Equity and adverse selection with correlated costs

    Authors

    R. Desiraju;D. E. M. Sappington

    Comments

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    Abbreviated Journal Title

    Econ. Lett.

    Keywords

    fairness; inequity; adverse selection; agency; correlated information; DESIGN; INFORMATION; COMPETITION; Economics

    Abstract

    We show that agent concern with inequity is not constraining for a principal when the binary costs of two risk neutral agents are correlated. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

    Journal Title

    Economics Letters

    Volume

    95

    Issue/Number

    3

    Publication Date

    1-1-2007

    Document Type

    Article

    Language

    English

    First Page

    402

    Last Page

    407

    WOS Identifier

    WOS:000247149000015

    ISSN

    0165-1765

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