Multilateral negotiations over climate change policy

    Authors

    L. M. Pinto;G. W. Harrison

    Comments

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    Abbreviated Journal Title

    J. Policy Model.

    Keywords

    CGE; multilateral bargaining; CO2; climate change; Economics

    Abstract

    Negotiations in the real world have many features which tend to be ignored in policy modeling. They are often multilateral, involving many negotiating parties with preferences over outcomes that can differ substantially. They are also often multidimensional, in the sense that several policies are negotiated over simultaneously. Trade negotiations are a prime example, as are negotiations over environmental policies to abate carbon dioxide (CO2). We demonstrate how one can formally model this type of negotiation process. We use a policy-oriented computable general equilibrium model to generate preference functions which are then used in a formal multilateral bargaining game. The case is to study climate change policy, but the main contribution is to demonstrate how one can integrate formal economic models of the impacts of policies with formal bargaining models of the negotiations over those policies. (C) 2003 Society for Policy Modeling. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

    Journal Title

    Journal of Policy Modeling

    Volume

    25

    Issue/Number

    9

    Publication Date

    1-1-2003

    Document Type

    Article

    Language

    English

    First Page

    911

    Last Page

    930

    WOS Identifier

    WOS:000188203300005

    ISSN

    0161-8938

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