Direct perception in the intersubjective context

    Authors

    S. Gallagher

    Comments

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    Abbreviated Journal Title

    Conscious. Cogn.

    Keywords

    direct perception; theory theory; simulation theory; mirror neurons; social cognition; MIRROR NEURON SYSTEM; SOCIAL-PERCEPTION; PREMOTOR CORTEX; SIMULATION; RECOGNITION; INFANTS; OTHERS; INTENTIONS; EMOTION; MIND; Psychology, Experimental

    Abstract

    This paper, in opposition to the standard theories of social cognition found in psychology and cognitive science, defends the idea that direct perception plays an important role in social cognition. The two dominant theories, theory theory (TT) and simulation theory (ST), both posit something more than a perceptual element as necessary for our ability to understand others, i.e., to "mindread" or "mentalize." In contrast, certain phenomenological approaches depend heavily on the concept of perception and the idea that we have a direct perceptual grasp of the other person's intentions, feelings, etc. This paper explains precisely what the notion of direct perception means, offers evidence from developmental studies, and proposes a non-simulationist interpretation of the neuroscience of mirror systems. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

    Journal Title

    Consciousness and Cognition

    Volume

    17

    Issue/Number

    2

    Publication Date

    1-1-2008

    Document Type

    Article; Proceedings Paper

    Language

    English

    First Page

    535

    Last Page

    543

    WOS Identifier

    WOS:000256490100014

    ISSN

    1053-8100

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