Title

Spatial aspects of pollution control when pollutants have synergistic effects: Evidence from a differential game with asymmetric information

Authors

Authors

J. A. List;C. F. Mason

Comments

Authors: contact us about adding a copy of your work at STARS@ucf.edu

Abbreviated Journal Title

Ann. Reg. Sci.

Keywords

COMPETITION; Environmental Studies; Geography

Abstract

An asymmetric information differential game is utilized to explore the normative issue: should environmental regulations be carried out locally or centrally? Modeling localities as having superior information, or more leniency to adopt new environmental regulations, results from simulations indicate that local control Pareto dominates central control when enough synergism occurs between pollutants. In contrast to predictions made by those responsible for framing US environmental policy in the 1960s, these findings suggest an expanded future role for local governments in providing environmental protection, particularly in light of Tiebout's (1956) analysis of consumers who "vote with their feet" for their preferred basket of public services. "Practically all the things we've done in the federal government are like things Al Smith did as governor in New York." -Franklin Roosevelt (Schlesinger, 1960, p.520).

Journal Title

Annals of Regional Science

Volume

33

Issue/Number

4

Publication Date

1-1-1999

Document Type

Article

Language

English

First Page

439

Last Page

452

WOS Identifier

WOS:000084285600005

ISSN

0570-1864

Share

COinS