Title

Spatial Aspects Of Pollution Control When Pollutants Have Synergistic Effects: Evidence From A Differential Game With Asymmetric Information

Abstract

An asymmetric information differential game is utilized to explore the normative issue: should environmental regulations be carried out locally or centrally? Modeling localities as having superior information, or more leniency to adopt new environmental regulations, results from simulations indicate that local control Pareto dominates central control when enough synergism occurs between pollutants. In contrast to predictions made by those responsible for framing US environmental policy in the 1960s, these findings suggest an expanded future role for local governments in providing environmental protection, particularly in light of Tiebout's (1956) analysis of consumers who 'vote with their feet' for their preferred basket of public services.

Publication Date

11-1-1999

Publication Title

Annals of Regional Science

Volume

33

Issue

4

Number of Pages

439-452

Document Type

Article

Personal Identifier

scopus

DOI Link

https://doi.org/10.1007/s001680050114

Socpus ID

0033399565 (Scopus)

Source API URL

https://api.elsevier.com/content/abstract/scopus_id/0033399565

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