Title

Income distribution preferences and regulatory change in social dilemmas

Authors

Authors

L. T. Johnson; E. E. Rutstrom;J. G. George

Comments

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Abbreviated Journal Title

J. Econ. Behav. Organ.

Keywords

income inequality; social preferences; social dilemma; regulatory change; RECIPROCITY; FAIRNESS; ENTITLEMENTS; COOPERATION; COMPETITION; RIGHTS; GAMES; Economics

Abstract

We present results from an experiment where we elicit preferences over regulatory policies of social dilemmas for small groups. These policy choices differ only in income distribution and are made after a common group experience of an unregulated social dilemma game. We model two policies: a traditional grandfathering allocation of pollution permits and an egalitarian public trust fund. We find a sizeable fraction of our participants favor the public trust, indicating that social preferences are not sufficiently expressed during the interactive social dilemma game. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Journal Title

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

Volume

61

Issue/Number

2

Publication Date

1-1-2006

Document Type

Article; Proceedings Paper

Language

English

First Page

181

Last Page

198

WOS Identifier

WOS:000241474700004

ISSN

0167-2681

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