Keywords

Terrorism, civilian victimization, insurgency, incumbent violence, guerrilla warfare, conflict, civil war

Abstract

Insurgency has two main strategies, guerrilla warfare and terrorism, which should be treated as linked, but distinct, strategies. This thesis examines the role of incumbent violence in leading insurgents to select one, or both, of these strategies. It argues that incumbent violence can create support for insurgency by causing fear and a desire for revenge and reshaping the social structures of a community. It also argues that incumbent violence increases popular support for terrorism in particular by creating outbidding incentives and desires to respond in kind to civilian deaths and as a way of punishing norm violations against attacking civilians on the part of the incumbent. The paper tests this theory with a qualitative case study of the conflict in Northern Ireland during the 1970s and a quantitative analysis of insurgent violence in the Kirkuk, Diyala, Babylon, and Salah al Din provinces during the 2003-2009 Iraq conflict

Notes

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Graduation Date

2013

Semester

Summer

Advisor

Dolan, Thomas

Degree

Master of Arts (M.A.)

College

College of Sciences

Department

Political Science

Degree Program

Political Science; International Studies

Format

application/pdf

Identifier

CFE0004959

URL

http://purl.fcla.edu/fcla/etd/CFE0004959

Language

English

Release Date

August 2016

Length of Campus-only Access

3 years

Access Status

Masters Thesis (Open Access)

Subjects

Dissertations, Academic -- Sciences, Sciences -- Dissertations, Academic

Restricted to the UCF community until August 2016; it will then be open access.

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