Title

Openness, lobbying, and provision of infrastructure

Authors

Authors

U. Chakravorty;J. Mazumdar

Comments

Authors: contact us about adding a copy of your work at STARS@ucf.edu

Abbreviated Journal Title

South. Econ. J.

Keywords

MARKET SHARE RIVALRY; PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE; ECONOMIC-GROWTH; TRADE; INVESTMENT; POLICY; Economics

Abstract

Casual empirical evidence suggests that infrastructure provision is higher in economies that are open to world trade. We develop a model of imperfect competition to show that open economies are likely to provide more infrastructure than closed economies. If infrastructure is financed by taxing a producer lobby, the open economy will overprovide while the closed economy will underinvest; an open economy approaches optimal provision when this lobby group is small in size. If financing of infrastructure is done by taxing the whole population, the closed-economy outcome may be preferred relative to that of the open economy.

Journal Title

Southern Economic Journal

Volume

74

Issue/Number

4

Publication Date

1-1-2008

Document Type

Article

Language

English

First Page

1149

Last Page

1166

WOS Identifier

WOS:000255820800013

ISSN

0038-4038

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