Designing auction mechanisms for dynamic spectrum access

    Authors

    S. Sengupta;M. Chatterjee

    Comments

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    Abbreviated Journal Title

    Mobile Netw. Appl.

    Keywords

    auctions; dynamic spectrum access (DSA); cognitive radio; winner; determination; knapsack; Computer Science, Hardware & Architecture; Computer Science, Information; Systems; Telecommunications

    Abstract

    With the increasing demands for radio spectrum, techniques are being explored that would allow dynamic access of spectrum bands that are under-utilized. In this regard, a new paradigm called dynamic spectrum access is being investigated where wireless service providers (WSPs) would dynamically seek more spectrum from the under-utilized licensed bands when and where they need without interfering with the primary users. Currently, there is little understanding on how such a dynamic allocation will operate so as to make the system feasible under economic terms. In this paper, we consider the dynamic spectrum allocation process where multiple WSPs (bidders) compete to acquire necessary spectrum band from a common pool of spectrum. We use auction theory to analyze the allocation process when the demand from WSPs exceeds the available spectrum. We investigate various auction mechanisms under different spectrum allocation constraints to find WSPs' bidding strategies and revenue generated by spectrum owner. We show that sequential bidding of bands provides better result than the concurrent bidding when WSPs are constrained to at most single unit allocation. On the other hand, when the bidders request for multiple units, (i.e., they are not restricted by allocation constraints) synchronous auction mechanism proves to be beneficial than asynchronous auctions.

    Journal Title

    Mobile Networks & Applications

    Volume

    13

    Issue/Number

    5

    Publication Date

    1-1-2008

    Document Type

    Article

    Language

    English

    First Page

    498

    Last Page

    515

    WOS Identifier

    WOS:000259482600009

    ISSN

    1383-469X

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