Title
Managerial rights, use of investment banks, and the wealth effects for acquiring firms' shareholders
Abbreviated Journal Title
J. Bank Financ.
Keywords
Investment banking; Mergers and acquisitions; Shareholder rights; Wealth; effects; Managerial rights; INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; FINANCIAL; INTERMEDIATION; UNDERWRITER REPUTATION; STOCKHOLDER WEALTH; EMPIRICAL-ANALYSIS; WEAK INSTRUMENTS; CEO COMPENSATION; STOCK RETURNS; PERFORMANCE; Business, Finance; Economics
Abstract
We examine the relation between managerial rights in acquiring firms and the decision to use an investment bank in merger and acquisition deals, and explore whether this relation impacts the wealth effects for acquiring firms' shareholders. We find that acquiring firms whose managers have relatively strong rights are more likely to use investment banks to facilitate deals and are more likely to use reputable banks. The wealth effects to acquiring firms are inversely related to the use of investment banks when managerial rights are relatively strong. However, the wealth loss is mitigated when acquiring firms use reputable investment banks. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Journal Title
Journal of Banking & Finance
Volume
34
Issue/Number
1
Publication Date
1-1-2010
Document Type
Article
Language
English
First Page
44
Last Page
54
WOS Identifier
ISSN
0378-4266
Recommended Citation
"Managerial rights, use of investment banks, and the wealth effects for acquiring firms' shareholders" (2010). Faculty Bibliography 2010s. 921.
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/facultybib2010/921
Comments
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