Title
Competition and cooperation in divisible good auctions: An experimental examination
Abbreviated Journal Title
Rev. Financ. Stud.
Keywords
Business, Finance; Economics
Abstract
An experimental approach is used to examine the performance of three different multiunit auction designs: discriminatory, uniform-price with fixed supply, and uniform-price with endogenous supply. We find the actual strategies to be inconsistent with theoretically identified equilibrium strategies. The discriminatory auction is found to be more susceptible to collusion than either uniform-price auction and so, contrary to theoretical predictions and previous experimental results, it generates the lowest average revenue. Consistent with theoretical predictions, the actual bid schedules are more elastic with reducible supply or discriminatory pricing than in the uniform-price auction with fixed supply.
Journal Title
Review of Financial Studies
Volume
19
Issue/Number
1
Publication Date
1-1-2006
Document Type
Article
DOI Link
Language
English
First Page
195
Last Page
235
WOS Identifier
ISSN
0893-9454
Recommended Citation
"Competition and cooperation in divisible good auctions: An experimental examination" (2006). Faculty Bibliography 2000s. 6527.
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/facultybib2000/6527
Comments
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