Title

Sharing the Rewards, Dividing the Costs? The Electoral Consequences of Social Pacts and Legislative Reform in Western Europe

Authors

Authors

K. Hamann; A. Johnston; A. Katsanidou; J. Kelly;P. H. Pollock

Comments

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Abbreviated Journal Title

West Eur. Polit.

Keywords

WELFARE-STATE RETRENCHMENT; COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE; POLITICAL CONTEXT; BLAME AVOIDANCE; ACCOUNTABILITY; GLOBALIZATION; CONCERTATION; GOVERNMENT; PARTIES; ECONOMY; Political Science

Abstract

Do electoral pressures provide an explanation for why governments offer pacts to unions and employers rather than acting through legislation when faced with the need to pass potentially unpopular reforms to welfare policies, wages, and labour markets? This article addresses that question by analysing whether governments' pursuit of pacts affects their vote share and increases the probability that they gain re-election for 16 West European countries between 1980 and 2012. It is found that the presence of social pacts has a significant and positive effect on incumbents' vote shares at the next election and also results in a higher probability of re-election. These results are conditioned by government type: While all types of governments benefit electorally from pacts, the electoral penalties from the pursuit of unilateral legislation on policy reforms harm single-party majorities the most, minority governments moderately, and coalition majorities the least.

Journal Title

West European Politics

Volume

38

Issue/Number

1

Publication Date

1-1-2015

Document Type

Article

Language

English

First Page

206

Last Page

227

WOS Identifier

WOS:000343417500010

ISSN

0140-2382

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