Title

Managerial rights, use of investment banks, and the wealth effects for acquiring firms' shareholders

Authors

Authors

W. S. Wang;A. M. Whyte

Comments

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Abbreviated Journal Title

J. Bank Financ.

Keywords

Investment banking; Mergers and acquisitions; Shareholder rights; Wealth; effects; Managerial rights; INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; FINANCIAL; INTERMEDIATION; UNDERWRITER REPUTATION; STOCKHOLDER WEALTH; EMPIRICAL-ANALYSIS; WEAK INSTRUMENTS; CEO COMPENSATION; STOCK RETURNS; PERFORMANCE; Business, Finance; Economics

Abstract

We examine the relation between managerial rights in acquiring firms and the decision to use an investment bank in merger and acquisition deals, and explore whether this relation impacts the wealth effects for acquiring firms' shareholders. We find that acquiring firms whose managers have relatively strong rights are more likely to use investment banks to facilitate deals and are more likely to use reputable banks. The wealth effects to acquiring firms are inversely related to the use of investment banks when managerial rights are relatively strong. However, the wealth loss is mitigated when acquiring firms use reputable investment banks. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Journal Title

Journal of Banking & Finance

Volume

34

Issue/Number

1

Publication Date

1-1-2010

Document Type

Article

Language

English

First Page

44

Last Page

54

WOS Identifier

WOS:000272113900005

ISSN

0378-4266

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