Executive compensation and agency costs in Germany

    Authors

    J. A. Elston;L. G. Goldberg

    Abbreviated Journal Title

    J. Bank Financ.

    Keywords

    executive compensation; corporate governance; Germany; agency; EMPIRICAL-ANALYSIS; PERFORMANCE; OWNERSHIP; DETERMINANTS; FIRM; Business, Finance; Economics

    Abstract

    With the growth of international mergers like DaimlerChrysler, interest in executive compensation practices abroad, particularly in Germany, has increased. Using unique data sources for Germany, we find that similar to US firms, German firms also have agency problems caused by the separation of ownership from control, with ownership dispersion leading to higher compensation. In addition, there is evidence that bank influence has a negative impact on compensation. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

    Journal Title

    Journal of Banking & Finance

    Volume

    27

    Issue/Number

    7

    Publication Date

    1-1-2003

    Document Type

    Article

    Language

    English

    First Page

    1391

    Last Page

    1410

    WOS Identifier

    WOS:000183655600008

    ISSN

    0378-4266

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