Title

The intrinsic comparative dynamics of locally differentiable feedback Nash equilibria of autonomous and exponentially discounted infinite horizon differential games

Authors

Authors

M. R. Caputo;C. Ling

Comments

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Abbreviated Journal Title

J. Econ. Dyn. Control

Keywords

Comparative dynamics; Differential games; Feedback Nash equilibria; COMPARATIVE STATICS; STICKY PRICES; ENVELOPE; DUOPOLY; INVESTMENT; OLIGOPOLY; BACK; Economics

Abstract

The comparative dynamics of locally differentiable feedback Nash equilibria are derived for the ubiquitous class of autonomous and exponentially discounted infinite horizon differential games. The resulting refutable implications are intrinsic to the said class of differential games, and thus form their basic, empirically testable, properties. Their relationship with extant results in the optimal control theory and the static game theory is discussed. Separability conditions are identified on the instantaneous payoff and transition functions under which the intrinsic comparative dynamics collapse, in form, to those in optimal control problems. Applications of the results to capital accumulation and sticky-price games are provided. (c) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Journal Title

Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control

Volume

37

Issue/Number

10

Publication Date

1-1-2013

Document Type

Article

Language

English

First Page

1982

Last Page

1994

WOS Identifier

WOS:000323239200003

ISSN

0165-1889

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