Having begun from the assumption that our most fundamental way to relate to the world stems from an #I think# and that consciousness is at the center of this act, Edmund Husserl sets himself up for a very narrow and specialized view of human experience. In the end, such assumptions in the philosophical tradition and their terms often remain unquestioned and ingrained in a paradigm of discourse. My aim is to move beneath these assumptions-using Heidegger's and Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological work-so as to, first, explicitly undermine the scope of Husserlian intentionality at its foundation and, second, decenter the subject in contemporary phenomenological literature. An account of human experience in terms of inner intentional content, I argue, yields an incomplete and misleading picture of our human involvements and we must ultimately move beyond the subject and its logic. The way we are always already being-in-the-world and embodied in the phenomenal texture of everydayness leaves the cogito one step behind.
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Bachelor of Arts (B.A.)
College of Arts and Humanities
Arts and Humanities -- Dissertations, Academic; Dissertations, Academic -- Arts and Humanities
Length of Campus-only Access
Honors in the Major Thesis
Diaz, Edgar, "Deconstructing Presence: Rethinking the Intentionality of the Subject on the Basis of the Existentiality of Dasein" (2014). HIM 1990-2015. 1838.