Real Estate Agents, House Prices, and Liquidity

    Authors

    H. J. Munneke; J. T. L. Ooi; C. F. Sirmans;G. K. Turnbull

    Comments

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    Abbreviated Journal Title

    J. Real Estate Financ. Econ.

    Keywords

    Real estate agents; House prices; Liquidity; Moral hazard; BROKERAGE; MARKET; PERFORMANCE; UNCERTAINTY; COMPETITION; DEMAND; Business, Finance; Economics; Urban Studies

    Abstract

    Comparing agent-owner with agent-represented home sales illustrates that commission contracts lead to external agent moral hazard. Real estate developers are sophisticated sellers who can either use external agents or hire internal agents. The theory shows that neither scheme eliminates agent moral hazard. The empirical study of how the seller-agent relationship affects both price and liquidity in a simultaneous system concludes that external agents enjoy superior selling ability that offset moral hazard effects.

    Journal Title

    Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics

    Volume

    50

    Issue/Number

    1

    Publication Date

    1-1-2015

    Document Type

    Article

    Language

    English

    First Page

    1

    Last Page

    33

    WOS Identifier

    WOS:000348060400001

    ISSN

    0895-5638

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