Defining consciousness The importance of non-reflective self-awareness

    Authors

    S. Gallagher

    Comments

    Authors: contact us about adding a copy of your work at [email protected]

    Abbreviated Journal Title

    Pragmat. Cogn.

    Keywords

    blindsight; consciousness; higher-order theories; intentionality; non-reflective self-awareness; phenomenality; Linguistics; Language & Linguistics

    Abstract

    I review the problem of how to define consciousness. I suggest that rather than continuing that debate, we should turn to phenomenological description of experience to discover the common aspects of consciousness. In this way we can say that consciousness is characterized by intentionality, phenomenality, and non-reflective self-awareness. I explore this last characteristic in detail and I argue against higher-order representational theories of consciousness, with reference to blindsight and motor control processes.

    Journal Title

    Pragmatics & Cognition

    Volume

    18

    Issue/Number

    3

    Publication Date

    1-1-2010

    Document Type

    Article

    Language

    English

    First Page

    561

    Last Page

    569

    WOS Identifier

    WOS:000290968000005

    ISSN

    0929-0907

    Share

    COinS
     

    Accessibility Statement

    This item was created or digitized prior to April 24, 2027, or is a reproduction of legacy media created before that date. It is preserved in its original, unmodified state specifically for research, reference, or historical recordkeeping. In accordance with the ADA Title II Final Rule, the University Libraries provides accessible versions of archival materials upon request. To request an accommodation for this item, please submit an accessibility request form.