Abstract
This article examines political decision making in academic organizations, contrasting the rational-economic model with the realities of negotiation and bargaining in complex environments. It argues that limited information, conflicting goals, and interdependent subunits make purely rational decision making impractical, leading instead to “satisficing” outcomes shaped by coalitions and informal networks. The discussion highlights how leaders use influence, resource control, and interpersonal exchanges to stabilize authority and secure commitments. A set of practical negotiation rules is outlined, emphasizing strategies such as coalition building, impression management, strategic disclosure, patience, and maintaining options. These practices help leaders navigate ambiguity, manage power dynamics, and balance competition with cooperation. The article concludes that political processes are inherent in academic decision making and that awareness of bargaining strategies can enhance leadership effectiveness.
Recommended Citation
Browning, Larry D. and Gilchrist, James A.
(1987)
"Negotiating and Bargaining in Academic Settings,"
Association for Communication Administration Bulletin: Vol. 61, Article 5.
Available at:
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/aca/vol61/iss1/5
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