Title

Equity and adverse selection with correlated costs

Authors

Authors

R. Desiraju;D. E. M. Sappington

Comments

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Abbreviated Journal Title

Econ. Lett.

Keywords

fairness; inequity; adverse selection; agency; correlated information; DESIGN; INFORMATION; COMPETITION; Economics

Abstract

We show that agent concern with inequity is not constraining for a principal when the binary costs of two risk neutral agents are correlated. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Journal Title

Economics Letters

Volume

95

Issue/Number

3

Publication Date

1-1-2007

Document Type

Article

Language

English

First Page

402

Last Page

407

WOS Identifier

WOS:000247149000015

ISSN

0165-1765

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