Title
Equity and adverse selection with correlated costs
Abbreviated Journal Title
Econ. Lett.
Keywords
fairness; inequity; adverse selection; agency; correlated information; DESIGN; INFORMATION; COMPETITION; Economics
Abstract
We show that agent concern with inequity is not constraining for a principal when the binary costs of two risk neutral agents are correlated. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Journal Title
Economics Letters
Volume
95
Issue/Number
3
Publication Date
1-1-2007
Document Type
Article
Language
English
First Page
402
Last Page
407
WOS Identifier
ISSN
0165-1765
Recommended Citation
"Equity and adverse selection with correlated costs" (2007). Faculty Bibliography 2000s. 7026.
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/facultybib2000/7026
COinS
Comments
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