OAU.\textsuperscript{137}

The states that decided to intervene in the DRC did so under OAU and UN protocols allowing collective self-defense in response to an armed attack against a member of the organization. There was also the SADC protocol on the use of collective action in the event of an attempted coup against a member state. However, this protocol was never voted on by the SADC and was only presented by South Africa to the SADC.\textsuperscript{138} The establishment of stability and security for the region was the main goal of those who decided that military intervention was necessary, but it was also the goal of those who wished for a peaceful solution.

Similar to the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia, there were issues of national interest for the states that chose to intervene, as well as for the states that chose to seek a peaceful resolution. Mugabe’s reasons for spearheading the SADC intervention were both political and economic. When the conflict broke out with Rwandan and Ugandan forces supporting the rebels and Western support for the allies, it was seen as disrespectful to Mugabe. Mugabe felt that he was the leading player in southern Africa and therefore the imperialist tendencies and territorial aggression were not permitted without his approval or inclusion.\textsuperscript{139}

Kabila also made it clear that there would be rewards for the countries that came to his aid. When Mugabe decided to intervene in the DRC, his country’s economy was already crumbling. Zimbabwe spent US$3 million a month on intervention in the DRC and while this

\textsuperscript{136} (Berman & Sams, 2000, p. 178)
\textsuperscript{137} (Nathan, 2012, p. 88)
\textsuperscript{138} (Nathan, 2012)
\textsuperscript{139} (Tavares, 2011, p. 162)
accelerated the economic decline it did not come without benefits, especially for Zimbabwe’s elite. Hundreds of acres of farmland were handed over to Zimbabwe; contracts with mining companies and even mining concessions were given directly to the troops to pay for their support.\textsuperscript{140} As the conflict continued, Kabila paid for Zimbabwe’s continued assistance with more mining concessions and contracts, as well as allowing the Zimbabwean troops to take from the land that they occupied.\textsuperscript{141}

Angola also had its own reasons for intervening in the conflict. Like Mugabe and Zimbabwe, there was a personal reason for Angola’s intervention. On the eve of Angola’s fight for independence in 1975, Katangan soldiers changed the tide of the revolution and ensured that Angola would gain its independence. This was a debt of which Kabila’s minister, a Katangan, was quick to remind Angola.\textsuperscript{142} Angola was also unhappy with the fact that its two allies, Uganda and Rwanda, had invaded a country nearby without consulting them.\textsuperscript{143} This was enough reason for Angola to support the intervention and send troops.

Namibia was the third major player within the SADC to support military intervention in the DRC. The biggest reason that Namibia chose to intervene was because they wanted to build ties with its ally Angola.\textsuperscript{144} They also owed a debt to Angola for allowing the South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) to build camps in southern Angola in 1966.\textsuperscript{145}

All three countries signed the Luanda Mutual Defense Pact with the DRC in 1998, which required them to come to the aid of any signatory that was attacked. This only added to the

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{Tavares, 2011, p. 162}
\bibitem{Tavares, 2011, pp. 162-163}
\bibitem{Turner, 2002, p. 85}
\bibitem{Turner, 2002, p. 85}
\bibitem{Tavares, 2011, p. 164}
\bibitem{Tavares, 2011, p. 164}
\bibitem{Tavares, 2011, p. 164}
\end{thebibliography}

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reasons why they pushed for a military intervention by the SADC. However they were unable to find unanimous or even tacit support from the other members.

South Africa and other members of the SADC called for an immediate ceasefire and a move toward peace talks on the political future of the DRC. The Summit meeting of August 23, 1998, ended with member states agreeing that Mandela should work with the OAU to find a peaceful solution to the conflict, including the withdrawal of all foreign troops and movement toward national reconciliation. There was also a push to try and merge the initiatives of the Summit meeting with the decisions of the Organ. On August 31, 1998, the UN issued a similar statement about a peaceful solution to the DRC conflict.

The reason why South African leaders became so involved with the conflict was their belief that regional stability was necessary for South Africa to build stronger trade relations and a stronger economy. As a post-apartheid country there was not only a great disparity of wealth but a struggling economy and high rates of poverty, all of which South Africa hoped to remedy through a strong economic community. There was also a concern of spillover of the conflict into South African territory, a concern that was very real since one of the reasons why the Congo conflict persisted was spillover from the 1994 Rwandan genocide.

A month later Mandela and the SADC changed their stance and announced that the organization unanimously supported the military intervention by Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia. While Mandela still wanted to work toward a ceasefire and peaceful talks, he hoped that by supporting the military intervention that unity could return to the SADC. However, the

146 (Nathan, 2012, p. 88)
147 (Nathan, 2012, p. 88)
148 (Landsberg, 2002, p. 170)
149 (Nathan, 2012, p. 88)
SADC remained split as the organization tried to endorse both the military intervention by Zimbabwe and the peaceful resolution of South Africa.

While the SADC continued with their two pronged approach the conflict spiraled further out of control. Sudan and Chad joined the forces supporting Kabila, while Burundi joined forces with Rwanda and Uganda. By the end of 1998, the conflict in the DRC had become Africa’s largest war with nine different countries directly involved in the fighting and the SADC struggling to bring stability and peace to the region.

The SADC in the DRC

The divisions within the SADC meant that only a limited number of SADC states provided troops or financial support for the military intervention. The majority of SADC resources went toward negotiating peace settlements and finding a way to stop the spread of the war. The military intervention occurred first and was the first step in forcing the SADC’s hand in becoming involved with the crisis.

Once Mugabe decided to intervene, Zimbabwean troops and their allies entered the DRC, knowing that they could not trust any of the soldiers within the DRC, including those who claimed to still be part of the national army. This meant that protecting Kabila would have to be done by the Zimbabwean troops. It was also apparent that there were several other international players trying to get control of parts of the DRC in the middle of the conflict. Mugabe wanted to make sure that these actions were seen as illegitimate while the actions taken by Zimbabwe and its allies would be seen as the lawful protectors of stability. He hoped that by gaining the
SADC’s backing it would show which force was the right one for the Western nations and the people of the Congo to support.150

The first goal was to create a fast advance that would push the Rwandan forces out of the capital so as to restore a semblance of government and order to the country. The rebel forces had taken control of key parts of Kinshasa and were attempting to starve the city and force Kabila to step down, so regaining control of Kinshasa was imperative. To do this Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia entered the country with tanks, armored vehicles, helicopters and aircraft to create a force that would easily take back the country.

The initial skirmishes between SADC forces and the rebels quickly revealed that the “rebels” were really highly trained and organized Rwandan and Ugandan troops. As Mugabe hoped, the people of the Congo quickly rallied to the side of the SADC forces, partially because they were angry at the atrocities committed by the Rwandan Tutsi occupiers. The initial phase of the intervention was successful. Kabila was placed under protection and Kinshasa and important neighboring cities were secured. Zimbabwean electricians were able to return power to the city, which had been powerless for over a month due to rebel forces taking over the hydroelectric dam. The airport was also reopened for both commercial and normal operations.151

These efforts brought an initial sense of stability to the DRC and its government. It also prompted the conflict to grow even larger as Rwanda and Uganda refused to back down. Six national armies and everything under their control from tanks and helicopters to rockets and fighter planes came to a head on Congolese soil. With SADC forces and Rwanda, Uganda and

150 (Rupiya, 2002, p. 98)
151 (Rupiya, 2002, p. 99)
now Burundi throwing everything they had into the conflict, it was not long before a stalemate was reached.\textsuperscript{152}

The stalemate was the opportunity that the proponents of a peaceful solution had been waiting for. While there had been more than twenty attempts to broker a peace agreement by the SADC, they all failed, because neither side would agree to peace.\textsuperscript{153} The Lusaka Peace Agreement was negotiated on July 10, 1999 and it called for an end to the conflict, with foreign troops leaving the Congo and rebel forces disarming. It also called for a new government and democratic elections to be held. A month after the agreement was signed; fighting broke out once again, this time between Rwandan and Ugandan forces. As efforts toward a ceasefire continued, both countries began sponsoring rebel groups led by warlords who took over areas of lawless east DRC. For its own right, Rwanda had little reason to leave the Congo, with reports estimating that at the height of the war $250 million in Congolese mineral profits went to the Rwandan army and allied businesses.\textsuperscript{154} Paul Kagame, the President of Rwanda since 2000, even called the intervention in the Congo “self-sustaining” leaving plenty to gain at little cost for Rwanda.\textsuperscript{155}

The situation was similar for the other states involved in the conflict. While Zimbabwe was suffering from a disintegrating economy it still saw a benefit to spending $3 million a month on the Congo intervention. When the Lusaka agreement was signed, profits for the SADC countries were slowing down and even Zimbabwe admitted that it was time for a political

\textsuperscript{152} (Rupiya, 2002, p. 99)
\textsuperscript{153} (Nathan, 2012, p. 89)
\textsuperscript{154} (Stearns, 2011, p. 300)
\textsuperscript{155} (Stearns, 2011, p. 300)
However, the fighting was ongoing, even as efforts to keep the capital safe and build a new government continued.

In 2001, Kabila was assassinated and succeeded by his son Joseph Kabila, who called for multilateral peace talks headed by the UN to ensure that the terms of the Lusaka ceasefire agreement were met. By June 2003, all foreign forces, with the exception of Rwanda had pulled out of the country. As the DRC was moving toward democracy and few SADC states were willing to continue the expensive intervention, the SADC pulled out of the country. In 2006, the first multiparty elections were held and Joseph Kabila was elected president.

Despite the progress, fighting still affects the Congo as rebel forces headed by warlords looking for plunder ravage large portions of the country. The United Nations and the Human Rights Watch claim that the rebel forces are still being supported by neighboring countries, especially Rwanda. As late as 2008, people of Congo were dying at a rate of 45,000 persons a month, showing that the conflict was nowhere near over. In 2009, Joseph Kabila invited Rwandan troops to help hunt down the Hutu rebel groups in the DRC. Even though they were successfully able to capture the main leadership, yet the fighting has not stopped.

The war has displaced millions and has had a death toll of over 5 million, either from starvation and illness, or direct killings. Sexual violence persists, especially in the eastern areas of the Congo where rebel forces retain a strong hold. The efforts of the democratic government to bring peace and stop the rebel violence remains a struggle, as new rebel groups

156 (Rupiya, 2002, pp. 102-103)
157 (Dunn, 2002, p. 69)
158 (Reuters, 2012a, 2012b)
159 (Polgreen, 2008)
160 (McCrummen, 2009)
161 (Coghlan et al., 2007)
return to replace the old ones. In 2012, a new rebel group formed from members of the
Congolese army, which demanded higher pay and better weapons. The DRC accused the rebel
group of being a front for Rwanda to advance its exploitive enterprises in the country. With
renewed conflict in the DRC the SADC has once again pledged troops to help return stability to
the country and secure stability for the region.

Democracy Before and After Intervention

![Graph showing Polity IV values from 1990 to 2011.]

Figure 4 DRC Polity IV

Polity IV (2) changes values of -66, -77, and -88 to common Polity IV values. -77 is
marked as 0, -88 is prorated across the span of the transition.
Source: (Marshall & Jaggers, 2011)

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162 (News, 2012)
The DRC currently has a Polity IV rating of 5\textsuperscript{163}, which suggests that the government is moving toward a more democratic and stable regime. The Polity IV score says nothing of the ongoing violence in many regions of the DRC. Before SADC intervention, the DRC had a Polity IV rating of -77 all the way back to 1992. Prior to that date, it held a score of -8.\textsuperscript{164} Politically the country has progressed but the country’s political and economic stability continues to decline.

Under Mobutu, the country functioned as little more than a business enterprise for Mobutu and his allies. In 1990 under political pressure from the international community Mobutu announced that Zaire would move toward democracy. Human Rights Watch reported in 1992 that there was significant progress in the liberalization of the country as long term political detention ceased. There were still reported cases of opposition figures and journalists disappearing or of suspicious deaths. Censorship of newspapers and media was decreasing but there were still actions taken against newspapers or journalists who spoke out against the government.\textsuperscript{165}

Mobutu continued to centralize his power and to silence his opposition. In February of 1993, he dismissed the Prime Minister whom he had appointed as head of the transitional government and announced that he would not relinquish his firm control over the treasury or the armed forces.\textsuperscript{166} Mobutu would not be pressured by Western allies that threatened sanctions if Mobutu did not step down.

Under the new government that was created in 2006 following years of peace initiatives by the SADC and UN, there has been improvement in civil rights issues. However, 2006 was

\textsuperscript{163} (Marshall & Jaggers, 2011)
\textsuperscript{164} (Marshall & Jaggers, 2011)
\textsuperscript{165} (Human Rights Watch, 1993)
\textsuperscript{166} (Noble, 1993)
marred by several problems, including a boycott by the opposition.\textsuperscript{167} The public accepted the election largely because of the international influence by making sure that the elections bought the peace and stability that they promised.

The elections did not completely turn the tide as the 2012 report from Transparency International put the DRC as 160\textsuperscript{th} out of 176 countries, with a score of 21.\textsuperscript{168} The Mo Ibrahim Foundation rates the DRC government as 51\textsuperscript{st} out of 52 African countries.\textsuperscript{169}

The 2011 elections elicited numerous calls of illegitimacy by the opposition as Joseph Kabala was re-elected. The Carter Center observed the 2011 elections and found numerous irregularities such as voter inflation in areas loyal to Kabila and voter suppression in areas supportive of the opposition. In some areas loyal to Kabila, voter turnout was 99 to 100 percent, a turn out that the Carter Center disputes, saying that 100\% turnout is impossible when few streets are paved and every vote is for Kabila.\textsuperscript{170}

The SADC left the DRC with little stability and only a semblance of democracy. While the Polity IV score has improved, the conditions in the DRC for the general population have not. There are more political freedoms and civil rights, nevertheless the government continues to maintain a firm hold on state power and limiting the ability of the people to have their voices heard.

\textsuperscript{167} (Tannock, 2011)  
\textsuperscript{168} (Transparency International, 2012)  
\textsuperscript{169} (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2012)  
\textsuperscript{170} (Carter Center, 2011)
Other SADC Interventions

Like ECOWAS there were few instances where the majority of SADC states approved of substantial military intervention. Lesotho and Madagascar are the only other cases of direct military intervention by SADC states into another state. However, it is important to note that one of the most telling cases on SADC intervention is Zimbabwe, a state that despite human rights abuses, electoral concerns and extreme repression never experienced the strong arm of the SADC. The Madagascar intervention has not yet reached its conclusion, however the effects of action in Lesotho and the lack of action in Zimbabwe are well known.

Lesotho

The Lesotho intervention was unique and unexpected because it occurred only a month after the intervention into the DRC, and it was spear headed by South Africa. The reasons why South Africa chose to intervene militarily in Lesotho after adamantly criticizing the use of military force in the DRC are unclear. In fact, much like the DRC intervention, the Lesotho intervention occurred without the direct consent of the members of the SADC.

In 1994, King Letsie III suspended the constitution and dissolved the administration of Prime Minister Ntsu Mokhehle. This action effectively became a royal coup as the constitutional government of Lesotho no longer existed. Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe condemned the coup and South Africa responded by deploying troops to the Lesotho border. The show of force by South Africa was enough for King Letsie to reinstate the government and abdicate this throne, allowing his father to take the throne.
Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe decided to become the guarantors of Lesotho stability from that point onward. So when discontent erupted over national elections in 1998, the newly elected Prime Minister Paklitha Mosisili wrote to the SADC about the impending coup. South Africa, Botswana, Mozambique and Zimbabwe were quick to respond but South Africa supplied the majority of troops and the logistical coordination for the intervention to prevent the coup.

South Africa claimed that the intervention was under SADC auspices, claiming SADC protocol about not allowing coups d’état. However, the protocol to not allow coups d’état was only proposed by South Africa and never approved by the SADC, nor was any aspect of South Africa’s intervention into Lesotho approved by the SADC. There was little discussion about the situation in Lesotho within the SADC prior to the intervention and the most that was done was to set up a committee to find out whether or not the 1998 elections were fraudulent.

The intervention into Lesotho was met with unexpected resistance by the Lesotho army which killed several South African soldiers and their allies. The fighting caused Lesotho to erupt into a state of anarchy with public demonstrations against the intervention. The demonstrations led to a virtual sacking of the capital and thousands of people were displaced. The initial operation into Lesotho was filled with strategic and tactical errors and was seen as a military and political disaster. The situation became a huge embarrassment for South Africa.

The failure of the mission was largely due to the fact that South Africa still had a fledging government. At only four years old, the African National Congress (ANC) had not yet created a political and strategic coherence between state departments. The decision-making procedures

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171 (Tavares, 2011, pp. 158-159)
172 (Nathan, 2012, p. 82)
within the military were also ad hoc and rudimentary as the new government had very little experience with effective military operations.

Despite the criticisms over the failure of the initial operation and the justification for the intervention, South Africa continued to play a peacekeeping role in Lesotho. South Africa was able to facilitate negotiations between the parties and eventually and agreement was reached regarding the disputed elections. The intervention troops remained until May 1999, when a new electoral system was in place. Successful elections were held in 2002.

The reasons behind the South African military intervention into Lesotho are not entirely clear, given the rejection of Zimbabwe’s intervention into the DRC just a month earlier. Bringing stability to Lesotho was part of South Africa’s goal of bringing stability to the region in order to boost their own economic growth, but military intervention was not part of the peaceful initiatives of South Africa. However, there was a significant caveat to the Lesotho conflict in that Lesotho Highlands Water Project was the largest series of dams in Africa. It provided a steam of income to Lesotho while sending water to South Africa’s central province, which included Johannesburg and Pretoria. Protecting the water supply was a major objective for South Africa.¹⁷³

While there were several reasons for South Africa to become involved in Lesotho, the reasons to intervene in Zimbabwe were far less compelling. Therefore, neither the South Africa nor other states within the SADC were willing to intervene in the Zimbabwe crisis.

¹⁷³ (Tavares, 2011, p. 159)
Zimbabwe

The issues with Zimbabwe came to a head in 2000, but they were boiling under the surface for decades. In February of 2000, the ruling party Zimbabwe National Union Patriotic Front (Zanu-PF) lost a constitutional referendum, the first defeat since 1980. The defeat came largely due to the rise of an opposition party the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). The constitutional referendum would have allowed President Robert Mugabe to remain in power and would give immunity to Mugabe’s government and security forces for any illegal acts committed while in office. It also allowed for the government to seize any land without paying for the land itself, only improvements on the land.

Following the vote, Zimbabwean war veterans who were struggling under severe poverty but were ignored by the government began invading and occupying white owned farms. The Zimbabwean government supported the occupation and began its own program of land seizures, despite the vote against it. The international community responded with tough sanctions that threatened the economy and the stability of Zimbabwe.

The SADC responded by supporting the “land reform” program of Zimbabwe, stating that it was simply a way of redistributing land. At the time, 1% of the population owned 70% of the best arable land in Zimbabwe. A South African foreign affairs official also supported the occupation of farms by veterans as an understandable response to Britain’s failure to fund the land redistribution program.

Even as refugees streamed across the borders of SADC states and the economic situation became even more dire, the SADC leaders refused to see a problem in Zimbabwe. In December 2001, the members of the task force assigned to assist Zimbabwe with the economic and political
issues affecting the country, found that the situation was improving. They even rejected the grim view of Zimbabwe that was presented by the international media, even as reports of violence against MDC members were well known. In 2002 a SADC summit communique went as far as to welcome the following actions from the Zanu-PF regime: the respect for human rights, the commitment to investigating any claims of political violence and the commitment to fair elections and the rule of law.

However, Mugabe ignored the diplomatic requests by the SADC and the SADC continued to act complacent in light of continuing repression. In 2005, the Zanu-PF won parliamentary elections by a landslide. Observers from AU, SADC and South Africa endorsed the elections as being the will of the people, even as the International Crisis Group reported the government’s systematic use of propaganda, violence, electoral manipulation, targeted disenfranchisement and abuse of humanitarian relief.\textsuperscript{174}

The situation continued to deteriorate and by 2007, inflation in Zimbabwe was anywhere from 7,600 percent to 13,000 percent. Government repression of opposition was rampant as MDC members were imprisoned, tortured and killed. Political rallies were outlawed and nearly a quarter of the population had fled the country.\textsuperscript{175} President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa was put in charge of mediations between the Zanu-PF and the MDC, but it became apparent to the MDC and even the international community that Mbeki was biased toward the Zanu-PF government and Mugabe.

Despite the problems mediation was able to bring election reform and new elections in 2008. When it came down to a runoff election between Mugabe and MDC leader Tsvangirai,

\textsuperscript{174} (International Crisis Group, 2005)
\textsuperscript{175} (Nathan, 2012, p. 70)
Tsangirai pulled out of the election. The political repression and violent threats made it impossible for Tsangirai to continue his campaign, allowing Mugabe to win by a landslide. The international community found the election fraudulent and only the SADC continued to support the Mugabe regime. Mbeki continued his mediations, however, and this led to a coalition government in February 2009. The coalition placed Mugabe as President and Tsangirai as Prime Minister.

There was no pressure for Mugabe to truly bring Tsangirai and the MDC into a true partnership, so the Zanu-PF continued to maintain most of the power within Zimbabwe. Tsangirai and the MDC had few options with a mediator that was bias toward Mugabe and a party that was severely weakened by years of repression. The mediation did little to inspire cooperation between the two parties and it continues to simply be a way for Mugabe to gain legitimacy within the international community.

Due to the divisions within the SADC about how to handle the situation in Zimbabwe, more was not done. There was little initiative to hold Zimbabwe to the respect for human rights, the rule of law and for the democratic process by the SADC. The reasons why SADC states chose to support Mugabe and his presidency over the goals and ambitions in the SADC treaty were largely due to the norms of state solidarity and anti-imperialism. There was little effort to intervene on behalf of human rights and democracy.

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176 (Nathan, 2012, p. 76)
Conclusion

The SADC differed from ECOWAS in that it planned to have some sort of institution to address security concerns. However, like ECOWAS there were few mechanisms in place for how any interventions would be handled. The SADC did not have any interventions that included at least agreement for military intervention from a majority of member states.

Both the SADC military interventions into Lesotho and the DRC did not even consult the entire membership of the SADC before beginning the intervention. In both cases it was merely a handful of states operating on behalf of national interests and claiming SADC mandate after the fact. National interests were the driving force behind the SADC interventions, and the dominant concern for the major players in the interventions was stability.

The lack of intervention into Zimbabwe showed a desire to maintain status quo. Many SADC states were not willing to act against the established Zimbabwe government, especially when Mugabe had been such a dominant player in SADC politics. Even when it became clear that Zimbabwe was facing economic collapse and severe human rights abuses, the threat to stability of the region was not enough to convince SADC states to go against the status quo. The blind spot of President Thabo Mbeki and the rest of the SADC toward the repression and abuses committee by Mugabe were nothing short of shocking to the international community.177

The SADC also had few mechanisms in place to secure compliance to the Treaty by member states. While there was the ability to impose sanctions or suspend states, there were no circumstances in place for when such things should happen. There was also no unbiased reports given to the SADC about the state of affairs in Zimbabwe and it was apparent that the

177 (Nathan, 2012, p. 76)
organization refused to believe the reports in the international media.\textsuperscript{178} The lack of accountability mechanisms within the SADC prevented interventions from being a joint operation rather than just matters of national interest.

When the SADC was founded there was a strong emphasis on the necessity of policy agreement, and this proved to be the defining point for both the SADC and ECOWAS. It was only when national interest coincided that interventions became operations that involved all members of the regional organization. With the SADC, the DRC war was a major threat to the stability of the region but there was no discussion among the entire membership about how to proceed. The lack of unity and trust among the members prevented the operation from having a joint approach. The split approach of the SADC to the DRC crisis would not have been a problem if it had been that approach from the start, but the decision of Zimbabwe to intervene without consulting all SADC states created distrust throughout the membership. A joint operation between Zimbabwe and South Africa would have had a much better chance at bringing stability to the DRC. The following operation into Lesotho which did include both South Africa and Zimbabwe had better success, if it still was riddled with problems and was also without SADC approval.

The operation of ECOWAS into Liberia may not have been favored by all member states but a majority were at least willing to authorize the intervention. As the intervention continued and as national interests changed, more and more states were willing to supply troops and support. It was common national interests that led to the ECOWAS intervention being more successful than intervention attempts by the SADC.

\textsuperscript{178} (Nathan, 2012, p. 67)
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Table 1 Intervention Components and Outcomes
CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSIONS

The interventions performed by ECOWAS and the SADC are both important because they are some of the first initiatives by African organizations to try and bring stability and democracy to the region. The ECOWAS intervention into Liberia was the first time that any economic community had intervened militarily in a conflict, thus stressing the importance of the conflict to the stability of the region. Both interventions had their good and bad points and both were started by organizations without a majority membership of democracies.

What the case studies show is that success is largely based upon common interests. While both organizations had member states that wanted peaceful solutions and supported military intervention, there was more cohesion on the part of ECOWAS. The split between military and diplomatic initiatives of the SADC prevented the intervention from having the forces and the power it needed to create a major impact on the DRC.

Both organizations acted out of a fear of instability and national interests. For ECOWAS it was apparent that the region was experiencing instability within several states and the problems in Liberia were enough to tip the scales. The instability, regime changes and revolutions that occurred in the years following the Liberian intervention show how volatile the situation was. The interventions in Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau by ECOWAS occurred soon after the Liberian intervention and they both had very different results.

Both the Liberian and DRC interventions were spearheaded by a state that hoped to be seen as a regional hegemon. Nigeria and Zimbabwe both wanted to be seen as the dominant power within their region. Both states also had reasons to want to draw international attention
away from the problems within their own boarders and instead show what they could do for the region as a whole.

What is shown by these case studies is that a regional organization does not have to have a majority membership of democracies in order to promote or establish a democratic regime within their region. The interventions into Liberia and the DRC were able to establish a state that was moving toward an established democracy, however only one intervention brought true stability. In fact, one of the reasons why the Liberian intervention was so successful was because the autocratic regimes or states in transition, knew that their hold on power was tenuous. Reducing the conflict in the region was essential to securing what little stability they had over their own state, including using the intervention as way to get rid of any potential rebel threats in the military.

Can African Regional Organizations Promote Stability and Democracy?

The focus of this thesis was to determine whether African regional organizations can promote stability and democracy. However, as the case studies showed, initially there was no focus on democracy by any of the major states involved in the interventions or within the organizations themselves. The only time that democracy was discussed was following the intervention and the organization needed a way to maintain the stability that the intervention had created.

While the focus was not on democracy, these interventions did lead to transforming autocratic states into democracies. This does only seem to occur when a state is in the middle of a crisis; otherwise the organization does not care if member states are democracies or
autocracies. This is shown in the lack of interventions into states with established autocracies, but do not threaten the stability of the region, such as Swaziland.

Stability over Democracy

While democratic tenets are part of the treaties of both organizations, they are not enforced to the extent that the treaty suggests. The SADC has yet to place any restrictions on Swaziland despite its strongly autocratic regime and Gambia with a Polity IV score of -5 has full rights as a member of ECOWAS. What mattered to the autocratic and democratic states of ECOWAS and the SADC was not regime type, but stability.

At the end of the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia, the organization was tired of the fighting and the maintenance of troops. The main goal was to bring stability to the state and to the region so that ECOMOG could pull out and leave Liberia. ECOWAS member states believed that a democratic government with free and fair elections was the best way to ensure the stability and the lack of a new rebel uprising. Another indication of the desire of ECOWAS to ensure stability over democracy was their support of Charles Taylor as the presidential candidate for Liberia. It was believed that if Charles Taylor did not win, he would simply rebel again. This belief was shared by Liberians as the main reason why they decided to vote for Taylor - they hoped it would end the violence.¹⁷⁹

On the part of the SADC, the goal was also stability. The states that favored a peaceful solution and those that favored military intervention both wanted stability for the DRC and the region. Both South Africa and Zimbabwe, the major players in the SADC wanted to promote

¹⁷⁹ (Moran, 2006)
stability within their region. Zimbabwe wanted to promote stability as the perceived regional hegemon and South Africa wanted stability for better trade relations to boost their economy.

The belief that democracies are more stable is not new. The democratic peace theory suggests that democracies do not fight with other democracies.\(^{180}\) More importantly for these case studies, research has shown that democracies are less prone to civil war.\(^{181}\) Therefore, states and organizations looking to promote stability within their region would have better chances for long term peace by creating a democratic government over an autocratic one.

In terms of member states within an organization, if stability is the goal then it would be understandable why the SADC would not take action against Swaziland, even though the state does not have a democratic regime. Research has shown that strongly autocratic regimes, like Swaziland, are less likely to experience civil war than intermediate regimes.\(^{182}\) Since Swaziland has little chance of degenerating into a civil war that could threaten the region, it is more important for SADC states to focus on other matters rather than trying to promote democracy within Swaziland. The same research concludes that states in transition from autocracy to democracy are also more likely to engage in civil war than states that either have strong democracies or strong autocracies, so forcing liberalization onto Swaziland might even cause instability.

Strong democracies are still less likely to experience civil war than strong autocracies, so in states where civil war or rebellion is already occurring, it is more beneficial to establish a democratic government over an autocratic one.

\(^{180}\) (Kant, 1975)
\(^{181}\) (Myers & Krain, 1997)
\(^{182}\) (Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, & Gleditsch, 2001)
Autocracies and Promoting Democracy

Contrary to the research of Pevehouse, in African regional organizations autocracies have the potential to spur democratic change, even more so than democratic regimes. The interventions into conflicts by the SADC and ECOWAS were both spearheaded by autocracies, with the exception of the intervention by the SADC into Lesotho. It was actually because Nigeria was an autocracy that it was so important for Liberia and even Sierra Leone to move toward democracy.

As a firmly established autocracy, the government of Nigeria was well known for repression of civil rights and for human rights abuses. The international community harshly criticized Nigeria and threatened to impose harsh sanctions. Nigeria was barred from meetings of the Commonwealth because of the known human rights abuses that were occurring in the country. By promoting peacekeeping missions throughout Africa, Nigeria was able to get some positive attention and turn the focus of the international community away from what was happening inside the country. The goal of promoting democracy within Liberia and Sierra Leone was part of an initiative to increase the international opinion of the current state Nigeria and its government. Nigeria even used its support of interventions as a way to garner support from other states within ECOWAS, as backup against criticisms from the international community. This directly contradicts the work of Bueno de Mesquita and Downs whose research suggested that Nigeria would never support a transition to democracy in Liberia or any other state.\(^{183}\)

In turn, when Nigeria moved toward a civilian and democratic government, it was no longer willing to maintain costly interventions in other states. It pulled out of Sierra Leone and refused to supply troops or substantial finances toward the Guinea-Bissau intervention. Those

\(^{183}\) (Bueno de Mesquita & Downs, 2006)
resources were needed to solve problems at home. When it was an autocracy, it was easier for Nigeria to spare those resources and devote them to causes outside of the state. As a democracy, Nigeria no longer had that luxury. This suggests that there are cases where an autocracy would be more likely to support democratic transitions in another state than that of a democracy.

It is also important to note that for the DRC intervention there were more democracies within the SADC than any other regime type; therefore the SADC should have been more successful in promoting a transition to democracy. In reality, it was the autocracy dominated ECOWAS that was more successful in promoting democracy. It was a period of instability and transitions to democracy from the ground up that prompted democratic changes within the SADC and ECOWAS. This supports the work of Olonisakin, that African regional organizations will be transformed by transitions to democracy within the state and not the other way around.

Democracy and Economy

Both the SADC and ECOWAS were established as primarily economic regional organizations. Their goal was to establish trade arrangements and spur foreign investment in the region in order to spur development within member states. Both organizations did include aspects of good governance and democracy within their treaties, under the belief that stability and democracy where necessary for economic growth in the region.

The Liberian crisis created a situation that threatened the stability and the ability of the entire region to successfully build their economies and have effective trade relations. This caused the crisis to become part of the economic and stability goals of ECOWAS to intervene militarily, even though there were no institutions within ECOWAS for military intervention. While
democracy was not the focus of the intervention at its onset, democracy was always part of the goals of the organization within all member states. This seems contradictory for organizations that were composed of mostly autocratic regimes.

Yet democratic regimes had more to offer for the economic future of both regions than autocratic regimes. Not only would more democratic states lead to greater foreign investment as Western investors were more likely to invest in democratic regimes than autocratic ones. There has also been research that suggests that states with democracies have economic growth that is not as affected by corruption as states with autocratic regimes.\(^\text{184}\) The level of corruption within autocratic regimes makes it difficult for development efforts to be successful. Evidence of this can be seen in how corrupt Nigerian officials and military leaders took money for themselves while billing it under ECOWAS expenses for the interventions.

**What Are the Necessary Structures and Institutions to Promote Democracy and Stability?**

From the two case studies is apparent that one of the necessary structures for an intervention to be successful is a strong mandate and mechanisms in place to run a peacekeeping operation. Neither ECOWAS nor the SADC had the necessary structures in place for a peacekeeping force to be accountable to the political objectives of the organization. Nor were there structures to help the peacekeeping force to work hand in hand with the efforts to forge a peace agreement. A direct line of communication between the peacekeeping forces and the regional organization is necessary to make sure that the force not only maintains its neutrality and ability to be a peacekeeping force, but also to perform ambassadorial duties.

\(^{184}\) (Drury, Kriekhaus, & Lusztig, 2006, p. 133)
The findings in this paper coincide with the work of Boehmer, Gartzke and Nordstrom and the work of Hansen, Mitchell and Nemeth who found that member cohesiveness and strong institutions contribute to the ability of international organizations to influence policy and regimes within member nations.\textsuperscript{185}

\textbf{Policy Agreement/National Interests}

At the time of its formation one of the core aspects of the SADC was to have policy agreement among members. The belief was that only through policy agreement would the organization be able to thrive.\textsuperscript{186} This is necessary for any regional organization, that the members have similar goals and expectations for the organization. While there was some dissention in ECOWAS for each intervention, the majority of states either agreed to the need for intervention or directly contributed to the military intervention. For the SADC, there was never a majority consensus on how to approach the situations in Lesotho or the DRC. This prevented the SADC peacekeeping initiatives from getting the full support of the international community and even the full force of the SADC toward the peacekeeping missions.

At the heart of every peacekeeping operation by ECOWAS and the SADC were national interests by member states. This is yet another reason why policy agreement are so pivotal to the success of African regional organizations in particular. With so few states having substantial resources to spare, states need to work together to promote stability. Therefore, the national interests of the member states need to coincide so that peacekeeping missions will be successful. In the case of the ECOWAS interventions, the entire region was unstable and many of the states

\textsuperscript{185} (Boehmer et al., 2004; Hansen et al., 2008)
\textsuperscript{186} (Nathan, 2012)
themselves were only in tentative control, so it was in the national interest of most of the states to prevent anything from tipping the scales in the wrong direction. While there were some differences in national interests for why each state ultimately decided to support or be a part of the intervention, at the core was always stability for themselves and the region.

Using Mills methods it is clear that in situations where there was no policy agreement on the matter of intervention, the intervention was unable to progress to complete stability and democracy. In the cases where there was strong policy agreement such as in the ECOWAS interventions, the organization was more likely to succeed in its intervention efforts. However, the failure of the intervention in Guinea-Bissau and the necessity for UN help in the Sierra Leone intervention, prove that it does take more than just policy agreement for an intervention to be successful.

The national interests of SADC states in the DRC conflict were also focused on stability. More states were involved with the DRC conflict than any other and it was clear that it could ruin the potential for stability and trade within the region if the situation was not put under control. However, there were also national interests in conflict within SADC. South Africa was looking to protect its future trading region, Zimbabwe wanted to be established as a regional powerhouse, and both were getting something out of their separate efforts in the conflict. Zimbabwe elites were being paid for their assistance in the intervention and South Africa was getting positive attention from the international community by seeking a peaceful solution. It was not until the stalemate that the national interests of all the parties converged to the point where the SADC could present a united initiative toward peace. By then the region was too unstable and the rewards still too great for the region to be safe from rebel forces.
Highly Defined Institutions and a Strong Mandate

The biggest problem for ECOMOG in Liberia and it the interventions that followed, was a lack of direct communication and structure connecting it to ECOWAS. There was no established institution for overseeing or maintaining a peacekeeping force and therefore there was little understanding of who the leaders of ECOMOG would report to. The leaders were largely on their own for both military and political decisions. This added to the concerns over neutrality because the ECOMOG leaders were almost always Nigerian and therefore followed the political and military goals of Nigeria.

A clearly defined mandate that offers clear rules and guidelines for member states would prevent issues such as Zimbabwe within the regional organization. There would be a clearly defined consequence for human rights abuses and repression, regardless of the state or leader responsible for those crimes. An option for states to air grievances or discuss problems is also beneficial to deal with issues where states are not fulfilling their obligations to the organization. This is drawn from the work of Boehmer, Gartzke and Nordstrom that suggest that a strong organizational mandate on security concerns is pivotal to the success of a regional organization. In Africa, where security issues and instability are rampant in many states, the need for a security structure within African regional organizations is necessary for lasting success and stability in the region.

Clear definitions of the institutions are also necessary for the success of a regional organization to reach their goals. The poorly defined responsibilities of the Organ and the lack of authority of the SADC over the Organ not only caused a rift within the SADC but allowed a few states to act militarily under the guise of the SADC. If there is no clear line of authority over all the institutions and structures of the regional organization, it will not be able to effectively
manage all of its operations. Following the problems over the DRC, the SADC placed the Organ under the authority of Summit and restructured many of the institutions to make all SADC operations more effective.

Likewise, following the problems within the interventions into Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau and the democratic transition of the majority of member states, ECOWAS completely transformed its structures and institutions. Now there are clearly defined objectives, clear protocols for new initiatives by the organization and methods for states to air grievances or complaints. There are institutions to handle the regular operations of the organization, while the highest authority remains the Summit which includes all the heads of the member states.

These movements toward stronger institutions that are clearly defined and a clear mandate have strengthened the reputation of ECOWAS and the SADC within the international community. ECOWAS is now seen as a major force within Africa and the strongest regional organization on the continent. The SADC has been able to partner with other regional organizations and move toward greater economic development within the region. Both of these organizations are currently beginning new interventions into member states in conflict, future research into the progress and success of these interventions may give insight into how effective these improvements are.

There are currently no cases of completed interventions by ECOWAS or the SADC under the current restructuring of the institutions and protocols. Therefore, it is not possible to see how strong institutions and structures would change the likelihood of success by ECOWAS or the SADC, until the current interventions under way by both organizations are completed. However, through looking at the problems caused by the lack of strong institutions and protocols can be
seen throughout the interventions by both ECOWAS and the SADC. Using Mills methods and analyzing the effects of varying levels of institutionalization from no security structure to a poorly defined security structure shows that there is very little difference. Whether nonexistent or poorly defined there was no change to the likelihood of success because they caused severe problems in both instances.

Hegemon or Strong Leading Power

The existence of a regional hegemon was also a part of what made the interventions into Liberia and Sierra Leone successful. Nigeria was able to fund and supply troops toward the peacekeeping operations while still remaining relatively neutral and its actions legitimate by working through ECOWAS. Nigeria was also able to use its influence to encourage other states to become involved in Liberia as well. The influence of hegemons was also pivotal to the interventions by the SADC. Both South Africa and Zimbabwe were major players in the region. They were able to influence other states to join in their initiatives and work toward peaceful solutions. However, it was when the two hegemons disagreed that problems arose and threatened to destroy the entire organization. This shows that regional organizations can become struggles for power. As was proven by Mandela and Mugabe as they were unable to work together to find solutions because they both wanted control over SADC initiatives.

The need for a strong hegemon was seen in the ECOWAS interventions into Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau. Once Nigeria was no longer willing to be a major player in the intervention in Sierra Leone it was necessary for the UN to take over the peacekeeping mission in the country. In Guinea-Bissau, Nigeria was unwilling to take on the leadership role of the
intervention or even contribute troops as it was too focused on internal affairs as part of their transition to a democratic government. The mission into Guinea-Bissau was rife with problems including a lack of sufficient troops and equipment for a successful intervention. However, Nigeria still played a diplomatic role in offering up a place for the peace talks to be held.

In the SADC intervention into Lesotho, the two major powers of the region were joined together. Zimbabwe and South Africa were both working together on the intervention. Despite the two hegemons being on the same side, there were still problems and the intervention was considered to be an initial embarrassment. While the military intervention was considered flawed, the diplomatic efforts and peace talks that were led by South Africa did bring some stability and peace to Lesotho. Therefore, a region hegemon is not the sole component needed for a successful intervention but as seen in the ECOWAS interventions it can be one factor that makes a very big difference in success or failure. The SADC intervention into the DRC may suggest that the presence of two states fighting to be regional hegemons may create more problems and not be as helpful toward successful intervention as one single hegemon.

Using Mills methods it is clear that a strong, single hegemon is the strongest predictor of success for a regional organization’s attempts at intervention. When Nigeria was not present for the Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau interventions there was no chance of success without outside involvement. Even when there were two hegemons working together there was not as much chance of success for the intervention, when the two hegemons were at odds the intervention had even less chance of success. With so many states within African regional organizations militarily and financially weak, it is necessary for a regional hegemon or international organization to fill the military and financial gap.
The need for a hegemon does lend credence to the realist claim that international organizations are mirrors of the balance of power system. Even in African regional organizations the regional hegemon dominates the decision making and heads the intervention force because they are more powerful and able to do so. However, with the intervention led by two hegemons, even when they agreed, it was not a guarantee of success. The intervention by Zimbabwe and South Africa into Lesotho was not successful even though both hegemons were in agreement over the need for military force in the country.

**Were Regional Organizations Successful in their Goals?**

If stability is more important than democracy in African regional organizations, then the success of intervention should be measured by the ability to create stability within the state. In the case of the ECOWAS intervention into Liberia, it was able to bring some semblance of stability to the region. The 1998 intervention brought initial stability to the capital city and was eventually able to secure the entire state. When rebels entered the country again and ECOWAS was once again called for help, stability was quickly established. Both initiatives required the aid and support of the UN, with the UN even taking over ECOWAS forces to control the second intervention.

Today, Liberia is a poor but stable country. The economy is slowly growing and repression and violence within the country is on the decline. There have been two rounds of free and fair elections as rated by a number of independent monitors and there have been no significant threats to the government since 2006 when the new government took power. In terms
of stability and democracy, the end result in Liberia might be labeled as a success but it was not without its shortcomings.

ECOMOG was poorly run and had little political direction from ECOWAS. This did not change even in subsequent interventions in Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau. These interventions though poorly run and mismanaged, did bring some semblance of stability and in both cases the countries moved toward a more liberalized regime. However, in the case of Guinea-Bissau fighting continued on the edges of the country even as ECOWAS was pulling out to give control to the new government. Sierra Leone continued to struggle for stability within its borders when a joint effort by the UN, and the United States training troops from Nigeria, Ghana and Senegal to help with the UN mission occurred.\footnote{Adebajo, 2002, p. 102} It was only after this joint effort that tentative peace and stability came to Sierra Leone.

While there were significant problems with the interventions and they lasted several years, they were still able to bring countries in chaos to some semblance of stability. The biggest issue that ECOWAS and their forces must change for the future is that in each case of ECOWAS intervention there was knowledge of other ECOWAS states lending support to the other side.\footnote{Adebajo, 2002, pp. 48, 82,}

In terms of an SADC intervention, there has yet to be a united effort by the SADC to bring stability to another state. The two major interventions by the SADC have been into Lesotho and the DRC. The intervention in to Lesotho was spearheaded by South Africa and was largely hailed as a disaster and an embarrassment to South Africa. The intervention included Botswana, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, and was met with resistance from both the Lesotho army and the people of Lesotho. The country largely disintegrated into chaos.
The failure in Lesotho is understood due to the fact that South Africa was still a fledging country and the operation into Lesotho was poorly managed and poorly thought out. It was also criticized that South Africa so readily deployed military forces in Lesotho a mere month after speaking out against the military intervention into the DRC. It was only after South Africa abandoned the failed military operation that diplomatic efforts were successful.

The DRC intervention was also unsuccessful in bringing stability to the country. Even after the establishment of a democratic government, the country continued to be fraught with violence and extreme poverty. The elections that were held were found to be suspect and full of problems as reported by several election observers. The success of the second intervention into the DRC has yet to be seen.

ECOWAS is now involved in an intervention into Mali and the SADC has moved into Madagascar in the hopes of bringing stability to both of these countries. These new interventions have only begun in 2012, so it will be a new test to see if the restructured institutions and greater stability of the organizations will lead to greater success.

**Limitations of African Regional Organizations**

None of the interventions by ECOWAS or the SADC would have had a chance of being successful without the support of the UN and western allies. Even when the western nations were unable to send troops or intervene themselves, they offered political and financial support to the operations. In the case of the UN, a truly neutral force was introduced to help with peace agreements and disarmament processes.
African nations do not have the resources or the economies to intervene militarily without the support of the west. Even with the recent progress of ECOWAS and SADC toward creating a growing economic community, the interventions planned into the DRC, Mali and Madagascar will depend on support from the AU and the UN. It will be a very long time before these organizations will be able to run a peacekeeping mission on their own, as it was shown in the case of the military intervention into the DRC. Zimbabwe and her allies had very little international support and even with the incentives from Kabila, the economy of Zimbabwe has yet to recover from that expense.

ECOWAS and the SADC also have had several issues with neutrality. Their states are always very close to the situation and this was detrimental to the interventions. There were states that choose to support the rebel forces rather than ECOWAS forces during the Liberian intervention. ¹⁸⁹ There are long standing grudges, alliances and even the hope for monetary gain that can prevent African states from being neutral in their endeavors or truly working for peace. Several of the peace agreements that were attempted by the SADC for the DRC conflict failed because of neutrality issues. The states involved in the military intervention had too much to gain from the continuing conflict.

The assistance of UN monitoring groups and support can help African regional organizations present a neutral front and give them a stronger argument for peace agreements. Western nations will have to continue to fund interventions, but they will have the benefit of not needing to use their own forces. The United States was happy to train African forces to be sent on UN missions, because it reduced the need for American or western troops to intervene. There have also been instances where African heads of state will only allow African peacekeeping

¹⁸⁹ (Adebajo, 2002)
forces into their country, and this is where partnerships between the UN and African regional organizations will continue to be beneficial.

Even with their limitations, African regional organizations offer an at home approach to conflict. They are African and know better than any other region the problems they face and the obstacles that must be overcome in order to reach stability. Western states support the idea of “African solutions African problems” because it reduces the strain on their own resources and it prevents the need to deploy troops in Africa, a sensitive topic since the failure of western peacekeeping missions in the nineties.

African regional organizations can offer rough and ready opportunities for quickly establishing stability and movements toward a stable regime. Both the SADC and ECOWAS were able to bring security to the capitals of the countries where they intervened within a matter of months; lasting stability however was a much harder issue. They have the ability of building economic communities that may one day have the power to enforce economic constraints on member states in response to human rights or political abuses. ECOWAS has not only established free trade arrangements but free movement of citizens of member states between all other states. They have created an investment bank that spurs development projects within all 15 of its member states. The SADC has created a growing economic community with ties to other communities to offer unparalleled trading options to encourage growth.

African regional organizations need to develop strong institutions and mechanisms for the deployment of peacekeeping troops and initiatives if they are going to continue to intervene in member states. The existence of a single regional hegemon has proven to be helpful, if somewhat problematic in terms of neutrality, to successful intervention. Most importantly the
national interests of the member states will need to coincide for any initiative toward stability or democracy to be successful.

Currently the value of African organizations is seen in their ability to respond to conflict and stabilize the region. Stability is the goal for both ECOWAS and the SADC because that is the only way for their regional trade agreements to be successful. At the core of both organizations is the belief that only through the growth of their economies can development and lasting stability come to the region. Until the economic goals of African regional organizations are met, they will not be able to respond to conflict entirely on their own. They will always need the support of the UN and the AU to have effective solutions to regimes in crisis.


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