Defending the Personhood of Artificial Intelligence
In this thesis I discuss issues involving artificial intelligence and personhood. "Personhood" is a term we often attribute to human beings. My goal in this thesis is to define personhood, show how personhood can be present in varying degrees, and finally show why artificial intelligence may be candidates for personhood in the future. More specifically, in this thesis I will discuss five concepts of personhood. These are the metaphysical concept of personhood, the moral concept of personhood, the moral agent concept of personhood, the legal concept of personhood, and the religious concept of personhood. After discussing these concepts, a feasible definition will be given for what it means to be a person. Following this, the practical and philosophical problems that currently prevent artificial intelligence from being considered persons will be discussed along with some proposed solutions to these problems. Once these problems are dealt with we may have serious candidates for personhood. If artificial intelligence qualifies as having personhood then we will have some ethical issues to address. This thesis will discuss these ethical issues in the final chapter by giving reasons for treating artificial intelligence ethically if they should qualify as persons. This point will be defended from a Kantian standpoint using his categorical imperative requiring respect for persons.
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Bachelor of Arts (B.A.)
College of Arts and Sciences
Arts and Sciences -- Dissertations, Academic; Dissertations, Academic -- Arts and Sciences
Length of Campus-only Access
Honors in the Major Thesis
Persell, Jennifer, "Defending the Personhood of Artificial Intelligence" (2004). HIM 1990-2015. 395.