Title

Agency hazards and alliance portfolios

Authors

Authors

J. J. Reuer;R. Ragozzino

Comments

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Abbreviated Journal Title

Strateg. Manage. J.

Keywords

joint ventures; strategic alliances; agency theory; ownership structure; INTERNATIONAL JOINT VENTURES; OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE; STRATEGIC ALLIANCES; EQUITY OWNERSHIP; UNITED-STATES; RISK-TAKING; CORPORATE DIVERSIFICATION; HERD BEHAVIOR; PERFORMANCE; MARKET; Business; Management

Abstract

Prior research over several decades has catalogued many positive motives underlying firms' decisions to engage in joint ventures and other forms of alliances. in this empirical analysis, we investigate whether agency problems brought about by the separation of ownership and control also stimulate the development of firms' joint venture portfolios. By focusing on joint ventures, as opposed to diversification in general or acquisitions, we address the recent debate on agency theory's domain. Results from a sample of U.S. manufacturing firms' alliance portfolios offer supporting evidence, and comparable findings are obtained for international and domestic joint ventures. Agency hazards are also found to bring about extensions of firms' nonequity alliance portfolios in both the international and domestic settings. Copyright (c) 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Journal Title

Strategic Management Journal

Volume

27

Issue/Number

1

Publication Date

1-1-2006

Document Type

Article

Language

English

First Page

27

Last Page

43

WOS Identifier

WOS:000234283500002

ISSN

0143-2095

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