Intersubjectivity in perception

    Authors

    S. Gallagher

    Comments

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    Abbreviated Journal Title

    Cont. Philos. Rev.

    Keywords

    embodied cognition; extended mind; enactive perception; intersubjectivity; object perception; CAUSAL COMPLEXITY; CONSCIOUSNESS; EMBODIMENT; COGNITION; Philosophy

    Abstract

    The embodied, embedded, enactive, and extended approaches to cognition explicate many important details for a phenomenology of perception, and are consistent with some of the traditional phenomenological analyses. Theorists working in these areas, however, often fail to provide an account of how intersubjectivity might relate to perception. This paper suggests some ways in which intersubjectivity is important for an adequate account of perception.

    Journal Title

    Continental Philosophy Review

    Volume

    41

    Issue/Number

    2

    Publication Date

    1-1-2008

    Document Type

    Article

    Language

    English

    First Page

    163

    Last Page

    178

    WOS Identifier

    WOS:000257919300004

    ISSN

    1387-2842

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