A direct test of direct democracy: New England town meetings

    Authors

    R. Salvino; M. T. Tasto;G. K. Turnbull

    Comments

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    Abbreviated Journal Title

    Appl. Econ.

    Keywords

    median voter; direct democracy; representative democracy; revealed; preference; MEDIAN VOTER MODEL; GOVERNMENTS; CHOICE; DEMAND; Economics

    Abstract

    Representative democracies govern most locales in the US, making it difficult to compare performance relative to direct democracy. New England states, however, provide an opportunity to test both direct and representative democracy at the local level. This article uses revealed preference axioms to compare spending patterns in New England towns and cities against median voter hypothesis benchmarks. Contrary to previous evidence, we find no differences between direct and representative democracy. The results suggest that horizontal competition arising from local fragmentation minimize differences between direct and representative local government, providing support for wider applicability of median voter-based empirical models of local government behaviour in the US.

    Journal Title

    Applied Economics

    Volume

    44

    Issue/Number

    18

    Publication Date

    1-1-2012

    Document Type

    Article

    Language

    English

    First Page

    2393

    Last Page

    2402

    WOS Identifier

    WOS:000301539000010

    ISSN

    0003-6846

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