Toward A Theory Of Agenda Setting In Negotiations

    Authors

    P. V. S. Balakrishnan; C. Patton;P. A. Lewis

    Comments

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    Abbreviated Journal Title

    J. Consum. Res.

    Keywords

    Buyer-Seller Negotiations; Self-Serving Biases; Bilateral Negotiations; Attributional Search; Causal Attribution; Exchange Processes; Future; Interaction; Decision-Making; People Ask; Satisfaction; Business

    Abstract

    To date, negotiation research in two-party situations has largely focused on single issues or on multiple issues bargained simultaneously. In this paper, we develop, from a behavioral perspective, a conceptual framework and an associated set of propositions concerning the influence and interaction of a number of factors on agenda setting. We examine the consequences of negotiating multiple issues sequentially as opposed to discussing them simultaneously. Specifically, we posit (a) conditions under which sequential versus simultaneous negotiations are advantageous, (b) conditions that promote and inhibit integrative agreements between parties involved in sequential negotiations, and (c) conditions that foster greater utility and timeliness to the negotiating parties. In addition, directions for future research and methodological guidelines for testing the propositions are discussed.

    Journal Title

    Journal of Consumer Research

    Volume

    19

    Issue/Number

    4

    Publication Date

    1-1-1993

    Document Type

    Review

    Language

    English

    First Page

    637

    Last Page

    654

    WOS Identifier

    WOS:A1993KQ35100012

    ISSN

    0093-5301

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