Rivalry-Prone Dyads? Interstate Religious Differences and Military Conflict

2016

Manar Elkhaldi

University of Central Florida

Find similar works at: http://stars.library.ucf.edu/etd

University of Central Florida Libraries http://library.ucf.edu

STARS Citation

http://stars.library.ucf.edu/etd/5104

This Doctoral Dissertation (Open Access) is brought to you for free and open access by STARS. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of STARS. For more information, please contact lee.dotson@ucf.edu.
RIVALRY-PRONE DYADS?
INTERSTATE RELIGIOUS DIFFERENCES AND MILITARY CONFLICT

by

MANAR ELKHALDI
M.S. International Islamic University Malaysia, 2001

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in the Department of Political Science
in the College of Sciences
at the University of Central Florida
Orlando, Florida

Summer Term
2016

Major Professor: Barbara Kinsey
ABSTRACT

The link between religion and interstate military conflict has attracted a lot of attention among scholars of international relations and also foreign policy makers and religious organizations. This study examines whether religious differences between states in a dyad may partly affect various types of militarized conflict. It is argued in the literature that religion promotes stronger loyalty and sense of obligation than other cultural identities (Juergensmeyer, 1993); I argue that religious identity may be used by states effectively to mobilize people by means of rhetoric to generate and sustain popular support for conflict with other states. Thus I expect that states with different predominant religions to be more likely to engage in various dimensions of rivalry. The objective of this research is to contribute to understanding why certain dyads may be more likely to engage in military conflict.

I construct new datasets and develop statistical models to evaluate the connection between religion and interstate military conflict. I focus on the onset of different types of interstate rivalries and war and examine the link of each of these types with different kinds of religious differences. I explore whether (a) interstate dyads with religious difference, (b) Christian/Muslim dyads, and (c) interstate dyads with different religious denominations have a higher propensity to engage in (a) enduring rivalry, (b) rivalry recurrence, and (c) war. This study covers the time period between 1945 and 2001. I conduct the analyses using logit models that incorporate alternative explanations of each of these three dimensions of rivalry. In addition, I provide a case study of the 1947 India-Pakistan war to examine closer the mechanism of the relationship between religious difference in this dyad and war. Analysis results suggest that dyads with “religious difference” are associated with rivalry recurrence and war;
“Christian/Muslim Differences” do not appear to have an effect on rivalry. The findings of this research are expected to offer a better understanding of rivalry between dyads.
For my Parents
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

It is hard to believe that this chapter in my life is complete. This accomplishment could not have been possible without the will of Allah (God). I am grateful for the strength, health, and endurance that He has granted me and the vast blessings He has granted me throughout this academic journey.

Professionally, my gratitude must first go to Dr. Barbara Kinsey, who has been my Chair, advisor, mentor, professor, and friend. I am sincerely grateful for her guidance and patience since I joined the program. She believed in me at times when I did not believe in myself. Her enthusiasm and uplifting words really resonated in my mind and heart throughout this crucial time in my life. I am also grateful for Dr. Roger Handberg and Dr. Thomas Dolan for having such a positive influence on me and serving on my committee. Their insight, wisdom, and input helped shape my dissertation to be what it is today. I am sincerely thankful to Dr. Gennady Rudkevich for his infinite help from the infancy of this research to its final stage of completion. Dr. Rudkevich’s input, vast knowledge, and patience truly guided throughout my academic career and the completion of this thesis.

At a personal level, I do not have the words to express my gratitude to my family. My parents, Dr. Monzer and Dr. Feryal, always believed in me and constantly reminded me to remain steadfast despite the obstacles. My father is my moral compass. He has always advised me to do something good for my community and the world, writ large. My father’s constant reminders even affected the choice of this dissertation’s topic. My mother is my rock and my best friend. Her advice was never taken for granted and it is because of her continued support that I was able to complete this dissertation. My daughter, Neda, has always been my cheerleader. I could not
ask for a better daughter who is so mature, selfless, and exceptionally understanding. I cannot express how proud I am of her and that without her help and support with house chores and her baby brother, I probably would never have completed my thesis. My husband, Abusalma, has been my second pair of eyes—from rereading my work to beautifying my tables, charts, graphs, etc. His extensive support and patience throughout this time will never go unnoticed. He has sacrificed so much to facilitate my dream of becoming a doctor of philosophy. I am truly grateful to my sisters, Kholoud, Shorouk, Reem, and Noor for always believing in me and praying for me. I am also thankful to my brother, Homam, for being there to entertain my children when I had to do research and write. His support, as well as Seham’s (my sister-in-law) was amazing and I am truly blessed to have all of these people in my life. Last, but not least, I am thankful to my baby boy, Zakaria (Zaki), who was so cooperative when I would not be able to take him out to play. Zaki continuously reminded me to do my ‘homework’, although he never understood why I had homework in the first place. He may not remember this in the future, but his amazing hugs always energized me to continue writing just one more sentence, one more paragraph, or one more chapter until I completed my goal.

I am thankful to the Political Science Department of the University of Central Florida (UCF) for its financial support (i.e., fellowship) and employment as a Graduate Teaching Assistant throughout my academic career. These opportunities truly facilitated my ability complete the Security Studies Ph.D. program without any debt.

Aside from my Dissertation Committee members at UCF, I am particularly grateful to Dr. Kerstin Hamann, Dr. Michael Mousseau, Dr. Mark Schafer, and Camille Kelly. Each one played
a vital role throughout this academic journey. I am truly indebted to their support, encouragement, and patience.

I am grateful for the incredible support and guidance of the wonderful scholars who not only inspired me but also provided me with a wealth of information, data sets, and research ideas for this thesis. Paul F. Diehl, James D. Fearon, Jonathan Fox, Kristian S. Gleditsch, Gary Goertz, Jeffrey Haynes, Errol A. Henderson, Zeev Maoz, and Basedau Matthias merit specific mention in this respect.

During this period of my life, I did not really have much of a social life. But despite my inability to be a good friend, I had better friends who still kept me in their prayers. Maryam Hasan deserves the first mention for her continued support and help in any way that she could to relieve me of my stress—from getting me a cup of Starbucks coffee to taking my children home with her so I can finish my work. Maryam really personifies a best friend in this world and in the Hereafter. I am thankful for Gihan Omar, who is one of my longest friends. Her friendship has inspired me throughout this journey. I am grateful for Farhana Yunus, and Jenny MacDowell who remained incredibly understanding throughout this trying time. Their pursuit for higher education really motivated me to take on this program and complete my dissertation.
**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

LIST OF FIGURES .................................................................................................................. xii
LIST OF TABLES .................................................................................................................... xiii

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 1
   The Question ......................................................................................................................... 1
   The Main Argument .............................................................................................................. 5
   Enduring Rivalry .................................................................................................................... 13
   Rivalry Recurrence ............................................................................................................. 15
   War .................................................................................................................................... 17
   Types of Religious Differences ............................................................................................ 18
   Significance of Research ....................................................................................................... 19
   Dissertation Plan .................................................................................................................. 20

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK .................. 22
   Literature Review .................................................................................................................. 22
      Conceptual Limitations ....................................................................................................... 22
      The Link between Religion and Conflict .......................................................................... 24
      Perspectives on Religious Differences and Dimensions of Conflict.................................. 25
   Theoretical Framework ........................................................................................................ 32
      Theories ............................................................................................................................ 38
   Enduring Rivalry and Rivalry Recurrence Theoretical Framework, Part I ....................... 39
      Enduring Rivalry and Rivalry Recurrence ...................................................................... 42
   War Theoretical Framework, Part II ................................................................................... 47
      Conditions for False Optimism .......................................................................................... 52

CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH DESIGN ............................................................................. 57
   Data and Empirical Strategy ................................................................................................. 57
   Main Independent Variables ............................................................................................... 58
   Dependent Variables ............................................................................................................ 61
      Enduring Rivalry ................................................................................................................. 62
      Rivalry Recurrence ............................................................................................................ 62
   War .................................................................................................................................... 64
Control Variables ................................................................. 65
Territorial Issue ..................................................................... 65
Contiguity .............................................................................. 65
Major power dyad ................................................................. 66
Joint Democracy ................................................................. 66
Incongruent outcomes ........................................................... 67
Strength of Past Rivalry .................................................... 67
War as a Control Variable .................................................... 68
Linguistic differences .......................................................... 68
Ethnic differences ............................................................... 69
Method of Analysis ............................................................... 70

CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS AND ANALYSIS ........................................ 73
Results—Enduring Rivalry and Religious Differences .................. 74
Results—Enduring Rivalry and Effects of Control Variables ............ 78
Results—Rivalry Recurrence and Religious Differences ............... 78
Results—Rivalry Recurrence and Control Variables ..................... 86
Results—War and Religious Differences ..................................... 87
Results—War and Control Variables ......................................... 94
Findings for Enduring Rivalry, Rivalry Recurrence, and War ........... 94
The India-Pakistan War of 1947 ................................................. 96
Background of the India-Pakistan War of 1947 ............................. 100
Pakistan: Explaining the Condition for False Optimism Prior to the 1947-48 War .... 103

CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION .................................................. 112
Summary of Findings ............................................................ 113
Religious Differences and Enduring Rivalry: .............................. 115
Religious Differences and Rivalry Recurrence: ............................ 115
Religious Differences and War: ............................................ 116
The Case of the India-Pakistan War of 1947: ............................... 116
Policy Implications ............................................................. 117
Contribution in the Study of Religion and Conflict ....................... 117
Future Research ................................................................... 119

APPENDIX A: CASES IN CHRISTIAN/MUSLIM DYADS .................... 121
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1  Religious Pluralities: Summary Statistics and Distributions.  Dyads....................... 128

Figure 2  Religious Denomination Pluralities: Summary Statistics and Distributions.  Dyads. 129

Figure 3  Religious Denomination (Protestants & Anglicans) Pluralities: Summary Statistics and
Distributions.  Dyads. .............................................................................................................. 130
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Models to be Estimated ................................................................. 70
Table 2: Relationship between Enduring Rivalry and All Religious Differences and
Christian/Muslim Differences ...................................................................... 76
Table 3: Relationship between Rivalry Recurrence and All Religious Differences and
Christian/Muslim Differences .................................................................... 81
Table 4: Predicted Probabilities of Rivalry Recurrence .................................. 86
Table 5: Relationship between War and All Religious Differences and Christian/Muslim
Differences .................................................................................................. 89
Table 6: Predicted Probabilities of War .......................................................... 94
Table 7: Summary of Variables and Measures. All variables are dichotomous ........ 125
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

The Question

In 1947, India and Pakistan went to war over the “formally independent state of Jammu and Kashmir” and have since been “locked in an embrace of seemingly unending [conflict]” (Ganguly, 2001: 1). India, predominantly Hindu, and Pakistan, predominantly Muslim, remain in conflict despite several resolution efforts. The conflict pattern in the India-Pakistan case relates to the question I seek to address in this dissertation. Do the varying religious identities in this dyad contribute to this unending militarized conflict? It is commonly argued in the literature that [religious] identity is an essential clue for understanding interstate relations (Gartzke & Gleditsch, 2006). This thesis aims to provide a better understanding of the link between religion and conflict. In particular, do religious differences between states in a dyad partly affect various types of rivalry and war? I use social identity theory to understand the connection between states with different religions and their propensity for militarized conflict. Since religion may play a role in people’s social and political life (Chriss, 2013), I argue that when some collective group identity such as religion is in place, states may use the opportunity to mobilize the main population of adherents by means of rhetoric to generate and sustain popular support for conflict with other states.

---

1 India and Pakistan experienced an enduring rivalry from 1947 to 2001, with a total of 46 militarized disputes. They have also engaged in four wars throughout this period: “in 1947-48, they fought a long and intense battle over the formerly independent state of Jammu and Kashmir; in 1965 they fought another war over the same piece of land; in 1971 the two engaged during the civil war that severed East Pakistan into the nascent state of Bangladesh; and in 1999 they fought once more in the mountains of Kashmir” (Ganguly, 2001: 1).

2 I sometimes refer to them as ‘interreligious dyads’ throughout this dissertation.

3 A ‘dyads’ is a concept used to describe “pairs of states” involved in a dispute (Klein, Goertz, & Diehl, 2006: 337).
Since the end of World War II in 1945, several dyads\(^4\) (e.g., France-China [1945-1949], Italy-Albania [1950-1952], Greece-Turkey [1945-1958], and Russia-Turkey [1978-1993]) have engaged in enduring or recurring militarized rivalries\(^5\), with some disputes ending in wars. Other states ceased further hostilities and have had extended periods of peace (e.g., France and Germany post-World War II) \(^6\). Throughout intractable rivalry, states incur significant devastation to their defense capabilities, interstate positions, and domestic societies. Nevertheless, some state rivalries persist over time. Could religion be a contributing factor in interstate rivalry? In other words, does the existence of religious differences in a dyad\(^6\) increase the likelihood for the two states to seek conflict-based avenues?

The literature on the determinants of interstate militarized conflict raises some central questions in the field of security studies and international relations. Scholars identify links between culture and conflict and ethnicity and conflict, but do not test empirically how religion in particular is linked to interstate militarized conflicts. Although Huntington (1993, 1996) argues that some states are undergoing a ‘clash of civilizations’ and thus some interstate relationships are more conflict prone than others, there is no inquiry into the specific role of religion in such conflicts. Additionally, ethnic conflict literature (e.g., Sadowski, 1998; Smith, 1999) seeks to explain conflict behavior on the basis of ethnic identities. Civilizational and ethnic characteristics may be linked to conflict, yet the relationship between religion and conflict

\(^4\) Each state in a dyad refers to a sovereign state governments. Throughout this dissertation, the word ‘state’ refers to state leader, who is the final decision maker in matters of rivalry.

\(^5\) Other examples of seemingly perpetual rivalries include Hungary and Yugoslavia from 1968 to 1991; Italy and Yugoslavia from 1972 to 1992 (Rudkevich, Travlos, & Diehl, 2013).

\(^6\) According to Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006), “rivalries consist of the same pair of states [dyads] competing with each other, and the expectation of a future conflict relationship is one that is specific as to whom the opponent will be” (333). Basically, the players in rivalries include states, “and rivalries are dyadic” (Ibid., 2006: 333).
remains understudied. Thus the lack of systematic scholarship on the link between religion and militarized conflict is partially due to conceptual ambiguity. Scholars who attempt to analyze the effect of religious differences on interstate conflict use concepts such as ‘culture’ or ‘ethnic’ and not specifically ‘religious’ differences. Such conceptual limitations do not allow for systematic inquiry in the connection between religion and conflict. To contribute to the existing literature, I treat ‘religion’ as an exclusive concept to examine the connection between religious differences and three dimensions of militarized conflict.

Huntington (1993) argues that “decreasingly able to mobilize support and form coalitions on the basis of ideology, [states] will increasingly attempt to mobilize support by appealing to common religion and civilization identity” (9). Since Huntington’s (1993, 1996) prediction, 9/11 ushered a new-found need to understand the religion-conflict nexus since evidently religion had its part in the calamity. Soon after, scholars began studying the role of the religion in relation to the terror attacks in particular and conflict in general. The ‘religion’ category has since become an important reference in the dynamics of interstate politics. Both state and faction leaders may have the ability to mobilize the public’s support against other states with different religious beliefs. It is argued that prior to onset of militarized conflict campaigns, leaders may use religious discourse to recruit successfully believers to partake or support their cause. For example, in states such as Algeria, India, the Philippines, and Yugoslavia, “religious motivations overlay political conflicts with violent ramifications” (Gill, 2001: 118). Long term peace may be less likely once militarized campaigns erupt between religiously different dyads.

---

7 According to Huntington (1993), “civilizations are differentiated from each other by history, language, culture, tradition and, most important, religion” (25). The distinct variance of these civilizations from one another, history of prolonged violent conflicts, and other political factors may heighten the rivalry between each other.
Svensson (2007) explains that “religious armed conflicts are more intractable than nonreligious conflicts” (930). Thus, it is reasonable to argue that religious differences and different dimensions of conflict are correlated because religious identity has distinct properties for mobilization. The religious differences and militarized conflict nexus is not only of academic interest, but also has policy implications. Examining this link is an important inquiry in the international relations literature that will increase our understanding of militarized conflict but also for policymakers. This study may provide insight for policy makers to better understand the importance of religious differences via its mobilization potential on militarized conflict behavior.

This is a quantitative study that estimates the effects of religious differences between two states in a dyad on the likelihood to pursue rivalry and war. That is, are dyads with religious differences more disposed to militarized conflict? In particular, I examine the effects of religious differences within dyads on three types of militarized conflict: enduring rivalry, rivalry recurrence, and war.

---

Studies on interstate rivalries propose an empirically based direction for understanding militarized conflict. Typically, scholars have discussed rivalry in relation to “enmity” (Klein, Goertz, & Diehl, 2006; Cox, 2010), “protracted conflict” (Ayoob, 1997; Mearsheimer, 2002), and “enduring rivalry” (Goertz & Diehl, 1992, 1993; Vasquez, 1993; and Barnett, 1999). Each term denotes in the general sense “a longstanding, competitive relationship between two or more adversaries” (Hensel, 1998: 3) and is characterized by intense militarized disputes that may evolve into repeated confrontations (enduring rivalry) or abate over time (protracted rivalry). The clear difference between the rivalry disputes is that some do not have a militarized aspect and their renewal is not studied. Although some scholars consider “interstate rivalry” as identical to “enduring interstate rivalry,” the present research treats the term “rivalry” in a more specific sense. This dissertation will focus on three types of rivalry: (a) enduring rivalries, (b) rivalry recurrence, and (c) interstate war in the period between 1945 and 2001; thus, data on interstate rivalries are used to show whether various dimensions of rivalries may be partly motivated by the religious differences between the two states in a dyad. It is possible to derive more general predictions related to the initiation of religiously motivated militarized rivalries.
The Main Argument

This research aims to examine whether religious differences between states affect different dimensions of interstate rivalry and war\textsuperscript{9}. As has been generally observed, cultural identities, such as religion, appear to have become more significant as a source of mobilization in the past two decades (Hechter, 2004; Huntington, 1996; Huntington, 2002). Seul (1999) argues that “religion is not the cause of religious conflict; rather for many . . . it frequently supplies the fault line along which intergroup identity and resource competition occurs” (564). Since religion has a significant impact on the political setting, the state may use religion to motivate various types of state policies. Haynes (1994) argues that there are implications in such “religio-political movements” that seek to utilize religion through political means (30). Essentially, states may use “religious myths and symbols to influence the political process, [thus] espousing both religious and secular goals” (Fox, 2002: 108).

An extensive search through the literature on religion and conflict did not produce any distinctive and testable theories. The existing propositions can be grouped into two parts. The first part follows Huntington’s (1993, 1996) ‘Clash of Civilizations’ thesis (Henderson, 1998; Russett, Oneal, & Cox, 2000; Davis, Jaggers, & Moore, 1997; Fox, 2013). According to Huntington (1993), “civilizations are differentiated from each other by history, language, culture, tradition and, most important, religion” (25). The distinct variance of these civilizations from one another, history of prolonged violent conflicts, and other political factors may heighten the conflict between each other. More specifically, the cultural features between the different

\textsuperscript{9} I am concerned with religious identities as sources of mobilization. Seul (1999) argues that ‘religious conflicts’ are not necessarily about religion or religious conversion, and usually have non-religious causes.
civilizations drive the polarizations between the Eastern and Western spheres. Huntington (1996) includes various elements in the way he defined ‘civilization’, yet he maintains that culture is a common theme (Ellis, 2010). Particularly, Huntington (1996) argues that ‘civilization’ and ‘culture’ denote “the overall way of life of a people, and a civilization is a culture writ large” (41).

The second part follows the argument that a threat to an ethnic group by an out-group may dictate vengeful treatment and conflict behavior. Rai and Fiske (2011) broadly explain that the importance of unity is partially captured by supporting the in-groups’ integrity through a sense of collective responsibility and common fate (61). Smith (1981, 1986) argues that national movements are ‘multidimensional’ and include cultural aspects such as religion yet he focuses on specific ethnic group conflicts: Tamils, Tibetans, Sikhs, Pakistanis, and Indians. Smith (1981, 1986) does not make a direct link between these groups’ religious identities and respective national movements. Smith (1999) does not test systematically whether religious differences between the selected groups increase their likelihood to engage in intrastate conflict. Smith’s works (1981, 1986, 1999) all have important elements for understanding group differences, features of nationalism, and group conflict. Although Smith does not examine explicitly the role of religion, his central tenets on group conflict may further a logical analysis on religious differences and interstate conflict.

Studies exploring the effects of religion on conflict lack consistency in specifying the concept of ‘religion’. Nearly every study that attempts to analyze the effects of religious differences on interstate or intrastate conflicts applies the broad concepts of ‘culture’ or ‘ethnic’ dissimilarities not ‘religious’ differences. Thus these studies cannot identify the specific effect of religious differences on various dimensions of militarized conflict. Also, these quantitative
studies on the link between religion and conflict have important implications for further research because such studies need to include a more precise definition of ‘religion’ to test the specific kinds of religious differences on different types of rivalry and war. I address such limitations in the literature by evaluating the effects of religious differences on enduring rivalries, rivalry recurrence, and war. This study fills a gap by determining whether religious differences between dyads increase the probability of militarized conflict behavior.

While the literature on the role of religion in international politics has been increasing, the theories used to explain interstate conflict behavior are still ambiguous. There is no solid mechanism linking religion with conflict. For example, some theories emphasize how the in-group might increase its hostility against the out-group due to the existence of religious differences. However, these theories fall short in explaining the state’s role in this conflict. Essentially, it is important to understand the role the state may play as an agent that propagates hostility against the out-group. Thus, empirical studies on religion and interstate militarized conflict remain limited and the frameworks generally used to understand such studies “remain far too crude” (Toft, Philpott, & Shah, 2011: 8).

The prevailing social science literature based on social identity theory (Seul, 1999; Voye, 1999; Smith, 1999, 2000; Toft, Philpott, & Shah, 2011; Shaw, 2011) and social psychology (Ellingsen, 2000; Petersen, 2002) suggests that identity may provide a mechanism that is used by political institutions to facilitate public mobilization (Fox, 2013) in order to legitimize their agenda (Lewy, 1974; Johnston & Figa, 1988). Building on social identity theory, Coser (1956) argues that the in-group/out-group proposition suggests that conflict with the out-group increases the cohesion and political monopolization of the in-group. Thus, the state can influence the in-group’s perceptions by presenting the rival’s objectives as “evil.” By demonizing the rival, the
state may be able to influence the public’s existing social ties to their religious identity, ultimately mobilizing the main population’s support for the conflict.

In line with the social identity theory, the group’s religion provides a coherent worldview and fulfills the need to belong, which is an essential human motivation (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). I argue that a state may capitalize on such religious ‘motivation’ from its predominant population in order to gain public support during time of conflict. More specifically, a state’s perception of another state may be organized into “group schemas, or images, [whereby] these images\(^{10}\) are organized in a systematic way [with] cognitions and beliefs regarding the target state’s motives, leadership, and primary characteristics” (Alexander, Levin, & Henry, 2005: 28). According to Seul (1999), each group with which a given in-group is or is not associated is positively or negatively evaluated by either group (556). When an in-group attempts to negatively evaluate an out-group, for example, certain images may be used to achieve a “comparatively superior position for the in-group on the basis of valued dimensions, [which] is the key factor leading to discriminatory intergroup [conflict] behavior” (Seul, 1999: 557). Thus, a state may exploit these ‘images’ by deriving stereotypes of the out-group state when the two states’ main religions differ. Understanding how states may develop certain images “requires understanding the context of intergroup relations from which these beliefs and stereotypes directly derive” (Alexander et al., 2005: 28). Such stereotypes based on beliefs and other defining characteristics may play an important role in determining the particular images that states have of one another. Stereotypes or ‘images\(^{11}\) of other states stem from “perceived

---

\(^{10}\) This idea is reflected in Image Theory, which is a theory of “strategic decision making that identifies the primary judgments guiding international images, or stereotypes, and the selection of international policies” (Alexander, Levin, & Henry, 2005: 28).

\(^{11}\) Here, image theory examines the possible role of social identity, particularly in the context of religious differences and militarized conflict.
relationships between [states] and serve to justify a [state’s] desired reaction or treatment toward another [state]” (Alexander et al, 2005: 29). Accordingly, I rely on social identity theory to explain *enduring* and *rivalry recurrence* and *war* because the theory suggests that groups of people may engage in conflict when conditions such as different group identities exist. Hence, the role of the state (as an agent that influences its population based on stereotypical images of the out-group) is important because of the potential of mobilization of these identities. States that engage in rivalries and/or war may support hawkish policies instead of peaceful resolutions for several reasons, though. Thus, I control for other factors that may cause states to take the militarized conflict route.

Now, war is distinct in that it requires a weightier decision and more resources by the states involved. In particular, interstate war demands more material and --human resources, policy choices, and emotional obligations and costs on the states’ populaces. Since war has much higher costs, states usually consider the costs against the benefits of the war outcome. Mobilization of the state population’s religious identity may be a factor contributing to the state’s expectations regarding the outcome of the war. Consequently, mobilization based on identity may increase the state’s optimism regarding its performance in war and prospect of victory. I utilize the theory of false optimism as it is considered in the literature a significant explanation of war (White, 1970; Stoessinger, 1974; Jervis, 1976, 1988; Levy, 1983; Blainey, 1988; Van Evera, 1999; Johnson, 2004) and describe how my argument fits in this theoretical framework. According to false optimism in relation to war, a state may sometimes suffer from hubris, a level of overconfidence whereby the state ultimately resorts to militarized behavior instead of seeking peaceful settlements. The level of ‘false optimism’ “is the extent to which a state’s perception of how well it will fare in a war exceeds the reality” (Altman, 2015: 287). The optimism theory as
a mechanism is used in this research to link religious differences to the onset of war. Given the plurality of religious adherents, a state may have exaggerated expectations about winning the war since that population may be seen as a source to support and energize the war effort. Accordingly, interstate war behavior may be explained by a state’s hawkishness when the other state has a different religion.

Blainey (1988) argues that in the past three centuries, war unfolds repeated clues which highlight the causes of war and peace. Since warfare is costly and risky, there should exist negotiated agreements. When political bargaining fails, states may choose war over further diplomacy. Although the theory of false optimism is not a comprehensive explanation for war, the theory suggests a persuasive added part of the war puzzle. This argument is merely the start of discerning how false optimism is relevant to understanding how different religious identities in a dyad may be a contributive factor of war. According to Slantchev and Tarar (2011) “[optimism] is only a starting point: it shows why the actors might be unwilling to offer each war-avoiding peace terms” (136). The mechanism orients the effect on the war policy of at least one state in the dyad. Whereas the literature on the link between religion and conflict does not sufficiently and systematically explore the mechanism leading to war, my argument broadly applies false optimism to explain why states with varying religions may go to war over peace as a viable option. The identities in two different predominant religions between states may lead to hawkish policies via the populations’ support. Kahneman and Renshon (2007) argue that “a hawk’s preference for military action over diplomatic measures is often built upon the assumption that victory will come easily and swiftly” (37). Thus, there are also precursory

---

12 Johnson (2004) argues that “there is some probability of war even if there are no positive illusions (owing to a variety of other causes)” (38).
I focus on one such condition: religious differences between the two states.

I examine whether religious differences between states may contribute to rivalry and war in the time period between 1945 and 2001. Conducting the analysis during this time period allows me to hold several factors constant including the founding of international institutions aimed at preserving world peace, such as the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, and the European Union among others. In addition, since the end of World War II, scholars began questioning the validity of the category of religion in all parts of social life and politics and whether the world was moving toward a period of secularization. This is commonly known as the theory of secularization, “namely, the decline of religion and the privatization of religion” (Shah, Stepan, & Toft, 2012: 4). However, this secularization proposition was challenged by events around the world and was “severely jolted with the establishment of the first modern theocracy in 1979 in Iran” (Shah, Stepan, & Toft, 2012: 2). By the late 1980s religious political movements had emerged in Egypt, Sudan, Algeria, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Chad, Senegal, Turkey, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Kenya, Guatemala, Philippines, Sri Lanka, India, Israel, Punjab in India, Canada, and Britain (Shah, Stepan, & Toft, 2012: 2). These religious movements challenging secular states were Muslim, Protestant, Buddhist, Hindu, Sikh, and Orthodox Jews. Reviving the role of religion within a state highlighted not only the importance of religion for these groups, but also contributed to the creation of competitions, negative relationships, polarization, and greater separations between major religious groups (Shah, Stepan, & Toft, 2012). Since major religions demanded greater public presence, interreligious hostilities began to emerge between states (Shah, Stepan, & Toft, 2012). Thus studying the role
of religion in interstate militarized conflict during the 1945-2001 period may inform further the theory of secularization.

Now, the time period ranging from 1945 to 2001 is known for the changing world order that affected relationships between states. For the most part, the Cold War covered much of this study’s time period (i.e., 1945 to 1989) whereby some countries allied and/or established treaties and agreements with one of the two major powers: the United States or Soviet Union (Charap & Shapiro, 2016). The interstate relationships that were established during the Cold War period either suppressed conflicts between each major power’s allies or intensified conflict between those states allied with the United States and those allied with the Soviet Union. For example, Afghan-US relations became significant during the Cold War period. The United States supported Afghanistan’s efforts against the Soviet Union by offering military and financial assistance throughout this time (Charap & Shapiro, 2016). Similarly, interstate relations formed with the Soviet Union to achieve victory against the Soviets’ enemies (i.e., US allies). Such interstate relations may have contributed to interstate militarized conflict. Thus, conducting the study using this time period may introduce systematic error in the conduct of analysis.

Answering the question on whether religiously different dyads have a proclivity to conflict requires unique theories and systematic analyses to capture the causes of rivalry and war. Pearce (2006) argues that “given the frequency of religious conflict, the evidence shows that there are circumstances under which religion can, in fact, provoke rather than resolve conflict. I present the theories that probe the link between religious identity and conflict by exploring how such identity of the predominant population may contribute to at least one state’s optimism and overconfidence to pursue war. I rely on social psychology’s Social Identity Theory and False Optimism Theory to explain the mechanisms used for the various dimensions of militarized
conflict behavior. By applying the theories relative to the religion-conflict nexus, I seek to provide a new explanation on how religious differences between dyads may be used to affect hawkish state policies. I test hypotheses based on the above arguments.

Enduring Rivalry

Based on Klein, Goertz, and Diehl’s (2006) new rivalry approach, the phenomenon of rivalry is based on the intensity and frequency of militarized interstate disputes between two states (333-334). The empirical dimension of studying rivalry “focuses on phenomena ignored by standard conflict theories” (Diehl & Goertz, 2000: 2). While conflicts do not necessarily involve a military interaction, rivalries specifically involve several militarized disputes and/or systematic militarized violence between two sovereign states. According to Goertz and Diehl (1992), studies that use the rivalry framework are more equipped “to reflect actual conflict patterns and to allow scholars to understand irregular, but interconnected, conflict over long periods of time” (162). In particular, rivalries are identified as three or more “interconnected13” militarized disputes between two sovereign states in a dyad (Klein et al., 2006: 337). I adopt Klein, Goertz, and Diehl’s (2006) definitions of different dimensions of rivalry in “New Rivalry Dataset: Procedures and Patterns” (334). Klein et al. (2006) consider the initial “dyadic dispute to be the first behavioral sign that a rivalry exists” and the end of the last militarized interstate dispute (MID) “is the last behavioral manifestation of rivalry14” (338).

13 According to Klein et al. (2006), “disputes may [be] connected by the presence of unresolved issues that persist over a broad period” (337).

14 Klein et al. (2006) “consider the rivalry to have ended in the 10—15 years” after the “last behavioral sign of the rivalry” (338-39).
Unresolved political goals may lead adversaries to turn to “militarized means of settling their disagreements” (Hensel, N.d.: 3). Studies on enduring rivalries, or longstanding disputes between states, started to emerge in the 1990s (Klein et al., 2006). Scholarly works suggest that enduring rivalries “tend to be more violent and more escalatory than confrontations between non-rival adversaries” (Hensel, N.d.: 3). Goertz and Diehl (1996) argue that the concept of rivalry has prompted the “rivalry approach” to war and peace, “which focuses scholarly attention on contextual issues” that are often overlooked in interstate conflict research (Hensel, N.d.: 4). The rivalry approach focuses attention on the background (i.e., context) in which interstate relationships occur (Hensel, N.d.). Basically scholars seek to identify various circumstances that may affect interstate rivalry behavior. One such rivalry approach examines the processes that lead to the onset or evolution of rivalry (i.e., enduring or proto rivalries) (Hensel, N.d.: 4). Diehl and Goertz (2000) argue that rivalry behavior is a function of past conditions (e.g., arms races and military buildup, power transition, deterrence, etc.) under which conflict ensues between states. It is these past conditions that characterize the unique stability of rivalries, “which is reinforced by the expectation of future conflict” (Diehl & Goertz, 2000: 77). The rivalry approach assumes that the link between past conditions and the outbreak of rivalry between two states in a dyad is more likely when the states have the same suspicion and/or hostility (Hensel, N.d.). I predict that the religious differences between the two states motivates that suspicion and/or hostility.

Manifestations of militarized conflict are inherent in the state’s efforts to survive in the international system, and states are rational actors who calculate the expected benefits versus the costs prior to participating in interstate rivalry. For example, Bruce Bueno De Mesquita (1985) argues that war can be rational if “both sides have expected utility for fighting; that is, if the
expected utility of war (expected benefits less costs)” outweighs the expected utility of “remaining at peace” (161). Since religious difference may be used to decrease the costs of conflict it may be reasonable to argue that such difference between the states may increase the likelihood of the rivalry escalating to a full-fledged enduring rivalry.

Religious differences between states may play an important role in the development of enduring rivalry. The relationship between two states that has been marked by a history of repeated militarized interactions is susceptible to manipulation by at least one of the two states. Hensel (1998) argues that two adversaries’ relations at any given period are impacted by the context of relationships between them. As two states increase their history of conflict with one another, I argue that the states’ religious differences may be a contributing factor to this history. Consequently, at least one state in the dyad may use the existence of religious differences in its public rhetoric to mobilize the main population’s support for the rivalry cause.

Rivalry Recurrence

Hensel (1998) argues that “past interactions between two adversaries are likely to affect their future expectations, as when a history of frequent militarized conflict between them or a history of unsuccessful peaceful settlement attempts leads to the expectation of future conflict and the perception that peaceful means of settlement are unlikely to succeed in settling the issues at stake” (4). Various dyadic rivalries erupted in the 20th century to establish political and economic domination, among other reasons. In spite of territorial modifications, regime transformation, new leadership and generational change in both states, the rivalry resumed after decades of armistice.
According to Rudkevich, Travlos, and Diehl (2013), “there must be some concerns for the conditions surrounding the end of the original rivalry, but no study examines historical factors in the relationship, and certainly not whether there was a previous rivalry between the states, in accounting for rivalry onset” (160). I argue that one historical factor may be a country’s predominant religion, which ultimately embeds tradition and distinct principles for society. Thus, this study incorporates “religious difference” as a social dimension to the Rudkevich et al. (2013) model. A population’s predominant religion differentiates their state from another, thus widening the gap between them. Could religious difference be a partial underlying cause of rivalry recurrence? Rudkevich et al. (2013) stress “the longer that rivalries endure and the more frequent their hostile interactions, the less they are influenced by single events and more by the entire history of the rivalry, or the legacy of the past” (161). In other words, the more systematically active the rivalry in a dyad, the higher the likelihood it is renewed in the future. Thus, I extend the Rudkevich et al. (2013) analysis of rivalry recurrence by testing the religious differences as a causal factor. I argue that rivalry recurrence among states may not only be politically motivated, but religious differences may be an additional explanatory factor. Discerning past rivalry interactions and social and political patterns may help explain states’ prospective behaviors.

Religious difference may be an important factor for rivalry recurrence to occur. To be sure, I test rivalry cases after the end of World War II, which highlight religious differences between states that reentered into interstate rivalry decades after the initial rivalry was terminated. Based on this method I examine whether religious difference has been a cause since the rivalry’s inception. Other factors such as the state’s political regime and leaders might have changed since the initial rivalry, but the state’s main religious affiliation remained constant (for
the most part). Hence, I argue that religious differences between dyads may be the catalyst of interstate rivalry recurrence years after the initial rivalry’s termination. Iterating the historical enmity among states in a dyad is more likely when their predominant religions diverge. The newly constructed model may increase our understanding on the factors that account for rivalry recurrence.

**War**

Severe conflicts such as interstate wars between two enemies are very costly. Interstate war is a more distinct type of militarized conflict because it necessitates more material and human resources, political strategies, and emotional commitments and sacrifices from the states’ populations. Considering the high costs of war, states typically weigh their costs against the benefits of the war outcome. If one or both states believe that they will win the war (otherwise known as the *false optimism*\(^{15}\) explanation of war), their costs do not appear so high (Slantchev & Tarar, 2011). Lebow (1981) argues that most interstate conflicts include “underlying hostility” (i.e., a rivalry relationship of “past experience”) to explain subsequent militarized behavior between two states (337). Diehl and Goertz (2000) make an important claim when conceptualizing rivalry: “disputes and wars occurring in the rivalry are not independent of each other because they belong to the same relationship” (7). Klein et al. (2006) argue that “rivals expect that mutual disputes, crises, and war are likely to continue into the future” (335) and that one device “by which disputes are linked in rivalry is through the ‘pull of the past’” (342). The ‘pull of the past’ refers to the history of disputes between two states in a dyad, which makes future hostility more likely (Klein et al., 2006: 342). The expectations of future hostility are

\(^{15}\) In this dissertation, I use the theory of *false optimism* to explain war only.
“mechanisms to keep the rivalry going and provide continuity between present and future conflicts” (Klein et al., 2006: 335).

The historical link of disputes between two states may trigger future hostility based on religious differences. Leaders may rely on the population’s support for the war cause. I use exclusively the theory of false optimism to explain the link between religious differences and war. States may activate “a sizable portion of the public” to generate support for an imminent war (Hensel, 1998: 18). States may obtain the population’s support for war with the inculcation of rivalry hostility into domestic society. The state population’s support may be used to exaggerate the state’s optimism about winning the war. Due to such factors as having the backing of the main population to “sustain the war effort”, interstate negotiations may cease and “war becomes the inevitable outcome” (Slantchev & Tarar, 2011: 135).

**Types of Religious Differences**

This study creates a more precise measure of ‘religious differences’. I begin by defining ‘religion’ and then measuring difference in religions. I define ‘religion’ as a “belief system of an individual or a group of individuals that contains several elements: belief in supernatural beings (gods); a distinction between sacred and profane objects; a moral code believed to be sanctioned by the gods; prayer and other forms of communication with gods; a more or less total organization of one’s life based on the worldview; a social group bound together by the above”\(^{16}\) (Alston, 1967). I identify “religious affiliation” by the plurality of the dominant population of religious adherents within the state during a given militarized conflict. The dataset I use shows that states have large pluralities of a single religion. In order to ensure reliable coding of each

---

\(^{16}\) For a more thorough definition on “religion”, see Maoz and Henderson’s World Religions Codebook (2013: 2)
state’s predominant religion in a dyad, I rely on Maoz and Henderson’s (2013) World Religion Project that measures each state’s religious adherents based on denominational level data, which are aggregated into the relevant religious families. My models also control for ethnic and linguistic differences. There is a historical component in certain types of religious differences that may increase the chances of rivalry and war. I am testing for the effects that other types of ‘religious difference’ have on rivalry such as dyads with Christian-Muslim differences and dyads with different religious denominations. Berger (1990) argues that “men go to war and men are put to death amid prayers, blessings, and incantations” (44). States may convey religious messages to influence their population’s endorsement for conflict. Thus, I examine rivalries between dyads with Christian-Muslim differences to determine whether this type of religious difference is associated with enduring rivalry, rivalry recurrence and war. For example, Christian/Muslim dyads may be more inclined to pursue war. Thus, given the existence of religious differences in general or more specifically between Christian/Muslim dyads, states may espouse people’s support for war by reifying their religious fervor. Consequently, for adherents, the decision for war becomes good in itself, rather than a means to an end (Horowitz, 2009: 163). I also examine whether difference in the major religious denominations of each state in a dyad is related with each conflict dimension. These religious orientations may drive states to engage in enduring rivalry, rivalry recurrence, and war.

**Significance of Research**

My contribution to the body of literature on religion and conflict allows both academics and policy makers to better understand the unique impact that religious differences may have on militarized conflict behavior. This rigorous study with its unique theoretical argument advances
this area of research by offering a more nuanced approach to studying religious differences and different dimensions of rivalry and war. Also, policy makers may improve their international policies by exhausting diplomatic efforts prior to deciding on military action.

**Dissertation Plan**

Each of the chapters in this dissertation expands on the concepts discussed thus far, and examines a unique description of religious differences and its analytical connections.

Chapter 2 reviews the literature and theories, illustrating how the concept of ‘religious differences’ has developed prompting a clearer understanding of the concept, however also generating some drawbacks. I then discuss how the view of religious differences is relevant to my work. I postulate that there is an association between religious differences and militarized conflict in interstate dyad. Based on this assumption, I continue with a literature review of the connection between religion and various dimensions of interstate conflict. After defining interstate rivalry and establishing the distinctions among the various types of rivalry and war, I outline the prevailing explanations for these different types of militarized conflicts in the literature and present my arguments. Next, I discuss this study’s theoretical framework and derive the hypotheses to be tested.

Chapter 3 consists of the research design. In Chapter 3, I proceed to discuss the ‘religious differences’ measure, data measurement and methodology, and argue alternative explanations of the different dimensions of rivalry and war analyzed in this study. In addition, I offer a detailed discussion of the variables used in the datasets on enduring rivalry, rivalry recurrence, and war. Further, I distinguish between ‘religious’, ‘linguistic’, and ‘ethnic’ differences on the likelihood of militarized conflict by treating ‘linguistic’ and ‘ethnic’
differences as separate control variables. This method seeks to determine the independent effect, if any, of ‘religious differences’ on different types of rivalry and war.

Chapter 4 describes the estimated effects. To analyze whether religious differences between dyadic states are linked with various levels of rivalry behavior and war, I conduct a quantitative study using statistical models that incorporate alternative explanations on these different dimensions of rivalry and war. I also examine closer the link between religious differences\(^{17}\) and war using a qualitative analysis of the case of India and Pakistan. To examine war proneness, I offer an illustration of the India-Pakistan war of 1947. Chapter 5 concludes and discusses the contribution of this study to the literature of militarized conflict.

This dissertation has several objectives; however, the main one is to contribute to the way scholars and policy makers perceive the role of religion in militarized disputes. Through the use of more rigorous testing, I hope to transform the way this subject is understood and written about.

\(^{17}\) In addition the broad religious differences (e.g., Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, etc.) between states, I test other dynamics of religious differences: that is, ‘Christian-Muslim’ differences, ‘different religious denominations’, and ‘different religious denominations’ while aggregating Protestants and Anglicans on the likelihood of rivalry behavior (i.e., enduring rivalry, rivalry recurrence, and war).
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Literature Review

In this chapter first I review the literature on the link between religion and conflict and next I present my theoretical framework of the relationship between religious difference in a dyad and enduring rivalries, recurring rivalries, and war.

Conceptual Limitations

While the literature supports the argument that religion affects conflict proneness, there is not sufficient research on the connection between religion and armed conflict. In addition, there are conceptual ambiguities that limit the study of this relationship. Huntington (1993, 1996) predicts that the extent of conflicts after the end of the Cold War will be civilizational in nature. The existence of different identities such as religion may serve as a condition in exacerbating conflicts (Henderson, 1997), yet it is difficult to determine if religion may be a cause since “religion is subsumed under the ethnic and [civilizational] categories” (Henderson, 1997: 660; Carment, 1993; Carment & James, 1995). For example, several scholars argue that Huntington’s (1993, 1996) definition of “civilization” is controversial (Jervis, 1997; Buzan, 1997). Katzenstein (1996) explains that “although they are real, the defining characteristics of “civilization” ([i.e.] history, ethnicity, language, culture, tradition, and religion) cannot be grasped easily” (533). Basically, it is difficult to observe such a broad, all-encompassing concept as “civilization”; whereas, studying “religion” directly may serve as a basis for clarification in the study of the link between religion and conflict (Seul, 1999).
Thus although Huntington (1993, 1996) provides a compelling argument, he falls short in his definition of ‘civilizational difference’. On one hand, he refers to his causal variable as ‘culture’, and then argues that the different ‘religions’ between states cause wars. Though Huntington uses ‘civilization’ and ‘culture’ interchangeably, he also stresses their differences whereby they “share common elements such as religion, language, customs, history, and institutions” (Russett, Oneal, & Cox, 2000: 587). Additionally, Huntington (1993) separates ethnic and religious identities to explain the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ relationship between people of different ethnicity and religion (29). Further, Huntington (1993, 1996) interchangeably uses nationality and religious affiliation of a group, which creates confusion between the two concepts. For example, he says “many Arab countries...” and then he refers to them as Muslim countries (32). Ethnicity and religious affiliation may not necessarily reflect the same demography. Fox (2002) suggests that differences in culture seem to be a practical cause of ethnic conflict. However, there are several deficiencies when this relationship is tested empirically. If “culture” is used as a proxy for “religion”, then cultural identity will be misidentified. Thus, there are several inconsistencies in integrating the religious dimension into other conceptual categories. The reasoning of using “religion” as an element of “culture” may be partially justified, however, it does not permit for study of the direct association between religion and militarized conflict; the literature that follows Huntington’s thesis muddies the direct effect of religion on conflict.

Fox (2002) studies Huntington’s definition of civilization and presents an argument using his own concept of religion to analyze how either factor influences ethnic conflict. He conducts a quantitative analysis using the *Minorities at Risk Phase 3* dataset and collects data independently on religions and civilizations (Fox, 2002). Fox’s (2002) findings support his
initial argument that “religion” and “civilization” are not identical, despite their overlapping features.

The religious differences can be between the two states’ major religions, Christianity and Islam, and also their varying religious denominations. Nevertheless, the literature remains split and concepts are not exclusive. Nearly every study that analyses the effect of religious differences on interstate conflict talks in platitudes by applying concepts of “cultural” or “ethnic” differences. This broad generalization has many limitations. The literature rarely addresses whether religion is the main affiliation that stimulates interstate conflict. Much of the literature considers cultural identity as a multidimensional category that includes religion, nationalism, language, etc. Such an approach does not provide an observable religious variable in relation to interstate conflicts. The central claim of this literature informally depicts that a state’s particular religion may impact conflict. But there is no literature that studies systematically the connection between major religions or religious denominations and interstate conflict.

In sum, due to these conceptual limitations, studies that attempt to estimate the explanatory power of religious differences on interstate conflict cannot capture the exclusive impact of religion on militarized conflict (i.e., enduring rivalry, rivalry recurrence, and war). My thesis provides conceptual clarity regarding religious, ethnic and linguistic differences and estimates the independent effect of religion on interstate conflict.

The Link between Religion and Conflict

The association between religion and conflict has emerged as an increasingly significant area of research over the past decade and a half. There is an emerging literature that explores the connection between different “religious dimensions and the escalation, duration, and termination of armed conflict” (Svensson, 2007: 930). However, there is lack of systematic studies of this
association and those that attempt to analyze the effect of religious differences on interstate conflict apply the broad concept of ‘culture’ or ‘ethnic’ dissimilarities instead of ‘religious’ differences. This thesis addresses these limitations by examining religion and its connection to conflict.

This section sheds light on how the religious differences between states may result in various dimensions of militarized conflict. I use the literature on religion and conflict to build my theoretical framework. I argue that the state may pursue its foreign policy objectives by compounding the rival’s different religion into its political rhetoric to mobilize public support. In the next section I proceed to examine perspectives in the literature regarding the connection between religion and conflict.

**Perspectives on Religious Differences and Dimensions of Conflict**

There is a voluminous literature attempting to explain the causes of armed conflict. Notably, studies on religious-based armed conflict have increased since the end of the Cold War and those studies that exclusively test the link between religion and conflict do so by focusing on intrastate or civil conflicts. Although the relationship between religious differences and interstate conflict is understudied in the literature, this review provides the basis to construct my theoretical framework.

A body of research suggests that there will be a ‘clash of civilizations’ due to globalization facilitating the interaction of many cultures. This hypothesis is proposed by Samuel P. Huntington (1993) and is commonly known as the ‘Clash of Civilizations’ thesis, Huntington (1993) makes the assumption that the Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American, and African civilizations may engage in major conflicts along
the borders separating them from one another (25). He premises his argument on the differences between these civilizations. According to Huntington (1993), “civilizations are differentiated from each other by history, language, culture, tradition and, most important, religion” (25). The distinct variance of these civilizations from one another and other political factors may heighten the conflict between each other. Specifically, the cultural identities between the different civilizations drive the polarizations between the Eastern and Western spheres. Huntington (1996) includes various elements in his concept of ‘civilization’, yet he maintains that culture is a common theme (Ellis, 2010). In particular, Huntington (1996) argues that ‘civilization’ and ‘culture’ denote “the overall way of life of a people, and a civilization is a culture writ large” (41). A central premise in Huntington’s thesis “is the importance of ‘core’ or dominant states within civilizations and their ability to attract countries of similar culture and repulse those that are culturally dissimilar as a means of organizing collective security” (Russett et al., 2000: 587). This type of integration between states with similar identities may increase cohesion and reduce antagonistic interactions (Russet et al., 2000); such cohesive security is premised on the international relations of “smaller states under [the core state’s] hegemony—both pacifying relations among them and controlling their relations with outsiders” (Russet et al., 2000: 587). Huntington’s first hypothesis is based on the notion of cooperation, which liberal theorists view as a way of ensuring peace in the international system. However, rather than treating inter-dependence as an instrument for conflict mitigation, Huntington argues that

\[\text{Huntington (1993) refers to these borders as “fault lines”.} \]

\[\text{19 ‘Cultural identity’ as a broad concept includes aspects of religion, ethnicity, nationality, and language. Although I include studies on cultural identity, I distinguish my current study by focusing exclusively on ‘religious identity’ because religious identity is vital for collective group identity. For example, a person can be half Indian and half Syrian, but cannot be half Hindu and half Muslim. People with different ethnicity, nationality, and/or language, might share the same religious identity. Thus, I treat ‘religion’ as a distinct concept in this research.}\]
interdependence *through* globalization yields dissatisfactions as exemplified by the West’s endeavor to spread its principles. Huntington’s secondary argument borrows much of its context from the realist remedy\(^\text{20}\) for world order in a multipolar international system (Kupchan, 1998).

Huntington’s (1993, 1996) hypothesis serves as a stepping stone for further empirical analysis. Based on Huntington’s (1993, 1996) thesis, scholars test whether civilizational differences increase the likelihood of military conflict. For example, Russett, Oneal, and Cox (2000) find that Huntington’s ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis does not affect interstate disputes (583-608). They test the likelihood of international disputes (from 1950 to 1992) resulting from the states’ cultural, military, or political characteristics (591). According to Russett et al. (2000), ‘dispute’ is defined as “when one or both states in the dyad threatened to use force, made a demonstration of force, or actually used military force against the other” (591). Furthermore, the main explanatory variable is whether a dyad is ‘culturally heterogeneous’ based on eight civilizations: the Western, Sinic, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American, Buddhist, and African. Their findings suggest that civilizational differences do not affect the likelihood of international disputes.

Scholars who test Huntington’s hypothesis do so by following Huntington’s own broad conceptual treatment of “culture”. For example, Henderson (1998) tests Huntington’s thesis that “cultural difference” is a contributing causal factor on war participation. Henderson (1998) argues that the requirement of “human sacrifice” to preserve religious identity may occur amid interstate rivalry (471). In addition, for Henderson (1998) cultural difference, which includes religious difference, “acts as a brake on nonviolent conflict resolution resulting in the increased

\(^{20}\) In particular, Huntington’s argument seems to borrow from the hegemonic stability theory, which is commonly connected with Giplin (1981) and Krasner (1985).
intractability of disputes and an increased likelihood of war” (469). While states with religious differences\(^{21}\) may be more inclined to seek conflict-based avenues, interstate dyads with shared or identical religious affiliation may seek diplomacy to avoid military force. Henderson (1998) predicts that cultural features (i.e., religious, ethnic, and linguistic similarity) may affect the onset of interstate war (461), and conducts a multivariate analysis of state dyads from 1820 to 1989 to test his hypotheses (461). His (1998) findings do not support his proposition that “religious similarity is negatively correlated with war onset” (473-474). Thus, Henderson’s studies (1997, 1998) show that cultural differences have an uncertain impact on interstate war.

According to Gartzke and Gleditsch (2006), there are many other discrepancies that could possibly be used to demarcate cultural identities (61). Gartzke and Gleditsch (2006) argue that “most statistical analyses have simply adopted Huntington’s classifications of the relevant cultural groups (e.g., Russett et al., 2003; Henderson & Tucker, 2001; Chiozza, 2002; Bolks & Stoll, 2003). Although this is appropriate if the main interest is assessing empirical support for Huntington’s claims, it clearly runs into the problem noted here when attempting to move beyond the particular, even peculiar, Huntington typology” (61).

Gartzke and Gleditsch (2006) recommend that scholars use identifiable characteristics such as religion because such identity is more suitable for [quantitative] studies than other identities (61).

Another body of literature on armed conflict centers on the effect of religion. While empirical studies on religion and conflict are limited, the prevailing social sciences literature (Seul, 1999; Voye, 1999; Smith, 1999, 2000) suggests that identity may be a mechanism that is used by political institutions in order to legitimize their agenda (Lewy, 1974; Johnston & Figa, 1988) and facilitate mobilization (Fox, 2013). This argument is rooted in social identity theory.

\(^{21}\) ‘Religious difference’ is concerned with states’ dissimilar religions. Each state’s religion is identified when the plurality of the state population identify with that religion.
(Seul, 1999; Toft, Philpott, & Shah, 2011; Shaw, 2011) and principles of social psychology (Ellingsen, 2000; Petersen, 2002) that analyze interstate conflict behavior. Thus, this approach uses the identity of the group when explaining international conflict decisions, and maintains that groups of people engage in conflict when socio-psychological conditions are manifest in the groups’ different identities. Rai and Fiske (2011) explain that the importance of unity is partially captured by supporting the in-groups’ integrity through a sense of collective responsibility and common fate (61). Thus, within in-groups, people are inclined to avoid conflict, whereas, a threat to the group by an out-group may dictate conflict behavior.

Further, adversarial relationship once under way may lead to expectations about additional conflict. Hensel (1998) argues that “interactions between two adversaries are likely to affect their future expectations, as when a history of frequent militarized conflict between them or a history of unsuccessful peaceful settlement attempts leads to the expectation of future conflict and the perception that peaceful means of settlement are unlikely to succeed in settling the issues at stake” (4). Once an adversarial relationship starts between states, religion may become a component that contributes to the perpetuation of conflict. For example, various conflicts erupted in the early 19th and entire 20th centuries to establish political and economic domination, among other reasons. In spite of territorial modifications, regime transformation, new leadership, and generational change in both states, conflict perpetuated after decades of armistice. Hensel (1998) illustrates that the French Empire warred with China from 1870 to 1927, and then again engaged in conflict with China from 1949 to 1953. Although many conflicts may be fought over major political issues, Hensel (1998) suggests that further systematic research is needed to address the influence of religious differences on militarized interstate disputes. Consequently, it is reasonable to argue that although the French-Chinese
conflict’s obvious causes were political, the underlying religious differences between the two states might have enhanced the prospect of conflict.

Building on the notion of identity and conflict behavior, Hasencleaver and Rittberger (2000) argue that religion may influence conflict. According to Hasencleaver and Rittberger (2000), on a domestic level, decision makers use religion as a means to achieve their authority and to mobilize people’s support (Fox & Sandler, 2004). Religion can be utilized as a “tool of power and interest”, that is “leaders use new interpretations of their religions in order to justify their actions” (Fox & Sandler, 2004: 48) because the function of religion within a society is used to “unify society, preventing social conflict, control of society by elites”, among other related socio-political situations (Wilson, 1982; Turner, 1991).

Several scholars make claims about the link between religion and conflict but do not test them empirically. Smith (1981, 1986, 1999) postulates that national movements are ‘multidimensional’ and include cultural aspects such as religion. However, he does not test systematically whether religious differences between the selected groups increase their likelihood to engage in intrastate conflict.

Fox (2002) conducts an empirical inquiry on whether civilization or religion is a more significant factor of ethnic conflict in the post-Cold War period. He finds that neither civilizational nor religious differences are the primary causes of ethnic conflict. While Fox’s (2002) study focuses on domestic conflict, his findings suggest that differentiating between civilization and religion is a good starting point for empirical studies on religion and conflict.

Also, in a later study Fox (2004) examines the link between religion and domestic conflicts and argues that religion is an element of an ethnic group’s identity. For instance, he finds that states with different ethnic groups have a higher likelihood of engaging in conflict and
expects such ethnic-based civil wars to be more “violent” than other types of conflicts. Although Fox (2004) establishes that religion may stimulate ethnic conflict, he does not treat “religion” as a separate factor.

A state’s predominant religion is premised on institutions, spiritual expressions, symbols, and situations. Hassner and Horowitz (2010) consider several cases of interstate wars and conclude it is not that religion causes wars, rather religious beliefs and practices frame the way adherents identify themselves and actions. They argue that research analyses need to move away from “extreme cases, involving religious extremists and fanatics, and toward the typical universe of religion and contemporary interstate conflict” (204-205). This suggests that future studies should focus on interstate conflict in relation to religion rather than on idiosyncratic conflict by religious fundamentalists.

Seul (1999) studies how religion may influence domestic conflict. His main argument centers on the importance of religion in an ethnically diverse society. Seul (1999) argues that “religion has a protean quality: it can divide groups that otherwise are culturally similar, as in the case of former Yugoslavia; it can align fairly neatly with ancestral and linguistic markers, as it does, for example, in Northern Ireland; or it can serve as the basis for differentiation among groups that are similarly diverse, as it does in the case of Indian Hindus and Muslims” (565). These cases illustrate that religion occasionally functions as a “basis for self-identification and group differentiation that transcends other markers” (Seul, 1999: 565). This argument suggests that the presence of religious differences within a state increases the propensity of conflict irrespective of other cultural similarities, whereas other forms of ‘culture’ (e.g., ethnicity, language, heritage, etc.) sometimes inhibit a clear basis for explaining interstate rivalry behavior (Seul, 1999: 566).
All in all, the research pertaining to the effect of religion on armed conflict remains ambiguous in identifying the causal mechanism.

Theoretical Framework

States are the principal agents in the international system (Legro & Moravscik, 1999). Thus, states may pursue their goals including interstate conflict by such means that reduce costs (Mearsheimer, 2002) including using religion as a political instrument (Klein, Goertz, & Diehl, 2006: 334). States must rely on the support of the people in times of interstate conflict. Yet, studies that link religious differences and conflict do not account for the agents (i.e., states) that make the decisions for conflict. Instead, the religion-conflict link is treated as a tool for political ends without a satisfactory mechanism on how religion contributes to militarized conflict behavior between states in a dyad. Based on the literature I construct my argument on the relationship between religious differences (i.e., (a) all religious differences, (b) Christian/Muslim differences, and (c) different religious denominations) and various dimensions of rivalry and war.

Since religion may play a role in people’s social and political life (Chriss, 2013), I argue that when some collective group identity such as religion is in place, states may use the opportunity to mobilize the support of the population using religious rhetoric. Since, all else equal, “religion fosters stronger loyalty and commitment than other identities” (Juergensmeyer, 1993), the religious label particularly performs the influential function of uniting and mobilizing people to support potentially some form of collective action including militarized conflict with another state. In addition to the range of political and material motives, religion is an important
component for the population’s social identity; it can motivate and mobilize populations to act and react in certain ways (Donahue, 1975).

Second, out-group movements challenging a state’s main religion may heighten the importance of the predominant religion’s survival, for example. Seul (1999) argues that “when intergroup comparison does produce overt conflict, an escalatory dynamic often is evident” (556). Therefore, group identity inclines to intensify during periods of crisis (Stein, 1996). The conflict increases as each threat disturbs the identities of the target group and its members (Worchel, Coutant-Sassic, & Wong, 1993). Religion may become more salient under this type of threat to the group identity, whereby allowing the state to employ religious rhetoric to mobilize the adherents’ support against the out-group rivals. Mainly, a state may activate the public’s support for interstate conflict by means of rhetoric that amplifies social reactions linked to the religious identity of the out-group. Barnett (1999) argues that identity embodies “the understanding of oneself in relation to others” (9). Thus, group identities are mainly “social and relational” and may be contingent on the state’s interaction with others and position within the institutional situation (Barnett, 1999: 9). Such relational perception “informs the view that . . . state identities are partly formed” relative to other countries (Barnett, 1999: 9). Essentially, religion serves in constructing an identity that can be informed by the state’s rhetoric (Chap, 2007). The trajectory of the interstate conflict may be influenced by the predominant group’s religious identity in relation to cues from the state actor. When state leaders “[use] rhetoric during a national crisis such as war, substantive religious language is overwhelmingly used” (Warber & Olsen, 2006). Although interstate militarized conflicts may have nothing to do with religion, “it has to do with identity and life in groups” (Sacks, 2015: 39). Such conflicts may be
“about power, territory, and glory, things that are secular, even profane. [However,] if religion can be enlisted [to increase the motivation for conflict], it will be” (Sacks, 2015: 39).

Ruane and Todd (2010) argue that “narrowly conceived, ethnicity is usually conceived as a descent-based category associated with territoriality and with a distinctive origin myth (Connor, 1994), whereas [religious identity is stronger because it] is concerned with the sacred, and more narrowly again with confessional organizations and practices” (2). For Roe (2013) some state policies have religious implications, which is evidenced across generations (179). This research posits that religious identities offer believers with a purpose and belonging. In the case of an imminent conflict between two states, the ‘we-ness’ conviction may evolve into ‘we against them’, which becomes a state strategy. With this in mind, religion needs a certain level of conversion, or politicization, to make it a political instrument (Stewart, 2009). Thus, a state may transmit messages to the predominant religious adherents by employing the “religious difference” rhetorical tool, which creates a clear distinction with the relevant out-group.

Horowitz (2009) argues that the essential truth of religious logic can “theoretically justify the pursuit of certain ends through any means necessary, legitimizing warfare in some cases” (168). States may utilize religiously based motivations to supposedly perpetuate the survival of the religious group to ultimately mobilize their support. Theoretically speaking, collective identity of the religious adherents may sometimes play an important role in facilitating armed conflict onset (Basedau, Pfeiffer, & Vullers, 2014). For example, according to Chriss (2013), religion produced a mechanical solidarity in early societies and was “one of the first systematic forms of [informal] social control” (64). That is, societal unity was strong because of the

---

22 Horowitz (2009) adds that “this behavior does not necessarily follow from religious belief, but a violent actor motivated by religion might use that logic” (168).
perceived similarities and common interests found in religious identity. Chriss (2013) suggests that there are several changes that have happened within societies due to globalization and industrialization. As a result of such rapid changes in societies, religions vie for recognition and attempt to maintain the binds of group solidarity (Chriss, 2013: 25). Chriss (2013) argues that states realize that it is easier to foster unity through the religious identity of a group than other types of bonds since “religions generally promote group solidarity” (Clarke, 2014: 81). Thus, religious identity may offer the state an opportunity to mobilize such identity to gain support for interstate conflict. The social interests for conflict generated by religious motivations can influence how people evaluate state leaders’ decision to engage in conflict (Horowitz, 2009). Basically, religion can unify group-level judgments about the benefits gained from conflict. Horowitz (2009) argues that religious motivations could have an impact on the length of military campaigns.

Satana, Inman, and Birnir (2013) argue that “while religion per se is generally not the cause of conflict, it adds a troubling dimension to extant conflict” (33). Because religion tends to offer a “ready issue platform that does not depend on prior political mobilization,” religion may become that divide that can be “mobilized politically when needed” (Satana et al., 2013: 34). According to Juergensmeyer (2006), for instance, despite the typical economic and social sources of intergroup tension, “at some point in the conflict . . . the political contest becomes religionized. Then what was primarily a secular struggle takes on the aura of sacred [religious] conflict” (133-142). This argument suggests that states may use religion as a tool to reach their preferred goals (Satana et al., 2013). Basically, state leaders may use religion as a rhetorical tool to add momentum to their conflict objectives.
States may mobilize religious identities to gain support, consequently increasing the likelihood of militarized conflict. Hensel (1998) argues that “mobilization strategies, at least when pursued successfully, lead to domestic support and legitimation for the [state] policies, offering much greater flexibility than other strategies and amplifying the [state’s] willingness to respond to foreign threats” (13). The state’s population that represents the predominant religion may respond with their support when their personal interests—that is, their religious identity—may be affected. Seul (1999) argues that “because religion provides such powerful support to groups as they endeavor to establish and maintain secure identities, it is not surprising that much intergroup identity competition occurs between religious groups” (567).

Additionally, drawing from the literature, there has been an emphasis on militarized conflicts between Christian and Muslim states (Richardson, 1960; Huntington, 1996; Horowitz, 2009). Huntington’s idea of ‘Islam’s bloody borders’ is used to justify the fierce Islamic movement against other state religions, including Christian states. Yet, Huntington does not construct a theoretical framework to support his ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis. The literature on the conflicts between the Abrahamic religions is presented in historiographical (Houston, 2001) or historical (Erickson, 2001) texts with minimal systematic examination of specific events that prompt states to use religious appeal to pursue interstate militarized combat (Henderson & Tucker, 2001).

Thus, systematically examining militarized conflicts between Christian and Muslim states may explain whether these religious differences play a partial role in the states’ policies. The

---

23 Judaism, Christianity, and Islam all acknowledge Abraham as their first prophet and that his descendants have an important role in people’s spiritual development. While the Abrahamic religions originate from the same source, “the Abrahamic traditions contain many differences. For example, there is no equivalent to the papacy in Islam” (Horowitz, 2009: 168).
perceived stereotype of the intergroup relations based on the religious differences between the in-group (Christian or Muslim) and the out-group (Muslim or Christian) states may be used in a political context. Corresponding images and stereotypes based on historical conflicts, for instance the Crusades, may be sought by one state to engender hostility and promote its religious identity by disparaging the image of the out-group state. Tajfel and Turner (1986) suggest that individuals with strong religious identification may be inspired by “desires for a positive social identity to hold a specific type of negative image about an out-group, even above and beyond power, status, and goal perceptions” (55). While the theoretical debates about the role of Islamic states in fostering violence against Christian states are abundant, there are limited empirical studies, mixed findings, and no scholarly consensus about the relationship between these two major faiths (Fish, Jensenius, & Michel, 2010; Fox, 2004; Sorli, Petter, & Strand, 2005; Toft, Philpott, & Shah, 2011). Thus, examining the link between states with Christian/Muslim differences and various types of militarized conflicts may offer a clearer understanding on whether these two groups are more conflict prone than other groups.

It is possible that the particular religious differences between Muslim and Christian states may be more disputatious. I, thereby, conduct separate analyses of the Christian and Muslim religions in relation to interstate conflict behavior (a) enduring rivalry, (b) rivalry recurrence, and (c) war. I examine “whether dyads pitting Christian and Muslim states against one another are more [conflict] prone than other dyads, as often hypothesized” (Gartzke & Gleditsch, 2006: 65). The systematic distinction between dyads with Christian/Muslim differences and militarized conflict is vital to the study of the nature of these particular rivalries.

Throughout history, we have seen militarized conflicts between Sunni and Shi’a as well as Protestant and Catholic states (Fox & Sandler, 2004). Yet illustrative examples are not
conclusive enough to examine the influence of different religious denominations on militarized interstate conflicts. Another indicator of religious differences between states is employed based on the plurality of sectarian adherents. Thus, I take a more systematic approach to supporting my argument that religious differences between states increases the likelihood of rivalry and war. It may also be that differences between religious denominations may contribute to various types of rivalry and war.

In the next section, I offer a theoretical framework that explains how religious differences affect different dimensions of rivalry and war.

Theories

The presence of religious differences may increase the likelihood of militarized interaction between states in a dyad. Pearce (2006) argues that “given the frequency of religious conflict, the evidence shows that there are circumstances under which religion can, in fact, provoke rather than resolve conflict. Thus, based on my argument religious differences between states may serve as the catalyst for militarized conflict. Examining the question “does the existence of religious differences in a dyad increase the likelihood for two states to seek conflict-based avenues?” involves systematic analyses to capture the causes of rivalry and war. I present the theories that probe the link between religious identity and interstate rivalry by exploring how such identity of the predominant population may be used as a means to an end by states (i.e., state leaders). I rely on social psychology’s Social Identity Theory and False Optimism Theory\(^\text{24}\) to explain the mechanisms used for the various dimensions of interstate rivalry behavior and war. By applying these theories to the religion-conflict nexus, I seek to provide an explanation on how

\(^{24}\) I use False Optimism Theory only for war.
religious differences between dyads may be used to affect hawkish state policies. In the following sections I derive nine hypotheses from my theories.

Enduring Rivalry and Rivalry Recurrence Theoretical Framework, Part I

I use social identity theory to understand the connection between states with different religions and their propensity for rivalry. Below, I describe how the predominant population’s religious identity may be used as a mechanism by the state to mobilize the population’s support for various types of armed rivalry, enduring and recurring, as well as war.

One social psychology theory that draws a connection between persons and groups is social identity theory (Greenfield & Marks, 2007). The premise of social identity theory is that people belong in a society that consists of several social groupings, “[which] stand in relative power and status relationships to each other” (Greenfield & Marks, 2007: 2). Social identity is shaped when people perceive that they belong to a social grouping. Such social groupings have the ability to form an individual’s self-image. Understanding in-group and out-group behaviors are important concepts in social psychology theories. According to Turner (1975), social identity is based on intergroup social evaluations that intend to approve or create in-group support to determine the “distinctiveness between in-group and out-group” (Hogg & Terry, 2000: 122). Additionally, Tajfel (1972) argues that social identity is based on “the knowledge that [one] belongs to certain social groups together with some emotional and value significance of . . . the group membership” (31). In other words, the sense of obligation by an in-group might be heightened when the out-group has a different identity. Based on this notion, it is logical to assume that conflict is more likely when the two states have varying religions. When two states
identify with different religions, they may become more conflict prone due to the indelible nature or religion (Henderson, 1998).

In this section, I argue that the connection between religion and armed rivalry, enduring and recurring, and war can partly be explained by differences in religions between the states. I propose the mechanism of social identity theory that explains how out-group identity affects the likelihood of rivalry. The present-day reality is that religion is used to fuel conflict (Fox & Sandler, 2004). Thus, when religious identity is framed strategically by the state, it can become an important factor in interstate rivalry. Scholars utilize social identity theory as a useful mechanism in explaining how people develop an essential component of their identity from belonging to a group and they have a strong positive preference in favor of their group adherents (Powers, 2015; Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Brown, 2000). Social identity theory can be applied to states and their populations. States are principally rational, self-interested actors that want to maintain power and a reference to common identity may be used to mobilize public support for a rivalry. Thus, the division between the in-group and the out-group population may become increasingly significant when different religions dominate each group, which sets the stage for out-group “hatred.” The presence of religious differences between two states may, therefore, increase the likelihood of enduring rivalry, rivalry recurrence, and war via mobilization of the populations’ support.

Weiner, Tennen, and Suls (2012) suggest that “categorizing people, which often occurs rapidly and automatically, profoundly affects people’s perceptions, cognitions, feelings, and behavior” (430). Recognition of intergroup differences may, in turn, stimulate prejudices. Specifically, Weiner et al. (2012) argue that “social identity theory is relative not only to prejudice but also to more intergroup dynamics . . . and drawing from [this] theory, salient social
identity also arouses corresponding group-based emotions” (432). Such emotions are induced by significant signals that may in turn intensify the “function of in-group identification” (432). This insight extends the religious differences argument and may determine a more thorough account of the relationship between religious politics and various dimensions of rivalry. Stein (1996) suggests that because individual identity is somewhat dependent upon the legitimacy of the in-group’s identity, threats to the in-group qualify as dangers to the entire group.

Individuals who share the same identity may demonstrate instantaneous solidarity and “precipitate hostility toward outsiders” (Brewer, 2001: 28). Since state populations typically lack information, states may tactically use the existence of religious differences “to feed low intercultural perceptions [in their rhetoric]” to mobilize the population’s support for conflict (Hauk & Mueller, 2015: 369). I primarily focus on enduring rivalry, rivalry recurrence, and war because all of these conflict types have escalatory characteristics due to their severity, repetition, and intensity. In such militarized conditions, the appeal to religion by states [i.e., leaders] may be used to mobilize the predominant population’s support. This support is possibly generated prior to the onset of rivalry by states so that the predominant population becomes inclined to support the state government in the rivalry behavior against the out-group state.

Research on social identity and intergroup relations have traditionally argued that an important facet of the self is the link between the individual and the collective self (Brewer, 1991; Brewer & Caporael, 1990; Brewer & Chen, 2007; Brewer & Gardner, 1996). The collective self characterizes an internalization of group norms and values, which serve to guide cognition, behavior, and evaluation (Brewer & Gardner, 1996). The strength and endurance of largely populated religious groups are partially due to the inherent social nature of these collectives (Kramer, Leonardelli, & Livingston, 2011). Since the predominant population may
have limited information compared to the state regarding interstate conflict, the state may highlight the religious differences to gain the main population’s support for the militarized conflict. The religious difference between the two states is used as simplified method to influence the predominant group’s support for the armed rivalry. The state can influence the predominant public’s perception by presenting the rival’s objectives as “evil”. By demonizing the rival, the state may be able to influence the public’s social ties to their religious identity, ultimately mobilizing the predominant population’s support for rivalry, per se.

**Enduring Rivalry and Rivalry Recurrence**

I adopt Klein, Goertz, and Diehl’s (2006) new rivalry approach\(^{25}\), to include rivalries that specifically involve numerous militarized disputes and/or include some type of systematic militarized violence between states in a dyad. The inclusion of the rivalry approach in systematic studies is to determine conflict patterns based on interconnected\(^{26}\) conflicts between the same two states over an extended period (Goertz & Diehl, 1992). In particular, Klein et al. (2006) consider the first militarized dispute between two states in a dyad as the “first behavioral sign that a rivalry exists” and the termination of the last militarized interstate dispute is the last behavioral sign of rivalry\(^{27}\) (338).

First, a rivalry between two states that occurs for a long period of time is known as an *enduring* rivalry (Klein et al., 2006). According to scholars, enduring rivalries are more severe and escalatory (Hensel, N.d.). Considering the complexity of rivalries, one rivalry approach is to

---

25 The new rivalry approach is a phenomenon of rivalry that is based on the intensity and frequency of militarized interstate disputes between two states (333-334).

26 Rivalries are identified as three or more “interconnected” militarized disputes between two sovereign states in a dyad (Klein et al., 2006: 337).

27 Klein et al. (2006) “consider the rivalry to have ended in the 10—15 years” after the “last behavioral sign of the rivalry” (338-39).
treat ‘rivalry’ as a dependent variable in order to test the factors that affect the initiation of rivalry (i.e., enduring or proto rivalries) (Hensel, N.d.: 4). A rivalry between two states is argued to be a manifestation based on past conditions, which distinguish the unique stability of rivalries and is bolstered by the prospect of impending conflict (Diehl & Goertz, 2000: 77).

Since I consider states as rational actors in the international system, I assume that they calculate the expected benefits versus the expected costs before engaging in rivalry. At least one state out of the two in a dyad may perceive that the expected benefits outweigh other political options (Darnton, 2011). The religious differences between the two states may be a condition that facilitates the onset of enduring rivalry by mobilization of the predominant population’s support. Although the origins of a rivalry may be political in nature, the existence of the main population’s support (due to the religious differences between the two states in a dyad) may reduce the costs of conflict for at least one state in a dyad. Based on my argument, it is reasonable to expect that the religious differences within a dyad may increase the probability of an enduring rivalry.

Second, another important dimension of rivalry that is rarely studied is rivalry recurrence. Rudkevich, Travlos, and Diehl (2013) argue that “there must be some concerns for the conditions surrounding the end of the original rivalry, but none of these studies examines historical factors in the relationship, and certainly not whether there was a previous rivalry between the states, in accounting for rivalry onset” (160). Rivalry recurrence is a classification of rivalry that repeats after the initial rivalry had terminated. There are some conditions surrounding the termination of the initial rivalry that sometimes render peaceful negotiations unsuccessful (Hensel, 1998). For example, the dyadic rivalries during the 20th century manifested in order to secure political, economic, and territorial dominance, among other reasons. Nevertheless, even after the
emergence of new regimes and leaderships, the dyadic rivalries restarted after having terminated for many decades.

A state’s main religion can serve as a promoter of the rivalry’s recurrence. A state’s predominant religion may be part of that state population’s identity, which may be used to mobilize the population of adherents to support the recurring rivalry. Rudkevich et al. (2013) argue that the longer that rivalries last and higher the frequency of aggressive conflicts, “the less they are influenced by single events and more by the entire history of the rivalry, or the legacy of the past” (161). Basically, the recurrence of rivalry between two states may be influenced by more than one rivalry interaction. A state may utilize the existence of religious differences to mobilize the predominant population’s support to perpetuate a rivalry with an old enemy. The social interests for conflict generated by religious motivations can influence how the main population evaluates the value of the state reengaging in conflict (Horowitz, 2009). Religion can unify group-level judgments about the benefits gained from reengaging in conflict. Horowitz (2009) argues that religious motivations could have a bimodal impact on the length of military campaigns. The character of religious mobilization, which exacerbates the “othering” process common in armed conflict, could generate a stronger desire to eliminate enemies and seek decisive battles. Alternatively, when decisive battles are difficult, religiously motivated campaigns are likely to perpetuate and may create outcomes similar to recurring rivalries (Horowitz, 2009: 170).

This dissertation integrates “religious difference” as a social element to the Rudkevich et al. (2013) model. Including various types of religious dimensions may improve our understanding of how religion is a causal factor in rivalry recurrence. The religious differences
between two states may be a key reason for rivalry to recur. To determine the link between religious differences and rivalry recurrence, I test rivalry cases from 1945 to 2001. I identify whether states in a dyad with different religions have reentered into rivalry decades after the initial rivalry had terminated. This approach observes whether the presence of religious differences between two states may be used as the impetus for the recurring rivalry. Hence, I predict that the recurrence of rivalry between two states in a dyad is more likely when their predominant religions are different.

Based on the above arguments, two hypotheses are tested empirically:

\( H_1: \) Interstate dyads with different religions are more likely to engage in enduring rivalry than dyads with the same religions.

\( H_2: \) Interstate dyads with different religions are more likely to engage in rivalry recurrence than dyads with the same religions.

The link between two states, which has been categorized by a frequency of past militarized interactions, may be influenced by several conditions that stimulate further hostility. The longer the history of rivalry, the more intractable the relationship becomes between two states (Hensel, 1998). Based on the argument in the literature on the fighting between Christians and Muslims (Huntington, 1996), I predict that dyads with Christian/Muslim differences may be more predisposed to engage in enduring rivalry and rivalry recurrence. The different dimensions of religion such as Christian/Muslim Differences within two states in a dyad may affect the likelihood of armed rivalry, enduring and recurring.

Thus, I derive two hypotheses to test empirically:

\( H_3: \) Interstate dyads with Christian/Muslim differences are more likely to engage in enduring rivalry.
**H4:** Interstate dyads with Christian/Muslim differences are more likely to engage in rivalry recurrence.

Other religious groupings based on denominational differences require a more systematic approach. Some sects within major religions constitute irreconcilable groups (e.g., Sunnis versus Shiites, Catholics versus Protestants, Catholics versus Orthodox, etc.). Gartzke and Gleditsch (2006) suggest that “the Protestant reformation prompted a period of intense armed conflict in Europe in the late 16th and 17th centuries, and [conflict] between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland has, at best, only recently come to an end” (60). Also, the sectarian violence between Sunni and Shiite groups in the 20th and 21st centuries, among other sectarian conflicts between Sikh and Hindus, illustrate that denominational differences in a dyad may increase rivalry propensity. Thus I consider the relationship between different religious denominations in a dyad and likelihood of enduring and recurrent rivalry. Based on the major religions (e.g., Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Buddhism, etc.) in each state in a dyad, I classify the religious denomination based on the large plurality of adherents within each state (e.g., Christianity: Protestants, Roman Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, Anglicans, and Other Christian; Judaism: Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform; Islam: Sunni, Shi’a, Ibadhi, Nation of Islam, Alawite, and Ahmadiyya; Buddhism: Mahayana and Theravada; etc.). In such cases where states vary in religious denominations, at least one state uses the existence of different religious denominations as a tool to mobilize the public’s support for enduring rivalry and rivalry recurrence.

Another way I group the Different Religious Denominations is by aggregating Protestants and Anglicans under one denomination. According to The World Religion Dataset, 1945-2010: Logic, Estimates, and Trends (Maoz and Henderson, 2013), some sources grouped Protestants and Anglicans under one denominational level since they share several religious tenets. Thus, I
consider this discrepancy by aggregating Protestants and Anglicans in one denominational category and test separately (e.g., Christianity: Protestants and Anglicans Combined, Roman Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, and Other Christian; Judaism: Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform; Islam: Sunni, Shi’a, Ibadhi, Nation of Islam, Alawite, and Ahmadiyya; Buddhism: Mahayana and Theravada; etc.).

Based on the arguments above, two hypotheses and two sub-hypotheses are tested empirically:

$H_5$: (A) Interstate dyads with different religious denominations are more likely to engage in enduring rivalry.

$H_5$: (B) Interstate dyads with different religious denominations (Protestants and Anglicans Combined) are more likely to engage in enduring rivalry.

$H_6$: (A) Interstate dyads with different religious denominations are more likely to engage in rivalry recurrence.

$H_6$: (B) Interstate dyads with different religious denominations (Protestants and Anglicans Combined) are more likely to engage in rivalry recurrence.

War Theoretical Framework, Part II

Since interstate wars$^{28}$ are relatively far more costly than other types of conflict, to explain the connection between differences in religion in a dyad and war I incorporate my argument in the ‘false optimism’ theory used to explain war in the literature.

---

$^{28}$ The underlying hostility and past experience included in conflicts may reach the threshold of interstate war (Lebow, 1981: 337). A history of militarized conflicts between state rivals are expected to precipitate future hostility (Klein et al., 2006: 335). According to Diehl and Goertz (2000), various types of rivalry (i.e., militarized disputes and wars) between two states are connected and are interdependent (7). Such rivalry types are linked through the ‘pull
Considering the heavy costs associated with interstate wars, scholars argue that some pre-war rational decision making process may explain why some states go to war despite the costs. A state may suffer from hubris, a level of overconfidence whereby the state ultimately resorts to militarized conflict. This level of ‘false optimism’ “is the extent to which a state’s perception of how well it will fare in a war exceeds the reality” (Altman, 2015: 287). Altman (2015) shows that false optimism may heighten the state’s confidence—enough to make bold moves towards warfare. Further, Clausewitz (1976) argues that “boldness in war . . . must be granted a certain power over and above successful calculations involving space, time, and magnitude of forces. [Basically, boldness in war] is a genuinely creative force” (190). Based on the false optimism theory, states expect that they will win the war, which ultimately reduces the costs of entering into war (Slantchev & Tarar, 2011). White (1970), Stoessinger (1974), Jervis (1976, 1988), among others, suggest that false optimism is considered one of the most significant explanations of war (Levy, 1983; Blainey, 1988; Van Evera, 1999; Johnson, 2004). I link religious differences and war via this well-known theory of false optimism. I go one step beyond this analysis here and suggest that the support of the predominant population by means of rhetoric may exaggerate the state’s perception of the prospect of victory in war.

Some states still undertake costs and risks when they have the opportunity to prevent war. To begin with the rationalist perspective, scholars argue that states (i.e., rational decision makers) should not pursue fighting because negotiating a prewar bargain could avert costs and risks. That is, according to Johnson (2004), “both sides could obtain a similar result without the

of the past” (Klein et al., 2006: 342). Accordingly, wars are considered as part of the ‘pull of the past’ since they are part of a thread that links the disputes together (Klein et al., 2006: 342).
costs and risks of war” (4). But that is not the case since wars do happen when “states overestimate their relative power” (Johnson, 2004: 4). Goemans (2000) argues that the estimated war costs “depend on beliefs about relative strength, relative resolve, [structural and] random factors” (26). State decision makers do not always have complete information for their calculations, which consequently leads states to become “strategic calculators who go to war” with “imperfect information” (Goemans, 2000: 26). Thus, a state may still decide to pursue war despite the incomplete information because of its perceived relative strength. In the absence of complete information, a state may rely on private information that can be used to exaggerate its outlook of winning the war.

At first glance, the rational assumption may appear incompatible with false optimism theory, since the former relies on cost-risk calculations and the latter relies on psychological explanations of how state actors behave. But as Goemans (2000) argues despite the cognitive limitations, states still make decisions under uncertainty. In fact, before the war both states may expect that they are stronger than the other because of some private information such as “new weapon or some innovative strategy” (Goemans, 2000: 28). This private information may overestimate one or both states’ expectations about the war outcome, and therefore the expected utility for fighting seems rational. I argue that religious differences between the two states may be a condition that contributes to false optimism.

According to Johnson (2004), [optimism] is likely to rise in times of threat and more specifically at the beginning of the event than at the end of it (40). States are disposed to exaggerated estimations of their own advantage, and expectations about their ability to control actions, and of the future (Johnson, 2004). Nevertheless, the rational choice framework ought
not to be removed from understanding a state’s false optimism since decision making requires cognition, which is not independent of psychological processes. Actually, understanding a state’s decision to initiate war requires the study of “cognitive biases . . . to effectively model foreign policy choices (Schafer, 1999: 183). According to Schafer (1999), “several scholars [e.g., Downs, 1989; Mintz & Geva, 1997; Tetlock, 1998] argue for research to bridge the gap [between rational and psychological schools] (183). While a rational explanation is a good starting point, false optimism “leads to war as a result of strategic behavior by the optimistic actors” (Slantchev & Tarar, 2011: 137). The crossroads between the two schools of thought are summed accordingly: Jervis (1988) argues that “excessive military optimism” is often linked to war initiation, whereas for Blainey (1988) anything which augments that optimism may become a “vital prelude to war” (Johnson, 2004: 3). When coupled with the rationalist explanation of war, tracing the origin of optimism with which most wars were started by states offers a more nuanced explanation of wars (Blainey, 1988). In sum, the basic tendency in a state’s (i.e., leader’s) overassessment and overconfidence of its relative capabilities fluctuates systematically with particular conditions.

Building on the false optimism theory, Johnson (2004) deconstructed the war puzzle by using the positive illusions argument. Johnson (2004) argues that “positive illusions are a source of the overconfidence that exists before many wars” (Bas & Schub, N.d.: 4). In responding to information, states’ positive illusions are closer to reality with “an optimistic spin on things” (Johnson, 2004: 40). Such illusions may be driven by the decision maker’s psychological perceptions (Jervis, 1976, Kahneman & Renshon, 2007). According to Kahneman and Renshon (2007), “social and cognitive psychologists have identified [biases] in the ways that humans judge situations and evaluate risks” (34).
leaders) may have optimistic biases based on “highly favorable estimates of the outcomes of war” (Kahneman & Renshon, 2007: 35). Kahneman and Renshon’s (2007) 40 year of psychological research on biases discovered that:

“All the biases in [their] list favor hawks. These psychological impulses incline national leaders to exaggerate the evil intentions of adversaries, to misjudge how adversaries perceive them, to be overly [optimistic] when hostilities start, and overly reluctant to make necessary concession in negotiations” (36).

For Kahneman and Renshon (2007) “optimism is one of the most significant biases that psychologists have identified” (37). Dolan (2009) argues that “war involves putting [states’] beliefs about how they can win against the test of reality” (11). Thus state optimism in relation to outside threats may influence the likelihood of war.

Blainey argues that at least one state resorts to militarized force because based on its subjective appraisal of winning the war depends on, among other things, the ability of its “population to sustain the war effort” (Slantchev & Tarar, 2011: 135). Blainey’s widely accepted argument is known as the mutual optimism explanation of why war occurs (Slantchev & Tarar, 2011; Johnson, 2004; Lebow, 1981: 242-43; Levy, 1983: 82-86; Stoessinger, 2005: 211; Van Evera, 1999: 16; Wittman, 1979). I use the mechanism of false optimism as an underlying behavioral link between states’ optimistic beliefs and war. In particular, I use the state’s predominant population of religious adherents’ support for the war as the condition of optimism that increases the likelihood of war.

The false optimism theory suggests a persuasive added part of the war puzzle²⁹. Looking closely at the explanatory power of religious differences may add to our understanding

---

²⁹ Johnson (2004) argues that “there is some probability of war even if there are no positive illusions (owing to a variety of other causes)” (38).
of this puzzle. According to Slantchev and Tarar (2011) argue that “[optimism] is only a starting point: it shows why the actors might be unwilling to offer each war-avoiding terms” (136). The mechanism orients the effect on the war policy of at least one state in the dyad. I argue that the condition of different religious identities is used by at least one state to mobilize the main population’s support, whereby this public support may augment the state’s optimism. A state, thus, conflates its optimism about the imminent war because of different factors including the main population’s support. In cases where the rival state has a different religion, one or both states might leverage the conflict cause by using rhetoric against the out-group state to mobilize the population’s support. Accordingly, the identities of the two different predominant religions between states may lead to hawkish policies through the populations’ endorsement. Kahneman and Renshon (2007) argue that “a hawk’s preference for military action over diplomatic measures often built upon the assumption that victory will come easily and swiftly” (37). Thus, there are also precursory structural circumstances that affect the impact of false optimism on war, “or more specifically on the forms of overconfidence it engenders” (Johnson, 2004: 38). I focus on one such condition: religious differences between the two states.

**Conditions for False Optimism**

Since false optimism is typically generated in the time before a war, a state may receive feedback from numerous factors in the decision making process (Johnson, 2004). I suggest that one of the key conditions affecting whether a state experiences false optimism is the support of the predominant population when religious differences exist between the two states, all else being equal. As part of its optimistic calculus, the state may mobilize the predominant population’s support by demonizing the rival state by means of rhetoric, and consequently inflating expectations about the state’s likelihood of victory. Such exaggerated optimism may
manifest under conditions where the enemy adheres to a different religion, a state may activate the populace’s support by means of contentious rhetoric (e.g., public addresses, press releases, etc.).

Taylor (1991) suggests that people seek positive social affiliations in threatening times because such relationships offer support to sustain one’s cause. Thus, a state’s optimism may increase as a result of its population’s support prior to the onset of war. Thus, a state’s self-serving aggrandizement of its capabilities may be exaggerated and war initiation may seem more favorable because the state believes it will emerge as the victor. In other words, the state exaggerates its prospects of victory when the predominant population supports the state’s cause.

My contribution to the false optimism theory parallels well with Johnson’s (2004) phenomenon of ‘group illusions’. He argues that when it comes to group behavior, the group

“is bound together by a kind of group narcissism, one that subscribes to the familiar positive illusions: an unrealistically positive sense of itself, the somewhat grandiose sense of how much the group can make a difference . . . and an overly optimistic sense that things will turn out well” (Johnson, 2004: 20).

In-group positive illusions and out-group deprecation seem to be related to group conflict (Johnson, 2004). Baumeister and Boden (1998) argue that “groups whose members demonstrate higher levels of [confidence] also demonstrate higher levels of hostility and violence” (115-116). This type of group violence is often linked in specific beliefs “in the superiority of the violent group” (Baumeister & Boden, 1998: 115-116). Such optimistic biases may be exaggerated because “group think results in reinforcing perceptions of superiority” (Johnson, 2004: 21).

According to Johnson (2004), such perceptions include (but not limited to):

“an unquestioned belief in the group’s inherent morality; stereotyping out-groups as too evil . . . or too weak to be a threat; a collective illusion of unanimity in a majority viewpoint (based on the faulty assumption that silence means consent)” (21).
Thus, groupthink and positive illusions may energize each other intensely (Johnson, 2004). The state’s main population’s support is mostly vital in times of war\(^{30}\) (Johnson, 2004) because the infusion of such support may augment the state’s degree of confidence. Volkan (1985) argues that “anyone trying to deal with interethnic or interstate conflict must grasp the psychological cogency of man’s need to have enemies as well as allies, and his stubborn adherence to identification with a group when undergoing hardship and danger” (219). Accordingly, in-group positive illusions and out-group deprecation can be corroborated in the insistent ambition of states that eventually lead to war.

According to Bas and Schub (N.d.), “if both states in a crisis appear willing to go to war, rational actors will infer that they either underestimated the opponent’s strength or overestimated their own” (5). I extend the basic reasoning to include information due to one or both states’ nonmaterial capabilities (i.e., the main population’s support). In particular, war becomes more probable due to optimism when at least one state has the support of its predominant population practicing a different religion than the rival state. In addition to other explanations of war, “the theory of [false optimism] can add to our understanding of why war breaks out when it does” (Johnson, 2004: 38). Essentially, the predominant population’s support, which can boost the

---

\(^{30}\) Hensel (1998) argues that “an important domestic actor that can have a profound influence on the [state’s] choices regarding conflict is the mass public, which is generally responsible for the [state’s] continuation of power” (7). The mass public’s support for the state cause is germane in both democratic and authoritarian systems. The role of the mass public in the former system is to elect, reelect or replace the chief executive. In the latter system, the mass public also play a critical role in instituting the chief executive, “whether directly (through protests, riots or open revolution) or indirectly (by encouraging elements in the military or government to overthrow the government)” (Hensel 1998: 7). Thus, the state needs to be strategic in both systems to mobilize and sustain popular support throughout the conflict campaign. A state may frame the interstate conflict into an ‘us against them’ tactic, suggesting that the adversary’s religious difference poses a threat on their religious identity. A state’s strategy of using the predominant religion may be a unifying force in mobilizing domestic support and a validation for the state’s policy.
state’s expectation for victory, may be used to legitimize the state’s optimism. This theoretical addition highlights the significance of the main population of religious adherents as a stimulus to the state’s optimism.

Generally, religion provides the “most secure basis for maintenance of a positively regarded social identity, and it frequently supplies the fault line along which intergroup identity and resource competition occurs” (Seul, 1999: 564). Thus, when conflict between two religious groups does occur, the predominant populations of each state may be “emboldened by a sense of religiously defined identity and purpose”, and their traditions may provide “symbolic, moral, institutional, and other resources that can be used to mobilize the group and legitimate its cause” (Seul, 1999: 564). Thus, religious rhetoric may be used to mobilize the religious adherents in support of the war cause. Rhetoric about the superiority of the state’s religion and moral obligation to support the war cause may add leverage to the state’s overconfidence of winning over the adversary. Essentially, religious rhetoric may heighten the main population’s sentiments and consequently mobilizes their support for war. Aside from the state’s material capabilities, the population’s support may offer a robust, albeit virtual, defense prior to experiencing optimism about its victory.

Considering this history of different identities, religious adherents (of at least one state) may ascertain that the choice for war is good in itself when a state communicates a message of religious obligation [against an enemy] (Horowitz, 2009: 163). Also, based on the assumed link between religious differences and militarized conflict, I expect that dyads with Christian/Muslim differences are more likely to pursue war. States may promote people’s support for war via rhetoric by generating their religious fervor in cases where the two states have religious differences in general or more explicitly in dyads with Christian/Muslim differences and dyads
with different religious denominations. Basically, I am interested in identifying whether dyads with different types of religious differences are more inclined to participate in war. Thus, I derive three hypotheses to test empirically:

\( H_7: \) Interstate dyads with different religions are more likely to engage in war than dyads with the same religions.

\( H_8: \) Interstate dyads with Christian/Muslim differences are more likely to engage in war.

\( H_9: \) (A) Interstate dyads with different religious denominations are more likely to engage in war than dyads with the same religious denomination.

\( H_9: \) (B) Interstate dyads with different religious denominations (Protestants and Anglicans Combined) are more likely to engage in war than dyads with the same religious denomination.

I test these nine hypotheses using statistical modeling. Also, I use a qualitative study of the case of the 1947 India-Pakistan War to look more closely at the mechanism linking religious differences and war.
CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH DESIGN

In this chapter I describe the research design I use to test the hypotheses I derived in Chapter 2. I develop a novel criterion for operationalizing religious differences, the main independent variables, and focus on more nuanced types of militarized conflict, the dependent variables in this study.

Data and Empirical Strategy

I expand the scope of research on the link between religious differences in a dyad and conflict consisting of various types of militarized conflicts: Enduring rivalry, rivalry recurrence, and war. All of these dimensions of conflicts include militarized disputes between two states in a dyad. This study covers the time period from 1945 to 2001. A list of the variables, their operationalization and sources are included in Appendix B.

To test my hypotheses I employ three dependent variables. They are three different dimensions of rivalry, enduring rivalry, rivalry recurrence, and war. The unit of analysis is the “dyad” for enduring rivalry and war. The unit of analysis for rivalry recurrence is “rivalry” and the unit of observation is “post-rivalry year”. The dependent variables are all binary (0, 1), thus the method of analysis is logit regression. I begin with the Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) “The New Rivalry Dataset: Procedures and Patterns” to identify the list of rivalries according to the criteria of Enduring Rivalry, Rivalry Recurrence, and War from 1945 to 2001. For Enduring Rivalry, I use the Klein et al. (2006) list of proto and enduring rivalries (N= 219) over the period 1945-2001.
For Rivalry Recurrence, I replicate the Rivalry Recurrence variable in Rudkevich, Travlos, and Diehl’s 2013 study that is consistent with the Klein et al. (2006) list of dyadic rivalries that are militarized in nature. In this model N = 1,567.

For War, I examine rivalry cases, consistent with the Klein et al. (2006) “The New Rivalry Dataset”, which involved sustained combat, including organized armed forces, resulting in a minimum of 1,000 battle-related combatant fatalities within a twelve month period (N = 225).

**Main Independent Variables**

The militarized conflict between two states may be associated to their religious differences. The main independent variables in my Models are (1) All Religious Differences, (2) Christian/Muslim Differences, (3) Different Religious Denominations, and (4) Different Religious Denominations with Protestant and Anglican denominations combined.

I adopt Alston’s (1967) conceptual definition of religion that is a “belief system of an individual or a group of individuals that contains several elements: belief in supernatural beings (gods); a distinction between sacred and profane objects; a moral code believed to be sanctioned by the gods; prayer and other forms of communication with gods; a more or less total organization of one’s life based on the worldview; a social group bound together by the above”\(^{31}\). I operationalize a state’s predominant “religious affiliation” by the plurality of the population that adheres to a specific religion during a given rivalry and war. In order to ensure reliable coding of each state’s predominant religion in a dyad, I rely on Maoz and Henderson’s (2013) “World Religion Dataset, 1945-2010: Logic, Estimates, and Trends” that generates each state’s

\(^{31}\) For a more thorough definition on “religion”, see Maoz and Henderson’s World Religions Codebook (2013: 2)
religious adherents based on denominational level data, which are aggregated into the relevant religious families. In their dataset Maoz and Henderson (2013) use the same country IDs as in the Correlates of War dataset.

Using Maoz and Henderson’s (2013) “World Religion Dataset, 1945-2010, I provide a brief description of the magnitude of the pluralities of religious differences in my data. Appendix C, Figure 1 shows the minima and maxima and distributions of religious pluralities in the states in dyads for Enduring Rivalry, Rivalry Recurrence, and War models. For example, in 1945, 79% of the total population in the United States of America identified as Christian. In 1950, 81% of the total population in the US identified as Christian, and 82% identified as Christian in 1995. In 1950, 48% of the total population in the former Soviet Union (Russia) identified as Non-religious; and in 1975, 54% of Russia’s total population identified as Non-religious. But in 2000, 72% of Russia’s total population identified as Christian. In 1985, 96% of the total population in Saudi Arabia identified as Muslim; and in 2000, 93% of its population identified as Muslim.

Appendix C, Figure 2 shows the minima and maxima and distributions of pluralities of religious denominations pluralities in the states in dyads for the Enduring Rivalry, Rivalry Recurrence, and War models. Appendix C, Figure 3 shows the minima and maxima and distributions of religious denominations (Protestant and Anglican Combined) in the states in dyads for each of the models. Figures 1, 2, and 3 show that, for the most part, the pluralities for the various types of religious differences used in my models are large.
To construct (1) All Religious Differences, first I aggregate all the appropriate denominations under their religion family. For example, I add the populations of Catholics, Protestants, Anglicans, and Eastern Orthodox in a “Christianity” category\textsuperscript{32}. Thus I create the following religious categories: Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Buddhism, Zoroastrian, Hindu, Sikh, Shinto, Bahai, Taoism, Confucianism, Jain, Syncretic Religions, Animism, Non-Religious, and Other (Maoz & Henderson, 2013). Second, I identify each state’s “predominant” religion based on the plurality of total adherents. The World Religion Project offers data at five-year intervals from 1945 to 2010 on the population of religious adherents of states (Maoz & Henderson, 2013: 267). Thus, I use the year in religious differences most proximate to the rivalry year. In cases where I use the most proximate year, I double check each state’s religious populations using the CIA World Factbook and Britannica Book of the Year. I then identify each state’s religion (within a dyad) based on the country code and the initial year of conflict. “Religious Differences” means that states in a dyad have different predominant religious affiliates based on the plurality of the dominant population of religious adherents within the state during a given militarized conflict. The coding is 1 if a dyad is characterized as having two different religions and 0 if a dyad shares the same religion.

“Christian/Muslim Differences” tests whether specifically Christian/Muslim dyads have conflict-proneness. It is argued in the literature that Islamic and Christian states may have a “general tendency . . . to engage in conflict” (Fox, 2002: 206; Huntington, 1993, 1996) but this

\textsuperscript{32} From 1945 to 1989, some communist countries had made substantial efforts to suppress or ignore religious practice (i.e., atheist, nonreligious, or areligious) (Helble, N.d.: 217). Therefore, I include atheist, nonreligious, or areligious communist countries until 1989.
prediction has not been tested systematically. Given these propositions in the literature, I examine whether Christian/Muslim Differences may increase the likelihood of interstate militarized conflict. The variable is coded as 1 for Christian/Muslim differences, and 0 if not.

“Different Religious Denominations” examines whether dyads with different religious denominations have conflict-proneness also. Based on the major religions (e.g., Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Buddhism, etc.), I identity the religious denomination based on the large plurality of adherents within each state (e.g., Christianity: Protestant, Roman Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, Anglican, and Other Christian; Judaism: Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform; Islam: Sunni, Shi’a, Ibadhi, Nation of Islam, Alawite, and Ahmadiyya; Buddhism: Mahayana and Theravada; etc.). Furthermore, I include a separate variable aggregating Protestant Anglican denominations into one denomination (i.e., Protestant-Anglican). Again, I rely on the World Religion Project (Maoz & Henderson, 2013) to collect my data on religious denominations. The variable is coded as 1 if the dyad consists of different denominations, and 0 if not.

**Dependent Variables**

To determine the relationship between religion and various dimensions of rivalry and war, I identify rivalry and war cases over the period of 1945-2001 (Klein, Goertz, & Diehl, 2006). According to Klein et al. (2006), the players in rivalries “consist of states and rivalries are dyadic” (333). Basically, rivalries include the same pair of states who engage in militarized conflicts with each other, “and the expectation of a future conflict relationship is one that is specific as to whom the opponent will be” (Klein et al., 2006: 333). Below, I conceptualize and operationalize the three types of conflict as the dependent variables in this study.
**Enduring Rivalry**

Following Klein, Goertz, and Diehl’s (2006) conceptualization of “Enduring Rivalry”, they begin by selecting potential “dyads with three or more militarized disputes” (337). Klein et al. (2006) determine “whether [militarized] disputes belong to the same rivalry” by looking at the interrelation of issues between the two states. States consider other states as rivals mainly through their history of repeated confrontations or by the “presence of unresolved issues that persist over a broad period of time” with that enemy (Klein et al., 2006: 337). An enduring rivalry is operationalized as a “competition between the same two states that involves six or more militarized disputes over a period of 20 years” (Goertz & Diehl, 1995: 33). The variable “Enduring Rivalry”, taken from Klein, Goertz, and Diehl’s 2006 New Rivalry Dataset, includes “the cases of enduring rivalry (coded as 1) experience a mean of 13 disputes and last on average of 36 years from the first until the last behavioral sign of rivalry” (340). Proto rivalries are operationalized as those conflicts that produce three to five disputes in a 15-year period (Goertz & Diehl, 1995: 33). Proto rivalries “experience a mean of four disputes and last on average of 11 years” are coded as 0 (Klein et al., 2006: 340). I rely on the Klein et al. 2006 list of dyads that are candidates for enduring and proto rivalries from 1945 to 2001 (N= 219).

**Rivalry Recurrence**

Following the Rudkevich et al. (2013) study, I “examine only those [interstate dyadic] rivalries that are candidates for rivalry recurrence, namely, those rivalries that have terminated. [That is] a rivalry [is] terminated when it experiences a period of approximately 15 years without
a militarized dispute (Ghosn, Palmer, & Bremer, 2004)\(^{33}\); the end date of the last dispute is conventionally defined as the end of the rivalry” (165). Following the Rudkevich et al. (2013) alternate specification, I allow the “possibility for a rivalry to recur every year after the initial 15-year cutoff for rivalry termination until the 40-year cutoff for recurrence from 1945 to 2001 (165). “Rivalry Recurrence”, is derived from the Rudkevich et al. (2013) dataset, which is taken from the Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) list of rivalries. They define “rivalry recurrence” when dyadic rivals reenter into rivalry once the initial rivalry has terminated. Rudkevich et al. (2013) conceptualize a terminated rivalry as having ‘recurred’ “if it is followed by the beginning of a new rivalry between the same states between approximately 15 and 40 years following the termination of the original rivalry. I operationalize “rivalry recurrence” according to the specification presented by Rudkevich et al., (2013), whereby “they allow the possibility for a rivalry to recur every year after the initial 15-year cutoff for rivalry termination until the 40-year cutoff for recurrence”; however, no more years for that case are considered once a rivalry has recurred (166). My research timeline is from 1945 to 2001 and thus \( N = 1,567 \). To illustrate using the US/USSR example: if the rivalry terminates in 1947, the observations start with 1948 until either the rivalry recurs or until 1987 (when 40 years pass) and “once a rivalry has recurred [between 15 and 40 years] (coded as 1), however, no more years for that particular case are considered” (Rudkevich et al., 2013: 166). If a rivalry does not resume in 40 years (coded as 0), there are no more observations on it. According to Diehl and Goertz (2000), “the 15-year period is consistent with existing standards in rivalry termination research and reflects a significant,

\(^{33}\) According to Rudkevich et al. (2013), the word “approximately 15 years” is used according to the original Klein et al. (2006) source that “determined rivalry termination according to a sliding scale of dispute-free periods. The year period is consistent with existing standards in rivalry termination research and reflects a significant, inductively determined breakpoint in rivalry patterns” (Rudkevich et al., 2013: 165).
inductively determined breakpoint in rivalry patterns” (Rudkevich et al., 2013: 165). The maximum 40-year lapse reflects the effects of generational change in politics and society (166). This is suitable because a lot of political changes may occur within a maximum span 40 years since the initial rivalry terminated. States may experience changes in leadership, regime infrastructure, or even changes in religion following large demographic changes. It is interesting to explore whether religious difference has an effect on recurring rivalry despite the generational and other changes that may take place over time.

War

War is viewed as an organized form of violence or “use of force” (according to Clausewitz) that occurs primarily between political organizations (Vasquez, 2009). More precisely, “war” is a “group activity, fought between and directed at collectivities” (Vasquez, 2009: 39). I operationalize the concept of war as a binary variable. It is coded 1 if, according to the Correlates of War, the two states engaged in war throughout their conflict. If the militarized dispute between the two states did not escalate to war, then it is coded 0. I operationalize interstate war as cases that “must involve sustained combat, [including] organized armed forces, resulting in a minimum of 1,000 battle-related combatant fatalities within a twelve month period” (Correlates of War Data, v4.0). Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) argue that “one way to examine . . . the occurrence of wars [is] in the sequence of disputes within the [militarized dispute]” (342). Thus, I use the Klein et al. (2006) list of militarized disputes between states that are candidates for interstate war from 1945 to 2001 (N= 232).
Control Variables

All nine models have several common control variables. I include in the models the following control variables which may increase the likelihood of enduring rivalry, rivalry recurrence, and war. See Table 1 for the 9 models estimated in this study.

Territorial Issue: I predict that incompatibilities over territory increase the likelihood of enduring rivalry, rivalry recurrence, and war. “Territorial issue” reflects whether the dyadic interstate conflict between two states involved a territorial dispute. Henderson (1998) stresses that “the most important “step” in the conflict process— and Vasquez’s underlying “cause” of interstate militarized conflict—is the rise of a territorial dispute between states (468). Goertz and Diehl (1992) explain that states are more likely to engage in militarized conflict if they consider a territorial transfer as invalid. Thus, dyadic rivals who fight over territorial matters may intensify feelings of nationalism towards protecting their right to the territory, which may lead to different levels of rivalry and war. I identify whether the dyadic interstate rivalry involved a territorial dispute using the “(Militarized Interstate Dispute) MID3 Dataset: Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description (Ghosn, Palmer, & Bremer, 2005). Enduring rivalries, recurring rivalries, and wars that are fought over a territorial issue are coded as 1 and those that were not are coded as 0.

Contiguity: I predict that the closer the states are to one another, the more likely they engage in different types of rivalry and war. Consistent with the interstate rivalry and war literature, I employ “Contiguity” as a control variable. Empirical tests have repeatedly revealed that contiguous dyads have higher likelihoods of conflict (Bremer, 1992; Goertz & Diehl, 1992; Gochman, 1991). “Contiguity” is a binary variable created on whether two states in the dyad
share a land border (coded as 1) or not (coded as 0) (Rudkevich, Travlos, & Diehl, 2013). I identify whether the dyadic interstate conflict was contiguous using the “MID3 Dataset: Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description (Ghosn, Palmer, & Bremer, 2005). “Contiguity” is operationalized with the coding standards from the Correlates of War Project (2005). Henderson (1998) identifies “pairs of states within 400 miles by sea are coded as (1) if contiguous and those apart are coded as (0) or noncontiguous” (471).

**Major power dyad:** I employ the *Major Power* dyad to reflect whether both states in the dyad were major powers in accordance to the Correlates of War Project (2008) “State System Membership List, V2008.1” criteria. Based on the Correlates of War dataset, I operationalize “major power” as both states possessing political status and overall observable capabilities (i.e., military and economic). According to the Correlates of War Project, “states must behave as major powers, with global interests and reach and must be regarded by the other major powers as ‘members of the club’” (2008). Major Power dyad is conceptualized as those states that the bulk of coders agree are major powers (Singer & Small, 1972). “Major power dyad” is binary whereby dyads that include *both* major powers are coded as 1 and those that do not are coded as 0. The emphasis is on the status of the states as great powers, which is a matter of reputation and capabilities. Dyads with major power capabilities may “reinforce the legacy of past hostility” due to the accessibility and control over major resources such as weapons, money, international support, etc. (Rudkevich et al., 2013: 160).

**Joint Democracy:** Building on the democratic peace thesis, states that are both democratic are less likely to engage in conflict as opposed to states of opposing regime types. I rely on the Polity IV Project (2010) “Center for International Development and Conflict Management” dataset to operationalize “Joint Democracy;” Democracies are identified based on a Polity IV
score of 6 or higher, which is a conventional threshold point (Hensel, Goertz, & Diehl, 2000).

Joint Democracy is a binary variable that is coded as 1 if both states within the dyad share the same democratic regime. If neither, or just one, state in the dyad is identified as a democracy, then it is coded as 0. According to Hensel, Goertz, and Diehl (2000), joint democracies increase the likelihood of seeking peace talks as opposed to resorting to enduring rivalry, rivalry recurrence, and war.

**Incongruent outcomes**: “Incongruent outcomes” examines the initial rivalry’s incompatible termination procedures and outcome. Accordingly, the devices used to terminate the previous rivalry may serve as one or both rivals’ incentives to rekindle old flames. The “incongruent outcome” of the losing party may serve as a catalyst for renewed hostilities if the victorious rival imposes (on the losing state) an unsuitable settlement or does not offer a settlement at all (none) (Rudkevich et al., 2013: 161). Rudkevich et al. (2013), use the “MID3 Dataset: Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description” (2005) to derive the outcome and settlement types, and identify incongruent outcomes. According to Rudkevich et al. (2013), “A congruent settlement is one in which one of the following combinations occur: victory-imposed, compromise-negotiated, and stalemate-none” (167). The remaining [“incongruent”] cases consist of victories with either negotiated or no settlement (167). Incongruent outcome is a binary variable (coded as 1) for the presence of an incongruent termination outcome and absence thereof is coded as 0.

**Strength of Past Rivalry**: Rivalry may escalate if it is severe and steadily continues to strengthen. A rivalry’s frequency and relentlessness between opposing parties are likely to cause rivalry recurrence. The strength of the terminated rivalry is measured according to the militarized dispute that occurred in the rivalry between the two states in a dyad, which has at
least five militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) between the two rivals in the dyad (Rudkevich et al., 2013: 166). These are derived from the Correlates of War (2005) data set on rivalry, which originated from the “MID3 Dataset: Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description”. “Strength of Past Rivalry” (coded as 1) has to have a minimum of five MIDs, which is indicative of a long-lasting rivalry (repetitive). A Rivalry with only three to four disputes is coded as 0. “In a recent update of their original work, Goertz and Diehl 1993, 1995) no longer include a time minimum or maximum when defining rivalries (Klein, Goertz, and Diehl, 2006)” (Conrad, 2011: 532). Thus, I include “strength of past rivalry” as a proxy for conflict intensity in this study.

**War as a Control Variable:** I include “War” as a binary variable for the “presence of war in the rivalry-ending MID” (Rudkevich et al., 2013: 167). There is mixed evidence on whether war supports longer-term peace or not (Rudkevich et al., 2013). Werner (1999) argues that the costs of the previous war reduce the likelihood to return to the battlefield quickly due to the effects of war exhaustion (Mitchell & Vasquez, 2014: 339). Thus, war may serve as a deterrent for future rivalry and thus I expect a negative relationship in my findings. According to Correlates of War, “war” includes conflict events with 1,000 or more battle-related deaths (Rudkevich et al. 2013: 167). I rely on Sarkees and Wayman’s (2010) “Resort to War: 1817-2007” Dataset for this variable. I treat “war” as a dummy variable. Initial rivalry ending in war is coded as 1, versus the rivalry that does not is coded as 0.

**Linguistic differences:** In order to test for other cultural indicators on the likelihood of rivalry and war, I use ‘language’ as a proxy for the number of the leading ethnic groups in each country (Fearon & Laitin, 2000). I include “Linguistic differences” as a binary variable (coded as 1 if
both states in the dyad have different linguistic groups, 0 otherwise). I use Ellingsen’s\(^\text{34}\) (2000) dataset, which offers annual estimates that are “based on averaging values from *The CIA World Factbook, Britannica Book of the Year* and the *Demographic Yearbook* and interpolating missing years” (Gartzke & Gleditsch, 2006: 80). The data specify each state’s linguistic identity that is based on the largest linguistic group in each state from 1945 to 2000 (Gartzke & Gleditsch, 2006: 62). I use these data to identify each state’s linguistic identity based on the rivalry year. Based on each state’s linguistic identity in a dyad during the specific year of militarized conflict, I determine whether the two states have linguistic differences.

**Ethnic differences:** According to Fearon and Laitin (2000), “psychological theories perceive ethnic groups as satisfying an inherent need to belong to a group and as allowing group members to maintain self-esteem” (717). Additionally, Horowitz (1985) and Tajfel (1982) argue that conflict may occur when psychological conditions are somewhat threatened by a divergent group. To determine the exclusive effect of the main independent variables, I test separately if ethnicity influences the various types of rivalry and war. I include “Ethnic differences” as a binary variable (coded as 1 if both states in the dyad have different ethnic groups, 0 otherwise). I use Ellingsen’s (2000) dataset, which specifies each state’s linguistic identity based on the largest ethnic group in each state from 1945 to 2000 (Gartzke & Gleditsch, 2006: 62). I operationalizes “Ethnic difference” as the differences of each state’s ethnic identity that is based on the largest ethnic group in each state during the specific conflict year. I use these data to

---

\(^{34}\) According to Gartzke and Gleditsch (2006), “Ellingsen reports inter-coder reliability correlation between 0.78 and 0.95, and interpolation seems adequate, since cultural traits tend to be static over short periods of time” (80).
identify whether states in a dyad are ethnically different or not from 1945 to 2001. I code variables as 1 when they have ethnic differences or 0 when they are the same.

Table 1:
Models to be Estimated

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model Variables</th>
<th>Enduring Rivalry</th>
<th>Rivalry Recurrence</th>
<th>War</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Religious Differences</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian/Muslim Differences</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Different Religious Denominations</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Different Religious Denominations (Protestants/Anglicans Combined)</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial Issue</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contiguity</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Power</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Democracy</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incongruent Outcome</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strength of Past Rivalry</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linguistic Differences</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Differences</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Method of Analysis

As noted earlier, the three dependent variables in this study, Enduring Rivalry, Rivalry Recurrence, and War are dichotomous (0, 1), thus I use logit regression to conduct the analysis. The functional form of Models 1, 2, 3, and 4 (the 4 models with enduring rivalry as dependent variable) is as follows: (Model 1) Enduring Rivalry = \( f(\text{religious differences all dyads}, \ldots) \).
Model 2 evaluates separately the Christian/Muslim dyads. I explore the effect of religion when the rivals in the dyad are “Christian/Muslim”. I use the “Christian/Muslim” dyads as a separate independent variable: (Model 2) Enduring Rivalry = f (religious differences CH/MU dyads, territorial issue, contiguity, major power dyad, joint democracy, linguistic differences, and ethnic differences). Model 3 tests whether different religious denominations between states increases the likelihood of rivalry recurrence. I examine whether the theoretical framework in this study applies to different religious denominations because there have been historical conflicts due to denominational distinctions (i.e., different religious denominations and different religious denominations (Protestants and Anglicans combined). And finally, Model 4 tests whether different religious denominations with Protestants and Anglicans combined increases the two states’ likelihood of enduring rivalry: (Model 3) Enduring Rivalry = f (different religious denominations, territorial issue, contiguity, major power dyad, joint democracy, linguistic differences, ethnic differences), and (Model 4) Enduring Rivalry = f (different religious denominations [Protestants and Anglicans Combined], territorial issue, contiguity, major power dyad, joint democracy, linguistic differences, ethnic differences). The following are Models 5, 6, 7, and 8: (there are 4 models with rivalry recurrence as dependent variable): (Model 5) Rivalry Recurrence = f (religious differences all dyads, territorial issue, contiguity, major power dyad, joint democracy, incongruent outcome, strength of past rivalry, war, linguistic differences, ethnic differences). (Model 6): Rivalry Recurrence = f (religious differences CH/MU dyads, territorial issue, contiguity, major power dyad, joint democracy, incongruent outcome, strength of past rivalry, war, linguistic differences, ethnic differences); (Model 7) Rivalry Recurrence = f (different religious denominations, territorial issue, contiguity,
major power dyad, joint democracy, incongruent outcome, strength of past rivalry, war, linguistic differences, ethnic differences) and (Model 8) Rivalry Recurrence = f (different religious denominations [Protestants and Anglicans Combined], territorial issue, contiguity, major power dyad, joint democracy, incongruent outcome, strength of past rivalry, war, linguistic differences, ethnic differences). The following are Models 9, 10, 11, and 12 where the dependent variable is war: (Model 9) War = f (religious differences all dyads, territorial issue, contiguity, major power dyad, joint democracy, linguistic differences, ethnic differences); (Model 10) War = f (religious difference CH/MU dyads, territorial issue, contiguity, major power dyad, joint democracy, linguistic difference, ethnic difference); (Model 11) War = f (different religious denominations, territorial issue, contiguity, major power dyad, joint democracy, linguistic differences, ethnic differences), and (Model 12) War = f (different religious denominations [Protestants and Anglicans Combined], territorial issue, contiguity, major power dyad, joint democracy, linguistic differences, ethnic differences).

In Chapter 4 I describe the results of the analysis.
CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

This chapter presents the results of the analysis for each dependent variable: (1) enduring rivalry, (2) rivalry recurrence, and (3) war. Appendix D provides the summary statistics of the various groups of religious differences (i.e., Religious Differences (all dyads) and Christian/Muslim Differences and Different Religious Denominations and Different Religious Denominations [Protestants and Anglicans Combined]) across rivalry types (i.e., Enduring Rivalry, Rivalry Recurrence, and War). Finally, I present an illustration of the 1947 India-Pakistan war to examine closer the mechanism of the connection between religious difference and war.

As predicted, two states in a dyad with All Religious Differences, Different Religious Denominations, and Different Religious Denominations [Protestants and Anglicans Combined]) have a greater likelihood of Rivalry Recurrence and War but not on Enduring Rivalry. Basically, the motivation to mobilize and the support of the adherents of the predominant religion when the other state has a different religion may contribute to rivalry and war proneness. It is logical to infer that the enmity between the two states due to these religious differences partially contributes to the outcome of a recurrent rivalry and war.

Results with respect to Christian/Muslim Differences are not significant, however, which suggests that the link surrounding the Christian and Muslim states does not increase the likelihood of Enduring Rivalry, Rivalry Recurrence, and War. The small number of Christian/Muslim cases relative to the null cases in the models might explain the non-significant results. In addition to the small number of the small sample size of Christian/Muslim cases coupled with the study’s time period might explain the weak link between Christian/Muslim
differences and the types of militarized conflicts. For a closer look, a list of the cases in Christian/Muslim dyads are included in Appendix A. Several control variables are significant, each increasing the probability of Enduring Rivalry, Rivalry Recurrence, and War.

Results—Enduring Rivalry and Religious Differences

I test the relationship between religious difference and Enduring Rivalry, using various dimensions of religious differences. Tables 2 and 2a report the results of my analyses for the relationships between Enduring Rivalry and (a) All Religious Differences (b) Christian/Muslim Differences (c) Different Religious Denominations and (4) Different Religious Denominations (Protestants and Anglicans Combined). I propose that the existence of religious differences between two states in a dyad increases the likelihood of enduring rivalry. At least one state in a dyad may mobilize and sustain the support of the adherents of the predominant religion when the other state has a different religion.

Below I restate my hypotheses about the relationship between enduring rivalry and religious differences:

\[ H_1: \text{Interstate dyads with different religions are more likely to engage in enduring rivalry than dyads with the same religions.} \]

\[ H_2: \text{Interstate dyads with Christian/Muslim differences are more likely to engage in enduring rivalry.} \]

---

35 I only list the Christian/Muslim cases that experience Rivalry Recurrence and War since my religious difference variables (i.e., All Religious Difference, Different Religious Denomination, and Different Religious Denominations (Protestants and Anglicans combined) are significant.

36 To restate, the dependent variable (Enduring Rivalry) (coded as 1) is a “competition between the same two states that involves six or more militarized disputes over a period of 20 years” (Goertz & Diehl, 1995: 33) and Proto Rivalry is coded as 0 if those conflicts produce three to five disputes in a 15-year period (Goertz & Diehl, 1995: 33).
$H_3$: (A) Interstate dyads with different religious denominations are more likely to engage in enduring rivalry.

$H_3$: (B) Interstate dyads with different religious denominations (Protestants and Anglicans Combined) are more likely to engage in enduring rivalry.
Table 2: Relationship between Enduring Rivalry and All Religious Differences and Christian/Muslim Differences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All Religious Differences</th>
<th></th>
<th>Christian/Muslim Differences</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(I)</td>
<td>(II)</td>
<td>(III)</td>
<td>(IV)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Differences</td>
<td>1.423</td>
<td>1.142</td>
<td>1.511</td>
<td>1.197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.493)</td>
<td>(0.429)</td>
<td>(0.545)</td>
<td>(0.452)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial Issue</td>
<td>3.452***</td>
<td>3.748***</td>
<td>3.369***</td>
<td>3.656***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.211)</td>
<td>(1.349)</td>
<td>(1.189)</td>
<td>(1.325)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contiguity</td>
<td>2.666***</td>
<td>2.955***</td>
<td>2.583***</td>
<td>2.904***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.963)</td>
<td>(1.092)</td>
<td>(0.942)</td>
<td>(1.080)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.148)</td>
<td>(4.258)</td>
<td>(4.147)</td>
<td>(4.350)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Democracy</td>
<td>0.442</td>
<td>0.434</td>
<td>0.446</td>
<td>0.449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.508)</td>
<td>(0.508)</td>
<td>(0.510)</td>
<td>(0.523)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linguistic Differences</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.907</td>
<td>2.714*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.831)</td>
<td>(1.388)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Differences</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.758</td>
<td>0.470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.327)</td>
<td>(0.237)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.107***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.041)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.068***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.034)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.134***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.068)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.096***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.052)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.137***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.044)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.072***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.035)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.155***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.076)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.101***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.054)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood Ratio</td>
<td>22.880***</td>
<td>25.160***</td>
<td>23.290***</td>
<td>27.410***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(21.900***</td>
<td>25.400***</td>
<td>22.000***</td>
<td>27.510***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo-R2</td>
<td>0.094</td>
<td>0.103</td>
<td>0.095</td>
<td>0.112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.090)</td>
<td>(0.104)</td>
<td>(0.090)</td>
<td>(0.113)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Values in parentheses are Standard Error (SE); *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Table 2a:  
Relationship between Enduring Rivalry and Different Religious Denominations and Different Religious Denominations (Protestants and Anglicans Combined)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(IX)</td>
<td>(X)</td>
<td>(XI)</td>
<td>(XII)</td>
<td>(XIII)</td>
<td>(XIV)</td>
<td>(XV)</td>
<td>(XVI)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>1.437</td>
<td>1.179</td>
<td>1.489</td>
<td>1.199</td>
<td>1.718</td>
<td>1.404</td>
<td>1.782</td>
<td>1.395</td>
<td></td>
<td>22.670***</td>
<td>0.096***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Differences</td>
<td>0.577</td>
<td>0.500</td>
<td>0.607</td>
<td>0.511</td>
<td>0.708</td>
<td>0.613</td>
<td>0.744</td>
<td>0.610</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>219</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial</td>
<td>3.500***</td>
<td>3.781***</td>
<td>3.434***</td>
<td>3.705***</td>
<td>3.429***</td>
<td>3.705***</td>
<td>3.352***</td>
<td>3.634***</td>
<td></td>
<td>22.670***</td>
<td>0.096***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue</td>
<td>(1.226)</td>
<td>(1.354)</td>
<td>(1.210)</td>
<td>(1.337)</td>
<td>(1.205)</td>
<td>(1.333)</td>
<td>(1.186)</td>
<td>(1.317)</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>219</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contiguity</td>
<td>2.730***</td>
<td>3.017***</td>
<td>2.659***</td>
<td>2.956***</td>
<td>2.837***</td>
<td>3.109***</td>
<td>2.750***</td>
<td>3.029***</td>
<td></td>
<td>22.670***</td>
<td>0.096***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.011)</td>
<td>(1.144)</td>
<td>(0.993)</td>
<td>(1.127)</td>
<td>(1.042)</td>
<td>(1.168)</td>
<td>(1.021)</td>
<td>(1.145)</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>219</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Democracy</td>
<td>0.434</td>
<td>0.430</td>
<td>0.439</td>
<td>0.447</td>
<td>0.432</td>
<td>0.427</td>
<td>0.439</td>
<td>0.447</td>
<td></td>
<td>22.670***</td>
<td>0.096***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.496)</td>
<td>(0.503)</td>
<td>(0.499)</td>
<td>(0.520)</td>
<td>(0.496)</td>
<td>(0.500)</td>
<td>(0.502)</td>
<td>(0.522)</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>219</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linguistic</td>
<td>1.926</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.762**</td>
<td>(1.394)</td>
<td>1.813</td>
<td>1.813</td>
<td>2.609*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>22.670***</td>
<td>0.096***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Differences</td>
<td>(0.814)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.774)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.332)</td>
<td></td>
<td>219</td>
<td>219</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic</td>
<td>0.802</td>
<td>0.476</td>
<td>0.476</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.783</td>
<td>0.783</td>
<td>0.479</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>22.670***</td>
<td>0.096***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Differences</td>
<td>(0.339)</td>
<td>(0.239)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.333)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.242)</td>
<td></td>
<td>219</td>
<td>219</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.096***</td>
<td>0.063***</td>
<td>0.114***</td>
<td>0.088***</td>
<td>0.082***</td>
<td>0.057***</td>
<td>0.100***</td>
<td>0.081***</td>
<td></td>
<td>22.670***</td>
<td>0.096***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.046)</td>
<td>(0.036)</td>
<td>(0.066)</td>
<td>(0.053)</td>
<td>(0.040)</td>
<td>(0.032)</td>
<td>(0.059)</td>
<td>(0.049)</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>219</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>219</td>
<td></td>
<td>22.670***</td>
<td>0.096***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood</td>
<td>22.670***</td>
<td>25.190***</td>
<td>22.940***</td>
<td>27.370***</td>
<td>23.630***</td>
<td>25.650***</td>
<td>23.960***</td>
<td>27.780***</td>
<td></td>
<td>22.670***</td>
<td>0.096***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio</td>
<td>(1.021)</td>
<td>(1.145)</td>
<td>(1.021)</td>
<td>(1.145)</td>
<td>(1.021)</td>
<td>(1.145)</td>
<td>(1.021)</td>
<td>(1.145)</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>219</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo-R²</td>
<td>0.093</td>
<td>0.103</td>
<td>0.094</td>
<td>0.112</td>
<td>0.097</td>
<td>0.105</td>
<td>0.098</td>
<td>0.114</td>
<td></td>
<td>22.670***</td>
<td>0.096***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.045)</td>
<td>(0.037)</td>
<td>(0.058)</td>
<td>(0.040)</td>
<td>(0.037)</td>
<td>(0.040)</td>
<td>(0.037)</td>
<td>(0.040)</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>219</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Values in parentheses are Standard Error (SE); *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Table 2 reports the results of the logistic regression for models I through VIII and Table 2a reports the results of the logistic regression for models IX thru XVI. The effects of All Religious Differences, Christian/Muslim Differences, Different Religious Denominations, and Different Religious Denominations (Protestants and Anglicans Combined) are not consistent with my expectations. The coefficients are in the direction anticipated but not statistically significant. These results may be due to the operationalization of enduring rivalry that may be restricting the variable’s variation; thus the nonsignificant results may suggest that religious differences may affect similarly both proto- and enduring rivalries.

Results—Enduring Rivalry and Effects of Control Variables

Tables 2 and 2a show that territorial issues and contiguity have positive and significant effects on enduring rivalry. Further, the effect of linguistic differences is statistically significant and in the direction anticipated (as shown in Models IV, VI, VIII, XII, and XVI) even when controlling for Ethnic Differences. This shows that the coefficients are stable even when another cultural variable (i.e., ethnic differences) is included in the models.

Results—Rivalry Recurrence and Religious Differences

Tables 3 and 3a report the results of the analyses for the relationship between Rivalry Recurrence and (a) All Religious Differences (b) Christian/Muslim Differences (c) Different Religious Denominations and (d) Different Religious Denominations (Protestants and Anglicans Combined). Table 4 reports the predicted probabilities of rivalry varying religious difference

---

37 Rudkevich et al. (2013) started their observations 15 years after termination and looked at years 16-40 after termination to see at which point the rivalry would recur. Rudkevich et al. (2013) “define a rivalry as terminated when it experiences a period of about 15 years without a militarized dispute (Ghosn, Palmer, & Bremer, 2004; Diehl & Goertz, 2000)” (165).
(from 0 to 1) and holding all other variables at their means for the models that yield significant results. To go one step further, I examine whether a rivalry between two states (that has terminated) has a higher likelihood of recurring due to the religious differences between the states. As stated in the previous chapter, I operationalize “rivalry recurrence” according to the requirement offered by Rudkevich et al., (2013), whereby “they allow the possibility for a rivalry to recur every year after the initial 15-year cutoff for rivalry termination until the 40-year cutoff for recurrence”; but no more years for that case are considered once a rivalry has recurred (166). Since I count each rivalry every year from 16- to the 40-year cutoff and stop counting if the rivalry recurs, I end up with an \( N = 1,567 \). This is substantially higher than the Enduring Rivalry cases \( (N=219) \). The purpose of examining religious differences on rivalry recurrence is to better understand the strong element of time and history of past rivalry between states in a dyad. These past dynamics from the initial terminated rivalry may have a higher likelihood of recurring when the two states have different religions. Thus, I propose that religious differences between two states in a dyad increases the likelihood of rivalry recurrence. At least one state in a dyad may mobilize and sustain the support of the adherents for the predominant religion when the other state has a different religion. Below, I restate my hypotheses about the relationship between recurrent rivalry and religious differences:

\[ H_4: \text{ Interstate dyads with different religions are more likely to engage in rivalry recurrence than dyads with the same religions.} \]

---

38 Rudkevich (2016) explains that the point is to see when the rivalry recurred by having a 1 for the year of recurrence and 0 for years of non-recurrence.
H5: Interstate dyads with Christian/Muslim differences are more likely to engage in rivalry recurrence.

H6: (A) Interstate dyads with different religious denominations are more likely to engage in rivalry recurrence.

H6: (B) Interstate dyads with different religious denominations (Protestants and Anglicans Combined) are more likely to engage in rivalry recurrence.
Table 3: Relationship between Rivalry Recurrence and All Religious Differences and Christian/Muslim Differences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(XVII)</th>
<th>(XVIII)</th>
<th>(XIX)</th>
<th>(XX)</th>
<th>(XXI)</th>
<th>(XXII)</th>
<th>(XXIII)</th>
<th>(XXIV)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Religious Differences</strong></td>
<td>1.787***</td>
<td>1.692**</td>
<td>2.370***</td>
<td>1.961***</td>
<td>1.302</td>
<td>1.195</td>
<td>1.489*</td>
<td>1.231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.363)</td>
<td>(0.367)</td>
<td>(0.520)</td>
<td>(0.442)</td>
<td>(0.293)</td>
<td>(0.278)</td>
<td>(0.343)</td>
<td>(0.290)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Territorial Issue</strong></td>
<td>1.306</td>
<td>1.309</td>
<td>1.595**</td>
<td>1.705**</td>
<td>1.318</td>
<td>1.321</td>
<td>1.557**</td>
<td>1.688**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.265)</td>
<td>(0.266)</td>
<td>(0.337)</td>
<td>(0.363)</td>
<td>(0.264)</td>
<td>(0.265)</td>
<td>(0.322)</td>
<td>(0.353)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Contiguity</strong></td>
<td>18.537***</td>
<td>18.710***</td>
<td>18.934***</td>
<td>19.821***</td>
<td>14.934***</td>
<td>15.683***</td>
<td>14.036***</td>
<td>15.781***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Major Power</strong></td>
<td>6.043***</td>
<td>6.048***</td>
<td>7.301***</td>
<td>7.597***</td>
<td>6.668***</td>
<td>6.488***</td>
<td>8.150***</td>
<td>8.103***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Joint Democracy</strong></td>
<td>0.422</td>
<td>0.422</td>
<td>0.434</td>
<td>0.433</td>
<td>0.419</td>
<td>0.421</td>
<td>0.431</td>
<td>0.432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.245)</td>
<td>(0.246)</td>
<td>(0.254)</td>
<td>(0.259)</td>
<td>(0.245)</td>
<td>(0.247)</td>
<td>(0.253)</td>
<td>(0.260)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Incongruent Outcome</strong></td>
<td>1.212</td>
<td>1.243</td>
<td>1.185</td>
<td>1.238***</td>
<td>1.081</td>
<td>1.149</td>
<td>1.017</td>
<td>1.096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.390)</td>
<td>(0.401)</td>
<td>(0.379)</td>
<td>(0.751)</td>
<td>(0.344)</td>
<td>(0.367)</td>
<td>(0.322)</td>
<td>(0.351)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strength of Past Rivalry</strong></td>
<td>2.816***</td>
<td>2.867***</td>
<td>3.174***</td>
<td>3.535***</td>
<td>2.496***</td>
<td>2.633***</td>
<td>2.645***</td>
<td>3.140***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.571)</td>
<td>(0.586)</td>
<td>(0.666)</td>
<td>(0.751)</td>
<td>(0.483)</td>
<td>(0.521)</td>
<td>(0.522)</td>
<td>(0.640)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>War</strong></td>
<td>0.035***</td>
<td>0.034***</td>
<td>0.027***</td>
<td>0.025***</td>
<td>0.038***</td>
<td>0.036***</td>
<td>0.033***</td>
<td>0.028***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.035)</td>
<td>(0.035)</td>
<td>(0.028)</td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
<td>(0.036)</td>
<td>(0.034)</td>
<td>(0.028)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linguistic Differences</strong></td>
<td>1.171</td>
<td>2.177***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.359</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.528***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.270)</td>
<td>(0.586)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.301)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.664)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethnic Differences</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.237***</td>
<td>0.148***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.313***</td>
<td>0.168***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.070)</td>
<td>(0.051)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.088)</td>
<td>(0.057)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constant</strong></td>
<td>0.007***</td>
<td>0.006***</td>
<td>0.019***</td>
<td>0.015***</td>
<td>0.011***</td>
<td>0.008***</td>
<td>0.028***</td>
<td>0.020***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Observations</strong></td>
<td>1567</td>
<td>1567</td>
<td>1567</td>
<td>1567</td>
<td>1567</td>
<td>1567</td>
<td>1567</td>
<td>1567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Likelihood Ratio</strong></td>
<td>251.220***</td>
<td>251.700***</td>
<td>273.360***</td>
<td>282.180***</td>
<td>244.340***</td>
<td>246.290***</td>
<td>260.330***</td>
<td>273.760***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pseudo-R2</strong></td>
<td>0.234</td>
<td>0.235</td>
<td>0.255</td>
<td>0.263</td>
<td>0.228</td>
<td>0.230</td>
<td>0.243</td>
<td>0.255</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Values in parentheses are Standard Error (SE); *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Table 3a:
Relationship between Rivalry Recurrence and Different Religious Denominations and Different Religious Denominations (Protestants and Anglicans Combined)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable: Rivalry Recurrence</th>
<th>Different Religious Denominations</th>
<th>Different Religious Denominations</th>
<th>Different Religious Denominations</th>
<th>Different Religious Denominations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(XXV) (XXVI) (XXVII) (XXVIII)</td>
<td>(XXIX) (XXX) (XXXI) (XXXII)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Differences</td>
<td>7.855*** (2.006)</td>
<td>20.748*** (7.336)</td>
<td>11.404*** (3.105)</td>
<td>18.270*** (6.405)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7.856*** (2.005)</td>
<td>20.713*** (7.321)</td>
<td>11.394*** (3.101)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11.394*** (3.101)</td>
<td>18.247*** (6.395)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial Issue</td>
<td>1.290 (0.275)</td>
<td>1.319 (0.284)</td>
<td>1.655** (0.367)</td>
<td>1.604*** (0.357)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.290 (0.275)</td>
<td>1.318 (0.284)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.654** (0.367)</td>
<td>1.603** (0.357)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contiguity</td>
<td>29.758*** (9.337)</td>
<td>32.870*** (10.557)</td>
<td>29.930*** (9.525)</td>
<td>31.605*** (10.192)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>29.521*** (9.270)</td>
<td>32.642*** (10.496)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>29.766*** (9.482)</td>
<td>31.431*** (10.146)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Power</td>
<td>5.176** (3.754)</td>
<td>4.756** (3.304)</td>
<td>6.627** (5.053)</td>
<td>6.142** (4.541)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5.149** (3.726)</td>
<td>4.737** (3.285)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6.602** (5.026)</td>
<td>6.120** (4.519)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Democracy</td>
<td>0.337* (0.218)</td>
<td>0.290* (0.190)</td>
<td>0.331* (0.221)</td>
<td>0.307* (0.206)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.337* (0.217)</td>
<td>0.290* (0.190)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.331* (0.220)</td>
<td>0.308* (0.205)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incongruent Outcome</td>
<td>1.322 (0.440)</td>
<td>1.206 (0.404)</td>
<td>1.042 (0.360)</td>
<td>1.070 (0.360)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.335 (0.445)</td>
<td>1.215 (0.408)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.049 (0.363)</td>
<td>1.076 (0.363)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strength of Past Rivalry</td>
<td>5.052*** (1.135)</td>
<td>5.687*** (1.320)</td>
<td>6.184*** (1.431)</td>
<td>6.364*** (1.490)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5.035*** (1.317)</td>
<td>5.670*** (1.428)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6.169*** (1.487)</td>
<td>6.349*** (1.487)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War</td>
<td>0.020*** (0.020)</td>
<td>0.022*** (0.022)</td>
<td>0.019*** (0.019)</td>
<td>0.020*** (0.020)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.020*** (0.021)</td>
<td>0.022*** (0.022)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.019*** (0.019)</td>
<td>0.020*** (0.020)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linguistic Differences</td>
<td>0.257*** (0.074)</td>
<td>0.458** (0.151)</td>
<td>0.257*** (0.075)</td>
<td>0.458** (0.151)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Differences</td>
<td>0.146*** (0.045)</td>
<td>0.213*** (0.073)</td>
<td>0.146*** (0.045)</td>
<td>0.213*** (0.073)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.001*** (0.000)</td>
<td>0.003*** (0.001)</td>
<td>0.001*** (0.000)</td>
<td>0.003*** (0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.001*** (0.000)</td>
<td>0.003*** (0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.003*** (0.001)</td>
<td>0.003*** (0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1567</td>
<td>1567</td>
<td>1567</td>
<td>1567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood Ratio</td>
<td>323.970*** 346.110*** 360.360*** 365.880***</td>
<td>324.150*** 346.250*** 360.470*** 365.990***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo-R2</td>
<td>0.302</td>
<td>0.323</td>
<td>0.336</td>
<td>0.341</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Values in parentheses are Standard Error (SE); *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
As anticipated, *All Religious Differences* has a positive and significant effect on recurrent rivalry. According to Model XVII on Table 3, religious differences raises the probability of rivalry recurrence from 0.091 to 0.139. In other words, when two states have different religions then they have a higher likelihood of rivalry recurrence years after the initial rivalry had terminated\(^{39}\). Although the initial rivalry may be rooted in territory, economics, power politics, and/or competition over scarce resources, the state (i.e., state decision maker) may ascribe to religious differences when addressing the population to mobilize their support prior to the onset of the recurrent rivalry. The leader’s interest is framed as a religious need to fight the opponent, which may ultimately trigger the public’s moral obligation to support the state’s cause. The effect is roughly the same when I control for Linguistic differences in Model XVIII (\(P \leq 0.01\)), Ethnic difference in Model XIX (\(P \leq 0.01\)), and both Linguistic and Ethnic differences in Model XX (\(P \leq 0.01\)).

The effects of Christian/Muslim Differences are not consistent with my expectations (see Table 3, Models XXI through XXIV). They are in the direction expected but not significant. Thus the study finds no support for the hypothesis that Christian/Muslim Differences are more likely to yield rivalry recurrence. There are 360 observations of Rivalry Recurrence that involve Christian/Muslim dyads of which 36 involve Christian/Muslim dyads that experience rivalry recurrence. The cases that are driving the rivalry recurrence in the years 1945 to 1986 are Italy and Albania; Greece and Turkey; and Bulgaria and Turkey (See Appendix A for Cases in Christian/Muslim Dyads and Rivalry Recurrence).

\(^{39}\) Rudkevich et al. (2013) conceptualize a terminated rivalry as having ‘recurred’ “if it is followed by the beginning of a new rivalry between the same states between approximately 15 and 40 years following the termination of the original rivalry.
In Table 3a, I test the relationship between Different Religious Denominations and Rivalry Recurrence as well as Different Religious Denominations (Protestants and Anglicans Combined) and Rivalry Recurrence. These two explanatory variables (i.e., Different Religious Denominations and Different Religious Denominations [Protestants and Anglicans Combined]) yield significant results (P ≤ 0.01). According to Model XXV, the existence of different religious denominations raises the probability of rivalry recurrence from 0.038 to 0.167. These results suggest that dyads that have different religious denominations have a higher propensity to re-engage in rivalry many years after the initial rivalry between them terminated.

The “Different Religious Denominations” variable is significant even when I control for Linguistic differences in Model XXVI (P ≤ 0.01), Ethnic difference in Model XXVII (P ≤ 0.01), and both Linguistic and Ethnic differences in Model XXVIII (P ≤ 0.01). When I control for Linguistic Differences (Table 3a, Model XXVI), the existence of different religious denominations raises the probability of rivalry recurrence from 0.027 to 0.193. When I control for Ethnic Differences (Table 3a, Model XXVII), the existence of different religious denominations increases the likelihood of rivalry recurrence from 0.033 to 0.176. Finally, when I control for both Linguistic and Ethnic Differences (Table 3a, Model XXVIII), the existence of different religious denominations increases the probability of rivalry recurrence from 0.028 to 0.190.

I obtain similar results when I test the link between Different Religious Denominations (Protestants and Anglicans Combined) and Rivalry Recurrence. In Model XXIX, the existence of different religious denominations (Protestants and Anglicans Combined) raises the probability of rivalry recurrence from 0.038 to 0.167. This suggests that dyads that have different religious
denominations (Protestants and Anglicans Combined) have a higher probability to have rivalry recurrence many years after the initial rivalry between them terminated.

A state in a dyad may express the “religious difference” biases to the predominant population when engaging in various types of rivalry. These findings support the in-group/out-group theory, which suggests that conflict with the out-group increases the state’s manipulation of the in-group (Coser, 1956). Thus, the state can influence the in-group’s opinions by presenting the rival’s intentions as “evil.” By vilifying the rival, the state may be able to stimulate the main population’s bonds to their religious identity, eventually mobilizing the predominant population’s support for the recurrent rivalry.

The “Different Religious Denominations (Protestants and Anglicans Combined)” variable is significant even when I control for Linguistic differences in Model XXX (P ≤ 0.01), Ethnic difference in Model XXXI (P ≤ 0.01), and both Linguistic and Ethnic differences in Model XXXII (P ≤ 0.01). When I control for Linguistic Differences (Table 3a, Model XXX), the existence of different religious denominations (Protestants and Anglicans Combined) raises the probability of rivalry recurrence from 0.027 to 0.193. When I control for Ethnic Differences (Table 3a, Model XXXI), the existence of different religious denominations (Protestants and Anglicans Combined) raises the probability of rivalry recurrence from 0.033 to 0.176. And when I control for both Linguistic and Ethnic Differences (Table 3a, Model XXXII), the existence of different religious denominations (Protestants and Anglicans Combined) increases the probability of rivalry recurrence from 0.028 to 0.190. Again, I provide the predicted probabilities of the models that yielded significant results on Table 4.
Table 4: Predicted Probabilities of Rivalry Recurrence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>XVII</th>
<th>XVIII</th>
<th>XIX</th>
<th>XX</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Religious Differences = 0</td>
<td>0.091</td>
<td>0.093</td>
<td>0.086</td>
<td>0.090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Religious Differences = 1</td>
<td>0.139</td>
<td>0.136</td>
<td>0.154</td>
<td>0.142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Different Religious Denominations = 0</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>0.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Different Religious Denominations = 1</td>
<td>0.167</td>
<td>0.193</td>
<td>0.176</td>
<td>0.190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Different Religious Denominations (P&amp;A) = 0</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>0.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Different Religious Denominations (P&amp;A) = 1</td>
<td>0.167</td>
<td>0.193</td>
<td>0.176</td>
<td>0.190</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3a shows that Different Religious Denominations and Different Religious Denominations (Protestants and Anglicans Combined) have positive and significant effects on rivalry recurrence. This shows that the coefficients in these models are stable. Thus, the introduction of the “Different Religious Denominations” and “Different Religious Denominations (Protestants and Anglicans Combined)” variables contribute to the explanation of rivalry recurrence.

Results—Rivalry Recurrence and Control Variables

Tables 3 and 3a show that territorial issue, contiguity, major power dyad, incongruent outcomes, strength of past rivalry, and war (as a control variable) have positive and significant effects on rivalry recurrence. In sum, each of these variables increase the probability of rivalry recurrence. Further, the effect of linguistic differences (as shown in Table 3a, Models XXVI and XXX) and ethnic differences (as shown in Tables 3 and 3a, Models XIX, XXIII, XXVII, and XXXI) are statistically significant and in the direction anticipated. Thus each increases the probability of rivalry independently of religious differences. In sum, looking at the findings where I control for both Linguistic and Ethnic Differences (in Tables 3 and 3a), these variable
are both statistically significant and in the direction anticipated across Models XX, XXIV, XXVIII and XXXII. Thus the findings suggest that linguistic and ethnic differences both contribute to the explanation of rivalry recurrence.

Results—War and Religious Differences

Here I examine the relationship between religious and war using several dimensions of religious differences. Tables 5 reports the results of my analyses for the link between War and All Religious Differences and Christian/Muslim Differences. Table 5a reports the results of my analyses for the link between War and Different Religious Denominations and Different Religious Denominations (Protestants and Anglicans Combined). Table 6 reports the predicted probabilities of war varying religious difference (from 0 to 1) and holding all other variables at their means for the models that yield significant results.

Interstate war is larger in scale and is distinct in that it requires a substantial decision and more resources by the two states in a dyad. Specially, interstate war demands more material and human resources, strategic policy decisions, and emotional obligations and costs on the states’ populations. Considering the great cost of war, states usually calculate the costs against the benefits of the war outcome. Horowitz (2009) suggests that nonmaterial incentives (such as religion) for war initiation may produce more support from the population of adherents than other types of warfare (163). Thus, I propose that the existence of religious differences between two states in a dyad increases the likelihood of war. It may be easier for at least one state in a dyad to mobilize and sustain the support of the adherents for the predominant religion when the other state has a different religion. Popular mobilization by the state based on identity may increase the state’s optimism regarding its performance in war and prospect of victory.
Accordingly, mobilization based on identity may increase the state’s optimism regarding its performance in war and prospect of victory. Below, I restate my hypotheses about the relationship between war and religious differences:

\( H_7: \) Interstate dyads with different religions are more likely to engage in war than dyads with the same religions.

\( H_8: \) Interstate dyads with Christian/Muslim differences are more likely to engage in war.

\( H_9: \) (A) Interstate dyads with different religious denominations are more likely to engage in war than dyads with the same religious denomination.

\( H_9: \) (B) Interstate dyads with different religious denominations (Protestants and Anglicans Combined) are more likely to engage in war than dyads with the same religious denomination.
Table 5:
Relationship between War and All Religious Differences and Christian/Muslim Differences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable: War</th>
<th>All Religious Differences</th>
<th>Christian/Muslim Differences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(XXXIII)</td>
<td>(XXXIV)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Differences</td>
<td>3.606***</td>
<td>4.363***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.424)</td>
<td>(1.990)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.447)</td>
<td>(2.448)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contiguity</td>
<td>0.802</td>
<td>0.751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.305)</td>
<td>(0.292)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Power</td>
<td>1.900</td>
<td>1.923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.396)</td>
<td>(2.425)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Democracy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(omitted)</td>
<td>(omitted)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linguistic Differences</td>
<td>0.637</td>
<td>0.637</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.316)</td>
<td>(0.316)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Differences</td>
<td>0.637</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.316)</td>
<td>(omitted)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.073***</td>
<td>0.094***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
<td>(0.046)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood Ratio</td>
<td>42.400***</td>
<td>43.220***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo-R2</td>
<td>0.178</td>
<td>0.181</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Values in parentheses are Standard Error (SE); *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Table 5a:
Relationship between War and Different Religious Denominations and Different Religious Denominations (Protestants and Anglicans Combined)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Different Religious Denominations</th>
<th>Different Religious Denominations (Protestants &amp; Anglicans combined)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(XL) (XLI) (XLII) (XLIII) (XLIV)</td>
<td>(XLV) (XLVI) (XLVII) (XLVIII)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Differences</td>
<td>3.331** (1.825) 3.439** (2.005) 3.439** (2.005) 3.439** (2.005)</td>
<td>2.831* (1.540) 2.912* (1.719) 2.912* (1.719) 2.912* (1.719)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial Issue</td>
<td>6.551*** (2.414) 6.536*** (2.410) 6.536*** (2.410) 6.536*** (2.410)</td>
<td>6.362*** (2.344) 6.345*** (2.340) 6.345*** (2.340) 6.345*** (2.340)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contiguity</td>
<td>0.866 (0.332) 0.858 (0.332) 0.858 (0.332) 0.858 (0.332)</td>
<td>0.815 (0.310) 0.810 (0.312) 0.810 (0.312) 0.810 (0.312)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Power</td>
<td>2.644 (3.325) 2.663 (3.351) 2.663 (3.351) 2.663 (3.351)</td>
<td>2.616 (3.290) 2.629 (3.308) 2.629 (3.308) 2.629 (3.308)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Democracy</td>
<td>1 1 1 1</td>
<td>1 1 1 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linguistic Differences</td>
<td>0.928 (0.432) 0.928 (0.432)</td>
<td>0.943 (0.444) 0.943 (0.444)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Differences</td>
<td>0.928 (0.432) 1 (omitted)</td>
<td>0.943 (0.444) 1 (omitted)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.057*** (0.034) 0.059*** (0.038) 0.059*** (0.038) 0.059*** (0.038)</td>
<td>0.068*** (0.040) 0.069*** (0.043) 0.069*** (0.043) 0.069*** (0.043)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>225 225 225 225</td>
<td>225 225 225 225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood Ratio</td>
<td>36.470*** 36.500*** 36.500*** 36.500***</td>
<td>35.020*** 35.040*** 35.040*** 35.040***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo-R2</td>
<td>0.153 0.153 0.153 0.153</td>
<td>0.147 0.147 0.147 0.147</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Values in parentheses are Standard Error (SE); *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
As expected, *All Religious Differences* has a positive and significant effect on War. According to Model XXXIII when the states in a dyad are of different religions, the probability of war increases from 0.124 to 0.303. “All Religious Differences” is significant even when I control for Linguistic differences in Model XXXIV, Ethnic difference in Model XXXV, or both Linguistic and Ethnic differences in Model XXXVI. Model XXXIV on Table 5 where I control for Linguistic Differences, Model XXXV where I control for Ethnic Differences, and Model XXXVI where I control for both Linguistic and Ethnic Differences all show that when the states in a dyad are of different religions, their probability of engaging in war is one in three as opposed to about one in nine when the dyads do not have religious differences.

The effects of Christian-Muslim Differences are not consistent with my expectations (see Table 5, Models XXXVII through XL). They are in the direction expected but not significant. Thus the study finds no support for the hypothesis that Christian/Muslim Differences are more likely to yield war. There are 41 observations of War that involve Christian/Muslim dyads of which 6 involve Christian/Muslim dyads experience war. The cases that entered into war in the years 1958 to 1990 are: United Kingdom and Iraq; France and Iraq; United States and Iraq; Italy and Iraq; Cyprus and Turkey; and Somalia and Ethiopia (See Appendix A for Cases in Christian/Muslim Dyads and War). The findings for Table 5 suggest that war is associated with religious difference between dyads, but not when in the Christian/Muslim cases.

In Table 5a, I test the relationship between Different Religious Denominations and War as well as Different Religious Denominations (Protestants and Anglicans Combined) and War. These two independent variables (i.e., Different Religious Denominations and Different Religious Denominations [Protestants and Anglicans Combined]) yield significant results. For a
dyad where the militarized conflict is between states with Different Religious Denominations (in Table 5a, Model XLI), the probability of war increases from 0.106 to 0.255. These results confirm that states in a dyad that have different religious denominations have a higher likelihood of engaging in war than dyads that do not have different religious denominations.

The “Different Religious Denominations” variable is significant even when I control for Linguistic differences in Model XLII, Ethnic differences in Model XLIII, and both Linguistic and Ethnic differences in Model XLIV. When I control for Linguistic Differences (Table 5a, Model XLII), the probability of war increases from 0.104, or one in ten times, to 0.256, or one in four times. When I control for Ethnic Differences (Table 5a, Model XLIII), the likelihood of war increases from 0.104 to 0.256. When I control for both Linguistic and Ethnic Differences (Table 5a, Model XLIV), the probability of war increases from 0.104, or one in ten times, to 0.256, or one in four times.

I obtain similar statistical results when I test the link between Different Religious Denominations (Protestants and Anglicans Combined) and War. For a dyad where the war is between states with Different Religious Denominations (Protestants and Anglicans Combined) [in Table 5a, Model XLV], the probability of war increases from 0.117, or about one in nine times, to 0.250, or one in four times.

These findings clearly support the theory of false optimism. I use the false optimism theory as the mechanism that links religious differences to war. The support from the predominant religious adherents against the enemy state may increase the state’s optimism for victory. Consequently, the state’s optimism results in overestimated beliefs about war outcomes relative to a pre-war compromise since that population may be seen as a source of support.
Consequently, a state’s exaggerated optimism may translate into a hawkish war policy when the other state has a different religion (i.e., All Religious Differences, Different Religious Denominations, and Different Religious Denominations (Protestants and Anglicans Combined)). The “Different Religious Denominations (Protestants and Anglicans Combined)” variable is significant even when I control for Linguistic differences in Model XLVI, Ethnic difference in Model XLVII, and both Linguistic and Ethnic differences in Model XLVIII. When I control for Linguistic Differences (Table 5a, Model XLVI), a dyad that does not have different religious denominations (Protestants and Anglicans Combined) have a likelihood of engaging in war approximately 0.115, or about one in nine times. But the probability of war increases to 0.251, or one in four times, when dyads have different religious denominations (Protestants and Anglicans Combined). Similarly, when I control for Ethnic Differences (Table 5a, Model XLVII), the probability of war is higher when the dyads have different religious denominations (Protestants and Anglicans Combined) versus dyads that do not have different religious denominations (Protestants and Anglicans Combined). Finally, when I control for both Linguistic and Ethnic Differences (Table 5a, Model XLVIII), the likelihood of war increases from 0.115 to 0.251, meaning that dyads with no Different Religious Denominations (Protestants and Anglicans Combined) have a probability of war of about one out of nine times versus one in four times when the dyad has different religious denominations (Protestants and Anglicans Combined). Looking at the findings of the models (XLVI thru XLVIII) on Table 5a, Ethnic Differences is omitted from the analysis because the cases of Linguistic and Ethnic Differences were identical. Basically, the introduction of the “Different Religious Denominations” and “Different Religious Denominations (Protestants and Anglicans Combined)” variables contribute
to the explanation of war. I derive the predicted probabilities of the models that yielded significant results on Table 6.

Table 6: Predicted Probabilities of War

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>XXXIII</th>
<th>XXXIV</th>
<th>XXXV</th>
<th>XXXVI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Religious Differences = 0</td>
<td>0.124</td>
<td>0.114</td>
<td>0.114</td>
<td>0.114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Religious Differences = 1</td>
<td>0.303</td>
<td>0.316</td>
<td>0.316</td>
<td>0.316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>XLI</td>
<td>XLI</td>
<td>XLI</td>
<td>XLI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Different Religious Denominations = 0</td>
<td>0.106</td>
<td>0.104</td>
<td>0.104</td>
<td>0.104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Different Religious Denominations = 1</td>
<td>0.255</td>
<td>0.256</td>
<td>0.256</td>
<td>0.256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>XLV</td>
<td>XLVI</td>
<td>XLVII</td>
<td>XLVIII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Different Religious Denominations (P&amp;A) = 0</td>
<td>0.117</td>
<td>0.115</td>
<td>0.115</td>
<td>0.115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Different Religious Denominations (P&amp;A) = 1</td>
<td>0.250</td>
<td>0.251</td>
<td>0.251</td>
<td>0.251</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Results—War and Control Variables

I expect a significant positive effect of territorial issue on war. Models XXXIII thru XLVIII in Tables 5 and 5a show that the probability of war increases when there is a territorial issue. Additionally, I do not find statistically significant results when I control for the linguistic differences in dyads (as shown in Models XXXIII thru XLVIII). In sum, linguistic and ethnic differences do not contribute to the explanation of war.

Findings for Enduring Rivalry, Rivalry Recurrence, and War

The findings support my expectation of the effect of religious differences on rivalry recurrence and war but not enduring rivalry. My argument is that at least one state in a dyad may exploit the religious identity of its predominant population in order to increase their support for the militarized conflict cause. I utilize social identity theory to explain *enduring* and *rivalry recurrence* because the theory suggests that groups of people may engage in conflict when
conditions such as different group identities prevail. Based on the findings in the Enduring Rivalry (Tables 2 and 2a) and Rivalry Recurrence (Tables 3 and 3a), it may be more plausible to mobilize the predominant population of adherents when two states have a history of militarized conflict. It is reasonable to suggest that the initial terminated rivalry, in the Rivalry Recurrence models, may be used to fuel the enmity between the two states when they have different religions. Although enduring rivalries are intense in nature, the absence of militarized conflict between the two states may reduce the impact of the religious differences that exist between the two states. Since I argue that religion may be used as a proxy by states to initiate militarized conflict, the adherents of the predominant religion in at least one state out of the two may be more likely to support the rivalry cause when there is a history of enmity. The history of fighting is found in the Rivalry Recurrence cases but not in the Enduring Rivalry ones.

States that engage in rivalry recurrence and war may support combative policies because the conditions of religious differences may facilitate the initiation of interstate conflict behavior. Evidently, the presence of religious differences between states in a dyad has a significant positive effect on rivalry recurrence and war. Also, the existence of different religious denominations and different religious denominations (Protestants and Anglicans combined) in a dyad has considerable positive effects on rivalry recurrence and war, respectively. In other words, I find evidence for my argument that rivalry recurrence and war may result from the state’s use of religious rhetoric to mobilize and sustain the support of the adherents of the predominant religion when the other state has a different religion. In the case of war, in particular, the state’s ability to mobilize and sustain the support of adherents to support the war effort may exaggerate its optimism about victory. This sense of false optimism increases the state’s proclivity to engage in war when the rival state has a different religion. The significant
results in Tables 5 and 5a support the in-group out-group mechanism coupled with false optimism increases the likelihood that at least one state may engage in war.

**The India-Pakistan War of 1947**

I illustrate the case of the India-Pakistan War of 1947 for a close examination of the link between religious difference and war. To begin, I rely on my War dataset \((N=232)\) to randomly select one case that resulted in war and involved a dyad with different religions. The 1947 India-Pakistan War case study aims to examine whether religious differences between two states in a dyad may increase the likelihood of engaging in war with each other. Since I argue that at least one of the two states in the dyad may use religious differences to mobilize the support of the adherents to the predominant religion by means of rhetoric, I use the Pakistan’s role in the events leading to war. The case of the 1947 India-Pakistan War suggests that Pakistan’s mobilization of such support may have contributed to Pakistan’s optimism regarding the outcome of the war thus increasing the likelihood of war with India. Religion may introduce a condition for false optimism. Under certain occasions, the state may miscalculate the chances of winning, which may explain the onset of war. Thus, the case shows that rhetoric was used to mobilize the support of the predominant population and increase optimism for a war victory.

My analysis focuses on how mobilizing the Muslim population’s support by means of rhetoric for the 1947 War contributed to Pakistan’s optimism regarding the outcome of war, that victory was highly likely. Evidence from the India-Pakistan War demonstrates that collective animosity that was heightened via rhetoric shaped the two populations’ commitments to support the onset of war. In 1947, the major religious identity of India was Hinduism based on an 80% plurality of adherents and the religious identity of Pakistan was Islam based on a 90% plurality.
According to Jalal (1990) Pakistan was particularly unwise in believing that a war with India over Kashmir would end in a Pakistani triumph. During the India-Pakistan War, the armed struggles were mainly fought between Hindus and Muslim forces. The anti-Hindu rhetoric and policies of the new Pakistani state led to the initiation of this war. The goal of this case study is to illustrate that at least one state (i.e., leader) may capitalize on the existence of religious differences between two states to mobilize the support of the predominant population of adherents for the war cause. Consequently, the state’s optimism about winning the war may increase when mobilization of the population is achieved. Essentially in the India-Pakistan War of 1947, the transmission of Islam by means of rhetoric\textsuperscript{40} may be ascertained as the uniting banner, which was meant to mobilize the support of the Muslim population and possibly contributing to the increase in Pakistan’s optimism about winning the war.

The main architect of the mobilization of the predominant Muslim population that employed the rhetoric in support of a Muslim state of Pakistan was Mohammed Ali Jinnah (Ganguly, 2001). In his speeches it can be discerned that there was a need to construct a Muslim majority state to restore the Muslims’ political role in the region. Muslim scholars like Abdul Ala Maududi publicly supported Jinnah’s cause to reestablish a Muslim \textit{ummah}\textsuperscript{41} (i.e., community), suggesting that all those who supported Pakistan’s cause were part of a collective Muslim community (Ganguly, 2001). Aside from the conflict over the territory of Jammu and Kashmir, evidence suggests that mobilizing support for a Muslim majority state and society was

\textsuperscript{40} The rhetoric was used to temper the threat of the Hindu state on the survival of a Muslim majority state.

\textsuperscript{41} Ummah means “community”, which is not based on common ancestry or geography. Rather, it is a “supranational community with a common [Islamic] history” (Ahmad, 1997: 11).
the momentum behind the consequent militarized conflict between India and Pakistan.

According to Slantchev and Tarar (2011),

“The formal literature that has emerged over the past two decades has provided us with coherent accounts whose fundamental insight is that [Mutual Optimism⁴²] causes actors to engage in behavior that ends in war even in environments where settlements exist that would make both better off and where they would be able to locate such settlements if they had better information” (136).

When states are exceedingly optimistic, “they can end up taking actions that commit them to war” (Slantchev & Tarar, 2011: 140; Fearon, 1994). That is not to say that optimism basically drives states to prefer war to peace. The state’s ability to mobilize its population to endorse the war policy via rhetoric may be a means through which a state’s optimism can end in war. Under the context of a supportive state population, a state can boost its capability in conflict, despite the rival’s military power, because [such support] “boosts resolve and/or bluffs⁴³ the enemy into submission” (Wrangham, 1999: 3). At this juncture, a state is actually deliberate or “conscious” in projecting publicly its resolve after activating the population’s support, which is intended as a signal to the other state. Positive illusions, another form of false optimism, may strengthen a state’s conviction about “certain facts [of victory], even if the interpretation of those facts was largely skewed in the first place for political purposes” (Johnson, 2004: 12). A simple illustration can be that the states in a dyad (State A and State B) have two different religions. State A’s task to mobilize its population by means of rhetoric may be furthered when State B has a different religion. State A addresses publicly the population of adherents by using religious rhetoric against State B. Johnson (2004) argues that a possible source of overconfidence may be

---

⁴² Mutual Optimism is also used by scholars to describe the basic principles of ‘false optimism’.
⁴³ According to Johnson (2004), “the word “bluff” implies conscious deception, but the positive illusions hypothesis suggests that the bluff occurs subconsciously—that one is not aware of overestimating oneself” (11). However, the conscious and subconscious components may in fact work simultaneously (Johnson, 2004).
that the inclusion of religious forces (such as god’s will) “offer superior powers and protection”, which would potentially heighten the population’s support for war (7). The state can create the necessary religious narrative that supports its war cause in its rhetoric when addressing the main population. The manipulation of religious rhetoric based on the surrounding circumstances is used to persuade the population that ‘war against the enemy’ is for a holy cause since it is decreed by god and is necessary to maintain the survival of the religion. Consequently, State A’s supportive population of religious adherents is used to propel the state’s cause for war and augment expectations of a victorious end thus creating false optimism to engage in war. At least one state in the dyad may use rhetoric of identities against the other state to mobilize the population’s support and therefore energize the onset of war.

Ganguly (2001) favors the argument that false optimism is an element that increased the likelihood of the war between India and Pakistan. For example, at the root of the 1947-48, 1965, and 199944 wars, Pakistan clearly miscalculated India’s military capabilities and its military responses (Ganguly, 2001). Johnson (2004) argues that “the anti-Indian and chauvinistic ideology of the authoritarian Pakistani state repeatedly contributed to a flawed assessment of India’s military capabilities and will” (32). According to Van Evera (1999):

“Chauvinist nationalism is a prime source of false optimism about the balance of will. Nationalist propaganda often inflates the bravery of one’s own people and denigrates the opponents’ toughness and character . . . . Such propaganda is bound to foster illusions about one’s own fortitude and that of others” (7).

‘Chauvinist nationalism’ reflects Pakistan’s need to establish a firm identity of a Muslim society, which is based on Islamic principles (Ganguly, 2001). While ‘chauvinist nationalism’ was the initial purpose, its essential primordial [religious] cause waned in later years. Van Evera (1999)

44 I only focus on the 1947 war between India and Pakistan.
argues that “false optimism seems a potent and pervasive cause of war. States are far more warlike when they are in the thrall of false optimism” (16). False hopes of victory can occur when rival states misinterpret their relative strength and power, their relative will, their relative population, among other considerations (Van Evera, 1999). Van Evera (1999) argues that there is some degree of false optimism about relative power prior to every war since 1740. Based on the description of states, “scholars trace war to human nature, biological instincts, frustration, fear and greed, the existence of weapons, and similar factors (Levy, 1998: 141). According to Altman (2015), “when a state selects the strategy it sees as best, it tends to pick a strategy whose effectiveness it has exaggerated” (292). A state would essentially utilize such strategies that are more efficient than others (Altman, 2015). Hence, war may be more likely when “states hold optimistic, and therefore conflicting, estimates about the prevailing power balance” (Bas & Schub, N.d.: 1), and such optimism may lead at least one state to opt for war. In the following sections, I explain the background of the India-Pakistan War of 1947 and how the condition of religious differences played a role in Pakistan’s false optimism prior to the onset of the 1947 War.

**Background of the India-Pakistan War of 1947**

Following the time of India’s independence from Britain and Pakistan’s partition⁴⁵ in 1947, two conflicting ideas of state-building activated the Indian and Pakistani nationalist

---

⁴⁵ According to Khan (2007), ‘partition’ “refers not only to the division of the Bengal province of British India into East Pakistan and West Bengal (India), and the similar partition of the Punjab Province into West Punjab (West Pakistan) and East Punjab (now Punjab), but also to the respective divisions of other assets, including the British Indian Army, the Indian Civil Service and other administrative services, the railways, and the central treasury” (46).
movements (Wolpert, 1984). First, the Indian National Congress’s\textsuperscript{46} (INC) nationalist undertaking pursued the creation of a “secular and democratic post-independence India” (Ganguly, 2001: 8). Second, the particular ethnic, regional, and cultural differences of India presented challenges to the INC’s political plan and created considerable resistance among the non-Hindu population (Ganguly, 2001). Namely, Jinnah’s ‘two-nation’ idea, which required the establishment of an official Muslim homeland, was thwarted by the INC’s political strategies. An Indian nation dominated by Hindus and backed by British colonial ideology dictated the emergence of Pakistani patriotism. It is beyond the scope of this section to delve into the sources of Hindu-Muslim ideologies of state-building. Rather, my analysis traces how the divergent religious ideologies between the Hindus and Muslims were used to mobilize the Muslim population’s support for a war with India, which energized Jinnah’s optimism about the outcome of the 1947 war. According to Ganguly (2001), it was the creation of this obviously Hindu-dominated community that consequently strengthened Jinnah’s plan for the establishment of an exclusive state based on religious affiliation (10). After the creation of the independent Muslim-majority state of Pakistan, the states of Jammu and Kashmir\textsuperscript{47} created a complex problem for both Hindus and Muslims. The leaders of the ‘princely states’ (i.e., Jammu and Kashmir) were now anticipated to choose one of the two nascent states, India or Pakistan, considering the geographic position and demographic features (Campbell-Johnson, 1953). However, a dilemma

\textsuperscript{46} According to historians, the INC at the time of its origin in 1885 was primarily composed of upper-middle-class, predominantly Hindu, members. It was an Anglicized institution concerned with the “constitutional and incremental growth of self-government in India” (Ganguly, 2001: 8). But after Mohandas Gandhi’s leadership in the 1920s, the INC evolved into a mass-based party that represented the diverse Indian population.

\textsuperscript{47} Jammu and Kashmir were considered ‘princely states’ in the region. They “were nominally independent but recognized the ‘paramountcy’ of the British Crown (Ganguly, 2001: 13).
emerged because Kashmir had a Hindu ruler, Maharaja Hari Singh, a predominantly Muslim population, and it was contiguous to both India and Pakistan (Lamb, 1992).

Jinnah sought the support of key Muslim figures in Kashmir, such as Mirwaiz Yusuf Shah and Ghulam Abbas, prior to aggressively leaning toward Kashmir’s accession to Pakistan (Ganguly, 2001). Despite the religious leaders’ support, Kashmir’s Muslim population lacked enthusiasm to back Pakistan’s accession plans for Jammu and Kashmir. Thus, it is logical to assume that Jinnah pursued another method to mobilize public support and expand Pakistan’s rule. Jinnah was able to mobilize the population’s support by appealing to their religious identity. He successfully embedded an Islamic cause in establishing the separate country of Pakistan and continued this purpose in mobilizing the populace’s support for the war with India.

A potentially costly war on the structure of the Pakistani state and its society seemed to be worth the risk for Jinnah. It appeared that Jinnah believed that his war policy against India would yield an easy victory. The role of Pakistan’s military efforts to continue the conflict with India in the period following the partition in 1947 has puzzled politicians and scholars alike. Basically, why was Jinnah highly optimistic about the perceived cadre of the Pakistani military, which he believed would yield a victory over India (Khan, 2007)? Haqqani (2006) argues that

“Pakistan’s military has traditionally drawn its legitimacy from the fact that it is the defender of Pakistan against the existential threat from India and that it is the institution that will get Kashmir for Pakistan. If the existential threat from India [was] acknowledged as no longer real and that the issue of Kashmir [was] already settled, the Pakistani military would lose its legitimacy as the arbiter of the nation’s destiny” (12).

Since the Islamic religion was at the heart of the ‘existential threat’ due to the atrocities that were inflicted on the Muslim population by the Indian government (Khan, 2007), Jinnah highlighted the survival and independence of Islam to unify both Pakistan and Kashmir’s Muslim
populations. While Jinnah’s actions leading to the 1947 war with India may have been for political purposes, his Islamic cause gained prominence among the Muslims in Pakistan (Bahl, 2007). According to my analysis, Jinnah used the religious differences to energize Pakistani Muslim population’s support, and his strategy exaggerated his expectation of victory. Thus, I focus on Jinnah’s pre-war efforts to mobilize his population’s support for the war cause via rhetoric, which essentially produced overconfidence about a Pakistani victory.

Pakistan: Explaining the Condition for False Optimism Prior to the 1947-48 War

The newly created state of Pakistan did not have the military might to initiate war with India in 1947. Scholars seek to explain the conditions that generated Pakistan’s false optimism upon entering into the First Kashmir War, which unfolded between October 24, 1947 and January 1, 1949 (Ganguly, 2001). Yet, no research has yet attempted to show that the religious differences between the two states might have been used to leverage Pakistan’s optimism and eventual war initiation. This research uncovers Jinnah’s speeches to Pakistan’s Muslim-majority population aimed at generating their enthusiasm and support for the war cause. Although the use of religious rhetoric against India is not a factor that explains the overall state of violence between the two states, state mobilization of religious identity may be considered a predisposing condition for war (Ganguly, 2001). The existence of religious differences between India and Pakistan was an opportunistic situation that Jinnah used to generate hostility and intensify his war cause. Emboldened by the Muslim population’s support, Jinnah initiated war with India thinking that he would achieve victory (Ganguly, 2001). Ganguly (2001) argues that “Pakistan’s decision to resort to war . . . stemmed from false optimism and perceived windows of opportunity” (51). The framing of Jinnah’s speeches was on perpetuating the legacy of Islam
through unity and sacrifice, which served as the momentum behind the Muslim population’s support. The existential threat was taken seriously by the Muslim majority. The process of Muslim ethnic cleansing that had started prior to the 1947 partition was used to validate the war cause and mobilize the support of the Muslims in Pakistan” (Khan, 2007). The saliency of this struggle due to recent experience with India motivated the Muslim civilians to enlist in the Pakistani army (Haqqani, 2006). The Muslim population’s overwhelming support for the war cause may have strengthened Jinnah’s perception of Pakistan’s capabilities. Basically, the putative bond of the Muslims in Pakistan was the momentum behind Jinnah’s optimism about the war outcome.

The following speech excerpt preceded Pakistan’s mission to invade Kashmir48. Some evidence can be deduced from Jinnah’s speech on the day of Eid-ul-Azha49, in which he sought to emphasize the Islamic message of sacrifice in order to mobilize the support of Pakistan’s Muslim population. Jinnah exemplifies how Prophet Ibrahim (Abraham) was ready to sacrifice his son, Ismael, because God decreed it. Consequently, Jinnah uses Ibrahim’s obedience to demonstrate that a Muslim must make sacrifices to show obedience to God. Although Jinnah was not spiritual, he was resolved in referencing Islam’s cultural history of obedience and sacrifice. Jinnah’s speech identifies the spirit of sacrifice in the Islamic religion in order to gain the Muslim’s support for the October 24, 1947 War between India and Pakistan (Protip Sen,

---

48 According to Singh (2012), on the night of October 24, “the Government of India received an emergency telegram from Srinagar informing them about [Pakistan’s] invasion with urgent please for dispatch of Indian troops. Vice President, Secretary of States, Government of India flew to Srinagar the next day and reported on the grave situation prevailing in Srinagar. He accompanied Prime Minister of Kashmir State to New Delhi. On October 26, 1947, the Instrument of Accession was signed by Maharaja Hari Singh in Jammu. VP Menon carried the document to New Delhi on the same day and the merger of the state of Jammu and Kashmir with the Union of India was completed” (136).

49 Eid-ul-Azha is the Islamic holiday of Sacrifice.
1988): In Pakistan, Zindabad, Jinnah says on October 24, 1947 (See Appendix E for Jinnah’s full speech):

“Eid-ul-Azha Message to the Nation: Allah often tests and tries those whom he loves. He called upon Prophet Ibrahim to sacrifice the object he loved most. Ibrahim answered the call and offered to sacrifice his son. Today too, Allah is testing and trying the Muslims of Pakistan and India. He has demanded great sacrifices from us. Our new-born State is bleeding from wounds inflicted by our enemies. Our Muslim brethren in India are being victimized and oppressed as Muslims for their help and sympathy for the establishment of Pakistan. Dark clouds surround us on all sides for the moment but we are not daunted, for I am sure, if we show the same spirit of sacrifice as was shown by Ibrahim, Allah would rend the clouds and shower on us His blessing as He did on Ibrahim. Let us, therefore, on the day of Eid-ul-Azha which symbolizes the spirit of sacrifice enjoined by Islam, resolve that we shall not be deterred from our objective of creating a State of our own concept by any amount of sacrifice, trials or tribulations which may lie ahead of us and that we shall bend all our energies and resources to achieve our goal. I am confident that in spite of its magnitude, we shall overcome this grave crisis as we have in our long history surmounted many others and notwithstanding the efforts of our enemies, we shall emerge triumphant and strong from the dark night of suffering and show the world that the State exists not for life but for good life.

On this sacred day, I send greetings to our Muslim brethren all over the world both on behalf of myself and the people of Pakistan. For us Pakistan, on this day of thanksgiving and rejoicing, has been overshadowed by the suffering and sorrow of 5 million Muslims in East Punjab and its neighborhood [Jammu and Kashmir]. I hope that, wherever Muslim men and women foregather on this solemn day. They will remember in their prayers these unfortunate men, women and children who have lost their dear ones, homes and hearths and are undergoing an agony and suffering as great hand cruel as any yet inflicted on humanity. In the name of this mass of suffering humanity I renew my appeal to Muslims wherever they may be, to extend to us in this hour of our danger and need, their hand of brotherly sympathy, support and co-operation. Nothing on earth now can undo Pakistan.

So my message to you all is of hope, courage and confidence. Let us mobilize all our resources in a systematic and organized way and tackle the grave issues that confront us [in Jammu and Kashmir] with grim determination and discipline worthy of a great nation” (Ahmad, 1997).

What is important about Jinnah’s initial speech in the pre-war period was his focus on the Muslim population’s unified strength, which would yield a “great nation”, instead of focusing on India’s military strength. Despite the various sources of intelligence confirming India’s military
might that “had been divided on a 30:70 ratio between Pakistan and India” (Ganguly, 2001: 19), Jinnah still showed resolve. Based on Jinnah’s narrative, it is implied that the Muslims will triumph by their strength and determination. It is possible that Jinnah believed that Muslims were good soldiers and fighters (Rudkevich, 2016), which may have been the source of Jinnah’s optimism. Thus Jinnah aimed at mobilizing the Muslim population’s support by invoking the Islamic cause several times in his speeches, consequently increasing his optimism and expectations for the war outcome. He emphasized that this was a “noble” cause that requires the unity of the Muslims in Pakistan and the world, writ large. His speech produced considerable influence on the population to the extent that they appealed to the Pakistani government to wage war on their enemy state of India (Khan, 1970). It appears that Jinnah determined the gauge of Pakistan’s military strength and eventual victory partially based on the Muslim population’s support. The analysis of Jinnah’s speech shows that he actually used rhetoric to generate higher mobilization, which may have contributed to his expectation of a war victory.

Pakistan’s perceived holy Islamic cause in aiding the other Muslims in Jammu and Kashmir had considerable impact on the bulk of the population (Khan, 1967). Even though Pakistan’s military realm was blatantly inequitable, Jinnah believed that Pakistan can become victorious (Ganguly, 2001: 53). Van Evera (1999) refers to the Pakistan’s Muslim support as ‘chauvinist nationalism’. Van Evera (1999) argues that

“Chauvinist nationalism is a prime source of false optimism about the balance of will. Nationalist propaganda often inflates the bravery of one’s own people and denigrates the opponents’ toughness and character . . . . Such propaganda is bound to foster illusions about one’s own fortitude and that of others. [Reference to Islamic history] exaggerates the righteousness of the national cause, leading groups to misread the balance of legitimacy between their own and their adversary’s claims. Thus, a misreading of the balance of legitimacy will likely lead to a misreading of the balance of will. Those who
conclude that ‘our side is right’ will deduce that ‘our adversaries know we are right, they are testing us to see if we know it too, and they will back down if we stand firm.’ Adversaries will back down because ‘once they earn we know we are right, they will realize that we have more will than they do and that we can outlast them; so they will fold if we stand firm.’ These chains of misperception rest on a false chauvinist-nationalist definition of the situation [with Pakistan and India]” (27).

Consequently, the Indian government urged the United Nations Security Council to censure Pakistan for inciting the population’s “complicity in [this] act of aggression [in Kashmir]” (Ganguly, 2001: 20). The Pakistani government refuted India’s claim by arguing that appealing to the Muslim population was necessary because “India was responsible for carrying out a genocidal policy toward its Muslim population in the wake of the Partition” (Ganguly, 2001: 20). Jinnah’s message to the Pakistani population emphasized that mobilizing their support was an essential task to show solidarity with their Muslim brethren outside of Pakistan.

Akbar Khan, a retired Pakistani Major-General, captured the sentiments of Jinnah’s decision to incite a war with India in 1947, despite the debilitating military shortcomings:

“In the remotest of our villages, the humblest of our people possess a self-confidence and ready willingness to march forward into India—a spirit the equivalent of which cannot be found on the other side . . . In India, in the absence of homogeneity [as opposed to the Muslim unity], a generation in any direction can result in separation of differing units geographically as well as morally because there is no basic unity among Shadras, Brahmans, Sikhs, Hindus and Muslims who will follow their own different interests” (Khan, 1970: 191).

Khan (1970) recalls the time before the 1947 war by saying that there was an “atmosphere of cheerfulness and confidence that prevailed . . . [but] the unpleasant truth was that there was complete ignorance about the business of anything in the nature of military operations” (17). Khan (1970) admits that Pakistan’s [i.e., Jinnah’s] exaggerated optimism may be explained as follows:
“From the start there existed the serious danger that the whole scheme would lack effective central control, [which] was a very disturbing thought. But at the time it was not difficult to persuade myself into thinking that all would be well in the end. We had just achieved independence from the British after a hundred years or so—and we had just achieved a new homeland, the State of Pakistan. Within less than a month of this, news of the uprising of Kashmiri Muslims came and spread through the country like wild fire. People responded with enthusiasm everywhere and they felt the smell of blood in their noses” (18).

Khan (1970) suggested that the pre-war sentiment among Pakistan’s Muslim population was fairly optimistic. Considering Kashmir’s Muslim majority population, Pakistan expected that Jammu and Kashmir’s accession to Pakistan would be effortless (Khan, 1970). However, the majority of the Muslim population in Kashmir saw a brighter future in India (Copland, 1991). Accordingly, India’s Prime Minister, Nehru, agreed to offer military assistance to Jammu and Kashmir against Pakistan under the precondition that the princely states accede to India (Ganguly, 2001: 17). Hence, the princely states gave their allegiance to India.

Some scholars argue that the conflict between the Muslims of Pakistan and the Hindus of India is due to the primordial basis, which is embedded in the contradictory and basically opposing world views of Islam and Hinduism (Burk, 1974; Cohen, 1976). The implicit and explicit contexts that Jinnah and his principal military leaders have expressed confirm that unifying the Muslim population in support of the war cause is necessary to uphold Muslims’ interests. Khan (1970) echoes Jinnah’s sentiments about the advantage that Pakistan was due to its Muslim population’s unity. Jinnah’s use of rhetoric to ignite the support of Pakistan’s population might have given him the leverage to dismiss any pre-war negotiation efforts and pursue war instead.
Days later, on October 30, 1947, Jinnah addressed the people of Pakistan in a speech that outlines the days ahead. I provide an excerpt of Jinnah’s speech that implied Jinnah’s anti-Hindu rhetoric. Jinnah’s prejudiced belief was used once again, which “contributed to a flawed assessment of India’s military capabilities” and exaggerated assessment of Pakistan’s will to win the war (Ganguly, 2001: 7). The following is an excerpt of Jinnah’s chauvinist propaganda, which invokes on the Pakistani people that the war cause is a good in itself since the ultimate goal is peace, a reiterated concept in Islam (See Appendix F for Jinnah’s full speech):

“We thank Providence for giving us courage and faith to fight these forces of evil. If we take our inspiration and guidance from the Holy Quran, the final victory, I once again say, will be ours . . . .

Do not be overwhelmed by the enormity of the task. There is many an example in history of young nations building themselves up by sheer determination and force of character. You are made of sterling material and are second to none. Why should you also not succeed like many others, like your own [Muslim] forefathers? You have only to develop the spirit of the "Mujahids". You are a nation whose history is replete with people of wonderful grit, character and heroism. Live up to your [Islamic] traditions and add to it another chapter of glory.

All I require of you now is that everyone of us to whom this message reaches must vow to himself and be prepared to sacrifice his all, if necessary, in building up Pakistan as a bulwark of Islam and as one of the greatest nations whose ideal is peace within and peace. Your immediate task is the rehabilitation of millions of our distressed and unfortunate brethren who are either already with us or who have still to join us in Pakistan, bereft of all they possessed or had in this world. The least we now can do for them is to receive them as our own brethren. No decent or sane person should consider that they are unwelcome burden thrust on us. Save all you can and give towards the relief of these victims of bestiality and vandalism who have suffered all this for the sole reason that they are Muslims” (Ahmad, 1997).

Jinnah stressed to his domestic society that this war was necessary to protect the Muslim community in Jammu and Kashmir. To validate the Muslims’ hostility and rouse their support for war, Jinnah referred to the history of Islam, which requires sacrifice and struggle (i.e., Jihad). A particularly interesting fact is that although Jinnah was considered a secular leader (Cohen,
1976), he strategically championed an Islamic cause to gain widespread support for war. It appears that Jinnah was a war hawk with the false optimism to win the war. Evidenced by Jinnah’s pre-war strategy to gain public support, he undervalued the Indian military competence and India’s possible responses to military trials (Ganguly, 2001). Jinnah’s anit-Hindu propaganda and prejudiced Muslim support repeatedly “contributed to a flawed assessment of India’s military capabilities and will” (Ganguly, 2001: 7). In fact, Pakistan’s political discourse on India’s military evaluations and capabilities were seldom aired in Pakistan’s media outlets (Khan, 1985). Essentially, Jinnah’s agitation strategies “consolidated the Muslim community” (Ganguly, 2001: 10), which exaggerated Pakistan’s expectation of victory over India.

On the same day of October 30, 1947, Jinnah broadcasted the following speech on Pakistan’s radio station in Lahore. He resounded his earlier message by proclaiming Islamic unity and faith in Allah. Additionally, Jinnah said that Pakistan’s role in the war is considered “a sacred undertaking” (Ahmad, 1997). The following excerpt illustrates Jinnah’s effort to mobilize Pakistan’s population of 70 million Muslims to unite for Pakistan’s cause in Jammu and Kashmir. Jinnah says:

“It is now up to the leaders and those responsible and in charge of the Governments to make their supreme effort to make amends for this indelible stigma. While the horizon is beset with dark clouds, let me appeal to you and give this message to the people of Pakistan. Create enthusiasm and spirit and go forward with your task, with courage and hope and we shall do it. Are we downhearted? Certainly not. This history of Islam is replete with instances of velour, grit and determination. So march on notwithstanding obstruction, obstacles and interference; and I feel confident that a united nation of 70 million people with a grim determination and with a great civilization and history need fear nothing. It is now up to you to work, work and more work; and we are bound to succeed. And never forget our motto: Unity, Discipline and Faith [in Allah]” (Ahmad, 1997).
Jinnah says with “unity, discipline, and faith . . . they need fear nothing”. On this occasion, Jinnah dismisses the challenges that Pakistan will face in the days ahead by stressing “a united nation of 70 million people”. Hinging on the history of Islam, Jinnah suggests that Pakistan will prevail as a victorious nation. Jinnah succeeded in energizing the support of his population by appealing to Islamic unity. Jinnah’s reference to “unity” increased the population’s morale about their position in the war. Consequently, Jinnah may have justified the war with India since he thought Pakistan had a great likelihood of winning this war.
CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION

Do religious differences between states in a dyad partly affect the extent of rivalry? This dissertation seeks to explain the connection between militarized conflict and religion. While there are many contending theories about the role of religion in stimulating conflict, there are few studies that examine this link systematically (Fish, Jensenius, & Michel, 2010; Fox, 2004). The extant research on the link between religion and conflict largely relies on case studies, ambiguous concepts of ‘religion’ or inclusion of confounding factors, and a focus on intrastate conflict with scant studies of interstate conflict.

This thesis conducts a systematic study of the link between religion and interstate military conflict and sheds light on the role of religion in interstate militarized conflict. Findings confirm that religious difference between two states in a dyad is associated with a higher probability of engaging in various types of conflict (i.e., rivalry recurrence, and war).

This study contributes to the literature by examining the exclusive impact of religious differences on conflict behavior. For the most part, studies that examine the effect of religious differences on interstate conflict apply concepts of “cultural” or “ethnic” differences. This conceptual ambiguity has many limitations. The literature seldom explores whether religion has an independent effect on interstate conflict. Much of the literature considers instead cultural identity as a multidimensional category that includes religion, nationalism, language, ethnicity, etc. Such an approach does not provide a distinct religious variable in relation to interstate militarized conflicts. The central claim of this literature is that a state’s particular religion may impact conflict. But there is no literature that studies systematically the association between major religions or religious denominations and interstate conflict. I study this question.
systematically by using the distinct concept of ‘religion,’ while controlling for other differences such as ethnic and linguistic differences.

This study challenges the theory of secularization because this study finds that religion has an effect on conflict contrary to that theory. Essentially, the role of religion appears to be more significant since the end of World War II. The argument about the association between religion and conflict is spiking among international relations scholars and also among states and religious organizations. In today’s international conflicts, it appears that religion is viewed by some as a key cause of conflict; whereas others argue that religion is a proxy used by politicians to initiate conflict. This study suggests that religious identity may be used as an effective tool of uniting and mobilizing people to sustain potentially some form of collective action including conflict with another state. Although many factors contribute to different dimensions of rivalry and war between states, a state’s predominant religion may account partly for various dimensions of rivalry and war with states where the predominant religion is different from that in the former state. Thus, this dissertation shows that religious differences may partly explain why certain states in a dyad may be more likely to engage in various types of militarized conflicts than others.

**Summary of Findings**

In recent decades, religion may have a high social relevance around the globe (Ellis & Haar, 2009), which is supported by claims that “religion and religious differences cause conflicts” (Ellingsen, 2006: 17; Thomas, 2000). In this dissertation I undertake a study of the link between religion and militarized conflict behavior between states in a dyad and hypothesize that differences between the predominant religions within two states may increase the likelihood
of different dimensions of interstate rivalry and war. Based on the expectation that interreligious dyads are more likely to be involved in interstate rivalry (Basedau, Pfeiffer, & Vullers, 2014), I extend distinct propositions to understand religious differences and interstate rivalry.

The main argument for this study applies to specific conflicts. The mechanism of a state using religious rhetoric when the two states have different religions may reinforce the proclivity of militarized conflict. These kinds of mobilizations may make future conflicts more likely since the enmity between the two states may become difficult to escape. Empirically, I examine these effects on rivalry, enduring rivalry and rivalry recurrence, and war.

I explore how different dimensions of rivalry and war are impacted by the religious differences between the states in a dyad. These findings may be important to the field of security studies. It is important to inform decision makers that religious difference between rivals may play an intrinsic role in rivalry recurrence and war. Further research may provide a better specification of these models. This may lead to further analyses of the relationship between interstate conflict and the characteristics of the states within the dyad.

The substantive results suggest that dyads with “religious difference” are associated with rivalry recurrence and war. Testing separately for the effect of “Christian/Muslim Differences” does not yield significant results. Thus, the study finds no support for the hypothesis that Christian/Muslim differences are more likely to yield enduring rivalry, rivalry recurrence, or war. The results of this study show that rivalry recurrence is associated with religious difference between dyads, except in Christian/Muslim cases. This finding contradicts general arguments in the literature that assume a link between Christian/Muslim cultural differences and conflict.
The study tests four variations of religious differences: All Religious Differences, Christian/Muslim Differences, Different Religious Denominations, and Different Religious Denominations (Protestants and Anglicans Combined).

**Religious Differences and Enduring Rivalry:**

Contrary to my expectations the religious differences variables (i.e., All Religious Differences, Christian/Muslim Differences, Different Religious Denominations, and Different Religious Denominations [Protestants and Anglicans Combined]) do not have any impact on the likelihood of Enduring Rivalry. There is no strong link between the religious differences variables and Enduring Rivalry. These results may be due to the operationalization of enduring rivalry that may be restricting the variable’s variation; the nonsignificant results may suggest that religious differences may increase the likelihood of both proto and enduring rivalries.

**Religious Differences and Rivalry Recurrence:**

The effects of religious differences variables on rivalry recurrence are as anticipated. These forms of religious differences (i.e., All Religious Differences, Different Religious Denominations, and Different Religious Denominations [Protestants and Anglicans Combined]) are significant predictors of rivalry recurrence. The findings suggest that there is a strong link between these types of religious differences (i.e., All Religious Differences, Different Religious Denominations, and Different Religious Denominations [Protestants and Anglicans Combined]) and rivalry recurrence. A state may be inclined to use the “religious difference” rhetorical tool to activate the support of the predominant populations of adherents. This type of support may be used to sustain rivalry recurrence.
Religious Differences and War:

Based on the false optimism theory, the overall results are favorable. There is a strong link between the effects of religious differences (i.e., All Religious Differences, Different Religious Denominations, Different Religious Denominations [Protestants and Anglicans Combined]) on War. Religious difference may matter when states mobilize the main population to support the war cause. At least one state in a dyad may use religious rhetoric to mobilize the support of the predominant adherents when the rival state has a different religion.

The Case of the India-Pakistan War of 1947:

The case of the India-Pakistan War of 1947 in Chapter 4 illustrates that the causal mechanism of the false optimism theory may apply in Pakistan’s case. This case study shows that Jinnah’s decision for war partially depended on the robust support of the predominant Muslim population, whereby that support energized the war cause and Pakistan’s perceived likelihood of victory. This suggests that Pakistan’s ability to mobilize and sustain its main population’s support generated an artificial sense of preponderance that would lead to Pakistan’s war victory. This perceived expectation of winning the war may have strengthened Pakistan’s resolve to initiate war with India. Based on the pattern of findings, it is reasonable to suggest generally that at least one state in a dyad may use religious rhetoric to mobilize and sustain the support of the adherents of the predominant religion in cases where the other state has a different religious identity and that effectively mobilizing the main population’s support may energize the state’s perception of victory.
Policy Implications

The lessons from these findings are important to the field of security studies. The findings may inform decision makers that religious differences between states in a dyad may play an inherent role in rivalry recurrence and interstate war. States may highlight the “religious difference” biases to generate the public’s support for a militarized campaign. The state’s ability to mobilize the main population’s support is based on strong group identities that are linked to historically formed perceptions of religious differences. Despite an extensive time lapse from the terminated rivalry to the recurring rivalry and heavy cost of war two states may engage in militarized conflict when they have different religions.

Just as important as these findings on the link between religious differences and conflict is the interfaith dialogue that needs to develop on a grassroots level. Interfaith initiatives by policy makers and all levels of society such as education may dismantle or moderate the “us versus them” culture, which may make it more difficult to mobilize popular support based on religious differences. This paradigm shift may unite, rather than fragment, citizens worldwide in an attempt for world peace. Further research on the religion-conflict nexus is necessary, of course, to decide how useful my remedy is on this issue.

Contribution in the Study of Religion and Conflict

The literature provides primary guidance in advancing the research on religious difference and different dimensions of rivalry and war. This study eschews the conceptual ambiguity in the literature and establishes clear operational distinctions of religious, ethnic and linguistic differences; further it conducts systematic tests of their independent effects on specific types of militarized conflict. Specifying explicitly different types of religious difference allows
for a closer examination of the connection between religion and militarized conflict behavior. This study examines the effect of religious differences on militarized conflict independently of other social identity differences such as ethnic and linguistic differences. To be sure, my study includes cases from 1945 to 2001, and in two cases (Rivalry Recurrence and War) I find a significant relationship; extending the time period and getting similar results may strengthen the external validity of this study. The in-depth research through the current literature produced a few studies that test systematically the link between religious difference and militarized conflict. The existing suggestions in the literature are mainly on cultural, ethnic, and civilization differences in relation to conflict onset. The existing literature’s argument outlines a causal connection between broadly defined cultural differences and inter- or intra- state conflict, which may also be non-militarized. Based on the conceptual clarity of ‘religion’ as a unique identity, I argue that religious difference may have explanatory value that may drive the two states in a dyad to engage in different dimensions of rivalry and war.

The scholarly works discussed above present some limitations; and variables on religious and political affiliations provide suggestions for further research. These studies’ indicators of religion encompass other factors besides each state’s predominant religion, which do not offer a direct test of the effect of religion per se. Based on the findings, I not only find religious effects (i.e., All Religious Differences, Different Religious Denominations, and Different Religious Denominations [Protestants and Anglicans Combined]) but I find significant linguistic and ethnic effects in Enduring Rivalry (Tables 2 and 2a) and Rivalry Recurrence (Tables 3 and 3a) models. Thus, it is logical to argue that some interstate relations may have a concealed logic behind their behavior: different social identities such as religion, ethnicity, and language may be embedded in their decision making process.
In addition, my findings in relation to the Christian/Muslim models appear to challenge Huntington’s prediction that Muslim states are more prone to conflict with states from the West (e.g., predominantly Christian states). Further analysis regarding the Christian/Muslim relation may help explain why there is not a strong link between Christian/Muslim dyads and militarized conflict. Although I did not find any significant religious effects on the Enduring Rivalry models, states in a dyad with Linguistic Differences may increase the likelihood of enduring rivalry controlling for ethnic differences. Thus at least one state in the dyad may become more susceptible to enduring rivalry when the opponent does not share the same language. Also, Linguistic and Ethnic Differences between states increase the likelihood to re-engage in rivalry (i.e., Rivalry Recurrence). These are interesting findings that increase the relevance of this study. Since differences in religion have predictive power, negotiators have to be aware that this may be a factor in their decision making process. These findings increase the information available for policy makers.

**Future Research**

The findings of this research may be important to future studies in the field of security studies and international relations. Based on the implications in the findings, scholars may be motivated to build on the models by including additional intervening variables such as religious political parties that may play a role in the state’s decision making process. Including this and other institutional components of religion in such models may be important in furthering our understanding of the state’s decision making process. Groups of adherents who are connected through institutions may also be a variable that partially explains a state’s behavior in engaging in militarized conflict.
In addition, I may expand the study’s temporal scope of religiously different dyads on enduring rivalry, rivalry recurrence, and war to examine whether there is a link between religion and these types of militarized conflicts prior to 1945. Expanding the range of the time period may shed light on the link between religion and conflict outside the Cold War period, for example. This may lead to further understanding how interstate religious differences may motivate different degrees of conflict instead of building bridges.

These findings may be important to future studies in the field of security studies and international relations. Furthermore, discerning interstate interactions and patterns may help explain the states’ likely behaviors. For instance, controlling for emergence of factions, relative success and failure of previous rivalry, or continued popular support throughout the duration of rivalry, may be associated with likelihood of rivalry. Based on the seemingly rising importance of religion in politics, it would be very productive for future research to build on these empirical findings.
APPENDIX A: CASES IN CHRISTIAN/MUSLIM DYADS
## Cases in Christian/Muslim Dyads and Rivalry Recurrence = 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Obs</th>
<th>Dyad</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>ITAALB</td>
<td>1950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>ITAALB</td>
<td>1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>ITAALB</td>
<td>1952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>GRCTUR</td>
<td>1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>GRCTUR</td>
<td>1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>GRCTUR</td>
<td>1947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>GRCTUR</td>
<td>1948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>GRCTUR</td>
<td>1949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>GRCTUR</td>
<td>1950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>GRCTUR</td>
<td>1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>GRCTUR</td>
<td>1952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>GRCTUR</td>
<td>1953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>GRCTUR</td>
<td>1954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>GRCTUR</td>
<td>1955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>GRCTUR</td>
<td>1956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>GRCTUR</td>
<td>1957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>GRCTUR</td>
<td>1958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>BULTUR</td>
<td>1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>BULTUR</td>
<td>1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>BULTUR</td>
<td>1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>BULTUR</td>
<td>1971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>BULTUR</td>
<td>1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>BULTUR</td>
<td>1973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>BULTUR</td>
<td>1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>BULTUR</td>
<td>1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>BULTUR</td>
<td>1976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>BULTUR</td>
<td>1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>BULTUR</td>
<td>1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>BULTUR</td>
<td>1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>BULTUR</td>
<td>1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>BULTUR</td>
<td>1981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>BULTUR</td>
<td>1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>BULTUR</td>
<td>1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>BULTUR</td>
<td>1984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>BULTUR</td>
<td>1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>BULTUR</td>
<td>1986</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Cases in Christian/Muslim Dyads and War = 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Obs</th>
<th>Dyad</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>UKGIRQ</td>
<td>1958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>FRNIRQ</td>
<td>1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>USAIRQ</td>
<td>1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>ITAIRQ</td>
<td>1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>CYPTUR</td>
<td>1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>SOMETH</td>
<td>1960</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX B: SUMMARY OF VARIABLES AND MEASURES
Table 7: Summary of Variables and Measures. All variables are dichotomous.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Operationalization</th>
<th>Data Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>(Dependent Variable)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War</td>
<td>Cases must involve sustained combat, [including] organized armed forces, resulting in a minimum of 1,000 battle-related combatant fatalities within a twelve month period.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(Independent Variable)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Religious Differences</td>
<td>States in a dyad have different predominant religious affiliates based on the plurality of the dominant population of religious adherents within the state during a given rivalry.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Different Religious Denominations</td>
<td>The state’s religious denomination based on the plurality of adherents within each state (e.g., Christianity: Protestant, Roman Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, Anglican, and Other Christian; Judaism: Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform; Islam: Sunni, Shi’a, Ibadhi, Nation of Islam, Alawite, and Ahmadiyya; Buddhism: Mahayana and Theravada; etc.).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Different Religious Denominations [Protestants/Anglicans Combined]</td>
<td>The same operationalization rules of Different Religious Denominations but I also include a separate variable for Protestants and Anglicans by aggregating them under one denomination (i.e., Protestant-Anglican).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Summary of Variables and Measures.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Operationalization</th>
<th>Data Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Contiguity</strong></td>
<td>Two states in the dyad share a land border and are within 400 miles by sea.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Joint Democracy</strong></td>
<td>Two states have the same democratic regime type according to the Polity IV score of 6 or higher—both states within the dyad are categorized as democracies.</td>
<td>Polity IV Project. 2010. Center for International Development and Conflict Management. Retrieved from <a href="http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm">http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm</a>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strength of Past Rivalry</strong></td>
<td>The militarized dispute that ensued in the rivalry context, which has at least five militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) between the two rivals in the dyad.</td>
<td>Sarkees &amp; Wayman. 2010. Resort to War: 1817-2007. Washington, DC: CQ Press.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>War</strong></td>
<td>The presence of war (with 1,000 or more battle-related deaths) in the rivalry-ending MID.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linguistic Differences</strong></td>
<td>Both states in the dyad have different linguistic groups.</td>
<td>Ellingsen. 2000. Colorful Community or Ethnic Witches’ Brew? Multi-ethnicity and Domestic Conflict During and After the Cold War. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 44.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethnic Differences</strong></td>
<td>Both states in the dyad have different ethnic groups based on the name of proportional size of ethnic group for each state.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 1  Religious Pluralities: Summary Statistics and Distributions. Dyads.
Figure 2  Religious Denomination Pluralities: Summary Statistics and Distributions. Dyads.
Figure 3 Religious Denomination (Protestants & Anglicans) Pluralities: Summary Statistics and Distributions. Dyads.
APPENDIX D: SUMMARY STATISTICS
### Enduring Rivalry

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All Religious Differences</th>
<th>Christian/Muslim Differences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>87 (77%)</td>
<td>78 (74%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>26 (23%)</td>
<td>28 (26%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>113 (100%)</td>
<td>106 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=219</td>
<td></td>
<td>Pr= 0.559</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Different Religious Denominations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All Religious Differences</th>
<th>Different Religious Denominations (P&amp;A)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>43 (75%)</td>
<td>122 (75%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>14 (25%)</td>
<td>40 (25%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>57 (100%)</td>
<td>162 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=219</td>
<td></td>
<td>Pr= 0.984</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Rivalry Recurrence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All Religious Differences</th>
<th>Christian/Muslim Differences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>761 (87%)</td>
<td>780 (92%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>111 (13%)</td>
<td>71 (8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>872 (100%)</td>
<td>851 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=1,723</td>
<td></td>
<td>Pr= 0.003</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Different Religious Denominations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All Religious Differences</th>
<th>Different Religious Denominations (P&amp;A)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>372 (93%)</td>
<td>1169 (88%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>30 (7%)</td>
<td>152 (12%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>402 (100%)</td>
<td>1321 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=1,723</td>
<td></td>
<td>Pr= 0.021</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### War

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All Religious Differences</th>
<th>Christian/Muslim Differences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>102 (89%)</td>
<td>80 (68%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>12 (11%)</td>
<td>38 (32%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>114 (100%)</td>
<td>118 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=232</td>
<td></td>
<td>Pr= 0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War</td>
<td>Different Religious Denominations</td>
<td>Different Religious Denominations (P&amp;A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=232</td>
<td></td>
<td>Pr= 0.006</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX E: JINNAH’S FULL SPEECH (OCTOBER 24, 1947)
Eid-ul-Azha Message to the Nation, on 24th October, 1947

God often tests and tries those whom he loves. He called upon Prophet Ibrahim to sacrifice the object he loved most. Ibrahim answered the call and offered to sacrifice his son. Today too, God is testing and trying the Muslims of Pakistan and India. He has demanded great sacrifices from us. Our new-born State is bleeding from wounds inflicted by our enemies. Our Muslim brethren in India are being victimized and oppressed as Muslims for their help and sympathy for the establishment of Pakistan. Dark clouds surround us on all sides for the moment but we are not daunted, for I am sure, if we show the same spirit of sacrifice as was shown by Ibrahim, God would rend the clouds and shower on us His blessing as He did on Ibrahim. Let us, therefore, on the day of Eid-ul-Azha which symbolizes the spirit of sacrifice enjoined by Islam, resolve that we shall not be deterred from our objective of creating a State of our own concept by any amount of sacrifice, trials or tribulations which may lie ahead of us and that we shall bend all our energies and resources to achieve our goal. I am confident that in spite of its magnitude, we shall overcome this grave crisis as we have in our long history surmounted many others and notwithstanding the efforts of our enemies, we shall emerge triumphant and strong from the dark night of suffering and show the world that the State exists not for life but for good life.

On this sacred day, I send greetings to our Muslim brethren all over the world both on behalf of myself and the people of Pakistan. For us Pakistan, on this day of thanksgiving and rejoicing, has been overshadowed by the suffering and sorrow of 5 million Muslims in East Punjab and its neighborhood. I hope that, wherever Muslim men and women foregather on this solemn day. They will remember in their prayers these unfortunate men, women and children who have lost their dear ones, homes and hearths and are undergoing an agony and suffering as great and cruel as any yet inflicted on humanity. In the name of this mass of suffering humanity I renew my appeal to Muslims wherever they may be, to extend to us in this hour of our danger and need, their hand of brotherly sympathy, support and co-operation. Nothing on earth now can undo Pakistan.

The greater the sacrifices are made the purer and more chastened shall we emerge like gold from fire.

So my message to you all is of hope, courage and confidence. Let us mobilize all our resources in a systematic and organized way and tackle the grave issues that confront us with grim determination and discipline worthy of a great nation (Ahmad, 1997).

Pakistan Zindabad
APPENDIX F: JINNAH’S FULL SPEECH (OCTOBER 30, 1947)
Speech at a Mammoth Rally at the University
Stadium, Lahore on 30th October. 1947

We have achieved our cherished goal of freedom and have established Pakistan as an independent, sovereign State, fifth largest in the world. That freedom can never be attained by a nation without suffering and sacrifice has been amply borne out by the recent tragic happenings in this subcontinent. We are in the midst of unparalleled difficulties and untold sufferings; we have been through dark days of apprehension and anguish; but I can say with confidence that with courage and self-reliance and by the Grace of God we shall emerge triumphant.

Some people might think that the acceptance of the June 3 Plan was a mistake on the part of the Muslim League. I would like to tell them that the consequences of any other alternative would have been too disastrous to imagine. On our side we proceeded to implement this plan with a clean conscience and honest intentions. Time and history will prove that. On the other hand, history will also record its verdict on those whose treachery and machinations let loose forces of disorder and disruption in this subcontinent causing death of lakhs, enormous destruction of property and bringing about suffering and misery to many million by uprooting them from their homes and hearths and all that was dear to them. The systematic massacre of defenseless and innocent people puts to shame even the most heinous atrocities committed by the worst tyrant known to history. We have been the victims of a deeply-laid and well-planned conspiracy executed with utter disregard of the elementary principle of honesty, chivalry and honor. We thank Providence for giving us courage and faith to fight these forces of evil. If we take our inspiration and guidance from the Holy Quran, the final victory, I once again say, will be ours.

Do not for a moment imagine that your enemies can ever succeed in their designs. But at the same time do not make light of the situation facing you. Search your hearts and whether you have done your part in the construction of this new and mighty State.

Do not be over whelmed by the enormity of the task. There is many an example in history of young nations building themselves up by sheer determination and force of character. You are made of sterling material and are second to none. Why should you also not succeed like many others, like your own forefathers? You have only to develop the spirit of the "Mujahids". You are a nation whose history is replete with people of wonderful grit, character and heroism. Live up to your traditions and add to it another chapter of glory.

All I require of you now is that everyone of us to whom this message reaches must vow to himself and be prepared to sacrifice his all, if necessary, in building up Pakistan as a bulwark of Islam and as one of the greatest nations whose ideal is peace within and peace. Your immediate task is the rehabilitation of millions of our distressed and unfortunate brethren who are either already with us or who have still to join us in Pakistan, bereft of all they possessed or had in this world. The least we now can do for them is to receive them as our own brethren. No decent or sane person should consider that they are unwelcome burden thrust on us. Save all you can and give towards the relief of these victims of bestiality and vandalism who have suffered all this for the sole reason that they are Muslims.
Along with this, keep up your morale. Do not be afraid of death. Our religion teaches us to be always prepared for death. We should face it bravely to save the honor of Pakistan and Islam. There is no better salvation for a Muslim than the death of a martyr for a righteous cause.

I would also impress upon every member of this State, particularly our youth, to show the right spirit of devotion, courage and fortitude, to give a lead to the others and to set a nobler and higher example for those who may follow us and the coming generations.

Remember that the scrupulous maintenance and enforcement of law and order are the prerequisites of all progress. The tenets of Islam enjoin on every Mussalman to give protection to his neighbors and to the minorities regardless of caste and creed. Despite the treatment, which is being meted out to the Muslim minorities in India, we must make it a matter of our prestige and honor to safeguard the lives of the minority communities and to create a sense of security among them. I would like to impress upon every Mussalman, who has at heart the welfare and the prosperity of Pakistan, to avoid retaliation and to exercise restraint, because retaliation and violation of law and order will ultimately result in weakening the very foundations of the edifice you have cherished all these years to erect.

Do your duty and have faith in God. There is no power on earth that can undo Pakistan. It has come to stay. Our deeds are proving to the world that we are in the right and I can assure you that the sympathies of the world, particularly of the Islamic countries, are with you. We in turn are grateful to every nation who has stretched out to us its hand of help and friendliness.

In the end, I once again appeal to the good sense of every subject and citizen of our State not to take law and order into his own hands but so to behave and act as to be a pillar of strength to his Government and leaders who are sincerely doing their best to put an end to the miseries and hardships of our unfortunate brethren seeking shelter with us, and battling against grave danger and menace which is facing us (Ahmad, 1997).

Pakistan Zindabad


Fish, M. S., Francesca, R., & Michel, K. E. 2010. Islam and Large-Scale Political Violence: Is There a Connection? *Comparative Political Studies*, 43.


Hensel, P. R. N.d. *Interstate Rivalry and the Study of Militarized Conflict.* Tallahassee, FL: Florida State University.


