Spatial aspects of pollution control when pollutants have synergistic effects: Evidence from a differential game with asymmetric information

    Authors

    J. A. List;C. F. Mason

    Comments

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    Abbreviated Journal Title

    Ann. Reg. Sci.

    Keywords

    COMPETITION; Environmental Studies; Geography

    Abstract

    An asymmetric information differential game is utilized to explore the normative issue: should environmental regulations be carried out locally or centrally? Modeling localities as having superior information, or more leniency to adopt new environmental regulations, results from simulations indicate that local control Pareto dominates central control when enough synergism occurs between pollutants. In contrast to predictions made by those responsible for framing US environmental policy in the 1960s, these findings suggest an expanded future role for local governments in providing environmental protection, particularly in light of Tiebout's (1956) analysis of consumers who "vote with their feet" for their preferred basket of public services. "Practically all the things we've done in the federal government are like things Al Smith did as governor in New York." -Franklin Roosevelt (Schlesinger, 1960, p.520).

    Journal Title

    Annals of Regional Science

    Volume

    33

    Issue/Number

    4

    Publication Date

    1-1-1999

    Document Type

    Article

    Language

    English

    First Page

    439

    Last Page

    452

    WOS Identifier

    WOS:000084285600005

    ISSN

    0570-1864

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