Non-cooperative games for service differentiation in CDMA systems

    Authors

    M. Chatterjee; H. T. Lin;S. K. Das

    Comments

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    Abbreviated Journal Title

    Mobile Netw. Appl.

    Keywords

    games; utility; Nash equilibrium; service differentiation; admission; control; NETWORKS; Computer Science, Hardware & Architecture; Computer Science, Information; Systems; Telecommunications

    Abstract

    In this paper, we address the problem of user-class based service differentiation in CDMA networks. Users are categorized into three classes who get differentiated services based on their expected quality of service (QoS) from the service provider and the price they are willing to pay. We adopt a game theoretic approach for allocating resources through a two-step process. During a service admission, resource distribution is determined for each class. Then, the resource allocated to each class is distributed among the active users in that class. We devise a utility function for the providers which considers the expected revenue and the probability of users leaving their service provider if they are not satisfied with the service. Our model demonstrates how power can be controlled in a CDMA network to differentiate the service quality. Also, we show the impact of admitting high paying users on other users.

    Journal Title

    Mobile Networks & Applications

    Volume

    10

    Issue/Number

    6

    Publication Date

    1-1-2005

    Document Type

    Article

    Language

    English

    First Page

    939

    Last Page

    946

    WOS Identifier

    WOS:000234396700012

    ISSN

    1383-469X

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