Intrinsic Comparative Dynamics of Locally Differentiable Feedback Stackelberg Equilibria

    Authors

    M. R. Caputo;C. Ling

    Comments

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    Abbreviated Journal Title

    Dyn. Games Appl.

    Keywords

    Comparative dynamics; Differential games; Feedback Stackelberg; equilibria; POLLUTING NONRENEWABLE RESOURCES; STOCK EXTERNALITIES; PIGOUVIAN; TAXATION; STRATEGIES; MODEL; LOOP; Mathematics, Interdisciplinary Applications

    Abstract

    The intrinsic comparative dynamics of locally differentiable feedback Stackelberg equilibria are derived for the ubiquitous class of autonomous and exponentially discounted infinite horizon differential games. It is shown that the follower's intrinsic comparative dynamics agree in their form and qualitative properties with those of every player in a feedback Nash equilibrium, while those of the leader differ in form. The difference allows, in principle, an empirical test of the leader-follower role in a differential game. Separability conditions are identified on the instantaneous payoff and transition functions under which the intrinsic comparative dynamics of feedback Nash equilibria, feedback Stackelberg equilibria, and those in the corresponding optimal control problem are qualitatively identical.

    Journal Title

    Dynamic Games and Applications

    Volume

    5

    Issue/Number

    1

    Publication Date

    1-1-2015

    Document Type

    Article

    Language

    English

    First Page

    1

    Last Page

    25

    WOS Identifier

    WOS:000350042300001

    ISSN

    2153-0785

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