Title

Real Estate Agents, House Prices, and Liquidity

Authors

Authors

H. J. Munneke; J. T. L. Ooi; C. F. Sirmans;G. K. Turnbull

Comments

Authors: contact us about adding a copy of your work at STARS@ucf.edu

Abbreviated Journal Title

J. Real Estate Financ. Econ.

Keywords

Real estate agents; House prices; Liquidity; Moral hazard; BROKERAGE; MARKET; PERFORMANCE; UNCERTAINTY; COMPETITION; DEMAND; Business, Finance; Economics; Urban Studies

Abstract

Comparing agent-owner with agent-represented home sales illustrates that commission contracts lead to external agent moral hazard. Real estate developers are sophisticated sellers who can either use external agents or hire internal agents. The theory shows that neither scheme eliminates agent moral hazard. The empirical study of how the seller-agent relationship affects both price and liquidity in a simultaneous system concludes that external agents enjoy superior selling ability that offset moral hazard effects.

Journal Title

Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics

Volume

50

Issue/Number

1

Publication Date

1-1-2015

Document Type

Article

DOI Link

http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11146-013-9452-x

Language

English

First Page

1

Last Page

33

WOS Identifier

WOS:000348060400001

ISSN

0895-5638

Recommended Citation

"Real Estate Agents, House Prices, and Liquidity" (2015). Faculty Bibliography 2010s. 6713.
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/facultybib2010/6713