Agency hazards and alliance portfolios

    Authors

    J. J. Reuer;R. Ragozzino

    Comments

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    Abbreviated Journal Title

    Strateg. Manage. J.

    Keywords

    joint ventures; strategic alliances; agency theory; ownership structure; INTERNATIONAL JOINT VENTURES; OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE; STRATEGIC ALLIANCES; EQUITY OWNERSHIP; UNITED-STATES; RISK-TAKING; CORPORATE DIVERSIFICATION; HERD BEHAVIOR; PERFORMANCE; MARKET; Business; Management

    Abstract

    Prior research over several decades has catalogued many positive motives underlying firms' decisions to engage in joint ventures and other forms of alliances. in this empirical analysis, we investigate whether agency problems brought about by the separation of ownership and control also stimulate the development of firms' joint venture portfolios. By focusing on joint ventures, as opposed to diversification in general or acquisitions, we address the recent debate on agency theory's domain. Results from a sample of U.S. manufacturing firms' alliance portfolios offer supporting evidence, and comparable findings are obtained for international and domestic joint ventures. Agency hazards are also found to bring about extensions of firms' nonequity alliance portfolios in both the international and domestic settings. Copyright (c) 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

    Journal Title

    Strategic Management Journal

    Volume

    27

    Issue/Number

    1

    Publication Date

    1-1-2006

    Document Type

    Article

    Language

    English

    First Page

    27

    Last Page

    43

    WOS Identifier

    WOS:000234283500002

    ISSN

    0143-2095

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