The intrinsic comparative dynamics of locally differentiable feedback Nash equilibria of autonomous and exponentially discounted infinite horizon differential games

    Authors

    M. R. Caputo;C. Ling

    Comments

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    Abbreviated Journal Title

    J. Econ. Dyn. Control

    Keywords

    Comparative dynamics; Differential games; Feedback Nash equilibria; COMPARATIVE STATICS; STICKY PRICES; ENVELOPE; DUOPOLY; INVESTMENT; OLIGOPOLY; BACK; Economics

    Abstract

    The comparative dynamics of locally differentiable feedback Nash equilibria are derived for the ubiquitous class of autonomous and exponentially discounted infinite horizon differential games. The resulting refutable implications are intrinsic to the said class of differential games, and thus form their basic, empirically testable, properties. Their relationship with extant results in the optimal control theory and the static game theory is discussed. Separability conditions are identified on the instantaneous payoff and transition functions under which the intrinsic comparative dynamics collapse, in form, to those in optimal control problems. Applications of the results to capital accumulation and sticky-price games are provided. (c) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

    Journal Title

    Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control

    Volume

    37

    Issue/Number

    10

    Publication Date

    1-1-2013

    Document Type

    Article

    Language

    English

    First Page

    1982

    Last Page

    1994

    WOS Identifier

    WOS:000323239200003

    ISSN

    0165-1889

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