The Bay Of Pigs Invasion: A Case Study In Foreign Policy Decision-making

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ABSTRACT

Policy makers have long recognized the importance of considering past experience, history, and the use of Analogical reasoning when making policy decisions. When elite political actors face foreign policy crises, they often use their past experience, refer to history, and use Analogical reasoning to help them frame their decisions. In the case of the ill-fated invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs, the use of Analogical reasoning revolving around past covert successes may have created an environment for faulty foreign policy decision-making. Former members of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) filled the ranks of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and held key positions within the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations. OSS success with guerrilla warfare, sabotage, and intelligence gathering during World War II, coupled with early CIA covert successes (specifically in Guatemala), may have led President Kennedy to make the wrong policy decisions with regard to dealing with Fidel Castro and Cuba. This research explores the use of Analogical reasoning during the decision-making process by way of process-tracing. Process-tracing attempts to identify the intervening processes between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable. We look at six critical junctures and compare how Groupthink, the Bureaucratic Politics Model, and Analogical reasoning approaches help explain any causal mechanisms. The findings suggest that Analogical reasoning may have played a more significant role in President Kennedy’s final decision to invade Cuba than previously thought. The findings further suggest that by using the Analogical reasoning approach, our understanding of President Kennedy’s foreign policy in Cuba is enhanced when compared to the Groupthink and Bureaucratic Politics Model approaches emphasized in past research.
This is dedicated to my mother and father who suffered equally during the Bay of Pigs as combatants; one at home and one in Cuba.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1  
  Why the Bay of Pigs Invasion? ........................................................................................................... 1  
  Setting the Context: Covert Operations Make Their Mark ............................................................... 6  
  Analogical Reasoning ....................................................................................................................... 9  

CHAPTER TWO: THREE THEORIES ...................................................................................................... 12  
  Literature Review ............................................................................................................................ 12  
    1. The Bureaucratic Politics Model .................................................................................................. 15  
    2. Groupthink ................................................................................................................................ 23  
    3. Analogical Reasoning ................................................................................................................ 30  
  Literature Review Conclusions ......................................................................................................... 38  

CHAPTER THREE: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND .................................................................................. 39  
  Historical Background on Covert Operations from Eisenhower to Kennedy ................................. 39  
  The Bay of Pigs Invasion Overview ............................................................................................... 42  

CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY .................................................... 45  
  Methods ......................................................................................................................................... 47  

CHAPTER FIVE: CRITICAL JUNCTURES ............................................................................................. 51  
  Establishing Critical Junctures (CJ) .................................................................................................. 51  
    CJ-1: How did the development of the CIA affect the decision-making process? ...................... 52  
    CJ-2: At what point did Castro become undesirable and why? ................................................. 55  
    CJ-3: What were the first decisions on dealing with Cuba and how were they arrived at? .. 58  
    CJ-4: How did the first plan change and why? ............................................................................ 60  
    CJ-5: How was the final plan formulated and why? ................................................................. 62  
    CJ-6: What happened that led to the final outcome and why? ............................................... 64  

CHAPTER SIX: DISCUSSION ............................................................................................................... 67  
  How Well Does Analogical Reasoning Explain the Critical Junctions? ....................................... 67  
    CJ-1: How did the development of the CIA affect the decision-making process? ...................... 67  
    CJ-2: At what point did Castro become undesirable and why? ................................................. 69  
    CJ-3: What were the first decisions on dealing with Cuba and how were they arrived at? .. 71  
    CJ-4: How did the first plan change and why? ............................................................................ 72  
    CJ-5: How was the final plan formulated and why? ................................................................. 73  
    CJ-6: What happened that led to the final outcome and why? ............................................... 76
CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................. 79
APPENDIX A: THE BATTLE ......................................................................................................... 88
   The National Security Archive’s Summary of the Battle ......................................................... 89
APPENDIX B: ANALOGICAL REASONING ............................................................................... 104
   Other Comments .................................................................................................................. 105
LIST OF REFERENCES .................................................................................................................. 109
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Why the Bay of Pigs Invasion?

The invasion of Cuba in 1961 by CIA trained Cuban exiles has been previously analyzed in terms of descriptive narratives, group dynamics, and organizational theory. It has received very little academic focus in terms of Analogical reasoning in foreign policy decision-making. The use of descriptive narrative, group dynamics, and organizational theory has extended our understanding of foreign policy decision-making by adding to the list of possible contributing factors. However, it is argued here that these approaches do not suffice to fully explain the decisions and why they were made. The Bay of Pigs is significant in its own right, but it becomes even more so when you consider it may have led to the Cuban missile crisis.

This argument is driven by exploring the significance of the Analogical reasoning approach. This research explores the use of Analogical reasoning during the decision-making process by way of process-tracing. Process-tracing attempts to identify the intervening processes between independent variables and the outcome of the dependent variable. We look at six critical junctures and compare how Groupthink, the Bureaucratic Politics Model, and Analogical reasoning approaches help explain various stages of the decision-making.

One significant causal mechanism is found by examining the operational similarities between the 1954 CIA venture in Guatemala (PBSUCCESS) and the Bay of Pigs invasion seven years later. In both cases:

1. The U.S. government decided there was a communist threat too close to home;
2. The United States felt the government in question was turning towards communism;
3. The opportunity to act was quickly fading and would be lost;
4. There was little to no intelligence on the country, but the go-ahead was given anyway;

5. A huge propaganda mission involving radio, leaflets, and other measures was undertaken;

6. There was a shroud of interdepartmental secrecy and a ‘need to know’ restriction which kept others important actors and resources from getting involved;

7. Somoza and Nicaragua were involved;

8. The United States stopped and or blocked arms going to the country;

9. The blockaded country still obtained weapons and support from the communist bloc;

10. The government learned of the operations against them but the United States went forward anyway and,

11. The operation got to a point where the planners felt there was no turning back. (Cullather, 1994)

As discussed later on in the research, these similarities and others suggest that the Bay of Pigs invasion was almost a carbon copy of the operation in Guatemala (PBSUCCESS). Most of the same leadership was brought back in for the Bay of Pigs. Allen Dulles, Richard Bissell, Jack Esterline, J.C. King, and Tracey Barnes were all in key positions in Guatemala. The mission consisted of the same elements including propaganda, sabotage, an invading force, and U.S. military muscle in the background. The operational plan was an almost direct copy as well. One of the main points used in Guatemala would be used again in Cuba: the veiled threat of American intervention. This perception was to help make Castro crumble as Arbenz did in Guatemala. The planners of the Bay of Pigs did not anticipate that Castro would learn from the Guatemalan experience and may have created his own analogy. This analogy would serve him well in preparing for what he felt was inevitable; some type of invasion by the United States.
The fact that Castro prepared for almost a year prior to the invasion is well documented in the literature.

Providing a detailed narrative is usually the method of choice when discussing a foreign policy decision. In this case, the first attempt came from *New York Times* investigative reporter Tad Sculc. He had already spent six years covering Fidel Castro’s rise to power. In 1962 he and another reporter, Karl E. Meyer, wrote *The Cuban Invasion: The Chronicle of a Disaster*. By using open source references (no materials had been declassified at that time), they put together a very detailed and (we now know) mostly correct version of the events as they had transpired. This first narrative was later overshadowed by Peter Wyden in 1979 when he wrote, *Bay of Pigs: The Untold Story*, which to date is the most widely accepted conventional narrative account of the invasion. It was ground breaking at the time because, it included six hours of first time interviews with Fidel Castro. It also contained interviews with other key Cuban participants or witnesses.

Other authors have tended to focus on controversies that surrounded the operation, instead of the event as a whole. For example, one such controversy centers on a CIA entrapment or ‘rogue elephant’ view. Blight and Kornbluh (1998) quoted Arthur Schlesinger thus:

> I believe Kennedy thought that Castro was the prize exhibit in Khrushchev’s threatening vision of wars of national liberation … But I do not think this accounts for the Bay of Pigs. That kind of feeling was in the background, true. But Kennedy was trapped for other reasons. He inherited this project from Eisenhower. When he talked to [CIA Director Allen] Dulles about it, Dulles kept emphasizing what he called the ‘disposal problem’. Dulles was telling Kennedy, between the lines, that if you cancel this venture it means that the 1,200 Cubans we have been training in Guatemala will disperse around Latin America, and they’ll spread the word that the U.S.
government has changed its policy towards Castro. This, in turn, will be a great stimulus to the Fidelistas throughout Latin America. The political impact of cancellation, Dulles implied, will be very serious for the balance of force in the hemisphere.

Schlesinger then notes domestic considerations:

What Dulles did not add, but what Kennedy fully understood, was that the domestic political implications of Kennedy’s cancellation of this expedition would be very considerable. For a lieutenant JG (junior grade) in the Navy in the Second World War to cancel an expedition that had been advocated, sanctioned, and supported by the general who commanded the largest successful amphibious landing in history, would have been hard to explain. I think that this was more important than anything else, that Kennedy felt trapped, having inherited the operation from Eisenhower. Kennedy’s basic approach, from the moment he heard about the operation, was to try to do something, but as little as possible. He wanted a neat little infiltration that was plausibly deniable, but which had some chance of success.

Schlesinger then addresses the fear of sounding soft on Communism:

The fear of sounding soft on Communism was a very strong one. A liberal Democrat like Kennedy had to be constantly concerned with this issue. All of us – Kennedy and [National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy and the rest – were hypnotized by [CIA Director of Plans] Dick Bissell to some degree, and assumed that he knew what he was doing. In this, Kennedy made a great mistake. One thing Kennedy learned was never again to take the CIA, or the Joint Chiefs of Staff, very seriously. (Politics of Illusion, 64)

Another controversy revolves around presidential betrayal. An example of this is found in *The Dark Side of Camelot*, written by investigative reporter Seymour Hersh:

Kennedy’s refusal to go forward with the essential second bombing mission – or, for that matter, simply to call off the exile invasion – was not a military but a political decision. As Kennedy had
to know, his decision amounted to a death sentence for the Cuban exiles fighting on the ground. But he and Nikita Khrushchev had just agreed, after weeks of secret back-and-forth, to an early June summit meeting in Europe. A second bombing attack was sure to focus attention on American involvement; it would jeopardize Kennedy’s face-to-face meeting with the Soviet premier and his chances for an early foreign-policy triumph. In terms of domestic politics, the president understood that a failure at the Bay of Pigs was preferable to the political heat he would take from Republicans and conservative Democrats if he did not go forward with the invasion. He would be considered just another liberal, like the much maligned Adlai Stevenson. Nothing – not even the death and capture of hundreds of Cuban patriots – was worth that. (Hersh, 212)

Grayston Lynch, who wrote *Decision for Disaster*, is another advocate of this view. Lynch was one of two on-site CIA operatives and at one point became the ad-hoc commander at the Bay of Pigs. He argues the invasion could have succeeded had President Kennedy not cancelled the planned air strikes against Castro’s air force. This viewpoint is expressed in the literature by a number of the CIA trained participants of the invasion and several other key CIA players.

And yet these and other narratives, detailed as they may be, contain little or no discussion of any decision-making theory that would help explain why the operation unfolded or, indeed, why the decision to invade was taken at all. Past analysis has mostly centered on Groupthink and Bureaucratic Politics type models which attempt to discuss the overall outcome but do very little to explain causal mechanisms, causal junctures, or even the breakdown of key decisions in a timeline. Without this breakdown of critical junctures, we have a mode of explaining that has a beginning and an end but no substantive middle.

These past approaches have not fully explained why President Kennedy, who had the final decision-making authority, gave the go ahead to invade Cuba. Nor do they address any of
the possible links in a causal chain which led to the final fiasco. For example, why was it decided that Castro and his new government were a direct threat to the United States? Why was the choice made by both Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy not to explore any other policy options short of enacting a secret war? How did covert operations become the primary policy choice of either president? We therefore believe, at least in this instance, that there is a gap that needs to be filled if we are to fully understand how foreign policy decisions were made during that time. By looking at the Bay of Pigs invasion through a different lens, we are able to see other possible explanations that might increase our understanding of this particular phenomenon.

As we explore other alternative explanations, there are two points that need to be made as an introduction to this research. The first point is that other foreign policy decisions of this era like the Cuban missile crisis and those in Vietnam have been studied to the point of exhaustion. On the other hand, the Bay of Pigs on has received very little attention in comparison. The experiences at the Bay of Pigs greatly influenced President Kennedy in future foreign policy decisions including the Cuban Missile Crises, events in Laos, and our involvement in Vietnam and it is significant enough as a foreign policy decision to merit further research in its own right. The second point to understand is that during this era, there seemed to be a perceived sense of urgency to use covert operations as a foreign policy tool. This tendency helped to overshadow other possible policy options as covert operations were considered the best option short of war.

Setting the Context: Covert Operations Make Their Mark

The early 1950s were a time of tension, uncertainty, and a profound sense of urgency. The nation had entered into a new era of possible nuclear annihilation. The term Cold War was
coined to represent the terror of a potential nuclear war and the devastating nuclear winter it would create. Tension was further aggravated by the ongoing police action in Korea which came on the heels of the end of World War II. The threat of nuclear war cast a shadow over the United States and created a new type of foreign policy consideration. This option centered on the use of covert action as opposed to waging a full scale war.

Covert action had been used successfully by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during World War II. The OSS created intelligence networks, worked with resistance forces, and gave its operatives valuable experience that would be used in the future. At the end of World War II, the OSS was disbanded by President Truman. He decided against keeping the wartime OSS intact and turning it into a civilian intelligence agency. Instead he chose to form a new agency altogether. The new Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) lacked experience, so it was a logical step that former OSS operatives would help fill in the ranks.

Many former OSS members became part of the newly formed agency in operational as well as management roles. President Truman had his own ideas as to the direction of the new agency which in his mind consisted mostly of intelligence gathering. In the end however, “the postwar concept of covert action sprang from the fecund intellect of diplomat George Kennan, who in 1948, headed the State Department’s newly-established Policy Planning Staff” (Rudgers 253). Kennan’s concept was defined as “the inauguration of organized political warfare, which he defined as all the means at a nation’s command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives” (Rudgers 253). Kennan found the way to turn his philosophy into direct action through the newly formed CIA.
Anticommunist hysteria, borne from post World War II events involving the Soviet Union and other pro-communist countries, gripped the U.S. political scene. Responding to the fear of communist world domination, and possible nuclear war, the U.S. world view changed. President Eisenhower embraced covert operations as a legitimate foreign policy tool to help keep the United States out of nuclear war. “Under Eisenhower and Dulles (DCI), Washington developed a foreign policy that equated Third World non-alignment with evil” (Forsythe, 388). When Eisenhower left presidential office President Kennedy continued to use covert operations as a primary policy tool. It is believed that “the two men unleashed covert action with an unprecedented intensity. Ike had undertaken 170 major CIA covert operations in eight years. The Kennedys launched 163 major covert operations in less than three” (Weiner, 180). This was very much a departure from President Truman’s post World War II concept for the CIA, who only wanted it to serve the President as a global news service, delivering daily bulletins. Truman would later write, “It [CIA] was not intended as a cloak and dagger outfit…it was intended merely as a center for keeping the President informed on was what going on in the world” (Weiner, 3).

When Kennedy took office he retained Allen Dulles as head of the CIA. That meant Kennedy also kept Dulles’ organization, philosophies, and his penchant for covert operations. Kennedy also kept alive a plan to invade Cuba that he inherited from the former President. Eisenhower had never given his approval for the launch of the invasion but instead left it as a contingency plan for the new president to consider. It is here then at this crossroad where this research tries to understand how President Eisenhower’s original concept for a long term guerrilla insurgency turned into President Kennedy’s small scale invasion. It is also here that a
divergent view is taken from conventional small group analysis or organizational theory. The research looks at the importance of President Kennedy’s decision-making as the final authority on the matter. It also looks for the use of Analogical reasoning in finding possible answers.

**Analogical Reasoning**

The use of history and Analogical reasoning in decision-making has been traditionally viewed with caution and skepticism by some political scientists. Analogical reasoning has been slow to materialize as a legitimate approach to understanding foreign policy, despite emerging evidence which point to its centrality within cognitive processes. Analogies have been documented as reference points in which to compare situations, draw parallels, generate policy preferences and stipulate options.

Analogies help provide policy makers with information concerning the expected results of alternative policy options. They help “introduce choice propensities into an actor’s decision making: they predispose the actor toward certain policy options and turn him away from others” (Khong, 22). Analogies are also drawn into foreign policy debates in terms of lessons learned or unlearned from history. Decision makers often turn to history for guidance, when faced with a novel foreign policy problem. Houghton (1996) posits that “humans always try and understand the world via analogical reasoning” (Houghton, 524).

Analogical reasoning is part of a cognitive approach to decision-making which differs significantly from other mainstream foreign policy approaches. For the purposes of this research, we will simplify this cognitive approach by going to its core: Analogical reasoning consists of using previous foreign policy decisions to help interpret new ones. Parallels are often drawn and
decisions made by putting a significant amount of faith in consulting past experience. This then helps set the stage and gives direction to this research. We want to look at how President Kennedy made the decision to invade Cuba despite the overwhelming odds against the operation succeeding.

The record indicates that President Kennedy was advised against the operation by some of his closest advisors and key political actors such as Arthur Schlesinger and William Fulbright. It further shows that President Kennedy had personal reservations about the operation, and that he preferred a much smaller type infiltration program along the lines of President Eisenhower’s original plan. Still, all things considered, he approved the invasion and let it run its course. Analogical reasoning may hold the keys to understanding how a decision of this magnitude can be made in light of the evidence that it would not work.

It becomes apparent that Analogical reasoning created a comparison between the successful operation in Guatemala (PBSUCCESS) and the proposed operation in Cuba that was too powerful to ignore. Analogical reasoning may also have played a part while President Kennedy interacted with key CIA officials for whom he held in high esteem. This research will scrutinize aspects of President Kennedy’s individual decision-making as he had the ultimate authority in this regard.

In chapter two we look at the conventional wisdom surrounding Groupthink, the Bureaucratic Politics m Model, and the Analogical reasoning approach. We discuss what impact past research has on our topic. In chapter three, we will discuss the historical background on covert operations from Presidents Eisenhower to Kennedy. We will also look at an overview of the Bay of Pigs to familiarize the reader with the basic outline of the battle and its outcome.
Chapter four will discuss possible research questions and explain this research’s methodology. In chapter five, six critical junctures are established during the decision-making process and what makes them so important to the outcome. Chapter six analyzes those six critical junctures one step further by comparing the three different approaches and examining how well Groupthink, the Bureaucratic Politics Model and Analogical reasoning help explain those main points. In chapter seven, we discuss our findings and make suggestions for future research.
CHAPTER TWO: THREE THEORIES

Literature Review

Before we discuss any theoretical approach, it is important to start with a brief discussion of the main descriptive narratives that give us a good accounting of the events. A narrative is important, because it not only discusses what happened but also helps sets the stage for why some type of theory exploration is necessary. The reason for this is the descriptive narrative usually tells us what happened but does not fully explain why it happened.

Tad Szulc was a significant *New York Times* investigative reporter with a high degree of credibility in the field. While visiting Miami in between assignments (after exclusively reporting on the 1959 coup in Venezuela) he stumbled on to some of the events that would lead to the Cuban invasion. His subsequent articles released only ten days before the invasion and then later on his book *The Cuban Invasion: The Chronicle of a Disaster*, written with fellow reporter Karl E. Meyer, did not sit well with the CIA. It appears that their reportage was too close to the actual events. It was Tad Szulc’s articles that President Kennedy was referring to when he commented that Castro did not need spies but just read our newspapers to find out what was going on with the invasion plans (Lewis, 2001). Why President Kennedy and the CIA were so upset could be characterized by this example as Szulc wrote about Miami prior to the invasion:

This is a city of open secrets and rampaging rumors for the legions of exiled Cubans who plot the downfall of Premier Fidel Castro and his regime. Men come and go quietly on their secret missions of sabotage and gun-running into Cuba, while others assemble at staging points here to be flown at night to military camps in Guatemala and Louisiana. (Lewis, 2001)
In that short paragraph Szulc indentifies several actual details of the invasion planning. Though by no means complete in his detail, Szulc & Meyer’s (1962) narrative was as close a description of the actual events as could possibly be presented at that time. The fact they got so much information correct sent ripples of concern through the intelligence community. Szulc & Meyer’s accounting of the incident created the impetus to start asking questions beyond what happened and began generating interest on why it happened.

Wyden (1979) was able to take advantage of some of the declassified documents which were not available to Szulc (and others) early on. It is here by including a scrutiny of these official government documents that Wyden’s work starts to take precedent as the generally accepted (conventional wisdom) descriptive account. In some ways, Szulc & Meyer’s (1962) narrative is all but lost as a primary version of the invasion after Wyden’s book was released. Wyden further strengthened his narrative by including interviews with Fidel Castro and other Cuban government officials which had never been interviewed before. Even though Wyden’s narrative was not complete or totally correct by today’s standards, his work still stands out as the primer account of the incident to date.

Jones (2008) has the latest entry in the descriptive narrative approach. His recent work builds on past narratives by basically compiling and describing all the important de-classified documentation that applies to date. One major part of his focus revolves around the assassination attempts sanctioned by the Kennedy Administration during the invasion planning. Though the assassination attempts are mentioned in Wyden’s work, the inclusion is not as detailed as in Jones’s. It is too early as to say if Jones’s work will replace Wyden’s, as easily as Wyden replaced Szulc’s. Like the others using the descriptive narrative approach, Jones describes the
event but offers no insights into the decision-making processes or into any applicable theory. It is inevitable that once something has been adequately described as having happened, the next logical step would be to research why and how did it happen. We must therefore yield and rightfully identify the descriptive narrative as a tool that gives us a direction for further research such as this.

Moving past the descriptive narrative approach, we find that research on the use of history and Analogical reasoning has only recently made inroads within the study of political science and foreign policy decision-making. Among political scientists, research into this approach of decision-making breaks down roughly into three general positions: those who feel Analogical reasoning is used in the decision-making process (and worth exploring with further research); those that feel Analogical reasoning is used only to learn from past mistakes (after the fact analysis); and those who feel it might be a small consideration as part of other decision-making theories, such as in Bureaucratic Politics or Rational Actor models.

Past research suggests that it is not a question of whether or not analogies are used but instead what degree of influence they exert. There is very little consensus on the topic. For example, and noteworthy to this research, the events of the Bay of Pigs has never been looked at in the light of the Analogical reasoning approach before. It is therefore important to understand some conventional theory first and how it compares with Analogical reasoning. In the past, Bureaucratic Politics, Groupthink, and the Rational Actor models have all been applied to the Bay of Pigs invasion to varying degrees of success and acceptance. They all share one thing in common and that is they do not fully explain the foreign policy decision-making processes or the casual mechanisms involved.
1. The Bureaucratic Politics Model

According to Clifford (1990), the Bureaucratic Politics Model began taking shape in the mid-1960s when members of the Harvard Faculty Study Group wrote scholarly papers on the topic. Clifford states:

The formal academic version of bureaucratic politics came a few years later with the publication of Graham T. Allison’s *Essence of Decision*. Building on works by Warner R. Schilling, Roger Hilsman, Richard Neustadt, and other political scientists who emphasized internal bargaining within the foreign policy process, and adding insights from organizational theorists such as James G. March and Herbert A. Simpson, Allison examined the Cuban missile crisis to refute the traditional assumption that foreign policy is produced by the purposeful acts of unified national governments. (Clifford, 161)

Clifford argued Allison explained that instead of resembling the behavior of a rational actor, the Kennedy administration’s:

Behavior during the crisis was best explained as the ‘outcomes’ of standard operating procedures followed by separate organizations (the navy’s blockade, the Central Intelligence Agency U-2 over-flights, and the air force’s scenarios for a surgical air strike) and as the result of compromise and competition among hawks and doves seeking to advance individual and organizational versions of the national interest. (Clifford, 161)

By the 1980s, Allison’s bureaucratic paradigm was being used throughout political science for international relations. The cornerstone of this paradigm suggests there are no single makers of foreign policy. Instead, policy flows from the different organizations and political actors as they try to influence decisions by advancing their own personal and organizational interests. “Because organizations rely on routines and plans derived from experience with
familiar problems, those standard routines usually form the basis for options furnished to the
president...final decisions are also ‘political resultants,’ the product of compromise and
bargaining among the various participants” (Clifford, 162).

Clifford reminds us that the Bureaucratic Politics Model emphasizes state-level analysis
and that it cannot fully answer all questions. “It is better at explaining the timing and mechanics
of particular episodes, illuminating proximate as opposed to deeper causes, and showing why
outcomes were not what was intended. The bureaucratic details of debacles like Pearl Harbor and
the Bay of Pigs invasion are thus better understood than long term dynamics of war and peace”
(Clifford, 164). He suggests that the bureaucratic perspective can enrich and complement other
approaches. “By focusing on internal political processes we become aware of the conflict within
government before arriving at the cooperative core values…” (Clifford, 168)

Allison (1969) started conceptualizing his models by analyzing the Cuban missile crisis.
He then introduced the Organizational Process Model (Model II) and the Bureaucratic Politics
Model (Model III). Model I is the Rational Policy (rational actor) model which he uses as a
baseline for comparing the other two models. At the time, the Rational Policy model was
represented by the widely cited explanation by the RAND Corporation. They concluded that “the
introduction of strategic missiles into Cuba was motivated chiefly by the Soviet leaders’ desire to
overcome…the existing large margin of U.S. strategic superiority” (Allison, 692). The Rational
Policy model then suggests that governments select the best action to maximize goals and
objectives. This implied there were a rational set and limited number of key decision makers
which Allison suggested was not true. He posited that his Model II and III came closer to
explaining decision-making during the crisis.
The Organizational Process Model (Model II) starts from the premise that “a government consists of a conglomerate of semi-feudal, loosely allied organizations, each with a substantial life of its own” (Allison, 698). Allison therefore suggested that decisions can be looked at as less of a deliberate choice by leaders, and more as outputs according to standard patterns of behavior. Few problems are handled solely by one organization, so multiple organizations act within their own sets of responsibilities which may or may not overlap other organizations. Coordination and cooperation then is viewed through this lens, and not necessarily through the lens of the desired outcome.

In this organizational process paradigm, the unit of analysis is policy as an organizational output. For example, during the Cuban missile crisis, “Deliberations of leaders in ExCom meetings produced broad outlines of alternatives. Details of these alternatives and blueprints for their implementation had to be specified by the organizations that would perform these tasks. These organizational outputs answered the question: What specifically could be done?” (Allison, 705) A rather simplified expression of this leads into framing. Each organization is left to frame the problem within its own organizational terms. This is brought out even more when one looks at the classic example of an exchange between Secretary of Defense McNamara and Admiral Anderson during the crisis, where the Admiral states: “Now, Mr. Secretary, if you and your deputy will go back to your office the Navy will run the blockade” (Allison, 707). The Admiral operated under U.S. Navy terms and missed the whole point (bigger picture) of the blockade’s intent and purpose. It was not so much a military action it was a political one.

In the Bureaucratic Politics Model (Model III), Allison outlined that state leaders do not act alone, but are “players in a central, competitive game. The name of the game is bureaucratic
politics: bargaining along regularized channels among players positioned hierarchically within the government” (Allison, 707). Taking this position, decisions are therefore made not as organizational outputs but as outputs from bargaining games. There is no single actor but many actors who have to look at many issues and problems at the same time. According to Allison, “there is no consistent set of strategic objectives but rather… [elite actors] making governmental decisions not by rational choice but the pulling and hauling that is politics” (Allison, 707).

Another way of incorporating the Bureaucratic Politics Model is by way of the dictum, ‘where you stand depends on where you sit.’ By looking at the model in this fashion, it “is able to account for viewpoints taken by the various participants” (Houghton, 1996, 181). *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, first published in 1971, is an elaboration of the original 1969 article. It was this book that firmly established the Bureaucratic Politics Model within political science.

In a follow-up journal article, Allison & Morton (1972), went on to further develop the concepts laid out earlier into an operational paradigm. They focused on the Bureaucratic Politics Model and described how an analyst or member of government could use this new paradigm efficiently. They did this by way of using historical examples and breaking them down via a series of questions based on their paradigm.

Vandenbrouke (1984) looked at the Bay of Pigs invasion through Allison’s eyes by using his three models to try and explain the debacle. He suggests that if the Rational Actor Model holds true, “the lack of other viable alternatives prompted the choice of the invasion, which appeared best in terms of rational cost-benefit analysis” (Vandenbrouke, 473). This is easily discarded because as Vandenbrouke points out (1) it was less than fully rational to assume that a
plan (PBSUCCESS) that had worked in Guatemala would met equal success in Cuba, (2) it was not rational that no matter how elaborate the deceit, to expect that the United States could deny its involvement, and (3) the president and his advisers did not carefully weigh competing alternatives (Vandenbrouke, 473).

Vandenbrouke also suggests that The Organizational Process Model explains the decision to invade better than rational choice. “Considerable evidence suggests that, encouraged by previous successes, the CIA sought a fresh occasion to prove its effectiveness and consolidate its position” (Vandenbrouke, 474). Vandenbrouke reminds us that bureaucracies have their own goals and promote their own interests. “As a result, bureaucracies tend to develop their own views, which they often translate into policy. This power stems in part from their control over information” (Vandenbrouke, 474). From the beginning, the CIA stressed secrecy. “Secrecy meant that within the CIA itself only a few operatives of the Directorate of Plans (covert operations) were cleared for the project. Hence many potential dissenters were eliminated, with incalculable consequences” (Vandenbrouke, 475).

Vandenbrouke points out that “by the time the CIA had opted for an invasion, the agency fit the organizational theory’s description of a typical sub-unit that, instructed to explore an option, becomes its own advocate for its adoption” (Vandenbrouke, 475). He further states that “in securing presidential approval for its plan, the CIA enjoyed a prized bureaucratic resource—control over information” (Vandenbrouke, 475). In controlling information, “the CIA also sold its plan by skillfully formulating the range of options. The agency bracketed the invasion between tow unacceptable alternatives—procrastinating or disbanding the brigade [invasion force]” (Vandenbrouke, 476).
Vandenbrouke further suggests that the Organizational Process Model fails to explain the entire record. He points out that “the CIA enjoyed a near monopoly of information only because the president willed it…moreover the fallacy of believing that the United States could disassociate itself from the invasion was glaring. Kennedy’s blindness to the fact cannot be laid simply to the quality of advice he received” (Vandenbrouke, 480). Vandenbrouke also pointed out there was another limitation of the model. It assumes that members have a single-mindedness to promote their organization’s shared goals and programs. Vandenbrouke states:

The chief architect of the invasion, Deputy Director for Plans Richard Bissell, was a relative newcomer to covert operations, having spent most of his time in the CIA developing the U-2s play plane and the first reconnaissance satellite…Bissell and his associates thus lacked some of the instincts of caution that characterized the covert branch’s better careerists, who had risen through repeated hazardous duty in the field. (Vandenbrouke, 480)

The author therefore suggests that a look at Allison’s last model is therefore in order.

The Government Politics Model holds that decisions are the result of a bargaining game between the players. Vandenbrouke suggest that “The decision had to be made now or never. Meanwhile, the new and inexperienced administration also faced crisis in Laos and the Congo. The context of the Bay of Pigs favored anything but calm decision-making” (Vandenbrouke, 481). Vandenbrouke suggests that “these players had different stakes, values, goals, and power resources that dictated different inputs into the decision. Dulles and Bissell were devoted to the ‘national interest,’ which they equated with the militant prosecution of the cold war” (Vandenbrouke, 481). The author points out that the timetable for execution and the amount of secrecy held negated bargaining. “Up to and even after the final ‘go,’ given a few hours before the scheduled landing, the plan was constantly changing to accommodate objections from
various quarters” (Vandenbrouke, 486). There was never any bargaining between agencies or organizations. The author also points out that “applying the model requires extensive information about the players that is not always available. Certain findings of the government politics analysis are therefore incomplete” (Vandenbrouke, 487). The author suggests that though Allison’s models help to explain the Bay of Pigs invasion better than the Rational Actor Model, they still fall short and are in need of further research.

Krasner (1972) suggested that “analyses have increasingly emphasized not rational calculations of the national interest or the political goals of national leaders but rather bureaucratic procedures and bureaucratic policies. Starting with Richard Neustadt’s *Presidential Power*, a judicious study of leadership published in 1960, this approach has come to portray the American President as trapped by permanent government more enemy than ally” (Krasner, 159). Krasner suggested that by the time Allison’s * Essence of Decision* was published [12 years after its main premise was first suggested] the Bureaucratic Politics Model was all but conventional wisdom. Krasner argues that:

this vision is misleading, dangerous, and compelling: misleading because it obscures the power of the President; dangerous because it undermines the assumptions of democratic politics by relieving high officials of responsibility; and compelling because it offers leaders an excuse for their failures and scholars an opportunity for innumerable reinterpretations and publications (Krasner, 160).

Krasner views the Rational Actor Model as being more in line with ethical assumptions of democratic politics. The state therefore, being viewed as a rational unified actor, produces outcomes from a rational decision-making process. It is clear Krasner favors the Rational Actor
Model and points out that what Allison spends his time describing is managerial skill.

“Administrative feasibility [and] not substance becomes the central concern” (Krasner, 1972).

Krasner also points out that bureaucratic analysis is not able to describe how policy is made. “Its axiomatic assumption is that politics is a game with preferences for players [as] given and independent. This is not true. The President chooses most of the important players and sets the rules. He selects the men who head the large bureaucracies” (Krasner, 166). Krasner suggests that in order for a bureau to further its interests, it must maintain the support of the President. Krasner makes it clear that the President is not as helpless or weak as Allison implies by vying against the Rational Actor Model. Krasner makes it clear that:

Objectives are ultimately a reflection of values, of beliefs concerning what man and society ought to be. The failure of the American Government to take decisive action in a number of critical areas reflects not so much the inertia of a large bureaucratic machine as a confusion over values which afflicts the society in general and its leaders in particular. (Krasner, 179)

Bendor and Hammond (1992) acknowledge that Allison’s *Essence of Decision* (1971) has had an enormous impact on the study and teaching of bureaucracy and foreign policy making. They suggest that “Allison’s work demonstrated that a more self-conscious theoretical approach to the study of bureaucracy was both feasible and desirable…Allison helped to place the study of bureaucracy’s influence on foreign policy on a more scientific foundation” (Bendor and Hammond, 301). They further suggest that Allison’s work is also useful because it shows students how to formulate and evaluate alternative explanations for political events. Though Allison’s three models came under fire, no criticisms “comprehensively examined the internal logic of all three models…it is precisely the logical structure for his work that is particularly beginning to show its age” (Bendor and Hammond, 301). The biggest criticism levied by the
authors is that Allison’s premise shows “an inevitable tension between attempting to explain a particular event (a task characteristic of historians) and attempting to construct models (a job more characteristic of social scientists)” (Bendor and Hammond, 318).

Bendor and Hammond suggest that a close examination of Allison’s models show they are much less rigorously formulated than is generally acknowledged. They also suggest that some of Allison’s case analysis is wrong, and in other cases the conclusions do not flow from his models. The authors point out they believe that the model’s foundations are wrong and incur five general concerns: (1) Allison does not cite enough literature to justify the models, (2) he set up the Rational Actor Model for failure, (3) the Bureaucratic Politics Model’s (Model III) key assumptions were not clear enough (4) neither the Organizational Process Model (Model II) or the Bureaucratic Politics Model’s (Model III) propositions were rigorously derived, and (5) if propositions are not rigorously derived from a model yet receive some evidential support, it is difficult to know what one should learn from the empirical corroboration (Bendor and Hammond, 319). The authors note that the models suffer over time because of progress made in the field. They also believe however that progress in the field does not detract from the work’s remarkable accomplishments.

2. Groupthink

Janis (1972) struck an early chord with his Groupthink hypothesis. He clearly states that although there may be one person ultimately responsible for a foreign policy decision, decisions are usually made in groups. Janis is quick to point out that “groups, like individuals, have shortcomings. Groups can bring out the worst as well as the best in man” (Janis, 3). Janis also
points out that the use of theory and research on group dynamics is intended to supplement, not replace, the standard approaches to the study of political decision-making. In fact, his work is often referred to as Allison’s fourth model.

Janis identifies the three conceptual frameworks described and applied by Graham T. Allison in his analysis of the Cuban missile crisis: (1) the Rational Actor Model, (2) the Organizational Process Model, and (3) the Government Politics Model. He goes on to explain that “in order to use the three conceptual models, analyst must take as the unit of analysis either the individual decision-maker or a large group such as the State Department [...] The group dynamics approach—which should be considered a fourth conceptual model—uses a different unit of analysis” (Janis, 1972). Janis brings light to the small group process which stems from a combination of, or an intermediate step between the other two. Janis’ group dynamics approach is based on the working assumption that “the members of policy-making groups, no matter how mindful they may be of their exalted national status and of their heavy responsibilities, are subjected to the same pressures widely observed in groups of ordinary citizens” (Janis, 8).

Janis uses the term Groupthink as a:

quick and easy way to refer to a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members’ striving for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action [...] Groupthink refers to a deterioration of mental efficiency, reality testing, and moral judgment that results for in-group pressures (Janis, 9).

In his study of four foreign policy fiascoes, Janis identified six major defects that he considered at least in part due to groupthink: (1) The group limited their alternative to a few without looking at the full range of choice; (2) the group fails to reconsider the first choice preferred by the
majority from the standpoint of non-obvious risks; (3) members neglect courses of action initially marked as unsatisfactory by the majority; (4) members make little or no attempt to gain information from experts who can supply solid estimates about alternative courses of action; (5) selective bias is shown in the way the group reacts to factual information from experts, the mass media, and outside critics; and (6) the members spend little time deliberating on the pitfalls of bureaucracy, politics, or unexpected accidents (Janis, 10).

Janis uses the Bay of Pigs invasion as his leading case. He ranks the Kennedy’s administration’s decision to invade Cuba as one of the worst fiascoes perpetrated by a responsible government. “The group that made the basic decision to approve the invasion plan included some of the most intelligent men ever to participate in the councils of government. Yet all the major assumptions supporting the plan were so completely wrong that the venture began to flounder at the outset and failed in its earliest stages” (Janis, 14). Janis’ basic premise for failure is that Kennedy and his group of advisors were very intelligent and capable men individually, but collectively, they failed as a group. The decision makers never really attacked their assumptions. Since their assumptions were wrong, their decisions were flawed. Because of in-group pressures and dynamics, a blind eye was cast to the pitfalls of the operation.

Smith (1985) agrees with Janis’ basic argument that “excessive esprit de corps and amiability restrict the critical faculties of small decision-making groups, thereby leading to foreign policy fiascos is both an appealing and a stimulating one” (Smith, 117). He argues that Janis’ work builds upon the work of social psychologists and argues that small group members, who are striving for unanimity and group cohesiveness, let that factor override their ability to evaluate alternative policy options. Smith takes a look at the Iranian hostage rescue mission
(April, 1980) in terms of having possible Groupthink elements. Smith states, “from a Groupthink perspective, we need to concentrate on two questions; first, to what extent did the decision-making group fail fully to evaluate the risks of the operation” [one of Janis’ first four symptoms] and second, “did the group tend towards unanimity and the exclusion of any deviants [one of Janis’ last four symptoms]” (Smith, 118). By 1985, there was a great deal of information that became available on the operation. The author felt that “those who took the decisions to undertake the rescue mission failed to evaluate the risks realistically, played down their own doubts as to its likely success, and excluded the leading critic of the mission from key meeting[s], thereafter downplaying its doubts” (Smith, 123). Smith therefore concludes that the operation did suffer from Groupthink. What is important from this conclusion is not so much the author’s assumptions but the fact he was able to still apply Janis’ hypothesis (13 years later) to present a logical argument.

Herek, et al., (1987) asks whether quality of process related to policy outcome. They suggest that “it is generally recognized by experts on decision-making that a ‘rational actor’ model is inadequate both as a descriptive and normative theory for improving the quality of policy making” (Herek, et al., 203). Their research suggests Janis’ vigilant problem-solving format which revolves around “rejecting a rational actor model however, does not necessarily preclude the possibility that the most effective policymakers engage in careful search for relevant information, critical appraisal of viable alternatives, and careful contingency planning, exercising caution to avoid mistakes in making important policy decisions” (Herek, et al., 204). This vigilant problem-solving format would later become the focus of another Janis book, *Crucial Decisions* (Free Press, February 1989). The premise is important to this literature review because
it seems to be an application of Groupthink but in reverse. This adaptation appears to help solve the outcomes of Groupthink.

Herek et al., outline seven symptoms of defective decision-making. They are: (1) gross omissions in surveying alternatives; (2) gross omissions in surveying objectives; (3) failure to examine major costs and risks of the preferred choice; (4) poor information search; (5) selective bias in processing information at hand; (6) failure to reconsider originally rejected alternatives; and (7) failure to work out detailed implementation, monitoring, and contingency planning (Herek, et al., 205). One easily recognizes the Groupthink-like elements laced throughout the new format. What is important here is that Groupthink is still a viable hypothesis even if it is being worked at from a different angle.

Whyte (1989) argues that though Groupthink is relevant, it is an incomplete explanation for the occurrence of decision fiascoes. He believes that “the critical question from an analytical point of view is whether or not any pattern can be recognized from decisions of this sort, or are these simply decisions that unfortunately went awry?” (Whyte, 40) He further states that, “many examples of decision fiascoes are characterized by the group’s inability to change a failing policy, but other examples such as the Watergate cover-up or the launch of the space shuttle Challenger were choices about a specific isolated event rather than about the fate of an entire course of action” (Whyte, 40-41). This suggests the possibility that risky decision-making might be an independent topic of study.

Whyte points out that the premise of Groupthink revolves around group concurrence which generally occurs in group decision-making and is not unique to groups that perform poorly. “The task after all, of a decision-making group is to produce consensus from the initial
preferences of its members. Consensus, moreover is typically obtained around preferences that are initially dominant within the group, although Groupthink sheds no light on what these preferences might be” (Whyte, 41). The author goes on to describe some of the current research on group dynamics and calls attention to the concept of group polarization.

“Group polarization implies that when individual members of a group are generally disposed toward risk before group discussion, it is reliable that the decision of the group will be even riskier than that of the average group member” (Whyte, 42). He also states that “Janis briefly acknowledged group polarization, but the phenomenon was not integrated into the theory of Groupthink because such integration is dependent on knowledge of the initial preferences of group members” (Whyte, 42). Whyte believes that though Groupthink is relevant, so is “the product of the way group members frame decisions and choose between alternatives. A theory of decision fiascoes, and a theory for choice in general, cannot be descriptively adequate and at the same time ignore the effects of framing decisions” (Whyte, 54).

As Hart (1991) notes “Janis’s work on Groupthink is one of the best-known attempts to illuminate and explain political decision-making processes using psychological concepts, theories, and perspectives” (Hart, 248). The inclusion of psychological analysis has brought the individual man back in as opposed to using organizational and political paradigms to keep him out. “It stresses the importance that individual capabilities and personal characteristics and propensities of individual actors can have on the course and outcomes of political decision-making” (Hart, 250). Hart suggests that the very hallmarks of the Groupthink left it open to two major criticisms: “historians are bound to criticize the focused and potentially superficial case accounts and interpretations, and experimentally inclined psychologists will point empirical
ambiguities and difficulties in pinpointing causality due to the post hoc nature of case study research” (Hart, 251).

Hart also suggests another key critique is found in the lack of evidence in experimental literature on group decision-making and task performance with regards to Janis’ key premise about group consensus. “Only a few analysts have produced articles or monographs applying, like Janis, Groupthink analysis to government and public policy-making” (Hart, 260). Though Hart does not discount Groupthink altogether, and is favorable to Groupthink’s contributions, he does suggest that further research is needed to see if Groupthink applies across the board in policy decision-making.

Kramer (1998) suggests that the Groupthink hypothesis remains an influential framework for understanding group decision-making. He does point out however that Janis did not have the advantage of new evidence which included “recently declassified documents, rich oral histories, and informative memoirs by key participants” (Kramer, 236). According to Kramer “this new evidence suggest that the Groupthink hypothesis overstates the influence of small group dynamics, while understating the role political considerations played in these decisions” (Kramer, 237). Kramer argues that recent evidence suggests that President Kennedy, rather than his advisory groups, was the principal decision-maker (Kramer, 240). President Kennedy ultimately chose to let the plan go forward even though aware of its drawbacks. However, as unattractive as his decision was, he simply believed “that more attractive alternatives were not available” (Kramer, 241).

“The new material suggests that Kennedy did not rely exclusively on a single group of advisers in making his decision about the Bay of Pigs operation. Instead he employed a broad
and complex—even somewhat idiosyncratic—advisory process when trying to decide what to do about Cuba” (Kramer, 243). Kennedy also had his own reservations and doubts about the plan. Kramer also reflects on another possibility and introduces a personal political angle. “As much as Kennedy entertained doubts about the plan, he also felt, however, that it was impossible to avoid proceeding with some version of the operation if he was to avert a potentially greater—perhaps even catastrophic—blow to his reputation and credibility as a leader” (Kramer, 245).

As with Kennedy, it appears close other advisors were intent on guarding their political capital as well. Insiders viewed their roles and advice as strategic. Not to the Cuban operation but to themselves. Chester Bowles expressed his reservations openly and blatantly and “as a consequence, Bowles had slipped in the President’s esteem” (Kramer, 250). This lesson was not lost on other advisors so they kept their true opinions close to their chest. This observation contradicts Janis presumptions that the newness of the group and tendency for consensus led to advisors keeping quiet. Therefore, because of the lack of alternate views, President Kennedy thought “Bissell consistently offered the keenest and most persuasive arguments regarding going forward with the proposed CIA operation” (Kramer, 251). Of course Bissell’s voice was persuasive; he was selling his program for action. Kramer therefore suggests that political considerations created the faulty decision-making environment and not group dynamics.

3. Analogical Reasoning

The Bay of Pigs invasion has not been analyzed in terms of Analogical reasoning to any great extent, but the use of history and past experience as a heuristic for foreign policy decision-making (in general) has. May (1973) spoke to understanding lessons of the past and placing
importance not only on Analogical reasoning, but in the proper use of history in making foreign policy decisions. This is a common theme found in with some foreign policy researchers who have identified that reasoning by analogy might be more significant than previously thought (Houghton, 2001; Khong, 1992; Vertzberger, 1986). May (1973) identifies three major theses in his book: (1) that foreign policy makers are often influenced by their beliefs about history, (2) that they do not use history correctly, and (3) they should look to history professionals to assist them. May looks at and discusses specific foreign policy decisions made during World War II, the Cold War, Korea, and Vietnam conflicts. He performs a qualitative analysis using the available historical record and by quoting key historical actors who made key decisions in each area. For example, he uses President Kennedy during the Bay of Pigs and the Cuban missile crisis.

May looks at how Kennedy learned quickly from the Bay of Pigs fiasco. “Kennedy publicly took the blame. Privately, he vowed in future to place less trust in advice and recommendations from the bureaucracy” (May, 89). As Kennedy dealt with his Laotian foreign policy decisions, he remembered that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had failed to warn him of what might happen at the Bay of Pigs. When pressed, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were “unwilling to give him any assurance of success unless authorized to deploy large ground forces and if necessary, use nuclear weapons” (May, 90). When May addresses the Cuban missile crisis, he finds the Kennedys reflecting not only on Pearl Harbor, but also of past European crises. According to Robert Kennedy, “we talked about the miscalculation of the Germans in 1939 and the still unfulfilled commitments and guarantees that the British had given to Poland” (May, xii). May goes on further to say that “although Kennedy was not equally imaginative when thinking about
Vietnam, he serves as an example of a statesman who could escape the confines of a single analogy or parallel” (May, xii). May feels that both Kennedy and Johnson’s decisions were based on faulty assumptions (framing) and would be judged by history to have been “misbegotten blunders” (May, 121).

May looked at how history and Analogical reasoning were used by four presidents (FDR, Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson). He suggested that foreign policy makers can make better decisions if they frame history more correctly when using analogies. He found that “historical reasoning entering into decisions…was at best superficial” (May, 116). Though his work was never meant to lead to a theory or model, it did open the door for further research. It is important to note that May was part of the original Harvard University group that helped develop the Bureaucratic Politics Model, along with Allison, in the 1960s.

Vertzberger (1986) looks at how decision-makers used historical analogies, metaphors and their comparisons. He suggested that the use of history by foreign policy decision-makers is a common phenomenon. Vertzberger defined functions for the use of history. He advised that history may serve four broad functional building blocks associated with the information processing and decision-making: (1) History may serve to define the situation (structure); (2) help create circumscribing roles (roles and status); (3) determine strategy (most effective range of policy); and (4) to justify strategy (convincing others) (Vertzberger, 225). He points out that “problems, real or imagined, are not detected and recognized only by observation or logical reasoning but frequently through inference from Analogical reasoning. Awareness of past problems focuses attention on current problems of a similar type” (Vertzberger, 228).
Vertzberger speaks to the process of comparing the past, present and future. He reminds us our understanding of history comes from at least two levels. There is a group level understanding regarding historical events which “is shared by a majority of the individuals within the same social group as part of the common national heritage” (Vertzberger, 231). There is also an individual level which “is stored in the individual’s memory in a particularistic form which is unique to him” (Vertzberger, 231). He suggests that under the right circumstances, there could be the appearance of Groupthink-like symptoms. Vertzberger believes that if certain preconditions exist where group members share the same historical associations, have a similar interpretation for those associations, and feel a need for consensus, Groupthink may develop. He does not suggest that Groupthink is a constant dynamic found in all small decision-making groups. He does however look at history as being a “common denominator for consensus” (Vertzberger, 232). Vertzberger suggests that:

History rarely provides exact analogies, yet historical analogies, metaphors, and extrapolations are functionally useful. They help in cognitive economization, provide illustrations and a sense of direction, structure argumentation, and help to amplify ideas. However, their main contribution to decision-making tasks lies in their power to stimulate thought by pointing to potentially relevant factors, variables and causes for the diagnosis and prognosis of current events, drawn from the same types and categories of occurrences which have taken place in the past. (Vertzberger, 243)

This implies that Analogical reasoning may be a common starting ground for policy decision-making.

Yuen Foong Khong (1992) follows May’s lead and looks at the foreign policy decisions made during Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and Vietnam. Khong feels that “learning from
history is said to occur when policymakers look to the past to help them deal with the present; the principal device used in this process is the historical analogy” (Khong, 6). He believes that May’s work, which he terms the analytical view, has found corroboration “in the works of Robert Jervis, Glenn Snyder, Pail Diesing, Yaacov Vertzberger, and Debra Larson” (Khong, 8). Khong points out that there are those who accept the finding that “policy makers often resort to history but are skeptical about the claim that statesmen use analogies for policy guidance or analysis” (Khong, 8). Khong points out that are other critics of historical analogy, found mainly with political scientists who, “doubt whether it is necessary to resort to cognitive structures like historical analogies to explain the choices of policy makers when explanations centering on the constraints imposed by the international system might suffice” (Khong, 9). Khong tries to take up the challenge of finding a causal link between analogies and decision outcomes by creating an analogical framework (AE).

Khong’s AE framework suggests that analogies are cognitive devices that help policymakers perform six diagnostic tasks central to political decision-making. Khong states that analogies:

help define the nature of the situation confronting the policymaker; (2) it helps assess the stakes involved; and (3) it provides prescriptions. Further, analogies help evaluate alternative options by (4) predicting their chances of success; (5) evaluating their moral rightness; and (6) by warning about dangers associated with the options (Khong, 10).

Khong argues that when he applies the AE framework to the analogies invoked by America’s Vietnam era decision-makers, he succeeds in accounting for the Vietnam decisions of 1965 at a level of precision not previously achieved by other explanations.
Khong tries to take May’s assumption that policy makers use historical analysis poorly one step further by trying to explain why they do. Khong’s explanation centers around how humans cope with large amounts of information and their reliance on knowledge structures to help them order, interpret, and simplify. “Matching each new instance with instances stored in memory is then a major way human beings comprehend their world” (Khong, 13).

Khong also addresses President Kennedy’s interest in counterinsurgency. Of specific value to this research are that President Kennedy’s models of counterinsurgency “were derived from the Malaya and the Philippines [counterinsurgency operations] analogies and how these past models may have affected U.S. strategy in Vietnam in the early 1960s” (Khong, 87). This is a very good example of how a policymaker might try and use Analogical reasoning to order, interpret and simplify the decision-making environment. In simple terms, it is much easier to move forward in a decision-making process from a familiar point of view then try to move forward from unfamiliar point of view.

Gleijeses (1995) suggested that “the disastrous operation was launched not simply because Kennedy was poorly served by his young staff and was the captive of his campaign rhetoric, nor simply because of the hubris of the CIA” (Gleijeses, 1). He points out that even though the CIA controlled crucial information that, “when Kennedy was first briefed, planning was rudimentary and fluid; it was under his watch that decisive choices were made” (Gleijeses, 2). Reviewing declassified documents reveals that the CIA sponsored coup in Guatemala (PBSUCCESS) became the model for the invasion of Cuba. “The similarities between the Guatemalan and the Cuban operations went well beyond the selection of the native leadership. From an institutional point of view as well, the parallels are striking” (Gleijeses, 7). Even though
Kennedy “fully sympathized with the aim of the operation and had no qualm about the right of the United States to overthrow Castro... he was not, however, persuaded by the CIA plan; he had reservations both about the chances of success and about its political costs” (Gleijeses, 26). According to the author, Kennedy was more in favor of infiltrating smaller teams than conducting an amphibious assault.

At some point, there was a shift in Kennedy’s reservations. It was apparent that “President Kennedy’s focused on the fig leaf [plausible denial to hide the US’s hand]” instead of military operational aspects (Gleijeses, 34). It could be suggested that by referring back to the Guatemalan experience, Analogical reasoning had more influence on the plan’s decision-making than previously thought. Gleijeses suggests that:

it is tempting to read an almost causal link between PBSUCCESS and the Cuban gambit. Indeed, many of the CIA players were the same in both operations, and victory in PBSUCCESS reinforced the ‘can do’ feeling, the sense of U.S. omnipotence in the region, the sense of historical inevitability; the CIA was to Castro as the CIA had been to Arbenz [subject of Guatemalan coup] (Gleijeses, 41).

Gleijeses further suggested that “in the words of Esterline [operation principle], ‘Allen Dulles, Bissell and so on were marked by the experience of World War II: the U.S. always wins! Then the Guatemalan thing stumbled to success. It reinforced the feeling that anything the U.S. did would succeed’” (Gleijeses, 41). Gleijeses concluded that the CIA and the White House were not speaking the same language. He suggested they had “tracks that diverged, assumptions shrouded in the veils of the convoluted language, [and] the half-expressed thoughts that characterized the principle of plausible denial. A new president was handicapped by his own
rhetoric during the presidential campaign and CIA operatives were led astray by their own passionate commitment” was the cause of the eventual failure (Gleijeses, 41)

Houghton (2001) suggests that “the use of Analogical reasoning in foreign and domestic policy-making has long been commented upon, although it has only recently been viewed as an explicitly psychological process” (Houghton, 32). Houghton points out that “one major finding in the growing literature of human problem solving is the fact that Analogical reasoning is a cognitive mechanism that tends to be used when the individual is confronted by novel or unusual circumstances” (Houghton, 24). A second central finding is that “analogizing involves what several authors have referred to as a ‘mapping’ process [...] the result of processes that map the conceptual structure of one set of ideas into another set of ideas” (Houghton, 25). A third finding suggests that “Analogical reasoning is a structural process [...] which is intimately connected to a larger body of theorizing in psychology usually referred to as schema theory” (Houghton, 26). Houghton also suggests:

These findings are arguably consistent with what one observes in everyday life. Individuals do not always use analogies, and whether they do or not appear to vary with the situation. What is being suggested here is that decision-makers ‘resort’ to the use of analogy when other (presumably more reliable) cognitive mechanisms-such as standard operating procedures or other decision rules-are unavailable (Houghton, 28).

Houghton states that Neustadtt and May (1986):

find that Analogical reasoning played a prominent role in decision-making with regard to Vietnam, the Cuban missile crisis, social security reform in 1983, Korea, the swine flu episode of 1976, the Mayaguez affair, President’ Carter’s first year in office, the Bay of Pigs fiasco, and a number of other instances (Houghton, 32).
Houghton further states that in other research, “Dwain Mefford finds that analogies played a prominent role in President Eisenhower’s decision to overthrow the Arbenz regime in Guatemala in 1954” (Houghton, 33).

**Literature Review Conclusions**

A general survey of conventional wisdom on foreign policy decision-making finds a significant amount of research on the Bureaucratic Politics, Groupthink, and Rational Actor models that dates back to the early 1960s. The use of Analogical reasoning in decision-making remains an interesting topic and a relatively new field of research in foreign policy decision-making. Case in point, the use of Analogical reasoning has never been used to try and explain the decision-making during the Bay of Pigs invasion.

Some of the more recent research suggests that when faced with unfamiliar settings, decision makers strive to go from the unfamiliar to the familiar when formulating a response. What has been done in the past is perhaps a more frequent starting point than previously considered. The research also suggests that Analogical reasoning is used to explain final decisions as well, again helping to understand and possibly sell the decision in terms of drawing a parallel point of understanding. Researchers like Houghton (2001) and Khong (1992) and have presented research that suggests that the use of Analogical reasoning in decision-making, especially with regard to foreign policy, may have more of an impact than previously thought and merits further study. Using Analogical reasoning to analyze the Bay of Pigs invasion may provide productive points in establishing theoretical frameworks to reevaluate and better understand foreign policy decision-making in general.
CHAPTER THREE: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Historical Background on Covert Operations from Eisenhower to Kennedy

In order to fully understand how the decision to invade Cuba in 1961 was developed, one must understand its historical backdrop. It is not enough to look at the discrete decision to invade by itself because in doing so it diminishes the importance of the decision to that of a simple task of choosing between two options: invasion or no invasion. What President Kennedy was presented with was more than a simple go or no-go scenario. There was a well established culture of covert operations from within the White House that was learned from conducting clandestine operations during World War II. This cloak and dagger culture then carried itself over into the post World War II era, and was further developed by President Eisenhower as a foreign policy tool during his presidency.

The richness of experience in covert operations Eisenhower gained during World War II was a direct result of using British Intelligence and his own American Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Ambrose (1981) stated that:

Dwight D. Eisenhower went into World War II knowing almost nothing about intelligence gathering, interpretation of information, security for operations, misleading the enemy about his intentions, the use of spies and double agents, or the possibilities of covert actions on a wide scale behind enemy lines. He came out of the war a highly sophisticated and effective user of all these techniques” (Ambrose, 153).

Eisenhower was very much a hands-on leader who participated directly in the decision-making process. “He was in constant contact with the heads of his staff sections, meeting with them
formally and informally, chatting, discussing, mulling over, and considering this or that item” (Ambrose, 155).

The Americans were sorely lacking in the field of intelligence at the beginning of the war so Eisenhower had to rely heavily on the British effort, which had already developed an extensive intelligence community. During the course of the war however, the Americans improved their own intelligence and covert capability via the OSS. This OSS influence would play heavily into Eisenhower’s future, as President of the United States. Covert operations became firmly entrenched as a significant foreign policy alternative during the Cold War.

It is somewhat overly simplistic but none the less correct to say that the CIA developed from the roots of the OSS. In fact, it was the OSS’s former director (William J. Donovan) who called for a postwar central intelligence organization. He hoped it would be made up of former OSS members that were already trained and had extensive field experience. Though the OSS was disbanded after the war, and it was never formally used to create any another peacetime organization, many of its members did find their way back into the American intelligence service. Rudgers (2000) pointed out that:

OSS Director Donovan, [was] an activist by nature…the OSS possessed the capacity for covert political, psychological, paramilitary and economic activities. Donovan’s disciples who had engaged in these activities were a group of able and articulate men in or near the corridors of power when the Cold War began who could argue that their former organization has demonstrated great expertise in ‘shadow warfare’ that had resulted in ‘a glorious record of covert operational triumph in World War II’. The presence of such a cadre would have potent influence as U.S. policy-makers addressed the increasingly unstable situation in postwar Europe (Rudgers, 250).
For example, according to Rudgers (2000), the victory of the Christian Democrats and their allies in the April 1948 Italian elections was, “following a major covert propaganda and political action campaign in which the CIA, according to various accounts, played a major role, seemed to confirm the value of covert action” (Rudgers, 256). It appeared that covert action was to be carried into the post World War II world and become a common practice.

Soon after the 1948 success, the CIA was involved in massive growth. “Between 1949 and 1952—abetted by the fall of China to the communists and the outbreak of the Korean War---the OPC [pre-CIA] grew from 302 to 2812 personnel (plus 3142 overseas contract employees), while its budget increased from $4.7 million to $82 million and its presence in overseas stations from 7 to 47” (Rudgers, 257). Rudgers advised that under reorganization, in January 1951 the legendary OSS spymaster Allen Dulles was made Deputy Director of Plans for the new agency. By 1953 Dulles was in charge of the entire agency and soon thereafter under Eisenhower “entered its golden age” (Rudgers, 259). Recall also that Eisenhower’s Secretary of State, John Dulles (1953-1959) was also a former OSS officer and the newly established director’s brother. Rudgers suggests that:

the new administration [Eisenhower] saw such actions [covert operations] as an effective way to combat the new ‘evil empire’ on a global scale without facing the threat of military confrontation and perhaps nuclear war. The evil empire of course consisted mainly of the Soviet Union and any communist efforts to expand. This view gave [Allen] Dulles, always a strong advocate of covert action, virtually cart blanche…” (Rudgers, 259).

Add an anticommunist hysteria, a string of early CIA successes including coups in Iran and Guatemala, along with the fact that many former OSS operatives filled key Eisenhower
administrative and bureaucratic positions, and you start have an understanding of the environment President Kennedy stepped into upon taking office.

As director of the CIA, Dulles pitched the original plans to deal with Fidel Castro to Eisenhower, who would in turn pass it on to Kennedy. Kennedy’s limited World War II background did not compare to that of Dulles (known as the OSS Spymaster) or Eisenhower (Supreme Allied Commander) being a Naval Lieutenant (junior grade) commanding a Patrol Torpedo Boat (infamous PT-109). It has been suggested that President Kennedy would have had to take their backgrounds into consideration when being presented with the plan. His lack of experience would cultivate an environment where he would easily differ to their (Dulles and Eisenhower’s) vast experience. The Dulles-Eisenhower covert success connection may have been a major contributing factor in Kennedy’s decision to go ahead with the invasion. This research suggests that by using Analogical reasoning to consider Dulles’, Eisenhower’s and the CIA’s prior success, specifically in Guatemala (PBSUCCESS) would certainly become a tempting factor when making decisions for dealing quickly with Castro.

The Bay of Pigs Invasion Overview

The Bay of Pigs Invasion had its origins in the latter part of the Eisenhower Administration. President Eisenhower decided that the decision to go forward with the Cuban project be finalized when Kennedy took office. The plan was a CIA controlled covert paramilitary operation from the beginning; the military was only allowed to play a supporting role.

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1 General narratives on the invasion can be found in Meyer and Szulc (1962), Johnson (1964) and Wyden (1979).
role. For example, General Graves Erskine, who headed a special unit that worked regularly with the CIA on covert operations, said of the Bay of Pigs operation, “Our job was primarily one of support. We were not shown the plans or the recommendations” (Gleijeses, 19). The final version of the plan had changed greatly from its humble beginnings of small-bands of guerillas infiltrating Cuba to that of a World War II styled amphibious-borne invasion, complete with pre-invasion bombing and an airborne infantry assault to secure key avenues of approach.

The invasion of Cuba, commonly referred to as the Bay of Pigs, started on April 15, 1961 with the bombing of selected Cuban military targets by a small Cuban exile air force made up of outdated A-26 medium bombers. This gave Castro two days to prepare for the actual invasion which would occur later. In the early hours of April 17th the main assault on the Bay of Pigs began. It was a classic World War II-type amphibious landing except that it was done at night. To put this decision in perspective, Eisenhower approved only one night time amphibious landing during World War II in Italy. In addition, two airborne assaults of light infantry (paratroopers) were made to secure main roads heading towards the landing areas. One unit was parachuted in the wrong location and never made it to any of the heavy fighting. The other unit would hold its ground as long as they could before overwhelming enemy numbers and lack of resupply caused them to fall back to the beaches.

Unfortunately, the Cuban militia was quick to react since they had been preparing for the invasion for over a year. Castro had ordered his American made T-33 trainer jets (recently converted to attack fighters), two British Sea Furies (single engine propeller), and two American B-26s medium bombers into the air to stop the invading forces. Since the initial Cuban exile bombings failed to neutralize Castro’s air force, the surviving planes made quick work of the
resupply ships. Just off the coast of Cuba were the Brigade’s command and control ship and another vessel carrying supplies for the assault force. Castro’s planes quickly sank the Brigade’s command vessel the Marsopa and the supply ship Houston. With no command and control ship, and no resupply capabilities, the logistics of the operation quickly broke down. The Brigade had to fight with what little they had on them going in, got to off-load when they landed, or took off dead militia soldiers.

Over the next 72 hours of fighting, the Brigade’s force of about 1500 men was pounded by the Castro’s tank, mortar, and artillery fire. By Wednesday the 19th, the assault force was pushed back to its original landing zone at Playa Giron. Requests for direct United States assistance from the Brigade leaders on the ground, along with CIA officials in charge of the operation, and U.S. military commanders in the field, were repeatedly denied by President Kennedy. Though the brigade fought valiantly, without the supplies and equipment, they were soon surrounded by Castro’s forces. The operation failed to reach its main objective of instilling an uprising and eventually toppling the Castro regime.

President Kennedy had made the decisions to go ahead with the invasion, insisted on critical last minute changes to the plan, denied direct U.S. military involvement, and ultimately took responsibility for his administration’s first major foreign policy disaster. The operation was considered to be a total fiasco, quickly became a political liability, and may have set the tone for future crisis during Kennedy’s term. For more details on the operation, there is an appendix containing a summary of the battle from the National Archive.
CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY

The Bay of Pigs invasion as a foreign policy case study has been looked at and mostly explained in terms of a descriptive narrative, as some type of group process, or in organizational theory terms. It has been referred to by some analysts as ‘a perfect failure’ and for the most part glossed over as a significant topic for further study. A few researchers have chosen to look at the Bay of Pigs invasion as an opportunity to study foreign policy decision-making by elite actors (Janis 1972; Jervis 1976; May 1973; Neustadt 1986), but their focus has been on analyzing the outcome rather than in the steps it took to get there. The macro-type research restricts the use of more refined analysis in looking for causal mechanisms, important junctures, and how they arrived at the very decision points they were analyzing. In other words, we believe that past analysis has acknowledged the forest without identifying the trees.

Policy makers have long recognized the importance of past experience and in using history as considerations in making policy decisions. When leaders face foreign policy crises, they often use historical references and Analogical reasoning to help frame the situation and thereby influence their decisions. In the case of the ill-fated invasion of Cuba the use of Analogical reasoning may have played a significant role. Past CIA covert successes, specifically the U.S. sponsored coup in Guatemala in 1954, may have created an environment for faulty foreign policy decision-making. Former members of the OSS filled the ranks of the CIA and some held key positions within the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations. These covert successes coupled with the men who made them still being in key leadership positions, helped create an analogy of success (if it worked before, it will work again) with regard to foreign policy decisions. These two basic factors may have led President Kennedy to put too much faith
in the CIA, its director (Dulles) which he held in high esteem, as well as in the plan’s architect (Bissell).

The Bay of Pigs Invasion represents an important footnote in the Cold War. It is considered by some as the starting point for the Cuban missile crisis, a consideration for staying out of Laos, and a factor in the planned draw down of forces in Vietnam prior to President Kennedy’s assassination. In the bigger picture, understanding why President Kennedy made his Cuban foreign policy decisions can lead to a more complete understanding of the factors that helped sustain the Cold War, to understand factors that prompted the Cuban missile crisis, and illuminate details about presidential decision-making processes as a whole.

Our research questions therefore speak to decision-making processes and the possible role of Analogical reasoning in President Kennedy’s foreign policy decision-making. Did early CIA successes, with their roots deeply embedded in the success of the OSS during World War II, play a key role in Kennedy’s decision to invade Cuba in 1961? Did the assurance of the past create a false hope for the future? How could a President decide a foreign policy which pitted a 1500-man invasion force, against an opposition which numbered in excess of 200,000, well armed military, police, and militia units? Was President Kennedy so influenced by the director of the CIA’s almost legendary status that Analogical reasoning became an overriding factor? This therefore is the focus of this research, a single case study with an eye to Analogical reasoning as a way to help explain the foreign policy decision-making of President Kennedy.
**Methods**

One of the primary goals of political scientists should be to place the study of politics correctly in time. As Douglas North has said, “I will be blunt: Without a deep understanding of time, you will be lousy political scientists, because time is the dimension in which ideas and institutions and beliefs evolve” (Pierson 1). Covariations in quantitative measurements are simply not enough.

We suggest that their very nature, covariations have limitations as a source of causal inference especially when we talk about a single historical event that we are trying to understand. “The problem derives from the fact that we cannot re-run history and change one variable in a perfect experiment that would allow us to observe the causal effect of that variable” (Bennett, George, 1). Therefore, even new and more sophisticated statistical methods will not likely be sufficient by themselves to create meaningful causal explanations. Explanation and prediction are obviously not the same thing. Since we are focusing on trying to garnish some explanation of the phenomena, we will turn to process-tracing as our method. We want to explore the temporal chain of events in the decision-making process by which the case conditions translate into case outcomes.

George & Bennett (2005) state that “in the past few decades process-tracing has achieved increasing recognition and widespread use by political scientists and political sociologists” (George & Bennett, 205). They state the process-tracing method attempts to identify an intervening process (causal chains and casual mechanisms) between independent variables and the outcome of the dependent variable. The authors suggest that “process-tracing is an indispensable tool for theory testing and theory development not only because it generates
numerous observations within a case, but because these observations must be linked in particular ways to constitute an explanation of the case” (George & Bennett, 206). The authors also state that “process-tracing provides a common middle ground for historians interested in historical explanation and political scientists and other social scientists who are sensitive to the complexities of historical events but are more interested in theorizing about categories for cases as well as explaining individual cases” (George & Bennett, 223).

We will be using a type of process-tracing that George & Bennett refer to as an analytic explanation. Analytic explanation “is a substantially different variety of process-tracing [which] converts a historical narrative into an analytical explanation couched in explicit theoretical forms” (George & Bennett, 210). In this case, our theoretical forms will take the shape of Analogical reasoning, which will be evaluated against the Groupthink hypothesis and the Bureaucratic Politics Model, for possible sources of explanation in the foreign policy decision-making by President Kennedy during the Bay of Pigs.

What we are looking for are any indications of a causal chain consisting of a set of conditions or decisions that set the decision-making process in a clear direction towards the final outcome. By breaking down the decision-making process into smaller steps, we can look for critical junctures and any other observable evidence. As Pierson (2004) explains, any analysis of a temporal process will require looking at elements of “path dependence, critical junctures, sequencing, duration, timing and unintended consequences” (Pierson, 7). We will be investigating the possibility for any causal mechanisms and their importance to the decision-making process.
In essence, we will be looking at the data as a forensics expert would be looking at criminal evidence. Searching the public record, written texts of key actors, declassified government documents, and documented verbal histories of the participants are examples of the information that will be scrutinized. Of special interest to our approach will be what mathematicians refer to as the Polya urn process. It is a process where:

Its characteristic qualities stem from the fact that an element of chance (or accident) is combined with a decision rule that links current possibilities to the outcomes of preceding (partly random) sequences. Polya urn processes exhibit positive feedback. Each step along a particular path produces consequences that increase the relative attractiveness of that path forth next round. As such affects begin to accumulate, they generate a powerful cycle of self-reinforcing activity (Pierson, 18).

The Polya urn process should be a significant point of departure for political scientists. In simplified language, the process draws attention to looking at early decisions which dictate direction and then become the starting point for future decisions. As the cycle continues, time, energy and money are put into decisions that get locked into a selected response or policy. This policy may not be as appealing as other alternatives farther down the line or even go as far as excluding other options altogether. The reason for this is that though another course of action may be a better solution, the simple truth is, there is a point where it may become too costly to turn back and start over.

Consider this simple yet effective illustration: a road project which is usually takes several years to plan and implement, finally gets started. However, the original conditions that prompted the project have changed. There is perhaps a better route to accommodate more people but to do so would be much more costly and time consuming. At that point the road is locked
into a policy which may or may not serve its original purpose well. The road is still built and the cycle starts again as new needs are identified and worked on for future building projects. This type of situation creates its own path dependence.

Path dependence refers to dynamic processes involving positive feedback, which generates multiple possible outcomes depending on the particular sequence in which events unfold (Pierson, 20). The crucial feature of the process is that path dependence is considered a positive feedback and therefore self-reinforcing. Given this feature, each step in particular direction makes it more difficult to reverse course (Pierson, 21). As political actors focus on alternatives, they search for increasing returns [or the possibilities of such returns] and they tend to focus on a single alternative, and continue down that path once initial steps are taken in that direction (Pierson, 24).

We will evaluate the evidence and identify six critical junctures that speak to specific causal mechanisms. Out of the six critical junctures that were explored, Analogical reasoning took the lead in helping to explain three junctures exclusively (CJ-2, CJ-5, CJ-6). Neither Groupthink nor the Bureaucratic Politics Model could explain any of the critical junctures independently. And finally, Analogical reasoning along with the Bureaucratic Politics Model helped in explaining three (CJ-1, CJ-3, CJ-4). In these junctures, the Bureaucratic Politics Model acted in concert with Analogical reasoning to the point of becoming difficult to separate the two.
CHAPTER FIVE: CRITICAL JUNCTURES

Establishing Critical Junctures (CJ)

In addition to the general research questions that guided our research, a set of specific questions were, or will be answered critically in this chapter in the context of the available evidence. This list enables us to narrow our focus to critical junctures which led to the development of the foreign policy against Castro. Analyzing these critical junctures and how the decision-making process led to each point in the temporal sequence is instrumental to an overall understanding of President Kennedy’s decision to invade Cuba. What follows are the six critical junctures that we are going to analyze:

   CJ-1: How did the development of the CIA affect the decision-making process?

   CJ-2: At what point did Castro become undesirable and why?

   CJ-3: What were the first decisions on dealing with Cuba and how were they arrived at?

   CJ-4: How did the first plan change and why?

   CJ-5: How was the final plan formulated and why?

   CJ-6: What happened that led to the final outcome and why?

   In answering these questions, we found that there were critical pathways that once embarked upon, were difficult to turn back from in the eyes of the key actors. In light of all the available evidence that showed the invasion should have been cancelled, the decision was made to go ahead, anyway. In actuality, no other policy choice or alternative course of action was ever given any serious consideration. This in and of itself is indicative of some strong reasoning powerful enough to derail any logic presented against the operation.
CJ-1: How did the development of the CIA affect the decision-making process?

When the OSS was disbanded after World War II, the United States was virtually left without any viable intelligence capability. A new organization under President Truman was created to help fill the intelligence gathering void. In 1947 the new organization went through its first major reorganization that would define the emerging CIA. “Proposals to reorganize the intelligence Community emerged in the period immediately following the passage of the National Security Act of 1947 that established the position of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The goals underlying such proposals have reflected trends in American foreign policy and the international environment as well as domestic concerns about government accountability” (Best, ii). These trends included the fear of a post World War II communist world domination. It is evident from the documentation that there became a shift from agency efficiency (Truman, intelligence gathering) to more aggressive action (Eisenhower, covert operations). Weiner (2007) advised that The National Security Act said nothing about secret operations overseas. “It instructed the CIA to correlate, evaluate, and disseminate intelligence—and to perform other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security” Those 11 words are what the CIA used (and still uses) to qualify the necessity and validity of their actions (Weiner, 25).

“In the Cold War context of the 1950s, a number of recommendations sought aggressively to enhance U.S. covert action and counterintelligence capabilities. The chairman of one committee [Doolittle Committee, 1954]…Army General James H. Doolittle, argued that sacrificing America’s sense of ‘fair play’ was wholly justified in the struggle to prevent Soviet world domination” (Best, ii). General Doolittle’s report consisted of 69 pages (declassified in
1976) and contained 42 recommendations. Best (2004) pointed out that this influential report began by summarizing contemporary American Cold War attitudes following the Korean War that helped set a new CIA criteria:

> It is now clear that we are facing an implacable enemy whose avowed objective is world domination by whatever means and at whatever cost. There are no rules in such a game…If the United States is to survive long-standing American concepts of ‘fair play’ must be reconsidered. We must learn to subvert, sabotage, and destroy our enemies by more clever, more sophisticated and more effective methods than those used against us. It may become necessary that the American people be made acquainted with, understand and support this fundamentally repugnant philosophy. (Best, CRS-10)

We believe this to be a critical juncture because it helped set the tone for covert operations by rationalizing and justifying it as a foreign policy tool from that point forward. Covert operations had been used since the end of World War II, but it was at this point in history that it became a legitimate and recognized form of political action. Prados (2006) supports the idea that the Doolittle report made a solid argument for covert operations (the secret war). The report’s second paragraph is also telling:

> As long as it remains national policy, another important requirement is an aggressive covert psychological, political and paramilitary organization more effective, more unique and if necessary, more ruthless than that employed by the enemy. No one should be permitted to stand in the way of the prompt, efficient and secure accomplishment of the mission. (Prados, 149)

No one should be permitted to stand in the way may prove to being an insightful cornerstone, in understanding how the CIA would operate from that point forward as well.
Under Allen Dulles as its director (appointed in 1953), the CIA was already well ahead of the report recommendations as the CIA had already conducted a host of significant covert operations. With regards to this case study, the most important covert operation is PBSUCCESS, which was a CIA backed coup that toppled the Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz Guzman in 1954. By this point, Allen Dulles (as its principal architect) was firmly entrenched and well-respected. He was already famous for his World War II exploits. He used his former OSS background and connections to his advantage. To help run operation PBSUCCESS, he brought in Tracy Barnes, who was a fellow OSS operative that had worked for him during World War II. “Dulles told others that Tracy Barnes was the bravest fellow he knew, and Barnes had a Silver Star and two French Croix de Guerres (one with Palm, the other with Star) to prove it” (Prados, 108). We believe it was this type of hero worship and connection to OSS that played more into the Bay of Pigs decision-making than previously thought. PBSUCCESS was to play an even more important role. It would serve as the model for the Bay of Pigs invasion. One researcher went as far as calling the Cuban operation a “carbon copy” of Guatemala (Hincle & Turner, 40).

It is important to note that in the early days of the CIA, there were two schools of thought. One was to focus on the gathering intelligence through espionage. The other believed in covert operations and a more active role. The difference can be summed up nicely with a quote from Weiner; covert operations consist of “secret warfare and taking the battle to the enemy. Espionage seeks to know the world…Covert action seeks to change the world” (Weiner, 11). Initial covert operations were run by Frank Wisner, another former OSS officer. This is significant because after serving ten years at his post, he would be replaced by Bissell [whom he had mentored] (Weiner, 35). It was the team of Bissell and Dulles that got the Bay of Pigs plan
pushed through. According to Weiner, in the eight years as director, Dulles “had never addressed the problem of a surprise attack by the Soviets [a tasking by Eisenhower]. He had never coordinated military intelligence and civilian analysis. He had never created the capability to provide warning in a crisis. He had spent eight years mounting covert operations instead of mastering American intelligence” (Weiner, 167). It was out of this pro-covert action environment, that the Bay of Pigs operation was born.

CJ-2: At what point did Castro become undesirable and why?

Pfeiffer (1979), a CIA historian who wrote *The Official History of the Bay of Pigs*, says Castro had been an interest of the agency since 1948. The question of whether or not Castro was a communist was central to the CIA’s framing of any policy towards revolutionary Cuba. Batista’s intelligence service was always trying to paint Castro as a communist even though the evidence never supported that allegation. This discussion went back and forth with the state department well into 1957. Charges that Castro was a Communist could not be substantiated, “but [the] State [department] did note that in his student days, he ‘was involved in gangster-type’ activities” (Pfeiffer, 3). “By early 1958, the Agency had become sufficiently concerned about the pro-Communist orientation of Castro’s government” (Pfeiffer, 6). Pfeiffer stated that it was not until the last week in December, 1958, that President Eisenhower became actively involved in discussions and decisions affecting U.S. policy towards Cuba. By the end of 1958, Eisenhower remembers Dulles informing him, “Communists and other extreme radicals appear to have penetrated the Castro movement. If Castro takes over, they will probably participate in
the government. When I heard this estimate, I was provoked that such a conclusion had not been given earlier” (Pfeiffer, 17).

The postmortem Taylor Commission reported that Colonel J.C. King (head of the CIA’s Western Hemisphere Division)) stated that:

in late 1958 [the] CIA made two attempts (each approved by the Department of State) to block Castro’s ascension to power…Colonel King commented that there were reports as early as June or July 1958 during the period that sailors from Guantanamo were held by Castro forces which indicated beyond a reasonable doubt that the United States was up against an individual who could not be expected to be acceptable to U.S. government interests. (FRUS, 169)

Another key actor was Jack Esterline who had also worked on PBSUCCESS. The record shows that:

Esterline was station chief in Venezuela when he first laid eyes on Fidel Castor in early 1959. He had watched the young commandante touring Caracas, fresh from his New Year’s Day triumph over the dictator Fulgencio Batista, and he had heard the crowds cheering Castro as a conqueror.

‘I saw-hell anybody with eyes could see-that a new and powerful force was at work in the hemisphere…it had to be dealt with. (Weiner, 156)

By December 1959, Colonel King recommended that “thorough consideration be given to the elimination of Fidel Castro,” because it “would greatly accelerate the fall of the present government” (Archive, T.N.S., 9). On December 11, 1959, Colonel King wrote a memorandum to Dulles and “contended that there now existed in Cuba a far left dictatorship, which if permitted to stand, would encourage similar actions against American holdings in other Latin American Countries.” King had several recommended actions that included “thorough consideration be given to the elimination of Fidel Castro” (Operations, 92). Eisenhower probably
took notice that “by December 1959 there were a hundred thousand Cuban émigrés in the United States alone” (Prados, 206).

Castro also nationalized United States property, “beginning with the sugar corporations and cattle ranches and expanding to oil refineries, utilities, mines, railroads, and banks. And when it was all over, everything—absolutely everything—previously owned by U.S. citizens, all $1.5 billion of it” was taken (Perez, 231). Perez (2002) suggests that:

Fidel Castro appeared to have lent himself to Soviet designs and allowed the use of Cuba as a base from which to threaten U.S. security produced deep disquiet in Washington.

‘Cuba has been handed over to the Soviet Union as an instrument with which to undermine our position in Latin America and the world,’ President Eisenhower feared.” (Perez, 233)

Combine anti-American domestic policies with Castro expanding ties with the Soviet Union and you get what the CIA referred to as the Cuban problem. Esterline became the Cuba task force chief in January of 1960. The task force would become a secret cell inside the CIA. He said Bissell “never stopped to analyze what would happen if the coup against Castro succeeded or failed…their first reaction was, God we’ve got a possible Communist here; we had better get rid of him just the way we got Arbenz” out in Guatemala (Weiner, 156-7).

Whether Castro was a communist or not, a critical path was created when he was labeled a Communist and subsequently interpreted to be a threat to the United States. The Cold War and the rise of pro-communist governments made having one 90 miles away from the United States unacceptable. There was never any significant thought given to developing relations with Castro; it was just the opposite. Policy-makers did not turn from this path even in the wake of the Bay of Pigs fiasco. The Kennedy administration continued to try and oust him from power. Projects like Operation Mongoose continued up until President Kennedy’s assassination (Operations, 135).
The propensity for covert operations and the disdain for communism gave the CIA an unquestionable direction. It would seem that the CIA thought every communist regime a nail (the problem) and covert operations would be the CIA’s hammer (the solution).

**CJ-3: What were the first decisions on dealing with Cuba and how were they arrived at?**

According to declassified documents, in December of 1959, the CIA decided that it needed to activate two programs against Cuba:

1. The selection, recruitment and careful evaluation of approximately thirty-five (35) Cubans, preferably with military experience, for an intensive training program which would qualify them to become instructors in various military skills.
2. The instructor cadre would in turn, in some third country in Latin America, conduct clandestinely a training of additional Cuban recruits who would be organized into small teams similar to the U.S. Special Forces concept, and infiltrated with communicators, into areas of Cuba. (FRUS, 169).

This concept was expanded and presented to President Eisenhower, who approved “A Program of Covert Action Against the Castro Regime” on March 17, 1960. The original program had four major courses of action:

1. Creation of political opposition. This took four to five months and during that period it was found less and less possible to rely on Cuban politicians.
2. Mass communications to the Cuban people.
3. Covert intelligence and action originating inside Cuba.
4. The building of an adequate paramilitary force outside Cuba which called for cadres of leaders. (FRUS, 169).
This was what the same basic formula the CIA had followed in the past. It is interesting to note, that this document is “the only U.S. Government policy paper issued throughout the life of the project” (Kirkpatrick, 4). Vandenbrouke (1984) suggested that an organization facing a new situation typically “reduces the unfamiliar issue to a familiar problem and solution” (Vandenbrouke, 474). He goes on to say:

Here the Guatemalan episode, in which the CIA toppled a leftist’s dictator with a handful of exiles and a skillful campaign of psychological intimidation, supplied the familiar precedent. The operation was a long shot, but it covered the CIA with glory and became a manner of agency program for disposing of troublesome Third World dictators. A similar operation was attempted against Indonesia’s Achmed Sukarno in 1958. Although the venture failed, the CIA again turned to the Guatemalan model in dealing with Castro. CIA officials repeatedly referred to the precedent while preparing for the Bay of Pigs. (Vandenbrouke, 474)

Jacob D. Esterline was named as a principal under J.C. King and would help run the Cuban project. Esterline was involved in PBSUCCESS and had extensive guerilla warfare experience in World War II with the OSS. “King stated clearly that Castro had a ’60 to 70 percent’ popular approval rating. For this reason, Esterline’s original plan for the Bay of Pigs called for infiltrating small, highly trained cadres into Cuba” (Kurnbluh, 7). Dulles testified in the Taylor Committee’s postmortem: “General Taylor asked if the plan was based on capabilities or on what we actually needed, to which Mr. Dulles replied in the negative. Mr. Bissell said we thought we could build up guerrilla resistance through teams being infiltrated to groups inside, which would lead to the formation of a large enough group to facilitate air drops of arms and other materiel” (FRUS, 169). The idea for the operation was simple and similar to OSS-styled missions in World War II. This style of operation had been going on since the CIA’s inception. Eisenhower held
that no Americans could be used in actual combat and that the American hand had to be hidden. As the planning moved forward however, “the myth of plausible denial [term coined by Eisenhower] overruled common sense” (Pfeiffer, 44).

CJ-4: How did the first plan change and why?

Pfeiffer stated that “by early June 1960, the program for paramilitary training of Cuban exiles was jumped from some 60 to 500 or more trainees, even though the actual training of the initial instructor cadre…had not yet begun” (Pfeiffer, 105). Pfeiffer suggests that “the call for increase in the numbers of PM [paramilitary] trainees was related to the continued importation of Soviet weapons and technicians and the increasing strength of the Communist Party in Cuba” (Pfieffer, 106). Jones (2008) pointed out that by the summer of 1960 the original “measures did not seem sufficient, and pressure soon grew to change the small-scale guerrilla focus to a military contingent large enough to attack Cuba” (Jones, 20). He explained that the CIA Task Force “expressed little confidence in the guerillas’ capacity to throw out Castro and suggested that a Cuban strike force of up to three hundred infantryman hit Cuba in coordination with the paramilitary contingent” (Jones, 20). It is apparent that as planners felt Castro was getting stronger by the day, the possibility of a guerrilla campaign was getting weaker. Kornbluh (1998) suggested that:

By October 1960, however, Richard Bissell, the CIA’s Deputy Director of Plans [second only Dulles] had abandoned this plan [the original concept]. He replaced it with an amphibious landing of a brigade of exiles in Cuba, which he expected, would set off a chain reaction of mass defections and support for the counterrevolution, bringing Castro down. This misreading of
Cuba’s political situation was the first of many willful mistakes that led to the Bay of Pigs disaster. (Kornbluh, 7)

It appears that Bissell was highly believable and credible even without the extensive covert background that others like Dulles had. Kornbluh advised that Author Schlesinger noted, “All of us-Kennedy and Bundy and the rest-were hypnotized by Dick Bissell to some degree, and assumed that he knew what he was doing” (Kornbluh, 5). After all, Bissell was behind the creation of the U-2 spy plane in record time. PBSUCCESS also comes into play again as “Bissell and other Eisenhower officials appeared to believe that Castro’s regime was similarly incompetent, [as in Guatemala] and would similarly collapse under the psychological stress of the invasion. Guatemala, Bissell writes in his rebuttal to the [CIA] Inspector General’s report on the Bay of Pigs, ‘was an analogy and a precedent’ for the Bay of Pigs” (Kornbluh, 8).

There was also a second track not mentioned openly in the original plan. Bissell was hedging his bets by ordering the assassination of Castro to coincide with the invasion. The assassination was to be conducted by the American Mafia\(^2\). “Assassination was intended to reinforce the [plan]…there was thought that Castro would be dead before the landing. In

Bissell’s memoirs he admits ‘as I moved forward with the plans for the brigade, I hoped the Mafia would achieve success” (Kornbluh, 9).

CJ-5: How was the final plan formulated and why?

Bissell noted “the real reason for the shift from infiltration to amphibious invasion is that by October we had made a major effort at infiltration and resupply, and those efforts had been unsuccessful. My conviction was that we simply would not be able to organize a secure movement in Cuba” (Gleijeses, 11). The president was made aware of the new plan in November. “No one, including Eisenhower, objected to the CIA’s new concept…acting Secretary Dillon had only one reservation: ‘the State concern was the operation was no longer a secret but is known all over Latin America” (Gleijeses, 12). Gleijeses (1995) reminds us that “Eisenhower had heartily approved the change in concept from guerrilla infiltration to amphibious invasion3. But by the time the CIA provided its first detailed plan of the new concept, he was gone” (Gleijeses, 13).

Using forward thinking, “the president [Eisenhower] authorized military preparations in the event of either a Cuban attack on Guantanamo or a threat to American citizens on the island” (Jones, 40). In January, a Department of Defense study “concluded that the only actions guarantying success were either a unilateral U.S. assault or a combined U.S. and Cuban invasion

3 It is interesting to note that the most experienced person in amphibious landings on the Cuba Project was the CIA chief of the Directorate for Intelligence, Robert Amory, Jr., who was kept out of the loop under the need to know basis. “In World War II Amory had been a landing-craft operator, finishing the war as a colonel in charge of a whole regiment of the vessels, a veteran of twenty-six assault landings in the South pacific, many of about the same dimension as the planned CIA operation. [LT. Colonel] Jack Hawkins, the actual invasion boss, had participated in exactly two, the massive Iwo Jima endeavor, where the United States had held all the cards and put ashore many thousands of troops and the large Inchon operation in Korea” (Prados, 242).
force…General Gray warned in mid-January that the 750 men in training could not stand up to Castro’s forces” (Jones, 43). The decision was made by Eisenhower to allow the change in planning and give the new Kennedy administration the option of whether or not to cancel or continue to escalate. Ambrose (1990) made that point clear when he quoted Eisenhower as saying, “the CIA was only creating an asset, not committing the United States to an invasion of Cuba or anything like that. Whether the refugees would be used or not depended entirely on political developments” (Ambrose, 534).

The real problem however revolved around the deception created by Dulles. Prior to meeting with Eisenhower and then president-elect Kennedy in November, Dulles already had been informed that the operation would not succeed.

Bissell had received a conclusive report from Esterline on the Cuban operation. ‘Our original concept is now seen to be unachievable in the face of the controls Castro has instituted.’ Esterline said, ‘There will not be the internal unrest earlier believed possible, nor will the defenses permit the type of strike first planned. Our second concept [amphibious assault] is now also seen as unachievable, except as a joint Agency/DOD action” (Weiner, 165).

In other words, for the plan to work, the United States would have to send in troops⁴. It was believed by Dulles and Bissell that like Eisenhower, when the chips were down, the President

⁴ There is evidence to support the suggestion that the Bay of Pigs was set up to fail from the beginning in order to force President Kennedy to act and get the US military involved. That however is not in the scope of this paper but does present a whole other dimension to decision-making for other scholars to explore. Viewed in this light, the Bay of Pigs starts sounding familiar with regards to future US foreign policy, specifically the invasion of Iraq.
would send it American troops. Using that type of Analogical reasoning, Dulles and Bissell had no choice but to think the plan would succeed and did their best to make sure it went forward.

**CJ-6: What happened that led to the final outcome and why?**

The final recommendation was presented to President Kennedy on March 11, 1961. According to the Taylor Committee Report:

> After full discussion of this plan the President indicated that he was willing to go ahead with the over-all project, but that he could not indorse a plan so ‘spectacular’ as TRINIDAD [first proposed landing site]. He directed that the CIA planners come up with other alternative methods of employing the Cuban force. An acceptable plan should provide for a ‘quiet’ landing, preferably at night, without having the appearance of a World War II type amphibious assault. The State Department requested that any beachhead seized should include an airfield capable of supporting B-26 operations, to which any tactical air operations could be attributed” (Taylor, 10).

The CIA went to work and in a period of four days, changed a year’s worth of planning to rework the operation in accordance with President Kennedy’s new requirements. This is where TRINIDAD turned into ZAPATA and the landing changed to the Bay of Pigs. Of the alternatives given to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the CIA, the ZAPATA plan was given the most likely chance to succeed. It is important to note that all the alternatives that were presented to Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy came from and were controlled by the CIA. The Joint Chiefs of Staff took a secondary role even when considering military options. It was a CIA controlled mission through to deployment. After deployment, however it became a White House operation.
President Kennedy was briefed on the new changes on March 15. “After full discussion, the President again withheld approval of the plan and directed certain modifications to be considered. The CIA returned the following day, March 16, and presented a modified plan for landing at Zapata” (Taylor, 12). Kennedy authorized proceeding with the plan but did not give it his formal approval to go ahead. Kennedy “reserved the right to call off the plan even up to 24 prior to the landing” (Taylor, 13). After giving the plan its final approval one day before the actual landings were to take place, General Taylor notes:

At about mid-day on D-1, 16 April, the President formally approved the landing plan and the word was passed to all commanders and officials involved in the operation. The frame of mind at that moment of the senior officials responsible for the approval of this operation seems to have been about as follows. It offered what appeared to be a last chance to overthrow Castro by Cubans before the weapons and technicians acquired from Communists and repressive internal measures would make the task too hard without overt U.S. intervention. It was recognized as marginal and risky, but the Cuban Brigade, if not used quickly, would become a political liability, whereas used in a landing it might achieve important success before Castro became too strong.

(Taylor, 15)

The actual tactics used and debate of the infamous cancellation of the air strikes which contributed to the failure of the operation is not part of this research except to say that their cancellation was decided by President Kennedy, creating a change to plans he had already approved. It is further important to note that this decision was made at a critical time that was already hinging on success or failure.

The CIA Inspector General’s Report shows “Late on 16 April, the eve of D-Day, the air strikes designed to knock out the rest of Castro’s air force on the following morning were called
off. The message reached the field too late to halt the landing operation, as the decision to cancel the air strike was made after the landing force was committed” (Kirkpatrick, 28). It is apparent throughout the three main governmental reports on the subject of the invasion (CIA internal IG Report, Bissell’s response to the IG Report, and the Taylor Committee) that political reasons and the deniability for United States involvement overruled any military considerations. Hinkle & Tuner (1992) said it best when they commented that “…such denials became more important than success” (Hinkle & Turner, 7).
CHAPTER SIX: DISCUSSION

How Well Does Analogical Reasoning Explain the Critical Junctions?

Analogical reasoning at its core compels the decision-maker to go back to an earlier time (situation, event, or circumstance) and look for guidance in the form of finding similarities which will hopefully create a starting point. Once the analogy is created, the decision-making process is framed in that light. Verztberger’s suggestion that that “history may serve to define the situation (structure), circumscribing roles (roles and status), determining strategy (most effective range of policy), and justifying strategy (convincing others)” (Vertzberger, 225), aptly applies to the development of the foreign policy toward Castro and Cuba. Using the evidence found in the six critical junctures we now take a second look and see how these junctures are best explained within the frameworks we have provided.

CJ-1: How did the development of the CIA affect the decision-making process?

The evidence shows that the CIA developed along two schools of thought; intelligence gathering and covert operations. The record also shows that covert operations were the policy choice of not only the CIA but of the two Presidents involved with the Bay of Pigs as well. Whether successful or not, covert operations continued to be the preferred option. There were a string of documented CIA failures that somehow were never highlighted to balance any equations. There is an element of Analogical reasoning here. The OSS was successful in World War II and when the newly formed CIA looked for guidance, it went back to its roots, using Analogical reasoning between past and future operations. Key players like Dulles, King, Esterline, and Barnes, all came from OSS backgrounds and would be key participants during the
Bay of Pigs. Bissell, who did not have an OSS background but was mentored by one that did. He was also a driving force behind both PBSUCCESS and the Bay of Pigs operations. It would appear that Analogical reasoning (historical success) may have played a significant role in the development of the CIA.

In looking towards Groupthink as a possible source of explanation, it would appear that it did not play any role in the development of the CIA. Groupthink involves dynamic small group processes in decision-making. The CIA leadership developed into its own decision-making body and once covert operations was in place as a policy preference, the only decisions left were how to get the policy into action. Though there was some initial disagreement on the direction of the CIA under Truman that quickly dissipated and subsequently evolved unchecked, under Eisenhower. Truman’s emphasis on intelligence gathering became a separate tract and proceeded on its own terms from within the agency. Though there would be continued discussion about the two approaches, each one was allowed to go forward. The primary emphasis always went to covert operations.

Unlike Groupthink, the Bureaucratic Politics Model does help explain why the CIA kept going forward with very little change. Once institutional goals and objectives were defined, the institution followed them until they were changed or updated. Standard operating procedures therefore create the basis from which to start new problems. Since the CIA was allowed to develop with little or no real outside influence, the where you stand depends on where you sit dictum applies as well. Certainly the early CIA pioneers where in the position to fight for their agency. They also helped to pull in others who could help them from the covert camp. The bureaucratic paradigm also suggests there are no single makers of foreign policy. In this case,
that helps explain the phenomenon. The CIA worked directly with the executive branch and moved the plan forward. Other branches or organizations of government supported what the CIA asked for and the President wanted.

In essence, the CIA just kept doing what it had done before. Clifford’s suggestion that “because organizations rely on routines and plans derived from experience with familiar problems, those standard routines usually form the basis for options” (Clifford, 162), becomes telling when compared to Analogical reasoning. It is almost as if Clifford is describing Analogical reasoning instead. This would of course give merit to Analogical reasoning if only to bolster portions of the Bureaucratic approach.

**CJ-2: At what point did Castro become undesirable and why?**

The record shows that the CIA had an interest in Castro since 1948. A dilemma arose when policy towards the Batista government, which was openly corrupt and oppressive, contradicted other foreign policy that called for supporting more democratic reforms. In the beginning, Castro was supported and recognized by the United States even though still viewed with caution. Luxenburg (1988) quoted Wayne Smith who was a U.S. embassy official in Cuba, that “relations between the United States and Cuba were rather good during the first half of 1959” (Luxenburg, 41). Luxenburg further adds that “Washington had promptly recognized the new government on 7 January and selected an ambassador with experience and disposition to set Cuban-American relations right. In assessing the new Cuban president and his cabinet, the staff of the US Embassy cabled the US State Department: None of the members appear to be pro-
Communist or anti-United States” (Luxenburg, 41). It wasn’t until December 1961 that Castro proclaimed himself to be a Marxist-Leninist.

When Castro started to affect United States business interests, the view shifted more toward his being a direct threat. Perez (2002) suggests that U.S. foreign policy became:

a series of improvisations, and impulses, in response to circumstances and events, sometimes as conditioned reflexes, other times as pragmatic expedients. Policy calculations were derived from cognitive categories often flawed by a mixture of misinformation and misrepresentation, sometimes driven by factors wholly extraneous to Cuba, a process in which U.S. response as often as not contributed to the very outcomes it sought to prevent” (Perez, 229).

Perez stated that policy towards Cuba was derived from assumptions and “security imperatives that originally justified sanctions, based on the proposition that Cuba was an instrument of Soviet design, to be contained on every occasion and countered at every possibility” (Perez, 228).

Analogical reasoning can help explain this juncture. The decision had been made that communism was a force that had to be dealt with. When Castro was labeled a communist, he became by default, a force that had to be dealt with as well. Political elites put a premium on confronting anything that would further the communist cause. If they were fighting it abroad, they certainly had to fight it 90 miles away. Evidence suggests that as they looked back at how they dealt with other pro-communist leaning governments, they decided to deal with Castro in the same manner as they had dealt with the others. Since no other policy options were explored by the Eisenhower administration, there exists a body of research that suggests he may have pushed Castro into stronger ties with the Soviet Union. This premise is not the focus of this research, but does bolster the argument of an Analogical approach as Eisenhower’s comparisons yielded the exact opposite result that was sought.
The Groupthink hypothesis has almost no role here at this point. In Eisenhower’s organization, small advisory groups were used, but there was already an agreed consensus that communism was a threat and anything or anyone associated with it had to be dealt with. The Bureaucratic Politics Model suffers somewhat here as well for the same reasons. All agencies were in fact not competing to make their share of foreign policy. There was a specific direction which they all followed. Standard operating procedures did not encourage this decision either, though they might have had something to with how the policy was later solidified. The different agencies were basically on the same sheet of music with the executive branch and the CIA. Even if you consider the dictum that where you stand depends on where you sit, you realize it played very little role at all. There was very little difference in opinion about Castro becoming undesirable.

**CJ-3: What were the first decisions on dealing with Cuba and how were they arrived at?**

It is at this point in the discussion we need to look at the similarities between Analogical reasoning and the Bureaucratic Politics Models. Vandenbrouke has pointed out that “considerable evidence suggests that, encouraged by previous successes, the CIA sought a fresh occasion to prove its effectiveness and consolidate its position” (Vandenbrouke, 474). They did this by using their past successes in Guatemala as a model for the Bay of Pigs. As pointed out earlier, the Bay of Pigs was almost a carbon copy of operation PBSUCCESS in Guatemala. Most of the same leadership was brought back in, the mission consisted of the same elements, and the operational plan was an almost direct copy Cullather (1994) noted that:

PBSUCCESS used an intensive paramilitary and psychological campaign to replace a popular,
elected government with a political nonentity. In method, scale, and conception, it had no antecedent, and its triumph confirmed the belief of many in the Eisenhower administration that covert operations offered a safe, inexpensive substitute for armed force in resisting Communist inroads in the Third World. This and other ‘lessons’ of PBSUCCESS lulled Agency and administration officials in a complacency that proved fatal at the Bay of Pigs seven years later” (Cullather, 1).

Cullather also noted that “it is tempting to find lessons in history, and Allen Dulles’s CIA concluded that the apparent triumph in Guatemala, in spite of a long series of blunders in both planning and execution, made PBSUCCESS a sound model for future operations” (Cullather, ix).

Analogical reasoning is significant in this critical juncture as is the Bureaucratic Politics Model. They both share similar elements that explain this decision equally well and almost become hard to distinguish between the two. At this stage, there was no evidence to suggest Groupthink might have had any influence. The conditions for Groupthink were not present.

**CJ-4: How did the first plan change and why?**

As Pfeiffer and Jones pointed out, it became apparent that changes within Cuba and the support it was receiving from the Soviet Union, necessitated changes to the original plan. Jones suggested that by the summer of 1960 the original “measures did not seem sufficient, and pressure soon grew to change the small-scale guerrilla focus to a military contingent large enough to attack Cuba” (Jones, 20). Unlike in PBSUCCESS, they could not count on their propaganda campaign to use these increases in communist actively to their benefit. If one applies the Analogical reasoning approach, the evidence suggests that the analogy of a successful
PBSUCCESS kept the mission going. Instead of looking for other policy options they just focused on strengthening the one they already had.

This fits in well with the Bureaucratic Politics Model from the standpoint of following standard operating procedures and working an issue from the standpoint of the last one. Since the CIA framed the options, the causal path became one of a self-sustaining enterprise. The only options they would consider were how to make the plan work. Groupthink does not apply as the escalation was easily agreed upon and was seen as being necessary to fulfill the policy option of getting rid of Castro. At this juncture it was still Eisenhower’s game to play and he agreed with the CIA’s proposals. Eisenhower found the escalation necessary despite the events that were unfolding inside Cuba.

**CJ-5: How was the final plan formulated and why?**

From the beginning, President Kennedy was enveloped by his own political rhetoric. He would seem weak if he did nothing against Castro. But Kennedy wanted to walk a fine line in case it failed. Jones suggests that the President “feared the domestic and foreign political consequences of U.S. attribution and wanted options other than an all-out invasion supported by American planes, ships, and supplies…The president sought to impose stringent political restrictions on a military operation” (Jones, 50). President Kennedy brought plausible denial to new levels and soon political considerations took over military ones. Chief of Staff, General Lemnitzer “had grave concerns about longtime battle between political and military objectives. ‘You have to be very careful about diluting military considerations in order to attain nonattribution and nonassociation with the United States” (Jones, 51). The restrictions Kennedy
would place on the operation helped decrease the chances of success, yet the plans went forward without objection.

It is possible that an unwritten assumption took hold of key actors; “more likely, the Joint Chiefs shared the Cuban brigade’s belief that the White House could not permit a failure and, if no popular insurrection occurred, would approve U.S. military intervention” (Jones, 52). This is a causal mechanism that directly relates to Analogical reasoning. When the Guatemalan operation started to flounder during PBSUCCESS, President Eisenhower authorized United States intervention. He had been informed by Dulles that “airpower could be decisive” and after weighing in the possibility of United States involvement being found out versus operational failure, the president allowed two fighters piloted by American contract pilots to go in and save the day. This move changed the course of the battle and the CIA gained its defining covert operational moment (Cullather, 76). That President Kennedy would follow suit and not allow the mission to fail became an unofficial (though speculative) forgone conclusion.

It is important to note that all the major changes to President Eisenhower’s original concept and plan were changed by President Kennedy. It was he who laid the restrictions and he would also later cancel the crucial bombing run to destroy the remaining aircraft in Castro’s air force. Unfortunately it would turn out those aircraft would later devastate the invaders and doom them to failure.

Neither Groupthink nor the Bureaucratic Politics Model helps explain this. Both approaches share key elements of group dynamics but do not apply at this point. The record shows that Kennedy often went outside his own group and sought advice from a variety of other sources. It was Kennedy that ultimately made the decisions, and not because of working in
concert with any group processes, (which would appear later during his handling of the Cuban
missile crises). Certainly, where the President sits is where he stands does not apply well either.
Kennedy had the ability to cancel or to let it go forward. President Kennedy was not limited by
his position in any way nor did his position as President make him fight for any one position
either.

How then, with having so many reservations which are aptly documented throughout the
whole process, did President Kennedy push through anyway? Analogical reasoning helps to
shed some light on his decision-making and provides some level of possible explanation.

The evidence points to the facts that Dulles and the CIA had been so successful in the
past, coupled with Dulles and Bissell repeatedly telling the President that the operation (invasion,
assassination, guerrilla option) had a fair chance to succeed, played a significant role. If these
two issues were not at play, President Kennedy could have easily cancelled the operation or
changed its objectives at any time prior to launch. When asked directly, “Dulles told the
President at his desk that he ‘was certain our Guatemalan operation would succeed, and Mr.
President, the prospects for this plan are better than they were for that one” (Jones, 70). It is very
possible that Kennedy reflected back on Eisenhower taking Dulles’s advice in the past. If
Eisenhower had accepted it, why not he?

The record also reflects other important elite actors weighed-in when asked by the
President for their thoughts on the matter. President Kennedy asked Dean Acheson (Truman’s
Secretary of State and Eisenhower advisor) for his opinion. Acheson had already been previously
consulted on Berlin and Kennedy had been alarmed by “Acheson’s hard stance on Berlin”
(Douglas, 126). His opinion obviously mattered (he would be consulted again, during the Cuban
missile crisis). When asked, Acheson told the president, “it was not necessary to call Price, Waterhouse [a large accounting firm] to discover that 1500 [invading] Cubans weren’t as good as 250,000 Cubans” (Douglas, 127). President Kennedy could have easily taken Acheson’s comment, which was both simple and yet profound, to heart in lieu of Dulles’s reassurances.

Senator William J. Fulbright wrote a memo to the president in late March just one month before the operation was to start. He:

sent the White House an extended memo warning that press stories and pictures showed the United States supporting an invasion by exiles secretly training in Florida, the Caribbean, or Guatemala.” The memo continued, that “the Castro regime is a thorn in the flesh; but not a dagger in the heart…to revert back to the Teddy Roosevelt style of intervention in Cuba…would set us back another two generations” (Jones, 65).

This still did not deter Kennedy from letting the operation go forward, even though Fulbright was the chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

**CJ-6: What happened that led to the final outcome and why?**

A detailed listing of the actual tactics employed at the Bay of Pigs is not part of the scope of this research and have been commented heavily on in other works. It is important to point out however, that amazingly, despite all the problems they encountered, the Cuban brigade did reach many of its objectives even though they were short lived. Some of these points were commented on by Bissell in his rebuttal to the Inspector General Report. There is a great deal of consensus, that in the end, it was President Kennedy’s placing a high premium on political considerations over military ones, which lost the day. The Taylor report determined that “the fatal flaw in the operation was the administration’s excessive concern about plausible deniability” (Jones, 147).
Kennedy’s two key decisions in the name of plausible deniability altered the plans in the direction of failure. He ordered the changing of the landing’s original site (so it would be less spectacular) and he canceled the second air strike on D-Day (to make it look more like an internal uprising).

The evidence further suggests that there was an over reliance on the CIA by the White House, and more specifically, by President Kennedy personally. Too much faith was placed on the CIA’s ability to perform its self-prescribed duties. There was no system of checks and balances; far too many factors were taken at face value and never questioned. Every aspect of the operation was controlled by the CIA except for the final decisions made by President Kennedy. Groupthink and the Bureaucratic Politics Model do not adequately explain this critical juncture.

The fact that President Kennedy ordered these changes himself negates any type of small group activity or suggestion of competing organizations. On the other hand, Analogical reasoning goes a long way to explaining his decisions. Perhaps the biggest suggestion that too much faith was used by Kennedy was that after the Bay of Pigs, he “wanted to destroy the CIA” (Weiner, 180). By September of 1961, Dulles was forced to retire and Bissell would be forced to leave the agency six months later. He also replaced Dulles with an outsider; he made John McCone, an Eisenhower elder statesman the new director of the CIA. He was not a former OSS officer, but a ship builder during World War II. The new head of covert operations would be Richard Helms. He was on the intelligence gathering versus covert operations side of the house (Weiner, 180). Perhaps President Kennedy’s new analogy was not to blindly trust the experts. He would definitely employ a different decision-making approach when faced with the Cuban
missile crises 18 months later. There was no blind trust exhibited and multiple policy options were explored before one was decided on. That was a stark contrast to the way he made decisions during the Bay of Pigs.
CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSIONS

Four main facts were made clear by analyzing the available record of the conduct of the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba: (1) The CIA performed covert operations as their preferred methodology and policy choice; (2) the Bay of Pigs invasion was modeled after the operation in Guatemala (PBSUCCESS); (3) President Kennedy placed too much trust in the CIA and did not explore other policy options; and (4) plausible denial was the lens that President Kennedy peered through as he made his final decisions. Groupthink, the Bureaucratic Politics Model, and Analogical reasoning all play a role in explaining certain aspects of the decision-making process when the Bay of Pigs invasion is looked at as a single case study. When the outcome is studied as the result of a causal chain, and temporal dynamics are broken down into critical junctures, the strength and weaknesses of each approach are exposed.

Out of the six critical junctures that were explored, Analogical reasoning took the lead in helping to explain three junctures exclusively (CJ-2, CJ-5, and CJ-6). Neither Groupthink nor the Bureaucratic Politics Model could explain any of the critical junctures independently. And finally, Analogical reasoning along with the Bureaucratic Politics Model helped in explaining three (CJ-1, CJ-3, and CJ-4). In these junctures, the Bureaucratic Politics Model acted in concert with Analogical reasoning to the point of becoming difficult to separate the two. For example, one could argue that the only opposition to the invasion from those closest to it, came from the State Department. At one point it was presented that diplomacy be used to deal with Castro. This is a good example of where you stand is where you sit component of the Bureaucratic Politics Model. And yet, one could argue from the Analogical reasoning standpoint equally as well. The
State department has used diplomacy to help mitigate crises before. They too, can reflect back on past successes, and use what works for them.

That being said, two factors still help in recognizing that the strongest observations were influenced by Analogical reasoning. The first is with regard to PBSUCCESS. There are 11 points found in PBSUCCESS that are also found in the Bay of Pigs invasion seven years later:

1. The U.S. government decided there was a communist threat too close to home;
2. The United States felt the government in question was turning towards communism;
3. The opportunity to act was quickly fading and would be lost;
4. There was little to no intelligence on the country but the go-ahead was given anyway;
5. A huge propaganda mission involving radio, leaflets, and other measures;
6. There was a shroud of interdepartmental secrecy creating a need to know only basis which kept others important actors and resources from getting involved;
7. Somoza and Nicaragua were involved;
8. The U.S. stopped and or blocked arms going to the country;
9. The blockaded country still obtained weapons and support from the communist bloc;
10. The government learned of the operations against them and the United States went forward anyway; and
11. The operation got to a point where the planners felt there was no turning back (Cullather, 1994).

The evidence is clear that very little thought was given to analyzing the internal Cuban situation and plan accordingly to its particular elements. The planners were definitely trying to fit a square peg in a round hole. For the CIA it would be Guatemala all over again despite the fact that it was not. None of the different factors were given very much consideration. Going back to
the earlier analogy of viewing all problems as a nail, it is evident that Castro was a nail and that CIA had the hammer.

The CIA tried to work with the Cuban underground but Castro destroyed their effectiveness with brutal and very efficient internal intelligence networks which reported any resistance sympathizers. According to Hinkle & Tuner (1992) “Hawkins had already made one critical decision-the underground would not be alerted” (Hinkle & Turner, 87). Knowing that the resistance efforts had been compromised, the CIA pushed forward anyway.

It was identified several times in the different postmortem reports that the planners felt the operation would fail. Dulles and the CIA were hoping for the shock of the invasion and that the fear of United States intervention would cripple Castro and his government causing his demise just like what eventually happened during PBSUCCESS in Guatemala. They were also hoping that if push came to shove, Kennedy would send in additional U.S. forces and save the day. It would appear that the faith in the Guatemala analogy overrode all other factors.

The second point is emphasized by President Kennedy’s own actions after the invasion failed. It appears that President Kennedy had trusted Dulles, the CIA, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the point of blind faith. For example, in addition to the numerous intelligence reports he received and never questioned, Kennedy received a report on the combat readiness of the brigade from Hawkins who inspected them in Guatemala. His faith in Hawkins may have overridden other factors. Kennedy said later, “that Hawkins’ unqualified endorsement was instrumental in his decision to go ahead” (Hinkle & Turner, 88). Kennedy realized afterwards that his faith was a mistake.
Even though President Kennedy publically assumed full responsibility for the operation by stating, “I am the responsible officer of the government,” he privately had other feelings (Jones, 131). Kennedy attacked the Joint Chiefs as “those sons-of-bitches with all that fruit salad just sat there nodding, saying it would work,” and “those CIA bastards whose office I would like to splinter into a thousand pieces and scatter…to the winds” (Jones, 131). From those passages one could suggest that Kennedy had regretted placing such a high premium on who he considered to be the experts. In the most telling of his comments which happened at the end of the operation and at the beginning of the political aftermath, he stated, “All my life I’ve known better than to depend on the experts. How could I have been so stupid?” (Jones, 132)

President Kennedy’s own comments suggest he used Analogical reasoning with regard to Dulles, the CIA, the Joint Chiefs, and the operation as a whole. Groupthink and the Bureaucratic Politics Model fall short in explaining President Kennedy’s final set of decisions that heavily affected the outcome of the invasion. These other approaches focus on group dynamics or organizational behavior but they do not contend with the individual decision-making authority President Kennedy held. They may explain some contributing factors or help to start alternative explanations, but independently they fail to paint the full picture.

The six critical junctures that were identified and examined can be considered branches from a type of Poly urn process tree, where early decisions are proven to be more important than later ones. The CIA first chose covert operations as their policy of choice. The U.S. government decided they had to fight communism as it strove to keep the Western Hemisphere free from its influence. Once Castro was identified as a communist and therefore a threat to the United States, there was only one decision left to be made and that was to get rid of him. This pattern decision-
making started soon after Eisenhower took office and was solidified by operation PBSUCCESS in Guatemala.

The process continued through the failure of the invasion (it would also continue after the invasion with other covert operations, like operation MONGOOSE, which targeted Cuba and included additional assassination attempts on Castro). Once the Cuba Project started, the further along it went the harder it was to turn around. The handling of the Cuban problem created its own path dependence. Of course, the final hope against hope was if the chips were down, that President Kennedy would send in American military muscle, like Eisenhower did in PBSUCCESS. Doing something the same way you did before, and hoping it would turn out the same way, regardless of the overwhelming evidence it would not, can easily be considered elements of Analogical reasoning.

In addition to the six identified critical junctures, the record also points to other contributing factors that can be identified as parts of a causal chain. President Kennedy campaigned as a hawk and that may have locked him into an aggressive policy that would not make him appear soft on Communism. Another factor is the respect and esteem that not only Kennedy (whether genuine or politically motivated) but shared by the nation for President Eisenhower. It should never be forgotten that the project started with his administration and Eisenhower promoted its need when he briefed the new president. There is also the fact that Dulles himself, a living legend in the eyes of Kennedy (and a personal friend), also backed and believed in the plan. And that regardless of how the Joint Chiefs felt their roles were, they did tell the president the plan had a reasonable chance of success. When looking at these other factors, one can easily see were Analogical reasoning could have played a significant role.
Analogical reasoning can be viewed as being in concert with heuristics. Khong suggests that Schema theory “has allowed us to provide a general description of what analogies are capable of doing; going beyond the information given and allowing default values to fill in for missing information” (Khong, 29). Khong further suggests that “when faced with a new situation, individuals turn to their repertoire of historical memories” (Khong, 35). According to Daniel Kaheman and Amos Tversky, this aspect is called the availability heuristic; “it operates when a person estimates the probability of the event by the ease in which similar instances can be recalled” (Khong, 35). They also suggest that decisions are made by “relying on the representativeness heuristic, their assessment of the degree to which A resembles B” (Khong, 36). This plays nicely when considering the reasons for the Guatemala operation as the analogy of choice instead of key decision makers focusing on others.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to attempt to develop a new theory on the political aspects of Analogical reasoning. It does however point to evidence that suggests that Analogical reasoning played a strong role in President Kennedy’s decision-making during the Bay of Pigs invasion. The research also suggests that the Bureaucratic Politics Model and the Analogical reasoning approach are very similar in application, analysis, and subsequent results. More research needs to be done in this field to see whether Analogical reasoning is present in other foreign policy decisions beyond the cases of Vietnam and the Iran hostage crisis. It might provide insight and shift research into more cognitive aspects of political decision-making. There is also considerable merit in suggesting the possibility of an integrated theory combining aspects of all three.
An integrated theory could take into account the close relationship between the Bureaucratic Politics Model and Analogical reasoning. It could also factor in the merits behind Groupthink. Combining the three would help reduce the weaknesses that are found when they are used independently from each other. It is felt that integrated approach might help discover higher levels of explanatory significance.

George Santayana, (The Life of Reason, Volume 1, 1905) once said, “those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” There are some similar elements between the Bay of Pigs and other foreign policy decisions. For an example, one needs to look no further than the President George Bush’s decisions to invade Iraq under a set of false pretences. If you compare the role the president played, the CIA’s manipulation of the intelligence, the path dependencies created by early decisions, and the time, money, and energy placed in justifying a foreign policy against a perceived enemy of the United States, both foreign policy decisions run rather similar. There are some striking similarities when comparing some elite actors as well.

Senator Fulbright compared Castro and Cuba, as a thorn in the flesh but not a dagger in the heart. Colin Powell said something similar of Saddam Hussein and Iraq comparing Saddam Hussein to a toothache. He said ‘it recurs from time to time and you just have to live with it.’ Powell also compared Saddam Hussein to a kidney stone that will ‘eventually pass.’ Both Fulbright and Powell advised their respective Presidents against controversial foreign policy decisions, and both men’s advice was ultimately ignored. One can also compare CIA intelligence handling between the two. Allen Dulles can be compared to George Tenet as well. Both former directors of the CIA assured their President that their respective operations would be a success. Dulles assured Kennedy that the chances of success were better for the Bay of Pigs than they
were for the operation in Guatemala. Tenet advised George Bush that weapons of mass
destruction in Iraq were a ‘slam dunk.’

In both Cuba and Iraq, misinformation was used and key information was withheld. It can
be argued that both Presidents faced some similar questions. For President Bush one such
question was whether or not the Iraqis would join in the fight to secure their freedom. For
President Kennedy it was asking if the Cubans would rise up and fight against Castro. One could
also argue that another similarity would include how the information flow was highly controlled
in both situations. There is an argument that can also be made that the information used to make
decisions by both Presidents Bush and Kennedy came primarily from the CIA. And finally, both
Presidents could have decided differently but chose not to, despite all the evidence they had to
the contrary. Though the Iraq War and the Cuban invasion are not exact in every detail,
President Bush’s decision to invade Iraq by no means is the only foreign policy similar to the
Bay of Pigs invasion. It is therefore suggested that further research needs to be conducted not
only in Analogical reasoning but in other alternative approaches to help explain the Bay of Pigs
and other similar foreign policy decisions.

There still is much work to be done in studying the Bay of Pigs invasion. This is
especially true in the light of all the newly declassified information. Much of the scholarly work
involving the Bay of Pigs invasion comes from the late 70s to early 80s. As of the date of this
research, there are still over 30,000 pages of information that have yet to be released by the CIA
on the Bay of Pigs. This suggests the record is still not fully clear and will not be clear until those
remaining documents are released. This begs the question as to why these documents are still
sealed and what information remains to be uncovered 48 years later. Many scholars have chosen
to water down the treatment of the Bay of Pigs choosing to concentrate more on the Cuban
missile crisis. In essence it has all but been forgotten by experienced political scientists and
largely ignored by up-and-coming ones. It would be wise to take another look at the Bay of Pigs,
if for no other reason because Santayana seems to be correct when he stated that history tends to
repeat itself. Perhaps future scholarship can help prevent the next generation of foreign policy
debacles.
APPENDIX A: THE BATTLE
The National Security Archive’s Summary of the Battle

APR 15, 1961

At dawn eight B-26 planes of the Cuban Expeditionary Force (CEF) carry out air strikes at three sites to destroy the Castro air capability. Initial pilot reports indicate that 50% of Castro's offensive air was destroyed at Campo Libertad, 75 to 80% at San Antonio de los Baos and five planes destroyed at Santiago de Cuba. Subsequent photographic studies and interpretations indicate a greatly reduced estimate of the damage, amounting to five aircrafts definitely destroyed and an indeterminable number of other planes suffering some damage. After the attacks and expecting further attempts to destroy his small air force, Castro orders his pilots to sleep under the wings of the planes, ready to take off immediately.

0700: A bullet-ridden B-26 with Cuban markings lands at Miami International Airport. The Cuban pilot claims that he and three of his comrades have defected from Castro's air force in stolen planes. They claim to have carried out the attack against Castro's airfields and after being hit by antiaircraft fire and low on fuel have flown to the United States. Reporters note that the planes machine guns have evidently not been fired and that its nose is of solid metal while Castro's B-26s have plastic noses.

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5 The National Security Archive sponsored “The Bay of Pigs 40 Years After,” International Conference in Havana Cuba, March 22-24, 2001. It was the first time key combatants faced each other since the invasion. Their web page contains various resources from the conference. This summary was modified from their original chronology of events for brevity. (http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/bayofpigs/chron.html)
Adlai Stevenson, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, responding to Cuban charges of involvement in the bombing attacks in Cuba, denies any U.S. role and reaffirms the U.S. commitment to make sure that no American participates in any actions against Cuba.

Nino Diaz leads a group of 160 men in the diversionary landing 30 miles east of Guantanamo. The landing is aborted. The reasons given are the failure to appear of a friendly reception party and the loss of three boats. The Cubans are ordered to land the following night (April 15/16). Again the 168 men do not land because of the breakdown of a reconnaissance boat and loss of time retrieving it, failure of a friendly landing party to appear, and heavy enemy activity in the area. The Diaz group is ordered to join the main invasion force but they fail to arrive in time to participate.

Cuba's Foreign Minister Dr. Raul Roa, speaking to the General Assembly of the United Nations, accuses the United States of responsibility for the bombing attack on Havana, San Antonio, and Santiago. Cuba succeeds in getting the General Assembly to convene a special session of the First Commission (Political and Security Commission) of the Assembly to hear their charges against the U.S. At this meeting, Roa calls the bombing "undoubtedly the prologue to a large scale invasion, planned, organized, provisioned, armed, and financed by the government of the United States. . . The Revolutionary Government of Cuba solemnly accuses the government of the United States, before the Political and Security Commission and before world public opinion of having resorted to the use of force to settle its differences with a member state of the organization."

In response, Adlai Stevenson, the U.S. representative to the U.N., states that there will be no intervention by the armed forces of the United States; that the U.S. will do everything in its
power to assure that no American participates in any action against Cuba." Stevenson then presents photographs of the planes that landed in Florida claiming that their markings show them to be Cuban Air Force aircraft. He finishes stating that the "fundamental question is not between the U.S. and Cuba but among the Cubans themselves."

**APR 16, 1961**

The CEF Airborne battalion moves from base camp in Guatemala to Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua, during the night of April 15/16. At about midday, the President formally approves the landing plan and the word is passed to all commanders in the operation. Assault shipping moves on separate courses toward the objective area. The ships make their rendezvous at about 1730 hours approximately 40 miles off the coast. They proceed in column and make rendezvous with U.S. Navy LSD (San Marcos) about 5,000 yards from Blue Beach. LCU and LCVP aboard the San Marcos are transferred to Cuban crews between 2300 and 2400 hours. Radio Swan repeatedly broadcasts a message which Phillips and Hunt compose to give the appearance that the station is activating resistance groups in Cuba: “Alert! Alert! Look well at the rainbow. The fish will rise very soon. Chico is in the house. Visit him. The sky is blue. Place notice in the tree. The tree is green and brown. The letters arrived well. The letters are white. The fish will not take much time to rise. The fish is red.”

2130: McGeorge Bundy telephones General Cabell of CIA to tell him that the dawn air strikes the following morning should not be launched until planes can conduct them from a strip within the beachhead. Bundy indicates that any further consultation with regard to this matter should be with the Secretary of State. General Cabell and Richard Bissell go to Secretary Rusk's
office at about 2215 Rusk tells them he has just been talking to the President on the phone and recommended that the Monday-morning air strikes (D-Day) should be canceled and the President agreed. Cabell and Bissell protest, arguing that the ships as well as the landings will be seriously endangered without the dawn strikes. The Secretary indicates there are policy considerations against air strikes before the beachhead airfield is in the hands of the landing force and completely operational and capable of supporting the raids. Rusk calls the President and tells him of the CIA men's objections but restates his own recommendation to cancel the strikes. The Secretary offers to let the CIA representatives talk to the President directly but they decline. The order canceling the air strikes is dispatched to the departure field in Nicaragua, arriving when the pilots are in their cockpits ready for takeoff.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff learn of the cancellation at varying hours on the morning of April 17. Realizing the seriousness of the cancellation of air strikes, CIA officials try to offset the damage. They warn the invasion force of likely air attacks and the ships to expedite unloading and to withdraw from the beach by dawn. A continuous cover of two B-26s over the beach is laid on. At 0430, General Cabell calls the Secretary of State at his home, reiterates the need to protect the shipping by providing air cover, and makes the request to the President by telephone. The President disapproves the request for air cover but authorizes early warning destroyers, provided they stay at least 30 miles from Cuban territory.

On the night of April 16, Committees for the Defense of the Revolution are mobilized to detain those opposed to the revolution. In a few hours they detain thousands of individuals. At 2345, the head of the militia post of Playa Girón Mariano Mustelier sees a red light in the sea. Reaching the beach, he and a companion observe signals coming from a boat. Jumping in a jeep
they turn the lights on and off, thinking that it is a boat that has lost its way. A group of the invading forces fires at the jeep and puts out the lights.

**APR 17, 1961**

Aboard the Blagar, CIA agent Grayston Lynch (Gray) receives a message on a yellow pad from Washington: "Castro still has operational aircraft. Expect you to be hit at dawn. Unload all troops and supplies and take ships to sea as soon as possible." On learning that the invading troops will meet resistance in the landing area, due to failure to destroy all of the Cuban Air Force, the Blagar moves in close to shore and delivers gunfire support. Brigade troops commence landing at 0100. At 0115 the Brigade Commander, José Perez San Roman, goes ashore and begins unloading troops and supplies. Local militias discover the landing at once. Some firing occurs, and the alarm is transmitted to troop and air headquarters throughout the island. 0300 Unloading of troops on the Caribe is completed. Unloading of troops from the Atlantico begins. 0315 Fidel Castro is woken in Havana and told that the enemy is landing at Playa Larga and Playa Girón and that his platoons in the area are resisting.

Castro also mobilizes a battalion of militia in Matanzas Province, containing three mortar batteries, and orders them to head toward Playa Larga while he dispatches three battalions from Las Villas Province to protect the other two major highways through the swamps. The air force gets orders to take off at dawn and attack the ships facing Playa Larga and Girón After giving his orders, Castro leaves immediately for the Bay of Pigs.

0400: Castro calls Captain Enrique Carreras at San Antonio base twenty miles west of Havana: “At this moment a landing is taking place at Playa Girón But I want you to sink those
ships! Don't let those ships go!” The pilots wait in their planes until six-thirty; about twenty minutes prior to daylight, then take off.

0420: In view of the Cuban response, the Brigade commander cancels the landing at Green Beach and puts this force ashore at Blue Beach. At 0630 Cuban air attacks on shipping and Blue Beach commence. 270 men are landed at Red Beach and immediately come under fire. The landing of the Second Battalion at Red Beach is slowed by motor trouble with the aluminum ships boats, which are the only landing craft available. The battalions can only use two out of nine boats for the 20-minute run from the Houston to the beach. The Fifth Battalion, which is to follow the Second, never gets ashore partly due to boat trouble and partly because of the lack of initiative of the Brigade Commander. Few supplies get ashore.

The Houston comes under air attack and is hit. It goes aground with about 180 men of the Fifth Battalion on the west side of Bahía de Cochinos [Bay of Pigs] about 5 miles from the landing beach. During this air attack, machine gun fire damages the LCI Barbara J disabling two of its engines. After cleaning up the Red Beach area, the troops of the Second Battalion push north about four miles but soon encounter militia forces that prevent them from reaching the southern exit of the road across the swamp which they were to block. At 0640, friendly air support arrives. At 0730, all vehicles and tanks are discharged from LCUs. After landing, the troops push out from the beach as planned. CEF parachutists of the First Battalion at 0730, seize the road center of San Blas ten miles northeast of Blue Beach, and establish outposts to the north and east to cover the routes of ingress into the beachhead. They are reinforced by the Third Battalion and a heavy weapons detachment. At 0825, The Blagar shoots down a Cuban T-33. All troops are ashore at Blue Beach.
0930: The freighter Rio Escondido is sunk by a direct rocket hit from a Sea Fury with ten days reserves of ammunition on board, as well as food, hospital equipment and gasoline. The Rio Escondido goes down with 145 tons of munitions, 38,000 gallons of vehicle fuel and 3,000 gallons of aircraft fuel. All crewmembers are rescued and transferred to the Blagar. Attacked by a CEF B-26, the Sea Fury shoots it down; another B-26 is shot down by a T-33.

1000: In face of continuous air attacks, the contract skipper in charge of the shipping radios CIA Headquarters that if jet air coverage is not immediately available, the ships will put out to sea.

1030: Following the air attack which sunk the freighters, all others in the landing area put out to sea with the order to rendezvous 50 miles off the coast. As ships withdraw they continue to come under air attack. The freighters Atlantico and Caribe head south and do not stop till intercepted by the U.S. Navy, 110 and 218 miles respectively south of Cuba. The Caribe is thus never available for resupply operations while the fight on the beach lasts and the Atlantico does not get back to the rendezvous point until 1645 on April 18.

1530: Based on a CIA request which has presidential approval, the JCS directs CINCLANT to establish a safe haven for CEF ships with U.S. naval air cover subject to the restrictions that no carrier ship operate closer than 50 miles from Cuban territory, no aircraft closer than 15 miles, and no more than 4 aircraft on station at one time. Commanders modify the rules of engagement of enemy aircrafts to allow an attack if an unfriendly aircraft makes an aggressive move when headed towards a ship to be protected.

In the afternoon, CEF troops of the First and Third Battalions make contact with Castro forces and their outpost situated to the east is pushed back. Starting at about 1700 and
intermittently thereafter, San Blas comes under attack from forces coming down the road from the north. Radio communications within Blue Beach are nonexistent during the entire operation since the troops have to wade ashore and most of the portable radios get wet and never function thereafter. In the area north of Red Beach, fighting astride the road continues throughout the day, enemy tanks appear in mid-afternoon, and enemy artillery becomes active about 1800. CEF B-26 aircraft, rotated over the beachhead throughout the day, sink one gunboat, make strikes against Cuban ground troops at Red Beach, and inflict several hundred casualties. Four CEF B-26s are lost to enemy T-33 action while the Castro air force loses two Sea Furies and two B-26s to antiaircraft fire. On the evening of D-Day the situation looks bad to the President in Washington. U.S. ships might have to be used.

At the end of the first day of combat the Brigade controls two of the three access roads and has the third within its line of fire. The Cuban Air Force has sunk two ships and a landing craft and damaged a ship and three barges. They have also brought down three B-26s and damaged two. A sixth plane crashes in the Nicaraguan mountains near Puerto Cabezas. The invading forces have shot down a Sea Fury and a B-26. A fourth road along the coast exists along which is advancing a reinforced battalion of the Cuban Armed Forces.

**APR 18, 1961**

Responding to the ease with which the T-33 aircraft is able to destroy the obsolete B-26, CIA leaders issue orders to bomb as many airfields as possible on the ground on the night of April 17/18 with fragmentation bombs. Three B-26s are launched for San Antonio de los Baos but fail to find the target. At 0300, the troops north of Red Beach come under heavy attack in the
early morning hours. Enemy tanks approach from the north and by 0730 the situation is so
difficult that the decision is made to move the force to Blue Beach. At 0400, artillery fire begins
falling on the troops in the San Bias area and continues most of the day. Artillery fire and enemy
pressure on the San Bias troops force a gradual contraction of their position around the town.
They attempt a counterattack to the north in the afternoon, but it bogs down in the face of
superior forces.

At 0730, The 2d Battalion at Red Beach reports that its position cannot be maintained
without air support for more than 30 minutes. Movement to Blue Beach begins at 0900 and is
completed by 1030. The Red Beach force has suffered about 20 casualties. After reaching Blue
Beach, the retreating force has two hours rest and gets additional ammunition and is ordered
back to Red Beach to block the coast road against the forces they engaged in the Red Beach area.
They encounter this force west of Blue Beach and heavy fighting ensues. It is not known what
occurred but it is assumed that the invaders succumbed to the superior numbers of Castro forces
moving down from the south. At 0824, Brigade commander reports that Blue Beach is under
attack by 12 tanks and four jets, and requests supplies. Authority to use napalm is granted for use
in the beachhead area. At 1010, Red Beach is reported wiped out.

At 1200, Blue Beach is reported under attack by MIG-15s and T-33s, [and is] out of tank
ammunition, and almost out of small arms ammunition. [In the morning], President Kennedy
receives a message from Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev: “It is not a secret to anyone that the
armed bands which invaded that country have been trained, equipped and armed in the United
States of America. The planes which bomb Cuban cities belong to the United States of America,
the bombs they drop have been made available by the American Government... As to the Soviet
Union, there should be no misunderstanding of our position: we shall render the Cuban people and the Government all necessary assistance in beating back the armed attack on Cuba. We are sincerely interested in a relaxation of international tension, but if others aggravate it, we shall reply in full measure.” Kennedy responds that the United States intends no military intervention in Cuba but should an outside force intervene we will immediately honor our obligations under the inter-American system to protect this hemisphere against external aggression.

Also at 1200, National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy reports to the President that the situation in Cuba is not good. "The Cuban armed forces are stronger, the popular response is weaker, and our tactical position is feebler than we had hoped. Tanks have done in one beachhead, and the position is precarious at the others." Bundy informs Kennedy that the CIA will press hard for further air help against a formidable enemy; he recommends that air support be provided because "in my own judgment, the right course now is to eliminate the Castro air force, by neutrally painted U.S. planes if necessary, and then let the battle go its way."

1400: With only about a third of the Cuban pilots at Puerto Cabezas willing to continue flying, Bissell, for the first time, authorizes American pilots to fly combat missions. Two CIA contract men, Peters and Seig, joined by Cuban pilots, head for Cuba. Castro's troops mistake them for friendly aircraft and instead of dispersing they begin to cheer. The six CEF planes swoop down, dropping napalm and regular bombs, firing rockets, inflicting what is claimed as eighteen hundred casualties and destroying seven tanks.

1449: The JCS directs CINCLANT to prepare unmarked naval planes for possible combat use following a call from Admiral Burke at the White House. This message makes clear that there is no intention of U.S. intervention. The aircraft are readied but permission is not given
to use them. At 1600, the Essex reports a long line of tanks and trucks approaching Blue Beach from the east. By the end of the day ammunition is very low throughout the beachhead. In spite of heavy fighting, casualties appear to be few among the invaders. At the end of the evening, CIA Headquarters asks the Brigade commander, via the Blagar, if he wishes to be evacuated. He replies: "I will not be evacuated. We will fight to the end here if we have to." While at the annual Congressional Reception, Robert Kennedy takes aside Senator Smathers of Florida and tells him, "The shit has hit the fan. The thing has turned sour in a way you wouldn't believe."

APR 18, 1961

In the early hours of the morning of the 18th, Fidel Castro receives information of an attack to the west of Havana. He attempts to verify the information and it is confirmed. He returns to Havana and finds that the information is false. But the maneuver is successful in removing from the area of Playa Larga/Playa Girón the only official who knows intimately the terrain, Fidel Castro. At 1030, Cuban army troops take Playa Larga. Captain Fernandez reports that the invading troops have moved toward Girón.

At the United Nations, the Soviet delegate reads a letter from his country's prime minister to the president of the United States calling for "an end to the aggression against the Republic of Cuba," and reads a Soviet government declaration that "reserves the right in the event that the intervention against Cuba does not end immediately to take, jointly with other states, the necessary measures to lend assistance to the Republic of Cuba." At 1200, Stevenson reads President Kennedy's reply to Soviet Premier Khrushchev denying that the U.S. is intervening militarily in Cuba and claiming the right of the U.S. to protect the hemisphere from external
aggression in the event of an intervention of outside forces. Stevenson goes on to claim that there is no evidence against the United States and that it is not true that the guerrillas have been brought by planes from the U.S. piloted by Americans.

At 1700, B-26 planes of the invading forces launch an attack on advancing troops and tanks, firing rockets and dropping napalm and causing extensive casualties.

APR 19, 1961:

At a meeting at the White House that begins just after midnight, the President, Vice President Johnson, McNamara and Rusk, all in white tie, with General Lemnitzer and Admiral Burke in dress uniform, hear a report on the decline of the invasion force. Burke asks the President to "Let me take two jets and shoot down the enemy aircraft." The President says, no, reminding Bissell and Burke that he has warned them over and over again that he would not commit U.S. forces to combat. Around 0100, the President authorizes one hour of air cover from 0630 to 0730 for the invading brigades B-26s by six unmarked jets from the carrier Essex. The jets are not to seek air combat nor attack ground targets. By the morning of April 19 nine of the invading forces sixteen B-26s have been shot down and several of the remaining planes are in poor flying condition. The U.S. Navy Combat Air Patrol and the B-26s fail to rendezvous because the CIA and the Pentagon fail to realize a time zone difference between Nicaragua and Cuba. Two CEF B-26s are shot down and four Americans are lost.

0550: A C-46 carrying 850 pounds of rockets and ammunition, maps, messages and communications equipment, lands on the Girón airstrip. After dropping off equipment and picking up messages, maps, and a wounded pilot who had been shot down on D-Day, the plane
flies back to Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua. At 0600, Cuban air strikes begin. At 0630, The Blagar is due to arrive at Blue Beach escorting three LCU's with ammunition. During the night, however, the captain reports to CIA Headquarters that if low jet cover is not provided, he believes all ships will be lost. Prior to this time, he has also requested a U.S. Navy destroyer. The CIA Headquarters wire that a destroyer escort is not possible and the captain replies that if he cannot get a destroyer escort in and out of Blue Beach, his Cuban crew will mutiny. CIA Headquarters directs the ammunition ships to stop northern movement and to rendezvous some 60 miles south of the Cuban coast. Beyond an arrangement for another airdrop, no further effort is made to get in ammunition before the final surrender.

0710: Cuban forces close in on CEF invasion forces in Blue Beach sector with tanks and infantry in coordination with air attacks. At 0925, invasion Brigade Commander San Roman reports that 2,000 militia are attacking Blue Beach from east and west. Need close air support immediately. At 1000, Castro's troops enter San Blas and by 1100 are approaching the last defenses blocking the road to Girón. At 1157, JCS directs CINCLANT to send two destroyers to a position off Blue Beach to determine possibilities for evacuation. At 1312, based on a call from Admiral Burke from the White House, the JCS directs CINCLANT to have destroyers take CEF personnel off the beach. Many of the landing force surrenders at about 1400.

1432: Brigade Commander sends last message that is received by the Blagar and reads: Am destroying all equipment and communications. I have nothing left to fight with. Am taking to the woods. I can’t wait for you. Allen Dulles meets with former Vice President Richard Nixon and tells him: "Everything is lost. The Cuban invasion is a total failure." Dulles blames the loss on soft-liners in the Kennedy Administration who doomed the operation to failure by last-minute
compromises. In the days and weeks following the invasion, 1,180 Brigade members are taken prisoner.

**APR 20, 1961**

Fidel Castro speaks on television for four hours. He explains the reasons for the failure of the invasion: "Imperialism examines geography, analyzes the number of cannons, of planes, of tanks, the positions. The revolutionary examines the social composition of the population. The imperialists don't give a damn about how the population there thinks or feels." The task begins in earnest of capturing invading troops who have fled into the mountains and the marsh and along the coast. Castro personally detains about fifty prisoners and interrogates them.

1946: On direction of the President to Admiral Burke, the JCS directs CINCLANT to take charge of CEF ships and personnel and get them safely to Vieques and to conduct destroyer patrols of Blue Beach for possible night evacuation of survivors.

**APR 21, 1961**

At a press conference President Kennedy accepts responsibility for the failed invasion: “There's an old saying that victory has a hundred fathers and defeat is an orphan. What matters,” he says, is only one fact, “I am the responsible officer of the government.”

**APR 22, 1961**

President Kennedy meets with former President Dwight Eisenhower at Camp David. Kennedy explains in detail where things began to go awry and states that the whole operation has
become a complete failure. Apparently some men are still hiding and possibly have made their way to the mountains.

President Kennedy charges General Maxwell D. Taylor, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, Admiral Arleigh Burke and Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles to study our governmental practices and programs in the areas of military and paramilitary, guerrilla and anti-guerrilla activity which fell short of outright war with a view to strengthening our work in this area, with special attention to the lessons which can be learned from the recent events in Cuba [Taylor Committee].
APPENDIX B: ANALOGICAL REASONING
Other Comments

As noted earlier, Analogical reasoning has not been applied to the decision-making during Bay of Pigs in any great detail. The use of history and analogy however deserve a few more comments to expand its possible use in foreign policy decision-making.

Macdonald (2000) says “Leaders often use historical information to diagnose and frame international crises, as well as to prescribe and legitimate policy. The most common means of retrieving information and lessons from history is by analogical reasoning” (Macdonald, 1). He further states:

For example, since the Vietnam War, debates about U.S. military intervention, such as about Nicaragua in the 1980s, the Persian Gulf in 1990-91, the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, have often been argues from two anthethical positions, each based on historical analogy: Vietnam (opposed to military intervention) and the 1930s (favoring military intervention) (Macdonald, 1).

Macdonald (2000) also says that historical analogies can be based on people or events. We either compare a current person with a historical person or a current event with a historical one. Many times, historical events are closely linked to historical people. Macdonald (2000) also classifies historical analogies based on three types of history: (1) learned historical analogies are based on events or people that occurred or lived before the actor using the analogy became aware politically (usually in the late teens); (2) observed historical analogies are based on people or events that occurred or lived when the actor was politically aware but not involved; and (3) personally experienced historical analogies based on events or people that the actor was personally involved in, or with, as a member of a government (Macdonald, 5). The classification of analogies allows for the concept of how framing might affect the analogy and how analogies
are used. This leads Macdonald (2000) to reflect that “individual variables have a significant influence on whether, how often, and with what effect, individual leaders sue historical information and lessons from history to make foreign policy decisions” (Macdonald, 29).

Taylor and Rourke (1995) discuss the use of historical analogies and tested its use by comparing the impact of the Munich and Vietnam analogies on the decisions made by members of Congress about U.S. Policy toward Iraq during the Persian Gulf Crisis of 1991. According to the authors, the idea that historical analogies are used contradicts another body of research:

The dominant theory of congressional voting behavior regarding foreign policy is that the policy choices of members of Congress can be best predicted by examining ideology and partisanship. If, as this scholarship holds, ideology and partisanship—and no other individual variables—strongly predict votes, then it stands to reason that analogies are used as post-hoc justifications for policy choices arrived at based on ideology and party affiliation. (Taylor and Rourke, 461)

Taylor and Rourke (1995) look at two possible uses for analogies. The first is that analogies play a role in policy formulation. The second is that analogies are merely employed as rhetoric to justify choices made on the basis of ideology and party. The authors suggest that the differences may arise from the qualitative studies done on foreign policy decision-makers.

The authors examined the use of the Munich and Vietnam analogies used by members of Congress during the debates of the Persian Gulf crisis. Their database included words spoken on the floor and remarks revised and extended for the Congressional Record. They used probit analysis to measure the validity of the two possible uses of analogies. Taylor and Rourke (1995) tested the independent variables of ideology, party, age, and experience over the dependant variable analogizers (use of analogies). Their results suggest that the independent variables of ideology and party explain analogy choice better than age and experience. This leads them to
posit that ideology and partisanship determine congressional foreign policy beliefs and votes (Taylor and Rourke, 465). The authors dismiss the use of analogies as being significant.

Record (1998), in writing for the Center for Strategy and Technology, acknowledges that historical analogy has played a significant role in the formulation and implementation of US foreign policy since the end of World War II, especially on matters involving consideration or actual use of force. The author believes states, like individuals, make decisions based at least in part on past experience, or, more specifically, what they believe past experiences teach. He levels the conventional caution that reasoning by historical analogies can be dangerous, especially if such reasoning is untempered by recognition that no two historical events are identical and that the future is more than a linear extension of the past. Records (1998) suggests that “the instructiveness of historical events tends to diminish the greater their distance in time and space from the day and place they occurred (Records, 1).

Records (1998) looks at the two most often used analogies in his monograph; the Munich Conference of October 1938 and the Vietnam War. Of his four main research questions, the last is of specific interest; he asks, as a general rule, does reasoning by historical analogy help or hinder decision-makers?” Record (1998) concludes that the examples of Munich and Vietnam reveal the limits of reasoning by historical analogy. However, he does suggest that “History nonetheless can teach at the level of generality. Munich constituted a legitimate lesson in how not to deal with [a] powerful aggressor seeking regional or global domination” (Record, 23). In addition he suggests that “The Vietnam analogy itself provides good instruction on the democratic political and professional military requirements of the United States should attempt to meet when contemplating major and potentially sustained use of force against another state”
(Record, 23). His research suggests that “whatever the utility of reasoning by historical analogy as tool of policy formulation and implementation, it is clear that policymakers will continue to be influenced by past events and what they believe those events teach” (Record, 23).
LIST OF REFERENCES


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