A Qualitative Characterization of Symmetric Open-Loop Nash Equilibria in Discounted Infinite Horizon Differential Games

    Authors

    C. Ling;M. R. Caputo

    Comments

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    Abbreviated Journal Title

    J. Optim. Theory Appl.

    Keywords

    Symmetric open-loop Nash equilibria; Local stability; Steady state; comparative statics; Local comparative dynamics; STICKY PRICES; OLIGOPOLY; Operations Research & Management Science; Mathematics, Applied

    Abstract

    The local stability, steady state comparative statics, and local comparative dynamics of symmetric open-loop Nash equilibria for the ubiquitous class of discounted infinite horizon differential games are investigated. It is shown that the functional forms and values of the parameters specified in a differential game are crucial in determining the local stability of a steady state and, in turn, the steady state comparative statics and local comparative dynamics. A simple sufficient condition for a steady state to be a local saddle point is provided. The power and reach of the results are demonstrated by applying them to two well-known differential games.

    Journal Title

    Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications

    Volume

    149

    Issue/Number

    1

    Publication Date

    1-1-2011

    Document Type

    Article

    Language

    English

    First Page

    151

    Last Page

    174

    WOS Identifier

    WOS:000287757500008

    ISSN

    0022-3239

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