Vertical structure and strategic environmental trade policy

Authors

    Authors

    S. F. Hamilton;T. Requate

    Comments

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    Abbreviated Journal Title

    J.Environ.Econ.Manage.

    Keywords

    strategic trade; vertical separation; environmental policy; INTERNATIONAL-TRADE; INDUSTRIAL-POLICY; DELEGATION; TAXES; Business; Economics; Environmental Studies

    Abstract

    The idea that environmental trade policy can be used to achieve competitive advantage in international markets has important implications for the way we conceive free trade. This paper considers strategic environmental policy in a model that makes explicit the vertical structure that supports production of the traded good. Including intranational vertical relationships in the analysis of strategic environmental trade policy has substantial qualitative effects. When vertical contracts are allowed, the optimal policy to levy on a polluting input under both quantity and price competition in the international market is the Pigouvian tax. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

    Journal Title

    Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

    Volume

    47

    Issue/Number

    2

    Publication Date

    1-1-2004

    Document Type

    Article

    Language

    English

    First Page

    260

    Last Page

    269

    WOS Identifier

    WOS:000220022400003

    ISSN

    0095-0696

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