Applying the methodology of mechanism design to the choice of electoral systems

    Authors

    B. S. Kinsey;O. Shvetsova

    Comments

    Authors: contact us about adding a copy of your work at STARS@ucf.edu

    Abbreviated Journal Title

    J. Theor. Polit.

    Keywords

    endogenous institutions; election laws; Europe; franchise expansion; incomplete information; institutional design; INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE; POLAND; EVOLUTION; POLITICS; EUROPE; Political Science

    Abstract

    In this article we inquire into the strategic intent behind the design of election laws. Presuming that institutional designers are strategic and rational, we identify the extent of information incompleteness as determining their objectives for rule choice. For different levels of information incompleteness, we assess empirically the validity of explaining actual choices with designers' electoral goals. Using parameter-specific predictions for players' institutional preferences (obtained from a game-theoretic model which assumes electoral success as the design goal) we find that design does not always meet the criterion of elections-aimed rationality (electoral rationalizability). We identify a structural difference between levels of electoral rationalizability in two sets of European electoral reforms, those that accompanied the late 19th - early 20th-century franchise expansion, and those during the post-communist franchise creation in East - Central Europe. For the later sub-sample we rely on a qualitative assessment of electoral rationalizability since extremely high levels of information incompleteness in these cases do not allow us to apply the model reliably. We provide evidence linking the structural difference in electoral rationalizability between the two sub-samples and the sub-sample variation in electoral rationalizability in the late 19th - early 20th century to the quality of information available to the designers.

    Journal Title

    Journal of Theoretical Politics

    Volume

    20

    Issue/Number

    3

    Publication Date

    1-1-2008

    Document Type

    Article

    Language

    English

    First Page

    303

    Last Page

    327

    WOS Identifier

    WOS:000257672900003

    ISSN

    0951-6298

    Share

    COinS