Situationism versus Situationism

    Authors

    T. J. Rodgers;B. Warmke

    Comments

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    Abbreviated Journal Title

    Ethical Theory Moral Pract.

    Keywords

    Virtue Ethics; John Doris; Situationism; Character; Virtue; VIRTUE ETHICS; OBEDIENCE; CHARACTER; ATTRIBUTION; PSYCHOLOGY; RESISTANCE; Philosophy

    Abstract

    Most discussions of John Doris's situationism center on what can be called descriptive situationism, the claim that our folk usage of global personality and character traits in describing and predicting human behavior is empirically unsupported. Philosophers have not yet paid much attention to another central claim of situationism, which says that given that local traits are empirically supported, we can more successfully act in line with our moral values if, in our deliberation about what to do, we focus on our situation instead of on our moral character. Call this prescriptive situationism. In this paper, we will point toward a previously unrecognized tension between these two situationist theses and explore some ways for the situationist to address it.

    Journal Title

    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice

    Volume

    18

    Issue/Number

    1

    Publication Date

    1-1-2015

    Document Type

    Article

    Language

    English

    First Page

    9

    Last Page

    26

    WOS Identifier

    WOS:000348640100002

    ISSN

    1386-2820

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