Title

Designing auction mechanisms for dynamic spectrum access

Authors

Authors

S. Sengupta;M. Chatterjee

Comments

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Abbreviated Journal Title

Mobile Netw. Appl.

Keywords

auctions; dynamic spectrum access (DSA); cognitive radio; winner; determination; knapsack; Computer Science, Hardware & Architecture; Computer Science, Information; Systems; Telecommunications

Abstract

With the increasing demands for radio spectrum, techniques are being explored that would allow dynamic access of spectrum bands that are under-utilized. In this regard, a new paradigm called dynamic spectrum access is being investigated where wireless service providers (WSPs) would dynamically seek more spectrum from the under-utilized licensed bands when and where they need without interfering with the primary users. Currently, there is little understanding on how such a dynamic allocation will operate so as to make the system feasible under economic terms. In this paper, we consider the dynamic spectrum allocation process where multiple WSPs (bidders) compete to acquire necessary spectrum band from a common pool of spectrum. We use auction theory to analyze the allocation process when the demand from WSPs exceeds the available spectrum. We investigate various auction mechanisms under different spectrum allocation constraints to find WSPs' bidding strategies and revenue generated by spectrum owner. We show that sequential bidding of bands provides better result than the concurrent bidding when WSPs are constrained to at most single unit allocation. On the other hand, when the bidders request for multiple units, (i.e., they are not restricted by allocation constraints) synchronous auction mechanism proves to be beneficial than asynchronous auctions.

Journal Title

Mobile Networks & Applications

Volume

13

Issue/Number

5

Publication Date

1-1-2008

Document Type

Article

Language

English

First Page

498

Last Page

515

WOS Identifier

WOS:000259482600009

ISSN

1383-469X

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