REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
AND
THE DURABILITY OF PEACE

by

JULIANA VELASCO
B.A. University of Central Florida, 2011

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Masters in Arts
in the Department of Political Science
in the College of Sciences
at the University of Central Florida
Orlando, Florida

Summer Term
2013
ABSTRACT

This thesis investigates the role of regional organizations in peacemaking and peacekeeping, particularly on the effects of peace agreement duration. This is important because the United Nations has been traditionally seen as the default international peacekeeping force but recently, more responsibility is being given to regional organizations.

This study hypothesizes that regional organizations’ ability to clear commitment problems, create specific agreements, and willingness to enforce agreements make them the most effective third parties to deal with many conflicts. However, the study also hypothesizes that regional organizations are less fit to mediate conflicts based around ethnicity, identity, or religious disparities.

By utilizing a mixture of logistic regression and case studies, the results illustrate that regional organizations are an essential asset to creating agreements that elongate the duration of peace. In testing for the partiality of regional organizations, the specifics of agreements made, the willingness and capabilities of enforcement, the reason for the conflict and the institutionalization of the organization, quantitative and qualitative results illustrate that regional organizations are a valid tool for conflict management.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First of all I’d like to thank Dr. Thomas Dolan for his tremendous assistance and guidance during this process. His persistence as thesis chair helped not only put forth my best effort into this work but also not to give up when things became daunting.

I’d also like to thank Dr. Nikola Mirilovic for his help on the quantitative portion of this thesis and helping to make sense of the results and helping me to explain the results clearly.

In addition, I’d like to thank Dr. Kurt Young who assisted with the qualitative portion of this thesis and helped me look at my case studies from different points of view and seeing the “big picture.”

I’d like to thank my friends and family who have given me unconditional support to go for my degree and pursue my dreams.

Finally, I'd like to thank caffeine, guarana, taurine, and ginseng for helping me get through late night research, revisions, and formatting.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES.......................................................................................................................... vi

LIST OF ACRONYMNS.................................................................................................................. vii

CHAPTER ONE – INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... 1

CHAPTER TWO – LITERATURE REVIEW ................................................................................... 5
  Background ................................................................................................................................. 5
  Hypotheses ................................................................................................................................. 16

CHAPTER THREE – STUDY DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY .................................................. 23
  Datasets .................................................................................................................................. 23
  Variables ................................................................................................................................. 25
    Dependent Variable ............................................................................................................... 25
    Independent Variables ........................................................................................................ 25
    Control Variables ................................................................................................................ 28
  Regressions and Results ........................................................................................................ 29
    Hypotheses Results ............................................................................................................. 29
    Additional Regression Results ............................................................................................. 33
  Implications ............................................................................................................................. 36
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1 - 3rd party and Conflict Cross-tabulation ................................................................. 24
Table 2: Logistic Regression Analysis of Hypothesis 2 ............................................................... 30
Table 3: Logistic Regression for Hypothesis 4 .......................................................................... 32
Table 4: Full Model Logistic Regression ................................................................................... 35
Table 5: Logistic Regression - 3rd Party Type and Region ......................................................... 80
Table 6: Logistic Regression: 3rd Party Type and Outstanding Issues .................................... 81
Table 7 - Logistic Regression for 3rd Party Type, Outline, and Region ................................... 82
Table 8 - Logistic Regression of 3rd Party type, Outstanding Issues, and Battle Deaths ........ 83
LIST OF ACRONYMNS

AU ......................................................................................................................... African Union

AFRC ................................................................................................................ Arm...
CHAPTER ONE – INTRODUCTION

After the end of the Cold War, the literature investigating the mechanisms behind conflict and conflict resolution began to grow. While a great body of work has studied conflict prevention and conflict management, less attention has been directed to what makes peace agreements last, whether or not third-party management can ease the peace agreement process and if so, which organizations are most successful. The official international peacekeeping force has traditionally been the United Nations but slowly, more responsibility is being given to regional organizations. Under the United Nations Charter - Chapter VIII, regional organizations can be tasked with a variety of peacekeeping tasks but the definition of regional organizations is purposefully vague, allowing for flexibility. What is fairly clear is that the relationship is meant to be top-down:¹ Article 53 of Chapter VIII states that while the United Nations Security Council may make use of regional organizations “where appropriate”, these organizations cannot take enforcement action without prior approval of the Security Council.²

After some time, scholars began measuring the effectiveness of the UN, of these regional arrangements and the relationship between these two. Many works hypothesized that regional organizations should be utilized more often because they are closer to the conflict zones and can portray more legitimacy to the belligerents. They can also alleviate some of the burden from the United Nations since it cannot handle all the world’s conflicts. Part of

this is due to bureaucratic difficulties, such as veto power of various members,\textsuperscript{3} but also because of financial burdens. Of course, there are those who believe that it is simply the goal of the UN to buck-pass its responsibilities to regional organizations.\textsuperscript{4} There are few works that specifically address the length of peace agreements and what may or may not make them more successful. Even less attention has addressed which organizations may be more effective. The majority of studies of this nature also have focused on intrastate wars. Finally, there are those who are ardently opposed to the use of regional organizations, claiming that the trouble outweighs their benefits, if they have any.

This study attempts to breakdown the studies of peace agreements in order to look at them in terms of specific variables and understand not only what aspects of the agreements themselves make them more effective, but what third party, if any, contributes to their success. Regional organizations are theorized to be the most effective third party for a variety of reasons, including their ability to clear commitment problems and their geographical and political proximity to the conflicts under their “jurisdiction.” Today there are roughly 38 international organizations with a mandate regarding peace and regional security.\textsuperscript{5} These practically span the whole globe and can have significant presence and say within their respective spheres of influence. Of course, these organizations may be better at some types of conflict over others; for example, ethnic versus non-ethnic conflicts.

The UCDP dataset also defines “agreement” and “Primary Warring Parties,” a necessary inclusion.

An agreement is a binding mutual deal signed or publically agreed to. Primary Warring Parties are two governments of a state in an interstate armed conflict; or a government and any opposition organization or alliance of organizations that uses armed force to promote its position in the incompatibility in an intrastate armed conflict.  

The remainder of this research shall be structured fairly simply. Chapter Two will not only cover a short history of regional organizations but examine arguments for and against their usage, improvement strategies, and also what previous studies have been attempted to measure their effectiveness. In Chapter Three, the design of the study will be clarified, followed by the hypotheses and why they are important to test. Next, the variables will be defined. Finally, the logistic regressions will be conducted and the results will be disclosed, accompanied by interpretations and implications of the findings – both to general research in academia and to policy making in terms of what assistance should be given to regional organizations. Chapter Four will delve into the case studies with ECOMOG in Sierra Leon and Guinea Bissau and with OSCE in Moldova. ECOMOG and OSCE are examined due to their different histories, approaches to conflict management, and experience in mediation. Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau are studied because while Sierra Leone initially failed, ECOMOG was able to craft a later peace agreement which held. Conversely, it was unable to craft a similar successful agreement in Guinea Bissau. Liberia was not included because of its popularity in case studies regarding Africa. Chapter 5 will

---

conclude with an overall summary of the study and its results, a critical look at the implications of the results to academia and research, and suggestions for alternate methods of conducting this study as well as suggestions for future research.
CHAPTER TWO – LITERATURE REVIEW

Background

A myriad of authors have researched the mechanisms of war and conflict settlement more generally. Arguments arise from all schools of thought, including rationalism, which emphasizes belligerents’ use of cost-benefit analysis. Fearon and others address why states may be unable to reach a settlement despite their preference to avoid costly conflict. The first issue is informational problems. Leaders are unable to gather private information about their adversaries and, for obvious reasons, are less than willing to offer it. Informational problems are exacerbated because most bargainers have high incentives to misrepresent their capabilities, resolve, and intentions.7

While this is a significant hurdle facing opposing parties attempting to reach a peaceful settlement, commitment problems also play a large role. Commitment problems state that due to the anarchic nature of the international system, both parties may have the opportunity to renege on an agreement, if they even commit to one in the first place.8 Indeed, Werner’s study finds that agreements break down most often when one party has incentive to renegotiate the terms of settlement9, perhaps due to a rapid shift in power10 or

8 Powell, “War as a Commitment Problem,” 170.
10 Powell, “War as a Commitment Problem,” 195.
Finally, Fearon suggests that conflict cannot end in peaceful settlement if the issue is indivisible; that is, there is no optimum settlement. Fearon and Powell state that these situations are rare and despite the fact that the issue, such as a territory, may be indivisible, there are still compromises or bargaining spaces that both parties would prefer over conflict.

According to Keohane, regimes should be rather successful in handling these issues because they can reduce transaction costs and effective international regimes can ease communications among officials. Since regimes are a “set of expectations, rules and regulations, plans, organizations energies and financial commitments, which have been accepted by a group of states,” it is appropriate to include regional organizations in this definition. Furthermore, prescriptions are offered on how to enhance the effectiveness of regional bodies. Several studies address these issues and find that conflict will end if there is a stable government as well as institutional arrangements – due to civil wars being highly correlated with national poverty – and the presence of a third party that can signal resolve and guarantee safety of adversaries. Although specifically addressing civil wars, third parties may be also be able to address the same issues in interstate conflicts; however, even more debate surrounds which third party should handle disputes at all.

13 Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” 382; Powell, “War as a Commitment Problem,” 177.
15 Keohane, *After Hegemony*, 57
The basis of the argument regarding the nature of the relationship between the United Nations and regional organizations could be similarly framed within the bounds of universalism and regionalism. This division has been debated for over half a century but took new strides near the end of World War II. Though more prominent an argument now, advocates of universalism have hailed the rise of technology and communication as a reason for a universal international organization. The criticisms leveled at regionalism are more of a definitional – or perhaps operational – issue of what qualifies as a region. Is it merely geography or is it also cultural and other considerations?18

This debate took further shape post-Cold War when many new states were formed and there seemed to be an immediate rise in conflicts. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) began dispatching peacekeepers once more. During this time, although regional organizations existed, the United Nations was still the leader in peacekeeping.19 In 1992, the UN’s Secretary General Boutros-Ghali released An Agenda for Peace, a detailed report to the General Assembly and the Security Council that gave regional organizations a role to play, under Chapter VIII. After the failed missions in Somalia, the nature of United Nations peacekeeping was fundamentally altered. The United States withdrew some of its support and began supporting the idea of creating peacekeepers from within the region of conflict.20 Though monetary support was not necessarily withdrawn, peacekeepers were rarely dispatched under the United Nations banner. This, in turn, lowered the United

---

18 Pitman B Potter, “Universalism Versus Regionalism in International Organization” The American Political Science Review 37, no. 5 (1943): 852
20 Quayat, “The United Nations and Regional Organizations,”5
Nations’ capacity to respond to the many conflicts around the globe and offered regional organizations a unique chance to become more involved.

Due to the definitional vagueness of Chapter VIII however, there has not been an explicit outline detailing the relationship that the UN and regional organizations should have. The lack of a solid definition has encouraged various research projects regarding the effectiveness of the UN versus regional organizations. The arguments for strengthening regional organizations seem to stem from the assumption that proximity to a conflict zone is better for several reasons. From a “boots on the ground” perspective, regional organizations can potentially respond much faster to a new conflict than the United Nations not only because they are literally closer but also because they can come to a conclusion regarding their involvement in a shorter span of time. Furthermore, member states of these organizations share a history and, more than likely, a similar culture. This allows for these organizations to better formulate their approach to these sensitive situations and would also portray a higher degree of legitimacy because the organizations are seen as “insiders.”

Finally, regional organizations, because they are in such close proximity, will be more concerned with finding a solution to end the conflict. In more recent history, some scholars are still more adamant than others in strengthening regional organizations.

---


organizations, though some claim that much more work needs to be done in order to truly see the effect of the UN and regional organizations.

Beginning in 2001, the United Nations began serious talks regarding cooperation with regional organizations. These talks led to high-level meetings, culminating in Resolution 1631 in 2005. The resolution laid out steps for furthering cooperation between the UN and regional organizations. In 2006, the United Nations released a report detailing the challenges and opportunities given by partnering with regional organizations. Kofi Annan, then the Secretary General, reported that while regional organizations were well capable of conflict prevention along with the United Nations, there is a lack of coordination between the UN and these organizations when it pertains to peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding. The coordination issue was listed alongside the issue of capacity; clearly some organizations will have better training and finances than others. Annan encourages the United Nations to provide further backing to regional organizations. Though some scholars concur with Annan’s push for more complex cooperation, their reasons are not necessarily similar.

Some suggested the creation of Regional Security Commissions (RSC’s) that would serve as middle-men between the United Nations and regional organizations, being legally and politically accountable to both.\(^23\) The creation of such an entity is based on the experience of the United Nations’ incapability to quickly react to crises and its need to share its burden – an argument shared by those who advocate cooperation. However, while

---

the basis of the argument is the same, other authors call for the strengthening of regional organizations instead of a creation of another bureaucratic arm of the United Nations; by strengthening these organizations, they claim, the UN would also become stronger. These arguments are generally framed around the African Union (previously known as the Organization of African Unity) – an organization that still pushes to gain more voice within the UN to the modern day. In 2011, South Africa pushed for an initiative that would effectively make regional organizations equal to the UN. Bolstered by the Libyan intervention, South Africa questions the motives of a Security Council that not only excludes members from Africa but all members of the developing world. Some authors also posit that so long as regional organizations do not undermine the norms of the UN, they actually serve to reinforce them, thus making themselves an asset.

Conversely, there are scholars who range from reserved to firmly against the use of regional organizations on several grounds. While accepting of the possible advantages of the inclusion of regional organizations, some authors question the impartiality and capacity – financial and otherwise – of regional organizations as well as their ability to handle the higher tiers (military) of peacekeeping. Other authors include alternate factors of determination, such as the whether the relationship between the UN and regional

---

27 Marnika, “Regional Peacekeeping: The Case for Complementary Efforts,” 10
organizations is one of “partnership” (horizontal) or one of “subcontracting” (vertical)\textsuperscript{29} and some find no reason to suggest regional organizations are more effective.\textsuperscript{30} Though not a quantitative piece, Oliver examines the role of the UN in several conflicts including, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Oliver also examined the role of CARICOM, a Caribbean organization, in Haiti and the role of NATO in Kosovo. Results suggested that the effectiveness of the United Nations or regional organizations is directly dependent on the level of consent of the parties that are involved. Specifically, the higher level of the consent, the more responsibility should go to the United Nations.\textsuperscript{31}

Quayat states that previous studies that touted the effectiveness of regional organizations were primarily based on the European experience, namely NATO – an example that is commonly used despite NATO not explicitly qualifying as a regional organization. \textsuperscript{32} Furthermore, some authors strongly believe that “the UN possesses the moral authority of a world body that regional organizations lack.”\textsuperscript{33} Dorn touches on impartiality and capacity as well but adds that regional organizations are generally run by a hegemon (a “bully” in his terms), using Nigeria and ECOWAS as an example.\textsuperscript{34} Dorn, however, fails to take perception into account. Especially in the developing world, the UN is

\textsuperscript{33} Dorn, “Regional Peacekeeping Is Not the Way,” 3
sometimes seen as a bullying entity, especially with none of the developing world being included in the Security Council.\textsuperscript{35} In addition, Dorn assumes neutrality is the most effective stance while other studies have shown that partiality may allow for more agreements.\textsuperscript{36} In general, these authors contend the disadvantages of regional organizations outweigh the advantages, if there are any. Finally, there are those who disagree with the formation of international institutions – “a set of rules that stipulate the ways in which state should cooperate and compete with each other”\textsuperscript{37} - more generally, claiming they do not fulfill their promises of peacemaking because they hold little to no influence on state behavior.\textsuperscript{38} However, this argument has been countered by alternate results that show although intergovernmental organizations are not foolproof, they do promote peace when controlling for certain variables.\textsuperscript{39}

Most scholars also tend to focus on the process of achieving an agreement and how to potentially increase the likelihood of reaching an agreement. The cohesiveness and institutionalizations of regional organizations are generally listed as the most important factors.\textsuperscript{40} Other authors include whether or not the mandate of a regional organization

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Patrick, “The UN versus Regional Organizations: Who Keeps the Peace?”
\item Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” 7.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
includes peacekeeping or conflict prevention.\textsuperscript{41} For example, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) supports the general consensus of non-interventionism, thus it would generally not involve itself in conflicts among its members even though it is institutionalized and highly cohesive. Wulf and Debeil and Ackermann tend to encourage the building of better conflict prevention mechanisms such as early warning systems,\textsuperscript{42} more highly trained mediators,\textsuperscript{43} or more effective strategies of intervention.\textsuperscript{44}

One aspect that pervades much of the literature of peacekeeping and peace agreements is selection bias. Most cases chosen include third-party involvement, leaving only a small number of studies in which no external involvement occurred.\textsuperscript{45} However, those authors that do include the latter cases face the problem of counterfactuals; although it is a viable method to explore international relations phenomena, the methodology is complex.\textsuperscript{46} This is particularly important given the occurrences of third-party involvements occasionally worsening conflict.\textsuperscript{47} Alternatively, many studies fail to consider that there is inherent bias in the study on third party involvement because third parties to not get involved in conflicts at random. For example, there is evidence that peacekeeping missions

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{41} Nathan, “The Peacemaking Effectiveness of Regional Organizations,” 3.
\item \textsuperscript{44} Patrick M. Regan, “Conditions of Successful Third-Party Intervention in Intrastate Conflicts,” \textit{Journal of Conflict Resolution} 40, no. 2 (1996): 34.
\item \textsuperscript{47} Dixon, “Third-Party Techniques for Preventing Conflict Escalation and Promoting Peaceful Settlement,” 667.
\end{itemize}
are more likely if the “United Nations or a regional IGO has previously been involved”, suggesting more enduring conflict. Though the specific study was primarily concerned with civil conflicts, its findings may be applicable to interstate wars as well.\footnote{Virginia Page Fortna and Lise Morjé Howard, “Pitfalls and Prospects in the Peacekeeping Literature,” \textit{Annual Review of Political Science} 11 (2008): 290, doi: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.9.041205.103022; see also Mark J. Mullenbach, “Deciding to Keep the Peace: An Analysis of International Influences on the Establishment of Third-Party Peacekeeping Missions,” \textit{International Studies Quarterly} 49, no. 3 (2005): 551, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3693606>}

Of those that address the durability of peace, some found that the content of cease-fire agreements has a significant effect on how long peace lasts, as well as the cost and outcome of the war. According to Fortna, if the agreements include high costs for an attack, specify compliance in order to prevent accidents from backsliding into war, and provide credible signals, the peace should hold.\footnote{Virginia J. Fortna, “Scraps of Paper: Agreements and the Durability of Peace,” \textit{International Organization} 57, no. 2 (2003): 342, doi: 10.1017/S0020818303572046.} This correlates with Werner’s findings that the most common reason for a breakdown of peace is the incentive for one party to attempt to renegotiate the terms of settlement.\footnote{Werner, “The Precarious Nature of Peace” 918.}

A peace agreement that raises costs for war and provides credible signals should discourage attempts of renegotiation. Walter contends that should agreements allow for all parties to have an effective voice in the government, less military enforcers would be necessary.\footnote{Walter, “The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement,” 362} Although she is referring to civil wars specifically, her argument implies that specific provisions and longer lasting peace are positively correlated. Other research addresses the issue of “ripeness” of conflict – the time frame in which both parties are

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{Werner, “The Precarious Nature of Peace” 918.}
\item \footnote{Walter, “The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement,” 362}
\end{itemize}
amenable to the idea of settlement. Establishing when this moment may occur, or if it is occurring, requires not only intimate knowledge of conflict in general, but of the specific conflict and parties involved – a task that may be best suited for organizations more entrenched in the region. Finally, Fortna finds that once the non-randomness of third-party involvement – specifically the United Nations - is accounted for, the presence of peacekeepers significantly raises durability of peace for both interstate and intrastate wars. Although these scholars delve into the issue of when peace agreements last or fail, there is no systematic research on which organizations achieve success more often.

Finally, some authors address the role of state capacity in the success or failure of peace agreements. State capacity, as defined by DeRouen, Jr. et al., is “the state’s ability to accomplish those goals it pursues, possibly in the face of resistance by actors within the state.” While several authors, including Fearon & Laitin and Taydas & Peksen apply state capacity towards a state’s probability of experiencing the onset of a civil war, Deroun et al., and McBride et al., apply similar arguments to achieving a peace agreement and its durability. Primarily centered around civil wars, several studies find that state capacity is a strong determinant of the duration of peace agreements in civil wars because strong

states are better able to implement agreement provisions\textsuperscript{57} and because they ensure the commitment power of the states, particularly when a solution calls for a power-sharing agreement.\textsuperscript{58} The investigation of state capacity is outside the scope of this thesis but should be addressed in further research and applied to interstate conflicts to see if the same holds true.

Hypotheses

It was stated previously that regional organizations should be the most successful at peace agreements because of their ability to clear commitment problems and their greater proximity to conflict or potential conflict areas. They are however, more effective at some conflicts over others. These ideas rest on certain assumptions if they are to be true. First, states are rational actors. Next, war is a means to an end, not the end itself. Finally, third parties are assumed to want to end the conflicts, not begin or exacerbate them. Several testable hypotheses can be extracted from these statements, each with their own value to the end result. Some hypotheses will be tested quantitatively in Chapter Three while some will be examined only qualitatively in Chapter Four; this is either due to too small an n to run regressions or a lack of quantitative measure.

\textsuperscript{57} DeRouen, Jr. et al., “Civil War Peace Agreement Implementation and State Capacity,” 344.
\textsuperscript{58} McBride et al., “Peace and War with Endogenous State Capacity,” 455.
H1: Peace agreements negotiated with the assistance of regional organizations should last longer than those without third party involvement or with the assistance of other kinds of third parties.

Though much of past researched assumed that neutral outside mediators were best equipped to handle conflicts, new studies have shown that insider mediators tend to produce better results. Specifically, Wehr and Lederach find that an ‘insider-partial’ mediator produces more trust because they are from within the conflict area and must deal directly with the results. The ‘bias’ involved is not referring to the desire to see one actor to prevail over another (outcome partiality); instead, it is related to the relationships that the mediator has to all disputants, referred to as relational partiality.

Placing this argument on a larger scale, regional organizations can represent ‘insider-partial’ parties because of their relationship with their member states. The results of the conflict directly affect the organization, more so when considering that conflicts left open ended can potentially spread throughout the region, making the conflict costly to states that are not necessarily primary actors. Therefore, it is in the best interest of the organization to return to the previous status quo: peace. Although there are instances of protracted conflicts between states or parties within the states, regional organizations as a whole benefit more from peace.

---

61 Elgström, Bercovitch and Skau, “Regional Organizations and International Mediation,” 15.
62 Elgström, Bercovitch and Skau, “Regional Organizations and International Mediation,” 17.
H2: Peace agreements negotiated with the assistance of regional organizations will be more specific than those negotiated without assistance or with the assistance of other kinds of third parties.

The literature on bargaining tends to circle around three issues: informational problems, commitment problems, and issue indivisibility. Informational problems occur when parties in a conflict have incentives to misrepresent themselves in order to gain more leverage in a bargaining situation. Third-parties can have the ability to diffuse these informational problems in general. Because regional organizations understand the background, culture, and other factors that may come into play in a negotiation, they are better suited to produce a clear but complex agreement that deal with the root causes of the initial conflict and creates binding mechanisms to diffuse them. According to Hansen et al., conflict management that includes binding agreements lead more often to peace agreements.

Finally, some authors find that culture may be the strongest factor in reaching the goal of a solid, long-lasting peace agreement. Faure addresses the role of culture, stating that because culture can affect so many aspects involved in negotiations, including behaviors and beliefs, it can influence the outcome of negotiations, especially when stakes are highest.

---

64 Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” 381-382.
65 Powell, “War as a Commitment Problem,” 170.
H3: Regional organizations are more willing to enforce peace agreements than other kinds of third parties.

For the same reason that regional organizations are better able to create specific agreements, they are also more willing to enforce the terms of the agreements. Their proximity creates a less burdensome task out of providing peacekeepers to a conflict zone if necessary. Also, utilizing regional capabilities stems the internationalization of the conflict. Considering many third world attitudes towards major international peacekeeping forces, many would prefer to keep conflicts as local as possible. Regional organizations also are aware of what kind of sanctions will create the most effective response from the involved conflict parties. Lastly, members of regional organizations, especially those who have strong economic ties to neighboring nations, are more willing to take the risk of enforcement because they are more likely to have economic stakes in the conflict.

H4: Peace agreements negotiated by regional organizations are more likely to resolve tractable issues than intractable ones.

H1 stated that the inherent bias that regional organizations portray is favorable because it encourages trust from the conflict parties that in turn, lead parties to perceive their actions and mediation attempts as legitimate. Unfortunately, the same bias backfires when faced with conflicts centered on intractable issues – religion, ethnicity, and sometimes territory.

69 Elgström, Bercovitch and Skau, “Regional Organizations and International Mediation,” 18.
Even though several quantitative works show that ethnicity and identity are not significant variables to predict the onset of conflicts\(^70\), some authors claim that these grievances can be produced by civil wars\(^71\) and Collier and Hoeffler show that ethnic dominance can be a predictive factor of civil war onset.\(^72\) Both ethnicity and religion can simplify the image of the ‘other’, which can lead to dehumanization and justify violence.\(^73\) Finally, even an issue that literally is divisible – territory - can become intractable when infused with symbolic qualities, such as identity or religious “choseness”.\(^74\)

These types of conflicts can make the bargaining procedure appear as a zero-sum game, which contributes to the “polarization of positions and to continued escalation…”\(^75\) of the situation. The insider partiality of regional organization can backfire because the member states are within the conflict zone, the organization as a whole will be subject to a much amount of pressure. The trust that is usually associated with regional organizations may either be substituted with suspicion, particularly if many of the members are from the ‘other’ category or one party of the conflict that may see itself as

---


\(^72\) Collier and Hoeffler, “Greed and grievance in civil war,” 588.


closely allied with the organization may have its’ trust broken. Finally, even if an agreement is reached, civil wars based upon ethnic lines are predisposed to reoccur.

H5: Regional organizations that are highly institutionalized will be more successful in creating durable agreements than less institutionalized regional organizations.

A portion of the criticism leveled against regional organizations is that they are not independent enough from their member states to police them effectively. The claim is that the stronger states will be able to veto or ignore decisions from regional organizations. Later studies attempted to establish what factors establish independence. Barnett and Finnemore insist that international organizations can become independent of their member states through “(1) the legitimacy of the rational-legal authority they embody, and (2) control over technical expertise and information.”

Haftel and Thompson indicate that life span is the most significant factor in independence of international organizations while Barnett states that collective identity, shared interests, the presence of a hegemon, and agreement of purpose indicates whether or not regional organizations specifically will be willing to act. Finally, Hansen et al., adds to Haftel and Thompson, stating that having sufficient resources are an equally important

---

79 Haftel and Thompson, “The Independence of International Organizations,” 269.
80 Barnett, “Partners in peace?” 420-422.
factor.\textsuperscript{81} Although in theory this hypothesis could be tested quantitatively by measuring the number of years since an organization’s inception, the $n$ is far too small to produce usable results. Therefore, this hypothesis shall be examined through case studies in Chapter Four.

\textsuperscript{81} Hansen et al. “IO Mediation of Interstate Conflicts,” 297
CHAPTER THREE – STUDY DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

Datasets

A mixture of databases was used in order to include variables that were not available in one dataset. The dependent variable, the region, the incompatibility, ceasefire, outstanding issues, outline and peacekeeping operations were taken from the UCDP Peace Agreements Dataset v.2. In order to measure the dependent variable and incompatibility from the UCDP dataset, certain categories were transformed or added. All other variables were gathered from the PRIO battle deaths dataset.

Of the 215 total cases, 125 ended in the dyads’ return to conflict while in 90 cases, conflict did not begin again for at least five years, if at all; this creates a fairly even and sufficient sample size to apply several variables to. Of those cases, 68 had no third party assistance, 57 had either a state or non-regional ad-hoc groups assist, 21 had assistance from regional organizations or regional ad-hoc groups and 35 had “other” assistance. “Other” assistance includes non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or an even group of the other variables. For example, if the United Nations and regional organizations were joint collaborations through mediation and agreement creation, they would be under this category. As seen in Table 1, regional organizations have had more successes than failures.

Also, although the UCDP dataset included information on which 3rd party, if any, was involved in ending the conflict, it was only in text; therefore, a variable coding the information (party3_type) was added. Finally, the UCDP dataset included measures for

whether a conflict was over territory, government or both. An additional measure for whether a conflict was regarding ethnic, religious, or ideological issues was included, partially based on a previous study. The total number of cases for the final set was 215; when including battle deaths data, cases dropped to 189 due to some missing information.

Table 1 - 3rd party and Conflict Cross-tabulation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict in 5 years?</th>
<th>3rd Party Type</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>None</td>
<td>State/s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>61.8%</td>
<td>56.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absence of conflict</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>26</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>38.2%</td>
<td>43.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>68</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Because the UCDP dataset did not include conflict deaths, PRIO’s Battle Deaths dataset v.3 was included. To combine the two sets of information, each conflict that ended in a peace agreement was found within the PRIO dataset. The “best” number of deaths between the start of the conflict and the date of the peace agreement was calculated and put into the master dataset. In order to make the regression simpler, the variable was made into a dummy.

---

Variables

**Dependent Variable**

The dependent variable measures whether, after a peace agreement was reached, there was any further conflict for a period of at least 60 months. A 60 month cut-off was utilized primarily because it the cutoff point in the dataset and it a traditional cutoff point in peace duration literature. It allows enough time for actors to begin implementing terms of the agreement. Further research may want to apply varying cutoff points to determine success but it is outside the scope of this thesis. While the original UCDP dataset measured it in terms of whether the conflict restarted (1= yes, restarted; 0=no), the variable *DyVi05* was renamed to *noconf_5* and was rearranged - where 0= conflict restarted and 1= no conflict for 5 years - for easier interpretation.

**Independent Variables**

The main purpose of the study is to determine the effectiveness of organizations in crafting peace agreements and creating long lasting peace. It naturally follows that the independent variable would determine which third party was central to the creation of the agreement. Though this might seem to be a simple coding matter, most attempts to end international conflicts are undertaken by multiple organizations from the individual states to the United Nations. The information for my coding was recoded from the textual information within the UCDP Peace Dataset; however, even within the dataset there were

---

multiple third parties listed for one agreement. Using the comments in the original data and some independent research, each primary mediator and contributor to the agreement was determined.

The following are the resulting categories for \textit{party3\_type}:

0. None  
1. State or ad hoc groups  
2. Regional Organizations  
3. United Nations  
4. Other

Of the original 215 cases, there were only 9 cases primarily handled by ad-hoc groups. If the coding for \textit{party3\_type} were to include an ad-hoc group category, the number of cases within each category would have rendered the variable useless as a measure. By separating the cases into regional and non-regional, the number of cases was acceptable without affecting the integrity of the study.

Within SPSS, which was used to analyze the data, there is a category option that allows nominal variables to be run as one variable without having to create a dummy for each category. It automatically creates a reference variable – in the case of \textit{party3\_type} it was “None” – and runs all other options against it.

Category 1 encompasses single state involvement as well as involvement from non-regional ad-hoc groups. For example, if the United States and the UK were the primary mediators in a conflict in Asia, they would be included under category 1 because they are neither a regional organization nor an ad hoc group made up of states in Asia. Whether it is

a state or an ad-hoc group of outside states, the category still encompasses the idea that “outsiders” will be less likely to produce an agreement that results in a longer duration of peace.

Similarly, category 2 not only encompasses regional organizations but also regional ad-hoc groups. Although this may seem to affect the core idea that regional organizations are the most effective, the inclusion of regional ad-hoc groups within this category also does not affect the study. Hypotheses 1 through 4 addresses the effects of geographical and cultural proximity of regional organizations to a conflict. Regional ad-hoc groups also possess these traits. ECOMOG at its beginning was a regional ad-hoc group under the leadership of ECOWAS. Although the institutionalization hypothesis (5) does not apply to regional ad-hoc groups, this hypothesis is not tested quantitatively; therefore, the inclusion of regional ad-hoc groups to category 2 will not affect the results of the regressions.

The UCDP dataset also included a variable for the incompatibility between the dyads. Their categories established whether the incompatibility was over territory or government but did not address whether the incompatibilities were over ethnicity or religion. Using Sambanis’ classifications that included ethnic and religious wars, some of the cases within the dataset were re-coded accordingly.

a) Inc – The incompatibility present in the conflict. In order to test the fourth hypothesis, all conflicts were examined for the parties’ statement of what the conflict was about as well as other analyses and categorized into the following:

0. Ethnic/Religious

---


88 Sambanis, “Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War,” 447-449.
1. Territory
2. Government

Control Variables

a) \textit{conf\_death} – Confirmed battle deaths within a conflict between start of conflict and year of peace agreement. Information obtained from PRIO Battle Deaths Dataset, version 3. The numbers estimated are taken from the “best estimate” section of the dataset.\textsuperscript{89} Conflict deaths were chosen in lieu of length of conflict because it is a more accurate depiction of conflict intensity.

b) \textit{Batdeathdum} – Dummy variable for \textit{conf\_death}.
   1. less than 1,000 deaths
   2. Over 1,000 deaths

c) \textit{Region} – The regional location of the conflict. Variable is thought to affect results because the majority of conflicts and peace agreements within the dataset are located in Africa and the Middle East.\textsuperscript{90}
   1. Americas
   2. Europe
   3. Middle East – Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, states in Arabian Peninsula.
   4. Asia
   5. Africa – Geographical location, excludes states in Middle East

d) \textit{Cease} – Binary variable that asks if the agreement included a ceasefire clause or article. Variable intended to measure the second and third hypotheses.\textsuperscript{91}
   1. The agreement did not include articles for a ceasefire
   2. The agreement included articles for a ceasefire.

e) \textit{Out\_iss} – “Are there any outstanding issues specified in the agreement?”\textsuperscript{92} Intended to measure the second hypotheses, this variables categorizes whether outstanding issues, based upon the incompatibility, were dealt with at the time of the agreement.
   1. Agreement did not specify or include outstanding issues
   2. Agreement is one of several in a process to be finalized in last agreement.
   3. Agreement iterated outstanding issues.
   4. Commission to oversee central issue to incompatibility

\textsuperscript{89} Lacina and Gleditsch, “Monitoring Trends in Global Combat.”
\textsuperscript{90} Högbladh, “Peace Agreement Dataset Codebook version 2.0,” 2
\textsuperscript{91} Högbladh, “Peace Agreement Dataset Codebook version 2.0,” 6
\textsuperscript{92} Högbladh, “Peace Agreement Dataset Codebook version 2.0,” 10
5. New negotiations or talks provided for.
6. Agenda for negotiations or provisions outlined for future agreement.

f) Outlin – Outlining peace process.\textsuperscript{93}
   1. No outline for a negotiating agenda including negotiations on the incompatibility, included in agreement.
   2. Outline for negotiating agenda, including negotiations on incompatibility, included in agreement.

g) PKO – Did the agreement provide for a deployment of a peacekeeping operation?\textsuperscript{94}
   1. No
   2. Yes

Regressions and Results

Hypotheses Results

Because hypothesis 1 is tested qualitatively, the first regression tests hypothesis 2. In order to test hypothesis 2, 3\textsuperscript{rd} party type, outstanding issues, and whether or not the agreement included negotiations on the incompatibility were included in the regression.

The results, reported in Table 2, show that of the third party types, only regional organizations had significant effects (.027). In comparison to no third party involvement, regional organizations are 3.494 times more likely to craft a peace agreement that is followed for at least five years. Despite, the other third party types not achieving significance, a comparison of the odds still holds that regional organizations are the most likely of all the options to achieve this result; not only that, but the involvement of the United Nations actually decreased the chance for peace duration.

\textsuperscript{93} Högbladh, “Peace Agreement Dataset Codebook version 2.0,” 8
\textsuperscript{94} Högbladh, “Peace Agreement Dataset Codebook version 2.0,” 9
Above the variables in the equation, the Hosmer and Lemeshow Test and the Classification Table illustrate the strength of the model. The model correctly predicts the outcomes 71.2% of the time, a 13.1% increase over the null model. Because $R^2$ is only appropriate for linear regression, the Hosmer and Lemeshow Test is utilized; contrary to usual significance tests, a significance over .05 indicates a fit model.

Table 2: Logistic Regression Analysis of Hypothesis 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model Summary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Step</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Estimation terminated at iteration number 4 because parameter estimates changed by less than .001.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hosmer and Lemeshow Test</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Step</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification Tablea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Predicted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absence of conflict</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. The cut value is .500

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables in the Equation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N=215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>party3_type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Organizations(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Out_iss</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process to finalize</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spelled out</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New negotiations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agenda for future</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outlin</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Step 1a

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: party3_type, Out_iss, Outlin.
b. $p = * \leq .05; ** \leq .01; *** \leq .000$
In addition to the finding for regional organizations, the table also shows an interesting finding for agreements that include discussions on outstanding issues. For agreements that are part of a process (not a full and final agreement between the conflicting parties), those issues that are set to be finalized in the last agreement (Out_iss(1)) have roughly a 9 times greater chance of prolonging the peace for at least five years. Agreements that lay out a negotiating agenda for those issues to be addressed in a future agreement (Out_iss (5)) increase the chance by 12 times. At a .000 and .002 significance, respectively, these findings are strong.

Although not an innate part of hypothesis two, this result indicates that partial agreements, such as an initial ceasefire agreement in order to negotiate a final agreement for example, should already specifically address the incompatibility between the parties and have a rough plan on how to approach and address said incompatibility. Although the other options in the Out_iss variable were not statistically significant, the majority of them increase the chances for peace duration.

The next regression tests Hypothesis 4 – regional organizations will be less successful at intractable issues such as ethnic, ideological, or religious conflicts. As seen in Table 3, regional organizations and “other” organizations are, despite not falling within traditional measures of significance, are relatively likely to have an effect on the dependent variable. Their presence roughly increases the chance of peace by about 2 times when compared to a lack of a third party.

Interestingly, the incompatibilities are significant, meaning that when controlling for third parties, territorial disputes decrease the chances for an agreement to end in peace
(by .268 times), followed by governmental disputes (by .459 times). This indicates that, out of the incompatibility categories, dyads that were conflicting over intractable issues and come to an agreement have a higher chance to comply with agreement terms for at least five years. This finding can occur for many reasons that are outside the scope of this research; however, the reasoning for these results is explored further in the study.

Table 3: Logistic Regression for Hypothesis 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>-2 Log likelihood</th>
<th>Cox &amp; Snell R Square</th>
<th>Nagelkerke R Square</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>280.374</td>
<td>.054</td>
<td>.073</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 4 because parameter estimates changed by less than .001.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>Chi-square</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.952</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>.666</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Hosmer and Lemeshow Test**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict in 5 years?</th>
<th>Conflict</th>
<th>Absence of conflict</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Observed</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predicted</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Percentage</td>
<td>72.0</td>
<td>47.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*a. The cut value is .500

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step 1</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>Wald</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Exp(B)</th>
<th>95% C.I.for EXP(B)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>party3_type</td>
<td>.225</td>
<td>.376</td>
<td>.359</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.353</td>
<td>.599, 2.618</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>State/s</td>
<td>.843</td>
<td>.526</td>
<td>2.562</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.109</td>
<td>.828, 6.519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regional Org./Ad-hoc</td>
<td>.084</td>
<td>.466</td>
<td>.032</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.857</td>
<td>.436, 2.711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>United Nations</td>
<td>.741</td>
<td>.456</td>
<td>2.635</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.105</td>
<td>.858, 5.131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Territory</td>
<td>-1.317</td>
<td>.455</td>
<td>8.373</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.004**</td>
<td>.268, .654</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>-.779</td>
<td>.347</td>
<td>5.039</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.025*</td>
<td>.459, .232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.019</td>
<td>.307</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.951</td>
<td>1.019</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: party3_type, Inc.
b. p = * ≤ .05; ** ≤ .01; *** ≤ .000
Additional Regression Results

In addition to testing the two hypotheses, alternate variables were included in order to study their effect on the dependent variable. The first regression was a full model with nine independent variables: 3rd party type, region of conflict, provisions for ceasefire, provisions for cultural freedoms, provisions for peace keeping operations, battle deaths, and whether there were outstanding issues and whether the incompatibility was outlined. Of those, 3rd party type, and outstanding issues had significant effect; specifically, regional organizations were significant at .011, agreements that are part of a process for finalization at a later date was significant at .000, and agreements that outlined a negotiating agenda from a future agreement was significant at .002.

The most significant outcome is that when accounting for all other variables, regional organizations are 6.728 times more likely to craft an agreement that is not broken for at least 5 years.\textsuperscript{95} The return of significance on regional organizations with the addition of the other variables not only reinforces hypothesis 2. It also reinforces the theory in general.

Eight separate regressions were run in order to combine 3rd party type and each of the remaining variables. Of those, significant results for a third party were present when controlling for region and outstanding issues. When controlling for region, regional organizations are almost three times more likely to produce a peace agreement that last five years\textsuperscript{96} and when controlling for outstanding issues, almost 3.5 times more likely.\textsuperscript{97}

\textsuperscript{95} Table 4.  
\textsuperscript{96} Appendix A: Table 5.  
\textsuperscript{97} Appendix A: Table 6.
Of the twenty two regressions which combined two non-repeatable variables with 3rd party type, seven returned significant results for regional organizations, ranging from peace agreements 2.998 times to 4.799 times more likely to last five years. Overall, the results show that regional organizations do make a substantial difference in the success of peace agreements in keeping the peace. Ranging for two to five times more likely to achieve the desired measure (peace for five years), regional organizations outperform the United Nations, individual states, and non-regional ad-hoc groups.

From the results, it is also clear that incompatibility is important and territorial disputes are generally the most difficult to resolve. The reasons for this result are several. First, mandated in several regional organizations, as well as the UN, is the respect for sovereignty of member states. When faced with a territorial dispute, organizations are by default required to seek out an outcome that keeps the initial borders of the state. As will be presented in Moldova’s case, the OSCE was primarily concerned with keeping the Soviet Era borders despite Transdniestria’s desire to become an autonomous state. This is not always the primary reason for involvement, however, it adds an aspect to a regional organizations involvement that can be more difficult to solve.

Alternatively, the territorial dispute could also be imbued with intractable characteristics. A common example is the Arab-Israeli conflict. Although it is a territorial conflict, the land is imbued with religious and ethnic values that only add to the already

98 Appendix A: Table 7.
99 Appendix A: Table 8.
immense complexity of the conflict. In terms of the fourth hypothesis, the null cannot be rejected, as none of the third parties yielded statistically significant results.

Table 4: Full Model Logistic Regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>-2 Log likelihood</th>
<th>Cox &amp; Snell R Square</th>
<th>Nagelkerke R Square</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>189.722a</td>
<td>.302</td>
<td>.405</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 20 because maximum iterations has been reached. Final solution cannot be found.*

Hosmer and Lemeshow Test

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>Chi-square</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>14.902</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>.061</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Variables in the Equation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N=189</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>Wald</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Exp(B)</th>
<th>95% C.I. for EXP(B)</th>
<th>Lower</th>
<th>Upper</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>party3_type</td>
<td>10.292</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.036</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>-.093</td>
<td>.549</td>
<td>.029</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.866</td>
<td>.911</td>
<td>.311</td>
<td>2.674</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Org</td>
<td>1.906</td>
<td>.746</td>
<td>6.530</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.011</td>
<td>6.728</td>
<td>1.559</td>
<td>29.028</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations</td>
<td>-.623</td>
<td>.611</td>
<td>1.041</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.308</td>
<td>.536</td>
<td>.162</td>
<td>1.775</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>.626</td>
<td>.597</td>
<td>1.099</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.295</td>
<td>1.870</td>
<td>.580</td>
<td>6.025</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Out_iss</td>
<td>19.649</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process to finalize</td>
<td>2.396</td>
<td>.617</td>
<td>15.103</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>10.983</td>
<td>3.280</td>
<td>36.778</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spelled out</td>
<td>.425</td>
<td>.771</td>
<td>.304</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.582</td>
<td>1.529</td>
<td>.338</td>
<td>6.929</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delegated to commission</td>
<td>.471</td>
<td>.790</td>
<td>.355</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.551</td>
<td>1.601</td>
<td>.341</td>
<td>7.527</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New negotiations</td>
<td>1.231</td>
<td>.716</td>
<td>2.956</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.086</td>
<td>3.426</td>
<td>.842</td>
<td>13.943</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inc</td>
<td>.3418</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.181</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 1 a</td>
<td>Territory</td>
<td>-.732</td>
<td>.716</td>
<td>1.046</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.307</td>
<td>.481</td>
<td>.118</td>
<td>1.956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>-.924</td>
<td>.502</td>
<td>3.381</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.066</td>
<td>.397</td>
<td>.148</td>
<td>1.063</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceasefire provision</td>
<td>.234</td>
<td>.495</td>
<td>.224</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.636</td>
<td>1.264</td>
<td>.479</td>
<td>3.337</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outline to address Inc</td>
<td>.357</td>
<td>.484</td>
<td>.543</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.461</td>
<td>1.429</td>
<td>.553</td>
<td>3.693</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacekeeping Operation</td>
<td>.697</td>
<td>.566</td>
<td>1.517</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.218</td>
<td>2.008</td>
<td>.662</td>
<td>6.088</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>.4082</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.395</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>20.784</td>
<td>11757.037</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.999</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.718</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>1.638</td>
<td>1.005</td>
<td>2.657</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.103</td>
<td>5.147</td>
<td>.718</td>
<td>36.918</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>.227</td>
<td>.794</td>
<td>.082</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.775</td>
<td>1.255</td>
<td>.265</td>
<td>5.944</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>-.095</td>
<td>.698</td>
<td>.018</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.892</td>
<td>.909</td>
<td>.232</td>
<td>3.570</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;1000 deaths</td>
<td>-.002</td>
<td>.452</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.996</td>
<td>.998</td>
<td>.412</td>
<td>2.418</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-.422</td>
<td>.852</td>
<td>2.786</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.095</td>
<td>.241</td>
<td>.718</td>
<td>36.918</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: party3_type, Out_iss, Inc, Cul, cease, Outlin, PKO, Region, batdeathdum.

b. p = * ≤.05; **≤ .01; ***≤ .000
Implications

These results suggest several policy prescriptions. First, regional organizations and regional ad-hoc groups, in general, should be involved in solving conflicts within their region, as they are shown to be significant actors in creating a durable peace agreement. However, not all regional organizations are currently equipped to properly handle conflict, due to lack of finances or military capability, which will be illustrated in the case studies. These organizations should be assisted in order to have the means to respond to such conflicts when and if they arrive.

As the counterintuitive results from incompatibility shows, there should be more attention directed towards territorial and governmental disputes because these agreements are more likely to fail in their infancy. As discussed before, this could be due to several factors that are outside the scope this study. That being said, these results open up several avenues for further study on the side of academia. Further studies should investigate cross-organizational involvement in territorial disputes and their efficacy.

Some control variables were also significant. First, full agreements should address all aspects of the incompatibility between dyads. However, if the agreement is part of a process, any issues not resolved within the scope of that agreement should have a formal outline on how to approach it in a later agreement. Under the full model, outstanding issues that had a clear agenda to be addressed with a future agreement raised the chances for durable peace nearly 17 times.\textsuperscript{100}

\textsuperscript{100} Table 4.
The case studies in the following chapter address some of the questions that resulted from the empirical research. Additional variables such as the life span of an organization and the terms included in the agreements are taken into account and applied to three conflicts. The importance of this addition, aside from theoretically providing greater evidence, is the examination of these variables in action and what implications they create for policy towards regional organizations and the policies of regional organizations.
CHAPTER FOUR – CASE STUDIES

This chapter applies the previous variables and new variables that were not quantifiable to three separate cases. The first two cases will be from Africa, particularly from West Africa and were mediated largely by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and their peacekeeping arm, the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). The final case will investigate the secessionist conflict in Moldova and the role of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in securing a ceasefire.

ECOWAS was selected as one of the organizations because it has been involved in many conflicts since its creation. Africa is a commonly utilized as a base for several case studies, the most common being the Liberian Civil War.101 The first case study will be Sierra Leone. During their civil war, four ceasefires/peace agreements were reached; only the final agreement, the Abuja Accord, held for five years. In order to test the role one of the variables (life span), two agreements will be tested: the Lomé Agreement of 1999 and the Abuja Accord signed in 2000. The purpose of the two agreements is to compare a failure to a success while controlling for the time span and the state in order to address the specificity of agreement terms and changes within the organization.

The other case is Guinea-Bissau and their agreement in 1998, also known as the Abuja Accord. The terms of agreement are different from both the Lomé and Abuja agreements in Sierra Leone although the incompatibility is the same. Furthermore, external

circumstances are different, particularly regarding the role of Nigeria within ECOMOG, which affects the examination of hypothesis 5 and institutionalism.

Moldova was selected as the OSCE case for several reasons. Despite being in a separate continent, Moldova also struggled with imposed borders that connected a population that was widely varied in ethnicity, history, and ideology. At the time of the signing of the agreement between Moldova and Transdniestria, the OSCE was “older” than ECOWAS at its involvement in Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau. This difference allows for further investigation of hypothesis five. Finally, the OSCE had to content with Russia’s involvement in the conflict, both as an outside actor and as a member state of the OSCE. This not only affected the level of partiality of the OSCE, but also hypothesis three in terms of enforcement of the agreement.

Finally, all of the peace agreements were drafted within a similar time span, between 1997 and 2000. Although a variety of time periods could be explored, examining peace agreements that were drafted close together lessens the probability of major world events affecting one outcome and not another. For example, the approaches of regional organizations may have changed in post 9/11 world.

The quantitative results in the previous chapter show that regional organizations do have a significant effect on the success of peace agreements. Case studies are also an important addition to the research because they provide a “detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be
generalizable to other events.” 102 Jack Levy identifies six types of case studies from those that are ends and of themselves to those that test theories. 103 This study focuses on the latter. The combination of explicit hypothesis, stated previously, along with what aspects of the case studies are falsifiable, make the agreements presented viable theory testing cases. 104

While John Stuart Mill called for comparable cases that were similar in all but one aspect, critics stated that the large numbers of cases are far too complex and riddled with interactions to practically be compared in this fashion. 105 Despite this, the selection of cases within this study attempt to overcome these difficulties and select cases that are capable of being tested accurately. Finally, while quantitative results bring new developments for academics to further test and develop, case studies can bring an application of these findings that can serve as tangible examples for policy makers.

The remainder of this chapter includes the list of variables to be added for analysis and includes standards for rejecting the null. The two cases handled by ECOWAS are examined and include a background of the conflict, a discussion of the peace agreements and the application of the variables in order to test the hypotheses. The section for OSCE follows and is set up similarly. If a case study ends in a failure of the peace agreement, as in Guinea Bissau and the Lomé Agreement in Sierra Leone, the hypotheses will still be

examined; however, an additional examination of potential reasons for the failure will also be undertaken. Finally, implications for policy will be included.

Variables

In order to design a viable case study design, the variables described in the quantitative section in addition to the non-quantifiable variables must be falsifiable. While the quantitative variables have already shown to be so, the falsifiability of the qualitative variables is explained below.

Agreement Terms (AT) – The terms of the formal agreement between conflicting dyads will be examined. If the terms of the agreement address the stated incompatibility (Inc) between parties, then the null can be rejected. This variable will be an additional measure to test hypothesis two and hypothesis 4. If the agreement terms do not directly address the incompatibility, then a section regarding outstanding issues will be searched for. If there is no such section in the formal agreement, then the null cannot be rejected.

Life Span (ls) – Life span is a proxy for institutionalization. The longer time between an institutions formation and its involvement in a conflict, the more likely that the agreement will result in a durable peace of no less than five years. Although this measure could be quantitative, the n would be too small for proper testing.

Partiality – This variable initially was meant to be names “bias” but this term evokes a negative connotation. As stated in Hypothesis 1, the term partiality in this case is positive because it relates to “insider-partiality”, meaning that the mediators are from the conflict area and have higher stakes in the results. The negative connotation of “bias” should be applied to organizations that are “outcome partial” and have the desire to see one actor prevail over another.

Should an organization be seen to have only insider-partiality, then the higher the chances for lasting peace. Conversely, should an organization be seen as outcome partial, such as ECOWAS in Sierra Leone, then not only
will it not raise the chances for peace, there is a likelihood of the chances being reduced. Due to the inability of this variable being quantified effectively, it can only be measured by investigating the perceptions of those being mediated.

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

Established by the Lagos Treaty in 1975, ECOWAS was not initially intended to be a peacekeeping or monitoring organization. As its name suggests, the organization was meant to foster economic integration and developing towards the final goal of an economic union among the West African states, thus promoting economic – and potentially political – stability. According to other scholars, however, ECOWAS was also an attempt by Nigeria to spread its influence in the region.  

Despite repeated attempts, these goals have not been achieved. West Africa was considered to be the most violent area of the African continent with a long history of coups and civil wars. Because of the security situation, ECOWAS slowly began incorporating peace and security in its mandate starting in 1978 with the Non-aggression Treaty; this led to the Mutual Assistance and Defence Protocol in 1986 and culminated with the creation of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in 1990 as a result of the ongoing Liberian Civil War.

---

106 Tavares, Regional Security, 15.
107 David J. Francis et al., Dangers of Co-deployment: UN Co-operative Peacekeeping in Africa (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2005), 122.
108 Tavares, Regional Security, 40.
The Protocol of Non-Aggression (1978) called for members to “refrain from the threat or use of force or aggression” against one another.\textsuperscript{109} The protocol failed to provide any institutional mechanisms should any breaches occur, rendering it at best, idealistic. The mutual Assistance and Defense (MAD) Protocol attempted to remedy this oversight and formed a binding commitment requiring members to provide assistance in the event of external aggression or internal conflicts that were “engineered or supported from the outside.”\textsuperscript{110} The protocol pushed ECOWAS further into the realm of peacekeeping but was still focused on protecting states from external threats. The protocol also created the Defence Council, the Defence Committee and the Allied Armed Forces of the Community (AAFC) as response mechanisms to threats; however, these institutions were not implemented, in large part due to the divide between the Anglophone and the Francophone member states. The divide, fueled by suspicions of Nigeria’s (Anglophone) ambitions towards hegemonic status, would continue to cause problems for ECOWAS in their responses to the wave of conflicts in the 1990s.\textsuperscript{111}

With the Liberian crisis in 1989, ECOWAS felt that its involvement was necessary and created and deployed ECOMOG, an intervention force with soldiers from Ghana, Sierra Leone, Gambia, Nigeria and Guinea. A full analysis will not take place, but ECOMOG’s mission was to prevent Charles Taylor and the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL)

from overthrowing President Samuel Doe’s regime. ECOMOG’s intervention enhanced the split between Francophone and Anglophone countries because of the Francophone’s opposition to the intervention. The result was Taylor’s victory in the subsequent elections and his involvement in Sierra Leone.112

Even with major funding and manpower from Nigeria, ECOMOG faced serious challenges of manpower, coordination and finances.113 Several of these challenges were created because of a lack of unity within ECOWAS which was exemplified in Liberia when some Francophone countries (Cote d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso) provided support to the NPFL.114 Furthermore, the protocols, agreements and treaties leading to the creation to ECOMOG envisioned an organization that would counter interstate conflict and had little measures in place for intrastate conflicts, which made up a majority of conflicts in West Africa during the 1990’s, including Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau.115

Sierra Leone

The Sierra Leone conflict was, in many ways, a spillover of the Liberian Civil War. In 1991, former army corporal Foday Sankoh and the rebel Revolutionary United Front (RUF) began a rebellion with support from Charles Taylor from Liberia, and Col. Qadafi from

114 Kabia, “Regional Approaches to Peacebuilding.”
115 Francis et al., Dangers of Co-deployment, 122.
In response to President Momoh’s support of ECOMOG’s intervention in Liberia, Taylor had threatened to bring the war to Freetown, the capital of Sierra Leone. The invading guerrilla group was made up of both Sierra Leonean fighters and some members of the force in Liberia. The RUF later also admitted that they had received military and financial support from Taylor. Feeling that General Momoh was neglecting them, the Sierra Leonean army staged a coup in 1992 and placed Captain Valentine Strasser as head of the new military junta. Despite Strasser’s initial attempts to broker a peace with the RUF, the war continued.

The government of Sierra Leone proved to be unable to counter the threat. Though the SLA’s number had swelled, the lack of training proved to be a major hindrance to success. In addition, large sections of the “army” were suspected of taking advantage of the chaos by looting and extorting citizens. After Strasser attempted to run for president again, despite his pledge not to, on January 1996, Brigadier Maada Bio staged a successful coup d’état. The coup was strongly condemned internationally and under immense external pressure, elections were held, making Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, from the Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP) President.

During Kabbah’s presidency, the Abidjan Accord was signed. Brokered by Côte d’Ivoire, on November 30, 1996, the accord called for disarmament and repatriation of

---

116 Francis et al., Dangers of Co-deployment, 122.
118 Adeke Adebajo, Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 83-84
120 Adebajo, Building Peace in West Africa, 84.
121 Francis et al., Dangers of Co-deployment, 137.
rebel fighters, the transformation of the RUF into a political party and granted blanket amnesty for war crimes. The peace did not hold, primarily due to the lack of enforcement mechanisms. In May 1997, during an attempted coup, former Major Johnny Koromah was broken out of prison and began to lead the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). Koromah was a member of the group that attempted the September 1996 coup on Kabbah. Though he had resisted several past coup attempts, President Kabbah’s government eventually fell to Koromah and he was forced to flee the country.

Soon after the coup, the AFRC formed an alliance with the RUF, their alleged enemies during the civil war. In 1998, the junta, made up of the RUF and the AFRC, was removed from power by ECOMOG. ECOMOG reinstated President Kabbah but he was unable to keep control and the RUF nearly took Freetown. ECOMOG again was able to defeat RUF forces; however, it was unable to destroy them. The heavy fighting left Freetown and most of the country in ruin. Despite firm domestic protest against dealings with the RUF, Kabbah wavered under international pressure to enter into new negotiations.

A pseudo-mediation attempt by ECOWAS resulted in the Conakry Agreement in October 1998. Tom Ikimi, the Nigerian foreign minister, reportedly stated that he was not there to negotiate with the RUF; he was only interested in setting up a timetable for their

---

124 Francis et al., *Dangers of Co-deployment*, 122.
126 “Profiles,” 87.
withdrawal or they would be “flushed out of Freetown.” Though the agreement called for a cessation of hostilities and a timeline for returning Kabbah to the Presidency by the following April, the junta soon reneged on the agreement and stated they would remain in power until 2001. The junta’s refusal to honor the agreement indicated that they were simply buying time in order to regroup. In this obvious one-sided stance from Nigeria, the agreement did not hold and clashes continued between the sides. In terms of the partiality hypothesis, despite Nigeria’s relational partiality, it was clearly also outcome partial, which is not useful towards achieving a viable agreement.

Following this failure, sanctions enacting an embargo on Sierra Leone were put in place. Although in technical terms, the sanctions were successful in blocking arms trades to the AFRC, ECOMOG also suffered from international criticism from its overzealousness, specifically on blocking and shelling humanitarian vessels. Attacks by the AFRC and the RUF continued until March 1999 when a ceasefire was signed in order to discuss a solution. Finally, the Lomé Peace Agreement was signed in July 1999.

*The Lomé Peace Agreement of 1999*

---

129 Francis et al., *Dangers of Co-deployment*, 140.
130 Wehr and Lederach, “Mediating Conflict in Central America,” 87.
There were eight years and roughly 14,000 battle related deaths between the outbreak of conflict and the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement. Although there is no certain number of civilian deaths measure for that span of time, according to the United Nations Development Program, roughly 70,000 casualties occurred between 1991 and 2002 as a result of the civil war. Therefore, it can be assumed that there were over 14,000 battle deaths between 1991 and 1999. The Lomé Peace Agreement was mediated through ECOWAS with the assistance of Francis Okelo, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in Sierra Leone.

As in previous peace talks, the RUF demanded a power-sharing agreement which would place them in a transitional government for a period of no less than four years; a condition also encouraged by Taylor. In addition, they demanded blanket amnesty for all war crimes and the immediate departure of foreign troops within 14 days of the signing of any agreement. Finally, the RUF demanded the unconditional release and pardon to Sankoh and the opportunity for the RUF to become a legitimate political party. As seen in the discussion of the actual peace agreement, the RUF were given the majority of their demands.

The government, in contrast, held a conference organized by the National Commission for Democracy and Human Rights. Those in attendance stressed Kabbah’s

---

135 “Profiles,” 89.
legitimacy as President and stated that the Abidjan and Conkary agreements should be the basis for peace. There was a strong opposition to any form of power-sharing with the RUF; however, the final agreement did allow for a shared government.\footnote{Ismail Rashid, “The Lomé peace negotiations,” in \textit{Paying the price: The Sierra Leone Peace Process, Accord 9} (London: Conciliation Resources, 2000), 30.}

During the agreement talks, which lasted six weeks, the disagreements regarding Sankoh’s freedom and the RUF’s idea of a transitional power-sharing government proved to be the items with most contention.\footnote{Rashid, “The Lomé peace negotiations,” 31.} Because both parties were encouraged to have direct talks, the discussions were heated, often resulting in public outbursts – usually by the RUF. When an impasse did occur, Gnassingbe Eyadema, ECOWAS’ chairman, was called to help mediate the impasse towards an agreement.\footnote{Rashid, “The Lomé peace negotiations,” 30.}

When the agreement was signed by all parties, it included articles for a ceasefire and ceasefire monitoring (detailing what exactly ceasefire violations are), inclusion of the RUF in the governance by making it a political party and giving pardon to all members “…in respect of anything done by them in pursuit of their objectives, up to the time of the signing of the present Agreement.”\footnote{“The Lomé Peace Agreement,” \textit{United States Institute of Peace}, posted August 19, 1999, http://www.usip.org/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/sierra_leone_07071999.pdf} The agreement also redefined ECOMOG’s and UNOMSIL’s mandate to one of peacekeeping and addressed human rights issues – particularly in respect of child soldiers. Perhaps most importantly, the death sentence for Sankoh was lifted. Despite these concessions, the peace agreement was still a failure and the question of why remains.
In order to view the variables more simply, they were: 3rd party type – regional organization; conf_death – 14,000; Region – Africa; Inc – government; Cease – Yes; Out_iss – No outstanding issues; Outlin – No; Lifespan – 16 years for ECOWAS, 9 years for ECOMOG; Agreement Terms: Yes, matched incompatibility; PKO – Yes. When comparing these variables to the quantitative section, most of the variables made this conflict conducive to being able to hold peace at least five years post-peace agreement.

Hypothesis 1 addressed the role of partiality and “bias” in third party mediation. In Sierra Leone, this was initially apparent during the Abidjan Accord due to Sankoh’s repeated statements of having little trust for the UN Special Envoy, Berhanu Dinka. Furthermore, in October 1999, the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) dispatched 6,000 peacekeeping troops to the area to assist ECOMOG in disarmament, as agreed upon under Article II of the Lomé Agreement. Sankoh claimed that the agreement never specified the use of UN peacekeeping troops and his close commander, Sam Bockarie, added that the UN presence was damaging to the peace process.

Sankoh’s mistrust was not a new phenomenon. During the talks for the Abidjan accord, Sankoh refused to speak to the UN special envoy and displayed mistrust of the UN in general. His mistrust for the UN stemmed from a fear of UN bias against him but also from doubting the UN’s ability to protect him; a doubt that began “as far back as the

---

141 Adebajo, Building Peace in West Africa, 86
144 Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work? 67.
betrayal and assassination of Congo’s Patrice Lumumba in the 1960s and of Samuel Doe in Liberia.” In this regard, the view of the UN as an unwanted outsider is present.

These statements alone are not enough to reject the null because although they show mistrust of the UN, they do not show whether the RUF was more open to ECOMOG’s involvement. In fact, although relational partiality, where the actor has a relationship with all disputants, is generally a positive addition to the bargaining table, it has been claimed that ECOMOG had outcome partiality, where the actor has a preference as to which party in the conflict should “win”; this became particularly apparent after Charles Taylor became president of Liberia in 1997. Liberian fighters were commonly seen fighting alongside RUF members seemingly making the Sierra Leone war the next stage for the conflict between Nigeria, also the head contributor to ECOWAS, and Liberia since the Liberian Civil War. Furthermore, there were serious allegations that Nigeria was benefitting from the illegal diamond economy, affecting their stance regarding the war’s outcome. Therefore, the null hypothesis for hypothesis 1 cannot be rejected in this case.

The initial causes for the outbreak of Sierra Leone’s civil war are still debated. Sierra Leone is a state rich with natural resources, including diamonds. This gives rise to a speculation about resource based conflict, which under the variables listings would make the conflict one over territory since the goal would be to control the diamond rich areas. Furthermore, although Sierra Leone had these resources, the country was still one of the poorest in the world. Several authors have examined the role of greed and grievances in

---

146 Cleaver, “Sierra Leone,” 217.
147 David J. Francis et al., Dangers of Co-deployment, 146.
conflicts, and even the former Finance Minister of Sierra Leone stated that “...the war in Sierra Leone is simply about diamonds.”

However, as much as Sierra Leone’s resources may have been fuelled by diamonds, the RUF and AFRC’s end goal was to control the government of Sierra Leone, thus the plentiful amount of coups. Furthermore, the ineptitude of Sierra Leone’s previous government leaders had led to the economic drop that further opened the door for rebellion and civil war.

As the Lomé agreement was meant to be a full and final agreement, there were no outstanding issues and no outline for a negotiating agenda was necessary. The conflict was about government control and the agreement addressed the incompatibility by not only granting amnesty to combatants – a highly contested topic, but also by making the RUF into a legitimate political party. In relation to hypothesis 2, which related to the specificity of agreement terms, these circumstances should have increased the likelihood of the success of the peace agreement except in one respect; the agreement provided no specifications for the consequences of breaching the ceasefire or the agreement in general. ECOMOG’s lack of specificity on the enforcement issue could have been a direct result of Nigeria’s desire to pull out of the conflict.

---

Despite its interest in the defeat of the RUF, Nigeria, and ECOMOG by default, was anxious to decrease the amount of troops and money it had committed internationally.\textsuperscript{152} This desire led not only to accords that, according to some, “…appease[d] local warlords by giving them political power in exchange for military peace,” and were an “…open invitation of warlords to enjoy the spoils of office in a giant jumble sale of national wares”\textsuperscript{153}, but also to a lack of enthusiasm and willingness to enforce the Lomé Agreement when it was breached.

Soon after the agreement was signed, ECOMOG informed UN Secretary Annan that it would begin withdrawing its troops, effectively leaving an untrained UNAMSIL force as the primary peacekeepers.\textsuperscript{154} By May 2000, over 500 blue-helmet peacekeepers were kidnapped and many other were killed, leading to British intervention and a significant increase of forces.\textsuperscript{155} Therefore, it seems that ECOMOG and UNAMSIL were unwilling, ill-prepared, or unable to enforce the agreement. In ECOMOG’s case, it appears to be a mixture of unwillingness and lack of capacity.

Hypothesis four predicted that intractable issues would be significantly more difficult to culminate into a strong peace agreement due to the volatile nature of such conflicts. Quantitative results showed; however, that tractable issues – namely conflicts over territory-, are the least likely to end in lasting peace, closely followed by conflicts over government. Deroun et al found that one possibility for this is how agreements approach compromising on the incompatibility - through sharing positions in government, or

\textsuperscript{152} Cleaver, “Sierra Leone,” 219.
\textsuperscript{153} Adebajo, \textit{Building Peace in West Africa}, 99.
\textsuperscript{154} Cleaver, “Sierra Leone,” 219-220.
\textsuperscript{155} David J. Francis et al., \textit{Dangers of Co-deployment}, 145.
“political power-sharing.”\textsuperscript{156} Although it is only applied to intrastate conflicts and the results did not reach conventional measure of statistical significance, Derouen, et al., found that political power-sharing actually decreases the likelihood of peace duration.\textsuperscript{157} Although the results of this study indicated that territory causes the most decrease in peace duration rather than government, as in Deroun et al.’s study, the consensus in the results is that tractable issues are the most difficult to overcome. Hypothesis four’s null cannot be rejected in this case.

Finally, hypothesis five addresses the institutionalization of a regional organization and predicts that regional organizations that are more institutionalized will be more likely to craft an agreement that elongates the duration of peace. For the purposes of this article, this was measured by calculating the lifespan of the organization from inception until the beginning on the conflict. In the case of Sierra Leone, ECOWAS had been established for 16 years; however, ECOMOG had only been established for a short time and only had previous experience in Liberia when it became involved in Sierra Leone’s war.

As Haftel and Thompson point out in their study, international organizations gain more independence over time; specifically, for every year of existence, the independence of an international organization increases by .075.\textsuperscript{158} By this measurement, ECOMOG has very little independence and is much less likely to be effective. ECOWAS has been documented several times as being uncoordinated, decentralized, and incapable of forming a central,


\textsuperscript{157} Derouen et al., “The Duration of Civil War Peace Agreements,” 382.

\textsuperscript{158} Haftel and Thompson, “The Independence of International Organizations,” 269.
unified command structure. Both Anglo- and Francophone states failed to provide translators and in 1999, Ghana withdrew its troops during an attack, despite Nigerian officers’ commands to hold. Furthermore, ECOWAS is also seen as a front organization for Nigeria, its dominant hegemon, in order to project its personal interest in Africa. In addition to lowering its independence, this also damages any reputation that ECOWAS had as being a legitimate third party, capable of solving conflicts within its scope of interest. This contributes not only to its failure in Sierra Leone, but potentially in Guinea-Bissau as well.

Adding to the lack of institutionalism was the obvious rivalry between the Anglophone and Francophone member states of ECOWAS. Aside from inhibiting ECOWAS’ initial purpose towards economic integration, the rivalry caused logistical problems on the ground including a dysfunctional central command that gave different orders and generals were entering the conflict with little to no accurate intelligence. These arguments also added to the suspicion placed on Nigeria on their true motives for becoming involved in Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau.

Several factors contributed to the inevitable downfall of the Lomé Peace Agreement. Nigeria’s bias within ECOMOG was perhaps the most serious because not only did it make it more difficult to have both parties at the bargaining table, it also made the Nigerian troops within ECOMOG a party to the conflict, effective destroying their reputation. In addition,

159 Tavares, Regional Security, 42.
161 Tavares, Regional Security, 43.
political power-sharing agreements are notoriously difficult to adhere to by both parties.\textsuperscript{163} In Sierra Leone this caused a greater problem because of the equal backlash of the international community.\textsuperscript{164} As Francis stated, “The Lomé Accord is a product of a hastily negotiated peace settlement, preoccupied with short-term objectives and flossing over issues of justice and the fundamental grievances that led to the war.”\textsuperscript{165} The May crisis discussed earlier was a clear indicator of the lack of commitment of the RUF to the Lomé Peace Agreement.

Furthermore, Nigeria had announced the withdrawal of its ECOMOG forces in Sierra Leone prior to the agreement even being signed, sending a clear signal to Sankoh and the RUF that they did not have to be committed to the agreement.\textsuperscript{166} The security vacuum left by Nigeria’s departure and the replacement by ill-trained UN peacekeepers presented the RUF with a unique “second chance” to regroup and continue the fight. Though Nigeria’s withdrawal from Sierra Leone after the peace agreement should have encouraged the adherence to the agreement, as per RUF request, their withdrawal only bolstered RUF resolve to rebel; this has led to some speculation that the RUF never intended to follow the agreement at all.\textsuperscript{167}

\begin{flushleft}
\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{163} Derouen et al., “The Duration of Civil War Peace Agreements,” 382.
\textsuperscript{164} Adebajo, Building Peace in West Africa, 99.
\textsuperscript{166} Kabia, Humanitarian Intervention and Conflict Resolution in West, 129.
\textsuperscript{167} Abraham, “The Elusive Quest For Peace: From Abidjan to Lomé,” 216.
\end{flushleft}

In response to the RUF’s May attack on UNAMSIL forces, the British dispatched Special Forces to contain the situation and regain control. The combination of UNAMISIL and UK presence was not the only deterrence to the RUF; Sankoh was eventually captured on May 17, 2000 and the heavy sanctions placed on Liberia severely lessened the RUF’s power. In addition, ECOWAS agreed to return 3,000 troops to Sierra Leone in order to help quell the unrest and to restart pursuing an agreement to end the conflict, even going so far as to send representatives to the RUF stronghold.

By November, a new agreement calling for cessation of hostilities was a much more viable option than the previous one, partially due to the replacement of Sankoh by Issan Hassan Sesay, the Interim Leader of the RUF. The Abuja Ceasefire Agreement was signed on November 10th, 2000. The RUF was to immediately halt hostilities under article 1 (with breaches clearly explained under article 9), agree to UNAMSIL supervision, monitoring and taking an active role in disarmament, demobilization and the beginning of reintegration (DDR) under articles 3, 4, and 7. Both parties had to agree to participate in the review of the implementation of the agreement, along with the ECOWAS Committee of six of the Medication and Security Council on Sierra Leone and the UN.

---


In contrast to the Lomé Peace Agreement, the Abuja accords held the peace although tensions were still high. In terms of the hypotheses, the specificity and enforcement of the agreement were conducive to its success. The incompatibility remained the same and less conducive to success. By the year 2000, ECOMOG was a decade old and had experiences in other conflicts in West Africa. Recalling Haftel and Thompson’s measure, ECOMOG was now ten times more likely to be an independent, institutionalized organization.

In May 2001, the ECOWAS Committee of Six, the UN, the Government of Sierra Leone, and the RUF met to review the progress of the Abuja agreement, led by Modibo Sidibe, Mali’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and the chairman of the ECOWAS committee. Despite the ceasefire being maintained since its inception in late 2000, the meeting stated that the implementation of certain aspects of the ceasefire, such as the return of arms, was proceeding too slowly. Furthermore, though there were technically two violations on the ceasefire, the meeting found that the RUF was not at fault.

Guinea-Bissau (1998)

Unlike the interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone, ECOMOG’s intervention in Guinea-Bissau was the organization’s first mission without the support of Nigeria, financially and otherwise. Also, unlike Sierra Leone whose natural resources are abundant,

\[173\] UNAMSIL Press Release, “Sierra Leone.”
Guinea-Bissau's largest earnings from less profitable areas such as fishing. Although Guinea-Bissau had successfully gained its liberation from Portuguese rule in the 1970's under Amilcar Cabral, the new administration was quickly wrapped in corruption that remade the state into a dictatorship under the repressive rule of the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC – African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde).  

In 1980, after 24 years, the army rebelled and staged a coup, inserting Prime Minister Joao Bernardo 'Nino' Vieira as the new President. President Vieira, despite some posturing to open the political system, was just as oppressive as his predecessor – torturing opponents and taking full command of the army after disbanding the National Popular Assembly. The eleven month conflict did not erupt, however, until 1998. Vieira accused his army chief of staff, General Asumane Mané, of illegally selling weapons to secessionists in Senegal. When Vieira attempted to arrest Mané, the army devolved into factions, with the majority defecting to Mané's defense.  

In response, Senegal and Guinea dispatched troops in Guinea-Bissau under Operation Gabou. Despite both states' claims that their intervention was legitimate based on previously signed 'secret' defense pacts among the three, this legality was questionable. The majority of interpretations of the pacts indicated that they called for a response to

174 Adebajo, Building Peace in West Africa, 112.  
175 Kabia, Humanitarian Intervention and Conflict Resolution in West Africa, 137.  
177 Adebajo, Building Peace in West Africa, 114.  
178 Adebajo, Building Peace in West Africa, 115.
external attacks rather than internal conflicts.\textsuperscript{179} In addition, the intervention was done without prior approval from ECOWAS. However, despite the additional troops, Senegal grossly underestimated the strength of the rebellion and, suffering heavy losses, urged Vieira to request ECOWAS support.\textsuperscript{180}

In response to Senegal and Guinea dispatching troops, the OAU Central Organ of the Mechanism of Conflict Prevention endorsed ECOWAS as the central mediator and called for the UN Security Council to endorse not only ECOWAS involvement but also to legitimize the legality of Senegal and Guinea's actions. Vieira also requested ECOWAS involvement in Guinea-Bissau to assist in subduing the rebels.\textsuperscript{181}

Although ECOWAS and the Communidade de Países de Língua Franca Portuguesa (CPLP), led by Portugal, attempted to mediate the situation, strained tensions brought on by “Franco-Portuguese regional competition formed the basis for mistrust.”\textsuperscript{182} Both organizations shared little to no information and proceeded to further separate agendas. ECOWAS’ obvious favoritism towards Vieira’s government also restricted its ability to appear as a helpful mediator.

As a result, for the initial stages of mediation, the CPLP took the lead that resulted in the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding, formalized on July 25, 1998. The agreement was made between the government and the rebels but Mane’s direct

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[\textsuperscript{180}] Adebajo, \textit{Building Peace in West Africa}, 116.
\item[\textsuperscript{182}] Simon Massey, “Intervention in Guinea-Bissau,” 237
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
involvement is unknown.\textsuperscript{183} Primarily, the memorandum called for a ceasefire, a
demilitarized zone and a start to negotiations between the parties. As a condition for sitting
at the negotiating table, the rebels stated that the foreign Senegalese and Guinean troops
had to leave the country. The ceasefire did not address this issue specifically but it did call
for a peacekeeping force led by the CPLP.\textsuperscript{184} The ceasefire held until October until an
outbreak of heavy fighting, including heavy shelling, in Bissau rendered all progress null.\textsuperscript{185}

The junta forces overtook a large portion of the country, almost overrunning the
presidential palace in Bissau. On October 21\textsuperscript{st}, Vieira declared a ceasefire, which the junta
accepted. Several consecutive meeting followed in which the Vieira and Mane attempted to
come to a consensus. After the two sides were flown to Abuja for the remainder of the talks,
the CPLP took a much smaller role in further negotiations.\textsuperscript{186}

Not until November 1, 1998 was the Abuja Accord signed by both parties, following
a long mediation, described as being littered by “‘tough talking’ by the hosts acting as
mediators,”\textsuperscript{187} by both ECOWAS and the CPLP. Unlike the Lomé Peace Agreement in Sierra
Leone, the Abuja Accord was significantly shorter with only five points including the
withdrawal of foreign troops, an ECOMOG interposition force that would guarantee
security for exiting troops and humanitarian organizations along the Guinea-
Bissau/Senegal border, installation of a Government of National Unity (that included the junta), and general and Presidential elections held by March 1999.\textsuperscript{188}

Without explicit terms and instructions, the terms of the mandate soon broke down due to suspicions from all sides at the involvement of CPLP, ECOMOG, Senegal and Portugal. In January of 1999, fighting once again broke out, displacing many civilians who had just returned. However, in February of 1999, a formal ceasefire was signed and the Government of National Unity was formed. The government only lasted until May of 1999 when Mané staged a coup, causing Vieira to flee to the Portuguese embassy, then to Lisbon where he renounced his presidency.\textsuperscript{189}

Mirroring Sierra Leone, ECOMOG did not have sufficient capabilities to handle the continued fighting between Vieira and Mané. Furthermore, ECOMOG was still suffering from its debilitating inability to coordinate deployment strategies, commanders and general logistics.\textsuperscript{190} Reiterating hypothesis five, ECOMOG is too new of an organization to be independent of its hegemon, Nigeria. Even with Nigeria’s support, ECOMOG had suffered from infighting in Sierra Leone. In Guinea-Bissau, without Nigeria’s back-up, ECOMOG suffered not only from infighting\textsuperscript{191} but from lack of troops and finances as well.


\textsuperscript{190}Kabia, Humanitarian Intervention and Conflict Resolution in West Africa, 140-141.

\textsuperscript{191}Massey, “Multi-Faceted Mediation in the Guinea-Bissau Civil War,” 94.
There were 11 months and roughly 900 battle deaths\textsuperscript{192} in the Guinea-Bissau conflict between its outbreak and the Abuja Accord of 1998. Although some estimates put civilian deaths in the several thousands, there is no true recorded number. The other variables include 3\textsuperscript{rd} party type – regional organization; Region – Africa; Inc – government; Cease – Yes; Out\_iss – No outstanding issues; Outlin – No; Lifespan – 23 years for ECOWAS, 8 years for ECOMOG; Agreement Terms: Yes, matched incompatibility; PKO – Yes.

In terms of hypothesis one, it has already been addressed that ECOWAS, and ECOMOG by default, had little reputation for being neutral. Although insider-partiality has been claimed to add legitimacy, ECOWAS was accused of having outcome partiality – working for one side over another. This not only lowered their ability to widen the bargaining space between combatants, but also added to the difficulties being able to fulfill the terms of the Abuja agreement. The overarching rivalries between the Anglophone and Francophone member states also contributed to the bias; this was exacerbated by the presence of the CPLP who often countered ECOMOG’s position.

Although the terms of the agreement did match the incompatibility between both parties, the agreement was not specific beyond granting the junta a place in the new government. In terms of the ceasefire provision, it did not state what constitutes a breach of the ceasefire, nor did it state ECOMOG’s or CPLP’s response to a breach of the agreement by either party. Of course, the lack of specification could have reflected ECOMOG’s lack of capacity in fulfilling the agreement in the first place.

\textsuperscript{192} Lacina and Gleditsch, “Monitoring Trends in Global Combat.”
With only 712 deployed troops, it was impossible for ECOMOG to successfully protect the border between Guinea-Bissau and Senegal. Furthermore, the lack of proper equipment (i.e. vehicles and radios), created an atmosphere of fear that prevented the troops to patrol at night, causing other serious logistical problems. Therefore, it appears that the lack of capability is responsible for the failure of hypothesis three, rather than the lack of will.

Like in Sierra Leone, the goal of the rebellion was to overthrow the current government, although Mané claimed he had no political aspirations other than to clear his name. Under hypothesis four, a governmental conflict should have been more likely to result in peace; however, as seen in the Sierra Leone case and the quantitative results, this was not the case. Once again, as in Sierra Leone, the inclusion of the self-proclaimed junta in the government could have caused enough tension to break the already fragile agreement.

Finally, ECOMOG had now been established for 8 years and thus, according to Haftel and Thompson, had a .6 more chance of creating a durable peace agreement than newly created organizations. Unfortunately, it was not enough to make them sufficiently independent to be able to pacify the conflict in Guinea-Bissau. Nigeria was still the hegemon within ECOWAS and its lack of involvement, due to over engagement in Sierra Leone, cause greater trouble for the intervention.

193 Kabia, Humanitarian Intervention and Conflict Resolution in West Africa, 140.
Unlike ECOWAS, the OSCE was an organization created with the intent that it would have the responsibility of not only peacefully settling disputes among its members, but also handle conflict management, including early warning and post-conflict duties.\textsuperscript{197} Primarily, the OSCE made conflict management a priority and based the structure of the organization around this principle.\textsuperscript{198} Under the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) Final Act of 1975, also known as the Helsinki Final Act, the basis for the security mandate was laid out.\textsuperscript{199} Born under the shadow of the Cold War, CSCE was the only regional organization at the time which was all inclusive,\textsuperscript{200} exemplified by having both the United States and the Soviet Union as members.\textsuperscript{201} In this aspect, the CSCE goes beyond the literal definition of “regional” but still includes the states in its geographic region, particularly after its member numbers swelled from 35 to 53, post Soviet Union breakup.\textsuperscript{202}

Although the Helsinki Final Act included other aspects of co-operation such as human, economic, environmental, and technological dimensions, the primary focus of this study is in its politico-military dimension in relation to peacemaking and peacekeeping.

\textsuperscript{201} Ibryamova, “The OSCE as a regional security actor,” 80.
\textsuperscript{202} Leff, “Conflict Management in East Central Europe,” 215.
After the 1992 Summit, the Helsinki Document of 1992 strengthened the CSCE’s peacekeeping arm and created the Forum for Security Co-operation whose tasks include:

- regular consultations and intensive co-operation on military security matters;
- negotiations on confidence- and security-building measures;
- further reduction of the risks of conflict, and
- the implementation of agreed measures.\(^{203}\)

The CSCE has relied more on voluntary implementation by its members rather than a binding charter; thus showing that it is dedicated to building confidence in its respect for territorial and political sovereignty of member states. Once it was institutionalized, the CSCE was renamed the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and although it still focuses on voluntary cooperation, it now has a “hard option” of using peacekeepers, either its own or requesting another organization (such as the UN or NATO) to implement its decisions while maintaining direct control.\(^{204}\) Furthermore, with the elimination of the Soviet Union, the OSCE included the pursuit of liberal democratic values as part of its charter.\(^{205}\)

The OSCE has had a progressive outlook on its role as an inclusive regional organization but has encountered obstacles due to finance troubles as well as due to full lack of independence from member states, particularly in relation to the conflict in Moldova.


The conflict in Moldova had its roots in the Cold War, like many others in the area. Moldova’s formal borders were established in 1947 under the Soviet Union. At the same time, socialist policies and the imposition of the Cyrillic script were implemented. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the Popular Front of Moldavia gained popularity due to its calls for a return to Latin script, the Romanian language and the Romanian flag. In an attempt to meet some of these petitions, the government of Moldova amended the Constitution in 1989 and added the Law “On Granting the Moldavian Language the Status of State Language and the Return to It of Latin Script.” Although the law attempted to be inclusive, it debunked Russian as the main language and sparked concern over oncoming discrimination.206

Transdniestria, located primarily between the Dniester River to the West and Ukraine to the East, declared autonomy on September 2, 1990 and created the Moldovan Transdniestrian Moldovan Republic (Pridnestrovskai Moldavskaia Republika, or PMR). Moldova followed and formed the Republic of Moldova in June 1990. Both territories formed parallel systems of government, however, the CSCE did not recognize the PMR because it violated the inviolability of borders and the CSCE supports the autonomy of established states. In contrast, Russia supported Transdniestria due to the asset they could prove to be as an ally, particularly since Transdniestria wanted to keep Soviet rule while Moldova desired democratic rule.207 Therefore, although the dispute was primarily territorial, it was also political and ideological.

---

207 Freire, Conflict and Security in the Former Soviet Union, 198.
Despite some early attempts at negotiation to unify the state, armed conflict broke out by March of 1992 and ended in July of 1992, resulting in a brutal, albeit short, war with roughly 700 battle deaths\textsuperscript{208} and an estimated 5,000 soldier and civilian deaths. The presence of Russia’s 14\textsuperscript{th} Army in Transdniestria pushed back Moldova and proved to be controversial, particularly since from Moldova’s and the CSCE positions were that this was an internal conflict.\textsuperscript{209} On July 21, 1992, Russia brokered a ceasefire with the Republic of Moldova.

The Agreement on Principles of a Peaceful Settlement of the Armed Conflict in the Transdniestrian Region of the Republic of Moldova called for a withdrawal of troops within seven days and the creation of a security zone. A Joint Control Commission composed of members of the three conflicting parties was to oversee the agreement and Russia’s 14\textsuperscript{th} Army was tasked with keeping neutrality while the negotiations over the incompatibility took place.\textsuperscript{210} Despite their presence, tensions remained high. By July of 1993, the Republic of Moldova requested active involvement by the OSCE.\textsuperscript{211}

Initially, the head of mission of the OSCE was the chief mediator with the assistance of Russia and the Ukraine. A series of problem solving workshops (PSWs), which “bring together influential yet unofficial representatives of the parties for informal discussions to open up communication, facilitate a joint analysis of sources and dynamics of the conflict,

\textsuperscript{208} Lacina and Gleditsch, “Monitoring Trends in Global Combat.”
\textsuperscript{211} Freire, Conflict and Security in the Former Soviet Union, 204.
and create direction and options for its resolution which are then fed into official policymaking and/or negotiations,”

212 were held between 1993 and 1996, culminating in the Memorandum on the Bases for normalization of Relations Between the Republic of Moldova and Transdneistria, also known as the Primakov Memorandum, signed on May 8, 1997.213

The leaders of Moldova and Transdneistria reaffirmed their previous commitment to pursue a solution to the conflict and agreed to not use violence or threat of force in order to do so. In addition, it recognized the Soviet-era borders of Moldova by introducing the idea of the “common state”214 and urged the parties pursue rebuilding a single state in a following final agreement. Despite being a partial peace agreement, it did call for an end to violence.215

There were roughly 62 months between the start of the conflict and the memorandum and five thousand total casualties. The OSCE was the chief mediating body, making it the primary third party involved. The outstanding issue of the territorial dispute was outlined and delegated to the OSCE Mission to Moldova. The agreement did not call for a peacekeeping mission but did enforce the ceasefire agreement. In fact, one of the outstanding issues was that Moldova demanded the deportation of the Russian 14th army

and their equipment stationed on the border but these issues were addressed in other meetings and draft agreements.\textsuperscript{216}

The partiality hypothesis is difficult to assess given the presence of Russia in this case as a unitary state actor – as a party to the conflict on the Transdniestrian side – and a member of the OSCE as a mediator. If Russia is taken as a state actor then the OSCE can be seen as an insider-partial actor, as it is willing to compromise with both sides. However, as Russia is a member of the OSCE and was a part of the mediation process, then a bias was clearly shown towards Transdniestria.

These mutually exclusive positions have proven to be a hindrance to the resolution of this frozen conflict; however, all parties involved desire a general resolution to the conflict.\textsuperscript{217} Both Moldova and Transdniestria seemed to view the OSCE separately from Russia, welcoming the OSCE involvement as a forum for negotiation and discussion.\textsuperscript{218} Therefore, the OSCE did possess relational partiality and lacked outcome partiality in this case. Despite complications, the peace has held for over five years without a resurgence of violence between the PMR and the Republic of Moldova. The null of hypothesis one can be rejected in this case as the agreement was successful.

In regards to the specificity of the agreement made, although the ceasefire article did not specify what constitutes a breach of agreement, it did clarify that “peaceful means” include “negotiations and consultations with the assistance and mediation of the Russian Federation and Ukraine, as guarantor States for the fulfillment of the agreements achieved;

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{216}] Freire, \textit{Conflict and Security in the Former Soviet Union}, 216.
\item[\textsuperscript{217}] Williams, “Conflict resolution after the Cold War,” 83.
\item[\textsuperscript{218}] Freire, \textit{Conflict and Security in the Former Soviet Union}, 212-213.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
of the OSCE and the assistant of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States].”\textsuperscript{219} In regards to the agreement terms, this agreement was part of a process and although the outstanding issues were delegated to a commission, the terms of this agreement did not address the incompatibility beyond stating that the parties should work towards a resolution.

As a security actor, the OSCE has focused on an all encompassing view of security, including human rights, economic and environmental issues, and other non-traditional areas aside from the politico-military dimension.\textsuperscript{220} The OSCE has not given a vested interest to the traditional enforcement aspect of security. During the years following the memorandum, the OSCE was unable to force compliance with the agreement, traditionally or otherwise, particularly from Russia who persistently violates its commitments to withdraw troops from the area.\textsuperscript{221} Although no final agreement had been reached, both continue to take part in peaceful talks and negotiations; therefore, the agreement has not been broken.

As seen in the quantitative results, territory is the least likely incompatibility to result in a long duration of peace. As seen in Moldova, a conflict over territory has proven to be immensely difficult to solve, although some of the hindrance comes from other third parties. However, the conflict in Moldova has not erupted into another violent debacle and is seen as a “frozen” conflict. In the strict definition of what constitutes success in this study, the agreement has been a success.

\textsuperscript{219} “Memorandum On the Bases for the Normalization of Relations Between the Republic of Moldova and Transdneistria," 2.
\textsuperscript{220} Ibryamova, “The OSCE as a regional security actor,” 82.
\textsuperscript{221} Gheciu, \textit{Securing Civilization}? 151.
Summary

The benefits of case studies are that they allow the application of variables to the ‘real world’. Quantitative results are undoubtedly useful; however, clear examples that illustrate the presence of each variable and explain the events of specific events can be more useful to apply to policy changes. Overall, two of the three examined conflicts were considered a success. In comparing the two agreements in Sierra Leone that were spearheaded by ECOWAS, the importance of institutionalization of organizations and the commitment to enforcement is apparent. In Guinea-Bissau, there was a lack of specificity in the agreement and there was a lack of trust between the parties and towards the involved third parties, including ECOMOG.

In Moldova, the OSCE’s nontraditional approach to peacekeeping, coupled with Russia’s mutually exclusive positions towards the conflict, made enforcement of the agreement more difficult. However, the specificity of the agreement and the comprehensive inclusiveness of the OSCE’s view of security assisted in ceasing hostilities between the parties, despite the incompatibility encompassing aspects of territorial and ethnic issues. Though the conflict is, as of yet, unresolved, the scope of this research studies the duration of peace – meaning a lack of violent conflict; thus Moldova is a success.

In terms of policy making, these cases also illustrate that although regional organizations can be a powerful tool in conflict situations, particularly when mediation is necessary, they need to be bolstered. Many regional organizations are still young, relatively
speaking, and their capabilities are limited by lack of experience, manpower, and/or finances. Training in all aspects of conflict management, prevention, and post-conflict rehabilitation must be given. The internal dynamics of regional organizations are also unique from one another, some choosing to focus more on conflict prevention (such as the OSCE), some more on economic issues (such as ECOWAS when it first began and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN]). Despite these wide differences, there is something to be said for creating a general format of power-sharing between member states and formal agreement creation to establish obligations and requirements.
CHAPTER FIVE - CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this study was to examine the contributions of regional organizations to conflict management. Chapter One introduced the concept of the advent of regional organizations and how they have become a more prominent actor in the international scene. Chapter Two began covering a majority of the arguments for and against regional organizations as well as giving a background to the history of regional organizations as a whole and their current place within the international framework, specifically their relationship to the United Nations. According to the United Nations, regional organizations are a valuable asset; however, it is a vertical relationship, as any organization must clear any action with the Security Council.222

Due to the various debates for and against the further incorporation of regional organizations, a definitive answer to their effectiveness and success rate would help clear the argument. Several of the authors who advocate the use of international organizations tout their ability to more closely relate to states in their region due to shared interests, general history, and similar cultures.223 Others claim that a regional organization’s forte is in its geographical proximity to conflicts that, theoretically, would be conducive to identifying a potential conflict prior to violence or responding quickly to an outbreak of violence.224

---

222 United Nations, “Chapter VIII: Regional Arrangements.”
There are also those against the use of regional organizations in conflicts, either claiming that they are merely pawns or fronts for regional hegemons, or that they are far too ill-equipped financially, militarily, and politically to properly handle conflict management. Generally, the consensus among those against the use of regional organizations is that the United Nations is far better equipped to handle international crisis situations. However, the United Nations is not always welcome and, several times, is seen as an outside intruder, as in the case of Sierra Leone. Furthermore, as Kabia pointed out, the disengagement of the West, including the UN, on the crises in Africa left ECOWAS with no other choice. Should this disengagement occur once more, it would be beneficial to have an organization that is well equipped to handle the situation.

Apart from the argument of whether or not regional organizations should be primary conflict managers, there are studies that have found that the contents of a peace agreement can determine its success or failure. Other variables deemed to have an effect include whether the incompatibility was over something intractable (such as ethnicity or religion), the intensity of conflict, and duration of the conflict.

Chapter Three addressed these arguments by hypothesizing that regional organizations do have a positive effect on the duration of peace when controlling for partiality, agreement terms, enforcement, incompatibility, and the institutionalization level of the organization. Of those five hypotheses, two were tested quantitatively with binary logistic regression. Hypothesis two addressed agreement terms and whether or not they

---

225 Dorn “Regional Peacekeeping Is Not the Way,” 3.
226 Kabia, Humanitarian Intervention and Conflict Resolution in West, 187.
227 Nathan, “The Peacemaking Effectiveness of Regional Organizations,” 3.
had a significant effect on the outcome. With a significance of 0.027, regional organizations were found to be roughly 3.5 times more likely to craft an agreement that ceases hostilities for at least five years. Furthermore, although regional organizations did not reach statistical significance upon testing hypothesis four, it was discovered that contrary to the hypothesis that intractable conflicts were far less likely to end in peace, territory is the most difficult incompatibility to end peacefully, when controlling for third party involvement. Additional regressions also showed that when controlling for all other variables, regional organizations are 6.728 times more likely to craft an agreement that ceases hostilities between dyads for a period of at least five years.

The case studies in Chapter Four served as examples to apply the hypotheses to. Recalling conflicts where the involvement of regional organizations succeeded and failed can solidly illustrate what aspects of the regional organizations helped or hindered the peace agreement process and how it affected the outcome. Furthermore, external influences on the peace process were also discussed, such as the presence of Russia and its role in Moldova, and the affects they had on the efficacy of regional organizations.

Of the agreements that succeeded, the organizations had previous experience in mediating and had the capability and willingness to enforce the agreement. In some cases the physical capabilities such as military equipment and personally may have come from other organizations (i.e. UN and Russia); however, with proper financing and training, regional organizations have the potential to achieve the same results.

Other avenues that this research could have taken would have been the inclusion of other regional organizations, such as the Organization of American States (OAS), the
African Union (AU), or the Association of Southeastern Asian Nations (ASEAN). Including other regional organizations in the case studies could further the application of the hypothesis to different regions. Also, the inclusion of the capacity of states receiving interventions by outside parties could also be included. Quantitatively, other variables could have been included, such as the yearly finances of regional organizations, the GDP of member states, number of available peacekeepers versus number of dispatched peacekeepers (if there were provided for in the agreement) and how much of the finances were directed towards the conflict they were mediating. These variables could have bolstered hypothesis three in terms of being capable of enforcing an agreement.

Further studies may want to include the above variables in order to further test the hypotheses. In addition, case studies could also address peace agreements made at different point of a regional organizations life span or address how many conflicts a regional organization had intervened in prior to its involvement in the conflict being addressed. Those case studies potentially could bolster hypothesis five.

This study sought to investigate whether or not regional organizations were effective at crafting peace agreements that stood the test of time in stopping violent conflict between dyads. Quantitatively, hypothesis two illustrated that regional organizations are a viable route to achieve this goal. Although regional organizations were not significant in hypothesis four, the odds ratio was still higher than other options in achieving peace. Qualitatively, the null of hypothesis one could not be rejected due to the outcome partiality of Nigeria within ECOMOG; however, in the case of Moldova the null could be rejected due to the success of the agreement and the lack of outcome partiality.
Hypothesis three showed that ECOMOG was initially unwilling to enforce agreements in Sierra Leone, particular Conkary and Lomé; however, took an active role in the Abuja Peace agreement which held. Further studies could include variables to test the role of rebel strength as a fact; however, as this was outside the scope of this study, the willingness to enforce made a difference in Sierra Leone. In Moldova, the ceasefire was continually enforced by Russia’s peacekeepers and OSCE oversight. Hypothesis five preliminarily showed the importance of the life span of an organization to the success of peace agreements. However, in terms of institutionalization, future studies may want to account for other measures, such as previous experience in conflict management.

As mentioned previously, regional organizations are an asset to the UN already; however, regional organizations require more backing in order to be truly effective. A large portion of that requires cooperation among member states in order to be logistically able to respond to rising conflicts. However, financing and training for mediators and peacekeepers are also necessary in order to make enforcement possible without external assistance. Much policy is needed to bolster the role of regional organizations and more research is necessary in seeing what are the most effective methods and policies for regional organizations to have among member states and in their approach to conflicts in their “jurisdictions.”
APPENDIX:
ADDITIONAL TABLES AND FIGURES
Table 5: Logistic Regression - 3rd Party Type and Region

Model Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>-2 Log likelihood</th>
<th>Cox &amp; Snell R Square</th>
<th>Nagelkerke R Square</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>266.360</td>
<td>.114</td>
<td>.153</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 20 because maximum iterations has been reached. Final solution cannot be found.

Hosmer and Lemeshow Test

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>Chi-square</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.124</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>.793</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Classification Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Observed</th>
<th>Predicted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict in 5 years?</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absence of conflict</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Percentage</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Classification Table a

Variables in the Equation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N=215</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>Wald</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Exp(B)</th>
<th>95% C.I.for EXP(B)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>party3_type</td>
<td>.528</td>
<td>.497</td>
<td>10.514</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.033</td>
<td></td>
<td>.576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>.440</td>
<td>.403</td>
<td>1.190</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.275</td>
<td>1.553</td>
<td>.704</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Org.</td>
<td>1.068</td>
<td>.549</td>
<td>3.785</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.052</td>
<td>2.910</td>
<td>.992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations</td>
<td>-.088</td>
<td>.518</td>
<td>.029</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.865</td>
<td>.916</td>
<td>.332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other 4rd party</td>
<td>.643</td>
<td>.444</td>
<td>2.094</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.148</td>
<td>1.902</td>
<td>.796</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>.418</td>
<td>.467</td>
<td>1.051</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.999</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>-21.524</td>
<td>13249.891</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.999</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>1.193</td>
<td>.710</td>
<td>2.823</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.093</td>
<td>3.296</td>
<td>.820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>-4.77</td>
<td>.579</td>
<td>.680</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.409</td>
<td>.620</td>
<td>.200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>-.548</td>
<td>.507</td>
<td>1.169</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.280</td>
<td>.578</td>
<td>.214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-.278</td>
<td>.497</td>
<td>.313</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.576</td>
<td>.576</td>
<td>.214</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: party3_type, Region.

b. p = *≤.05; **≤ .01; ***≤ .000
Table 6: Logistic Regression: 3rd Party Type and Outstanding Issues

### Model Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>-2 Log likelihood</th>
<th>Cox &amp; Snell R Square</th>
<th>Nagelkerke R Square</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>251.133*</td>
<td>.174</td>
<td>.235</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 4 because parameter estimates changed by less than .001.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>Chi-square</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.903</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>.551</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Classification Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Observed</th>
<th>Predicted</th>
<th>Conflict in 5 years?</th>
<th>Percentage Correct</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>Absence of conflict</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 1</td>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Absence of conflict</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Percentage</td>
<td>31.776</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>.000***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. The cut value is .500

### Variables in the Equation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N=215</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>Wald</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Exp(B)</th>
<th>95% CL for EXP(B)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Upper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>party3_type</td>
<td>11.356</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.023*</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.909</td>
<td>.837</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>.646</td>
<td>.421</td>
<td>2.361</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.124</td>
<td>1.909</td>
<td>.837</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Org.</td>
<td>1.244</td>
<td>.564</td>
<td>4.860</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.027*</td>
<td>3.470</td>
<td>1.148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations</td>
<td>-.746</td>
<td>.494</td>
<td>2.274</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.132</td>
<td>.474</td>
<td>.180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other 3rd Party</td>
<td>.845</td>
<td>.506</td>
<td>2.786</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.095</td>
<td>2.328</td>
<td>.863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Out_iss</td>
<td>31.776</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>.000***</td>
<td></td>
<td>9.571</td>
<td>3.917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 1a</td>
<td>Process to finalize</td>
<td>2.259</td>
<td>.456</td>
<td>24.553</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000***</td>
<td>9.571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spelled out</td>
<td>.691</td>
<td>.515</td>
<td>1.799</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.180</td>
<td>1.995</td>
<td>.727</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delegated to commission</td>
<td>-.071</td>
<td>.618</td>
<td>.013</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.908</td>
<td>.931</td>
<td>.278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New negotiations</td>
<td>.874</td>
<td>.510</td>
<td>2.939</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.086</td>
<td>2.396</td>
<td>.882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outline for future</td>
<td>2.528</td>
<td>.758</td>
<td>11.131</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.001**</td>
<td>12.531</td>
<td>2.838</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.709</td>
<td>.412</td>
<td>17.166</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000***</td>
<td>.181</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: party3_type, Out_iss, Outlin.
b. p = * ≤.05; **≤ .01; ***≤ .000
Table 7 - Logistic Regression for 3rd Party Type, Outline, and Region

Model Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>-2 Log likelihood</th>
<th>Cox &amp; Snell R Square</th>
<th>Nagelkerke R Square</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>264.685</td>
<td>.121</td>
<td>.162</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 20 because maximum iterations has been reached. Final solution cannot be found.

Classification Table\textsuperscript{a,b}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Observed</th>
<th>Predicted</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conflict in 5 years?</td>
<td>Percentage Correct</td>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>Absence of conflict</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 0</td>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Absence of conflict</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overall Percentage: 58.1%

a. Constant is included in the model.
b. The cut value is .500

Hosmer and Lemeshow Test

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>Chi-square</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>13.695</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>.057</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Variables in the Equation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable(s)</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>Wald</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Exp(B)</th>
<th>95% C.I for EXP(B)</th>
<th>Lower</th>
<th>Upper</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=215</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>party3_type</td>
<td>.438</td>
<td>.405</td>
<td>1.169</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.280</td>
<td>1.549</td>
<td>.701</td>
<td>3.426</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>1.076</td>
<td>.552</td>
<td>3.800</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.051*</td>
<td>2.933</td>
<td>.994</td>
<td>8.651</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Org.</td>
<td>-.030</td>
<td>.520</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.955</td>
<td>.971</td>
<td>.350</td>
<td>2.691</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations</td>
<td>.672</td>
<td>.447</td>
<td>2.256</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.133</td>
<td>1.958</td>
<td>.615</td>
<td>4.708</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other 3rd Party</td>
<td>.726</td>
<td>.447</td>
<td>2.256</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.133</td>
<td>1.958</td>
<td>.615</td>
<td>4.708</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>-21.491</td>
<td>13156.003</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.999</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>1.211</td>
<td>.714</td>
<td>2.875</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.090</td>
<td>3.357</td>
<td>.828</td>
<td>13.611</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>-.476</td>
<td>.500</td>
<td>.671</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.413</td>
<td>.622</td>
<td>.199</td>
<td>1.939</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>-.422</td>
<td>.517</td>
<td>.666</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.414</td>
<td>.656</td>
<td>.238</td>
<td>1.806</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outlin</td>
<td>.436</td>
<td>.337</td>
<td>1.677</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.195</td>
<td>1.546</td>
<td>.799</td>
<td>2.992</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-.498</td>
<td>.527</td>
<td>.893</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.345</td>
<td>.608</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: party3_type, Region, Outlin.
b. p = * ≤.05; ** ≤ .01; *** ≤ .000
Table 8 - Logistic Regression of 3rd Party type, Outstanding Issues, and Battle Deaths

Model Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>-2 Log likelihood</th>
<th>Cox &amp; Snell R Square</th>
<th>Nagelkerke R Square</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>213.331*</td>
<td>0.209</td>
<td>0.280</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 4 because parameter estimates changed by less than .001.

Classification Table\(^{a,b}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Observed</th>
<th>Predicted</th>
<th>Percentage Correct</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conflict in 5 years?</td>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>Absence of conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 0</td>
<td>109 0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Percentage</td>
<td>80 0</td>
<td>.0 57.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Constant is included in the model.
b. The cut value is .500

Hosmer and Lemeshow Test

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>Chi-square</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.934</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>.655</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Variables in the Equation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N=189</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>S.E</th>
<th>Wald</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Exp(B)</th>
<th>95% C.I. for EXP(B)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>party3_type</td>
<td>11.866</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.018*</td>
<td>1.310</td>
<td>.526</td>
<td>3.262</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>.270</td>
<td>.466</td>
<td>.336</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.562</td>
<td>1.310</td>
<td>.526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Org.</td>
<td>1.549</td>
<td>.635</td>
<td>5.946</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.015*</td>
<td>4.706</td>
<td>1.355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations</td>
<td>-.898</td>
<td>.514</td>
<td>3.053</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.081</td>
<td>.407</td>
<td>.149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other 3rd Party</td>
<td>.612</td>
<td>.553</td>
<td>1.222</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.269</td>
<td>1.843</td>
<td>.623</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Out_iss</td>
<td>31.335</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>.000***</td>
<td>12.859</td>
<td>4.824</td>
<td>34.276</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process to finalize</td>
<td>2.554</td>
<td>.500</td>
<td>26.071</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000***</td>
<td>12.859</td>
<td>4.824</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spelled out</td>
<td>1.174</td>
<td>.605</td>
<td>3.768</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.052*</td>
<td>3.234</td>
<td>.989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To commission</td>
<td>.183</td>
<td>.702</td>
<td>.068</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.795</td>
<td>1.200</td>
<td>.303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New negotiations</td>
<td>1.101</td>
<td>.585</td>
<td>3.542</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.060</td>
<td>3.007</td>
<td>.955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agenda for future</td>
<td>2.763</td>
<td>.794</td>
<td>12.121</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000***</td>
<td>15.846</td>
<td>3.345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>batdeathdum</td>
<td>.048</td>
<td>.363</td>
<td>.018</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.895</td>
<td>1.049</td>
<td>.515</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.860</td>
<td>.518</td>
<td>12.905</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000***</td>
<td>.156</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Variables entered on step 1: party3_type, Out_iss, batdeathdum.
b. p = * ≤.05; **≤ .01; ***≤ .000
REFERENCES


http://home.gwu.edu/~barnett/articles/1995_partners_ris.pdf

Doi: 10.1162/002081899551048


Doi:10.1177/0022002711400862


http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0021.pdf


www.journals.hil.unb.ca/index.php/JCS/article/view/4546


http://reliefweb.int/report/sierra-leone/sierra-leone-ceasefire-review-meeting-concludes-abuja


http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/28495/1/WP49.2.pdf