Title
Divisible Good Auctions with Asymmetric Information: An Experimental Examination
Abbreviated Journal Title
J. Financ. Quant. Anal.
Keywords
UNIFORM-PRICE AUCTIONS; SELF-SERVING BIASES; MULTIUNIT AUCTIONS; EMPIRICAL-ANALYSIS; MARKET; OVERCONFIDENCE; COMPETITION; Business, Finance; Economics
Abstract
An experimental approach is used to compare bidding behavior and auction performance in uniform-price and discriminatory auctions when there is incomplete information concerning the common value of the auctioned good. In a symmetric information environment, the different auction formats provide the same average revenue. However, when information is asymmetric the discriminatory auction results in higher average revenue than the uniform-price auction. The volatility of revenue is higher in the uniform-price auctions in all treatments. The results, therefore, provide support for the use of the discriminatory format. Subject characteristics and measures of experience in recent auctions are found to be useful in explaining bidding behavior.
Journal Title
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
Volume
48
Issue/Number
4
Publication Date
1-1-2013
Document Type
Article
Language
English
First Page
1271
Last Page
1300
WOS Identifier
ISSN
0022-1090
Recommended Citation
"Divisible Good Auctions with Asymmetric Information: An Experimental Examination" (2013). Faculty Bibliography 2010s. 4428.
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/facultybib2010/4428
Comments
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