Continuous-time dynamic games for the Cournot adjustment process for competing oligopolists

    Authors

    B. C. Snyder; R. A. Van Gorder;K. Vajravelu

    Comments

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    Abbreviated Journal Title

    Appl. Math. Comput.

    Keywords

    Cournot adjustment; Continuous-time dynamic game; Cournot oligopoly; Nonlinear dynamics; STABILITY; DUOPOLY; MODELS; Mathematics, Applied

    Abstract

    Under the assumption of an iso-elastic demand function, we consider a continuous-time dynamic Cournot adjustment game for n oligopolists. We first show the existence and uniqueness of a positive Cournot equilibrium and, for any n, we show that positive response functions are bounded in time. For the n = 3 case, we analytically show that the positive equilibrium is locally asymptotically stable, while, for n > 3, we are able to give some asymptotic results. As an application, we then introduce a proportional tax or subsidy to the model, and discuss the influence of such policies on the positive equilibrium. Furthermore, we briefly discuss a generalization of the results to non-iso-elastic demand functions. Comments on possible areas of future work are given. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

    Journal Title

    Applied Mathematics and Computation

    Volume

    219

    Issue/Number

    12

    Publication Date

    1-1-2013

    Document Type

    Article

    Language

    English

    First Page

    6400

    Last Page

    6409

    WOS Identifier

    WOS:000315708700002

    ISSN

    0096-3003

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