Sharing the Rewards, Dividing the Costs? The Electoral Consequences of Social Pacts and Legislative Reform in Western Europe

    Authors

    K. Hamann; A. Johnston; A. Katsanidou; J. Kelly;P. H. Pollock

    Comments

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    Abbreviated Journal Title

    West Eur. Polit.

    Keywords

    WELFARE-STATE RETRENCHMENT; COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE; POLITICAL CONTEXT; BLAME AVOIDANCE; ACCOUNTABILITY; GLOBALIZATION; CONCERTATION; GOVERNMENT; PARTIES; ECONOMY; Political Science

    Abstract

    Do electoral pressures provide an explanation for why governments offer pacts to unions and employers rather than acting through legislation when faced with the need to pass potentially unpopular reforms to welfare policies, wages, and labour markets? This article addresses that question by analysing whether governments' pursuit of pacts affects their vote share and increases the probability that they gain re-election for 16 West European countries between 1980 and 2012. It is found that the presence of social pacts has a significant and positive effect on incumbents' vote shares at the next election and also results in a higher probability of re-election. These results are conditioned by government type: While all types of governments benefit electorally from pacts, the electoral penalties from the pursuit of unilateral legislation on policy reforms harm single-party majorities the most, minority governments moderately, and coalition majorities the least.

    Journal Title

    West European Politics

    Volume

    38

    Issue/Number

    1

    Publication Date

    1-1-2015

    Document Type

    Article

    Language

    English

    First Page

    206

    Last Page

    227

    WOS Identifier

    WOS:000343417500010

    ISSN

    0140-2382

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