Game Theoretic Defense Approach To Wireless Networks Against Stealthy Decoy Attacks

Abstract

Wireless networks implementing dynamic channel assignment mechanisms are vulnerable to stealthy decoy attacks that aim to disrupt natural network operation by creating cascading channel conflicts. This paper develops a game-theoretic defense strategy in which a network administrator makes judicious adjustments of the transmission footprint of the various nodes, thereby continuously adapting the underlying network topology. The defense strategy is a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium of a formulated 2-player zero-sum game between the admin and the attacker. As the space of strategies of the admin grows exponentially with the size of the network, a scalable decomposition-based approach is developed yielding a defense strategy whose performance is shown to closely approach the Nash equilibrium of the non-decomposed game. Numerical results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed strategies against various attack policies under different attack costs and initial conflict sizes.

Publication Date

2-10-2017

Publication Title

54th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2016

Number of Pages

816-821

Document Type

Article; Proceedings Paper

Personal Identifier

scopus

DOI Link

https://doi.org/10.1109/ALLERTON.2016.7852317

Socpus ID

85015188110 (Scopus)

Source API URL

https://api.elsevier.com/content/abstract/scopus_id/85015188110

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