Income distribution preferences and regulatory change in social dilemmas

    Authors

    L. T. Johnson; E. E. Rutstrom;J. G. George

    Comments

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    Abbreviated Journal Title

    J. Econ. Behav. Organ.

    Keywords

    income inequality; social preferences; social dilemma; regulatory change; RECIPROCITY; FAIRNESS; ENTITLEMENTS; COOPERATION; COMPETITION; RIGHTS; GAMES; Economics

    Abstract

    We present results from an experiment where we elicit preferences over regulatory policies of social dilemmas for small groups. These policy choices differ only in income distribution and are made after a common group experience of an unregulated social dilemma game. We model two policies: a traditional grandfathering allocation of pollution permits and an egalitarian public trust fund. We find a sizeable fraction of our participants favor the public trust, indicating that social preferences are not sufficiently expressed during the interactive social dilemma game. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

    Journal Title

    Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

    Volume

    61

    Issue/Number

    2

    Publication Date

    1-1-2006

    Document Type

    Article; Proceedings Paper

    Language

    English

    First Page

    181

    Last Page

    198

    WOS Identifier

    WOS:000241474700004

    ISSN

    0167-2681

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