Title

Non-cooperative games for service differentiation in CDMA systems

Authors

Authors

M. Chatterjee; H. T. Lin;S. K. Das

Comments

Authors: contact us about adding a copy of your work at STARS@ucf.edu

Abbreviated Journal Title

Mobile Netw. Appl.

Keywords

games; utility; Nash equilibrium; service differentiation; admission; control; NETWORKS; Computer Science, Hardware & Architecture; Computer Science, Information; Systems; Telecommunications

Abstract

In this paper, we address the problem of user-class based service differentiation in CDMA networks. Users are categorized into three classes who get differentiated services based on their expected quality of service (QoS) from the service provider and the price they are willing to pay. We adopt a game theoretic approach for allocating resources through a two-step process. During a service admission, resource distribution is determined for each class. Then, the resource allocated to each class is distributed among the active users in that class. We devise a utility function for the providers which considers the expected revenue and the probability of users leaving their service provider if they are not satisfied with the service. Our model demonstrates how power can be controlled in a CDMA network to differentiate the service quality. Also, we show the impact of admitting high paying users on other users.

Journal Title

Mobile Networks & Applications

Volume

10

Issue/Number

6

Publication Date

1-1-2005

Document Type

Article

Language

English

First Page

939

Last Page

946

WOS Identifier

WOS:000234396700012

ISSN

1383-469X

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