Price information and bidding behavior in repeated second-price auctions

    Authors

    J. A. List;J. F. Shogren

    Comments

    Authors: contact us about adding a copy of your work at STARS@ucf.edu

    Abbreviated Journal Title

    Am. J. Agr. Econ.

    Keywords

    auctions; bidding; experimental markets; price; valuation; MARKETS; FOOD; SOMATOTROPIN; PREFERENCES; VALUATION; VALUES; IMPACT; Agricultural Economics & Policy; Economics

    Abstract

    Examining panel data on bidding behavior in over forty second-price auction markets with repeated trials. we observe that (i) posted prices influence the behavior of the median naive bidder; (ii) posted prices do not affect the behavior of the median experienced bidder or the bidder for familiar goods; and (iii) anticipated strategic behavior wanes after two trials. The results suggest that while affiliation might exist in auctions for new goods, the repeated trial design with nonprice information removes the correlation of values and provides the experience that bidders need to understand the market mechanism.

    Journal Title

    American Journal of Agricultural Economics

    Volume

    81

    Issue/Number

    4

    Publication Date

    1-1-1999

    Document Type

    Article

    Language

    English

    First Page

    942

    Last Page

    949

    WOS Identifier

    WOS:000083309500015

    ISSN

    0002-9092

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