Stated beliefs versus inferred beliefs: A methodological inquiry and experimental test

    Authors

    E. E. Rutstrom;N. T. Wilcox

    Abbreviated Journal Title

    Games Econ. Behav.

    Keywords

    Stated beliefs; Inferred beliefs; Repeated games; Experimental methods; NORMAL-FORM GAMES; MIXED STRATEGY EQUILIBRIA; PEOPLE PLAY GAMES; UNIQUE; HETEROGENEITY; MODELS; CHOICE; Economics

    Abstract

    Belief elicitation in game experiments may be problematic if it changes game play. We experimentally Verify that belief elicitation can alter paths of play in a two-player repeated asymmetric matching pennies game. Importantly, this effect occurs only during early periods and only for players with strongly asymmetric payoffs, consistent with a cognitive/affective effect on priors that may serve as a substitute for experience. These effects occur with a common scoring rule elicitation procedure, but not with simpler (unmotivated) statements of expected choices of opponents. Scoring rule belief elicitation improves the goodness of fit of structural models of belief learning, and prior beliefs implied by such models are both stronger and more realistic when beliefs are elicited than when they are not. We also find that "inferred beliefs" (beliefs estimated from past observed actions of opponents) can predict observed actions better than the "stated beliefs" from scoring rule belief elicitation. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

    Journal Title

    Games and Economic Behavior

    Volume

    67

    Issue/Number

    2

    Publication Date

    1-1-2009

    Document Type

    Article

    Language

    English

    First Page

    616

    Last Page

    632

    WOS Identifier

    WOS:000271143900020

    ISSN

    0899-8256

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