Title
Presidential Defense: Decisions and Strategies to Preserve the Status Quo
Abbreviated Journal Title
Polit. Res. Q.
Keywords
Congress; presidency; bureaucracy; divided government; CONGRESSIONAL INFLUENCE; POLITICAL CONTROL; DIVIDED GOVERNMENT; APPROVAL; BUREAUCRACY; DYNAMICS; SUPPORT; SUCCESS; POLICY; POWER; Political Science
Abstract
Theories of presidential success find that political disunity reduces the President's effectiveness by restricting his authority to generate new policies. We maintain that focusing solely on policy change neglects the influence exerted by the President when he defends his policy agenda by preventing unfavorable changes to the status quo. We develop a new theory of presidential success that predicts that certain political environments raise the resource costs to the President of policy change. During these times, the President shifts political resources to defending the status quo. We empirically test our predictions in both legislative and regulatory lawmaking, and find strong support for our theory.
Journal Title
Political Research Quarterly
Volume
67
Issue/Number
4
Publication Date
1-1-2014
Document Type
Article
Language
English
First Page
715
Last Page
728
WOS Identifier
ISSN
1065-9129
Recommended Citation
"Presidential Defense: Decisions and Strategies to Preserve the Status Quo" (2014). Faculty Bibliography 2010s. 5371.
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/facultybib2010/5371
Comments
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