Title
Intrinsic Comparative Dynamics of Locally Differentiable Feedback Stackelberg Equilibria
Abbreviated Journal Title
Dyn. Games Appl.
Keywords
Comparative dynamics; Differential games; Feedback Stackelberg; equilibria; POLLUTING NONRENEWABLE RESOURCES; STOCK EXTERNALITIES; PIGOUVIAN; TAXATION; STRATEGIES; MODEL; LOOP; Mathematics, Interdisciplinary Applications
Abstract
The intrinsic comparative dynamics of locally differentiable feedback Stackelberg equilibria are derived for the ubiquitous class of autonomous and exponentially discounted infinite horizon differential games. It is shown that the follower's intrinsic comparative dynamics agree in their form and qualitative properties with those of every player in a feedback Nash equilibrium, while those of the leader differ in form. The difference allows, in principle, an empirical test of the leader-follower role in a differential game. Separability conditions are identified on the instantaneous payoff and transition functions under which the intrinsic comparative dynamics of feedback Nash equilibria, feedback Stackelberg equilibria, and those in the corresponding optimal control problem are qualitatively identical.
Journal Title
Dynamic Games and Applications
Volume
5
Issue/Number
1
Publication Date
1-1-2015
Document Type
Article
Language
English
First Page
1
Last Page
25
WOS Identifier
ISSN
2153-0785
Recommended Citation
"Intrinsic Comparative Dynamics of Locally Differentiable Feedback Stackelberg Equilibria" (2015). Faculty Bibliography 2010s. 6447.
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/facultybib2010/6447
Comments
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