Title

Auction mechanisms and the measurement of WTP and WTA

Authors

Authors

J. F. Shogren; S. Cho; C. Koo; J. List; C. Park; P. Polo;R. Wilhelmi

Abbreviated Journal Title

Resour. Energy Econ.

Keywords

auction; endowment effect; willingness to pay; willingness to accept; random nth-price auction; WILLINGNESS; PAY; ACCEPT; DISPARITY; BEHAVIOR; Economics; Energy & Fuels; Environmental Sciences; Environmental Studies

Abstract

We evaluate the impact of three auction mechanisms - the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism, the second-price auction, and the random nth-price auction - in the measurement of willingness to pay (WTP) and willingness to accept (WTA) measures of value, our results show that initial bidding in trial 1 in each auction does not contradict the endowment effect; but that, if it is the endowment effect that governs people's initial bidding behavior, it can be eliminated with repetitions of a second-price or random nth-price auction; and if the thesis is that the effect should persist across auctions and across trials is right, our results suggest that there is no fundamental endowment effect. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

Journal Title

Resource and Energy Economics

Volume

23

Issue/Number

2

Publication Date

1-1-2001

Document Type

Article

Language

English

First Page

97

Last Page

109

WOS Identifier

WOS:000167885300002

ISSN

0928-7655

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