Voting games and computational complexity

    Authors

    G. W. Harrison;T. McDaniel

    Comments

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    Abbreviated Journal Title

    Oxf. Econ. Pap.-New Ser.

    Keywords

    ELECTION; SCHEMES; RULES; Economics

    Abstract

    Voting rules over three or more alternatives suffer from a general problem of manipulability. However, if the rule is difficult to manipulate, in some formal computational sense that is intrinsic to the rule or some cognitive sense specific to the set of voters, then one might not observe manipulation in practice. We evaluate this hypothesis using controlled laboratory experiments. We conclude that one voting rule, due originally to Condorcet, is indeed behaviorally incentive-compatible despite being theoretically manipulable if the underlying preference environment is sufficiently diverse that voters have difficulty ascertaining others preferences.

    Journal Title

    Oxford Economic Papers-New Series

    Volume

    60

    Issue/Number

    3

    Publication Date

    1-1-2008

    Document Type

    Article

    Language

    English

    First Page

    546

    Last Page

    565

    WOS Identifier

    WOS:000257190500008

    ISSN

    0030-7653

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