Instability in presidential and parliamentary systems : the cases of Costa Rica and Pakistan
Current Political Science literature tends to heavily favor Parliamentary systems for newly democratizing countries. Most Political Scientists argue that Presidential systems are inherently unstable and are unable to effectively deal with major political and economic problems that arise in government. It has been argued that unlike Parliamentary systems, Presidential systems', in-built rigidities leave few viable mechanisms to resolve crises that arise in government. This lack of flexibility then leads to political instability, and eventually democratic breakdown. In my thesis I dispute this argument using two countries, one Presidential(Costa Rica), and one Parliamentary(Pakistan). I argue that it is not Presidential systems per se that cause political instability, rather there are other factors, all together-independent of regime type, that are the cause of unstable governments. I will also show that Parliamentary systems might themselves be incapable of resolving economic and political crises, while conversely, some Presidential regimes have proven to be very successful with little political instability and considerable levels of ·economic and social development.
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Wilson, Bruce M.
Bachelor of Arts (B.A.)
College of Arts and Sciences
Arts and Sciences -- Dissertations, Academic;Dissertations, Academic -- Arts and Sciences;Costa Rica -- Politics and government;Democracy;Pakistan -- Politics and government
Length of Campus-only Access
Honors in the Major Thesis
Khurshid, Kamran, "Instability in presidential and parliamentary systems : the cases of Costa Rica and Pakistan" (1999). HIM 1990-2015. 145.